


John W. Lainhart IV
Inspector General

Office of Inspector General
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-9990

MEMORANDUM

TO: Wilson Livingood
Sergeant at Arms

FROM: 
John W. Lainhart IV
Inspector General

DATE: December 16, 1998

SUBJECT: Audit Report – Continued Improvements In The Management And Operations Of
The Office Of The Sergeant At Arms (Report No. 98-SAA-17)

This is our final report on the management and operations of the Sergeant at Arms (SAA). The objective of the audit was to provide an operational assessment of your office during the 105th Congress. Specifically, we examined the management and direction of each SAA office, controls over administrative functions, and program procedures and controls. We found that your office has initiated continued improvements in the management and operations of the critical functions supporting the U.S. House of Representatives. Also, we found that the changes you have initiated have led to continued improvements in the conditions reported in our previous audit report, entitled *Opportunities Exist To Improve The Management Of The Office Of The Sergeant At Arms* (Report No. 96-SAA-13, dated December 31, 1996). However, we did identify two issues needing management attention and made two recommendations for improvement.

In response to our November 2, 1998 draft report, your office concurred with our findings and recommendations. The November 6, 1998 management response is incorporated in this final report and included in its entirety as an appendix. The corrective actions planned by your office are appropriate and, when fully implemented, should adequately respond to the recommendations. Further, the milestone date provided for implementing corrective actions appears reasonable. However, we ask that you provide us with target completion dates for all the prior audit recommendations listed in the Exhibit (see Pages 15 and 17), which have not been fully implemented or otherwise resolved. Please respond by January 15, 1999.

We appreciate the courtesy and cooperation extended to us by your staff. If you have any questions or require additional information regarding this report, please call me or Robert B. Frey III at (202) 226-1250.

Attachment

cc: Speaker of the House
Majority Leader of the House
Minority Leader of the House
Chairman, Committee on House Oversight
Ranking Minority Member, Committee on House Oversight
Members, Committee on House Oversight

Continued Improvements In The Management And Operations Of The Office Of The Sergeant At Arms

Report No. 98-SAA-17
December 16, 1998

RESULTS IN BRIEF

CONCLUSIONS

Since our prior report, *Opportunities Exist To Improve The Management Of The Sergeant At Arms* (Report No. 96-SAA-13), dated December 31, 1996, the Sergeant at Arms (SAA) has continued to work towards further improving Office of the SAA operations and thus, towards achieving the Office of the SAA mission. Specifically, the SAA has made significant improvements in several Human Resources (HR) areas. During the course of this audit, we conducted interviews with both management and staff within the Office of the SAA. Based on these interviews we determined the Office of the SAA to be an organization that continually strives to achieve a high quality management process--encompassing competent leadership, goal setting, planning, communications, and morale. As a result, employee satisfaction appears to be high. Staff have been trained to a high standard in areas of security and intelligence, and the implementation of staff training programs, including cross training between Office of the SAA functions, contributes to further enhance staff morale. In addition, management has worked to develop an *esprit de corps* within the Office of the SAA workforce, using various initiatives, which include the "employee of the month" program and the provision of uniforms for parking and tour guide staff.

While these HR related improvements have significantly enhanced the performance of the Office of the SAA, additional actions are needed to further strengthen Office of the SAA capabilities. Specifically, there are no House-wide policies and procedures for the handling of security clearances and classified documentation. Also, there is no permanent facility or Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF) available to the Office of the SAA in which to discuss or view classified information. Therefore, there is a risk that information could be overheard, mislaid, or made available to persons who do not have appropriate clearances. The SAA has submitted a proposal to the Committee on House Oversight (CHO) to establish a House Office of Security under the control of the Office of the SAA. This proposal needs to be amended to include a request for a permanent facility and aggressively pursued by the SAA.

In addition, a designated secure waiting area for visiting dignitaries and other high ranking officials needs to be established. During the period January 1, 1997 to September 30, 1998, the Office of the SAA planned and participated in a total of 202 high ranking foreign dignitary visits, as well as a significant number of visits from high-ranking domestic officials. The SAA's own office has often been used as a waiting area for these visitors, which caused disruptions within the SAA office. In addition, the Office of the SAA used a room provided by the Architect of the

Capitol. However, that room was not always available and the room was not designed to accommodate visiting dignitaries. Alternatively, visitors have used a Member's office if invited to do so by the particular Member. However, before the visitor may make use of such an office, the Office of the SAA staff must perform a security check in the interests of the visitor's safety. Finally, there is an associated prestige issue with the House as a host to visiting dignitaries. The Office of the SAA's efforts to ensure that arrangements are adequate are impaired by the fact that no permanent space has been made available for Office of the SAA use as a waiting room. The SAA needs to formally request the necessary facilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Sergeant at Arms (1) amend the current House Security Office proposal to include the requirement for an appropriate permanent facility to be used as a SCIF for classified discussions and viewing of classified documents and actively pursue approval from the CHO for the proposal and (2) develop and submit a formal proposal to the CHO requesting that an appropriate permanent facility and sufficient funds be provided to properly accommodate visiting dignitaries, and that this facility be placed under the control of the Office of the SAA.

MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

On November 6, 1998, the SAA concurred with the findings and recommendations in this report (see Appendix). According to the response, the SAA agreed to immediately (1) submit a revised proposal to the July 22, 1997 memorandum to the CHO outlining the need for a House Security Office and reflecting the importance of acquiring a SCIF to support the integral requirements of the House Security Office and (2) draft and submit a proposal to the CHO requesting the designation of an appropriate waiting room for visiting foreign dignitaries and funding to support the integral requirements associated with hosting visiting foreign dignitaries in this space. The milestone date for completion of both actions is November 30, 1998.

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL COMMENTS

The actions planned by the SAA are responsive to the issues identified and, when fully implemented, should satisfy the intent of these recommendations. The milestone date provided for the actions appears reasonable.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Background

Election of the Sergeant at Arms (SAA). The Rules of the House of Representatives effective for the 105th Congress (dated January 1, 1998) detail the duties of the Speaker of the House (Rule I), the Election of Officers (Rule II), the duties of the Office of the SAA (Rule IV) and the duties of the Standing Committees, including the Committee on House Oversight (Rule X 1.(h) and 4.(d)(1)).

Rule II for the election of Officers states:

“There shall be elected by a viva voce vote, at the commencement of each Congress, to continue in office until their successors are chosen and qualified, a Clerk, Sergeant at Arms, Chief Administrative Officer, and Chaplain, each of whom shall take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States, and for the true and faithful discharge of the duties of his office to the best of his knowledge and ability, and to keep the secrets of the House; and each shall appoint all of the employees of his department provided for by law. The Clerk, Sergeant at Arms, and Chief Administrative Officer may be removed by the House or by the Speaker.”

Thus, the SAA is chosen, qualified, and submitted to the House for a voice vote. The SAA may be removed either by the entire House or by the Speaker.

Role of the Committee on House Oversight (CHO). The CHO has certain responsibilities detailed in Rule X 1.(h) regarding the SAA, including:

- 1.(h)(1) “Appropriations from accounts for committee salaries and expenses (except for the Committee on Appropriations), House Information Systems, and allowances and expenses of Members, House Officers and administrative offices of the House.”
- 1.(h)(2) “Auditing and settling of all accounts described in subparagraph (1).”
- 1.(h)(3) “Employment of persons by the House, including clerks for Members and committees, and reporters of debates.”
- 1.(h)(6) “Expenditures of accounts described in subparagraph (1).”
- 1.(h)(13) “Measures relating to services to the House, including the House Restaurant, parking facilities and administration of the House Office Buildings and of the House wing of the Capitol.”
- 1.(h)(16) “Measures relating to the compensation, retirement and other benefits of the Members, officers, and employees of the Congress.”
- 4.(d)(1)(B) “Providing policy direction for, and oversight of, the Clerk, Sergeant at Arms, Chief Administrator Officer, and Inspector General.”

Despite the inability of the CHO to directly or indirectly hire or remove the SAA, the CHO has direct oversight of the SAA. The CHO also has the responsibility to oversee appropriations, personnel decisions, and expenditures of the SAA.

The CHO provides the following critical functions in relation to the Officers of the House:

- The three Officers of the House must work together on several administrative areas including: finance and accounting issues; purchasing and procurement issues; technology issues; issues relating to media and support services; and human resources (HR) issues. The CHO provides for the oversight to ensure that the three Officers work together on key cross organizational issues.
- Rule X 1.(h)(2) provides for the CHO to oversee the audit activities of the House. As such, the CHO functions as an Audit Committee to ensure that the House is accountable for its public funding.
- The CHO ensures that the goals and objectives of the Members in general, and of the Speaker in particular, are met to the extent appropriate, through the activities of the House Officers.
- The CHO operates as a bipartisan committee to provide oversight to each of the Officers. The Rules of the 105th Congress continue the initiative of the 104th Congress which replaced the House Administration Committee with the Committee on House Oversight. The new name of the Committee reflects the change in philosophy of the Committee from administration by elected officials to oversight of professional administrators by elected officials.

Role of the SAA. The SAA has certain responsibilities detailed in Rule IV regarding its interaction with the CHO and Speaker, including:

5. “In addition to any other reports required by the Speaker or the Committee on House Oversight, the Sergeant at Arms shall report to the Committee on House Oversight not later than 45 days following the close of each semiannual period ending June 30 or on December 31 on the financial and operational status of each function under the jurisdiction of the Sergeant at Arms. Each report shall include financial statements, a description or explanation of current operations, the implementation of new policies and procedures, and future plans for each function.”
6. “The Sergeant at Arms shall fully cooperate with the appropriate offices and persons in the performance of reviews and audits of financial records and administrative operations.”

Thus, the SAA has a responsibility to provide the CHO an accounting of its operations as part of the oversight by the CHO.

The mission of the Office of the SAA. The mission of the Office of the SAA is to ensure the safety and security of Members, House staff, and the public on Capitol Hill and ensure that protocol and tradition are followed with respect to the Legislative body and its Members.

The main responsibilities of the Office of the SAA are to (1) oversee security on the House floor, gallery, and parking, (2) provide security to the Congressional Leadership, Members of Congress, and (3) ensure physical security of the Capitol and House Office Buildings and garages. The SAA has approximately 80 staff, with an operating budget for Fiscal Year 1998 estimated at \$3,564,000. The Office of the SAA is comprised of the following six divisions:

- **SAA Immediate Office.** This office is responsible for the management and oversight of Office of the SAA operations.
- **Police Services.** Police Services division is responsible for coordinating the security of House of Representatives with the U.S. Capitol Police.
- **Chamber Security.** Chamber Security controls access to the House floor and gallery. The office also provides a messenger service to Members while they are on the House floor, relaying messages from staff, constituents, and others.
- **House Garages and Parking Security.** The Office of House Garages and Parking Security is responsible for the safety and security of vehicles and pedestrians in all House garage and parking areas.
- **Special Events and Protocol.** This office coordinates and ensures security arrangements for formal events (e.g., visiting foreign dignitaries) within the Capitol and House Office Buildings, and formal events conducted off-site, involving traveling delegations of Members of the House.
- **Identification Services.** This office provides identification cards to the spouses and immediate family of Members, permanent and temporary staff, interns, pages, liaison offices, and vendors.

Status of significant Office of the SAA activities. Since our prior report, entitled *Opportunities Exist To Improve The Management Of The Sergeant At Arms* (Report No. 96-SAA-13, dated December 31, 1996), the Office of the SAA organization has continued to work towards further improving Office of the SAA operations and thus, towards achieving the Office of the SAA mission. Specifically, the SAA has made significant improvements in several HR areas. During the course of this audit, we conducted interviews with both management and staff within the Office of the SAA. Based on these interviews we determined the Office of the SAA to be an organization that continually strives to achieve a high quality management process--encompassing competent leadership, goal setting, planning, communications, and morale. As a result, employee satisfaction appears to be high. Staff have been trained to a high standard in areas of security and intelligence, and the implementation of staff training programs, including cross training between Office of the SAA functions, contributes to further enhance staff morale. In addition, management has worked to develop an *esprit de corps* within the Office of the SAA workforce, using various initiatives, which include the "employee of the month" program and the provision of uniforms for parking and tour guide staff.

Objective, Scope, And Methodology

The objective of our review of the Office of the SAA was to provide an operational assessment of the Office of the SAA during the 105th Congress. We conducted the work during the months of September through November 1998. We examined the adequacy and effectiveness of the operations of the Office of the SAA in the following areas:

1. Management and direction of each office.
2. Administrative controls.
3. Program procedures and controls over Office of the SAA operations, including the SAA Immediate Office, Police Services, Chamber Security, House Garages and Parking Security, Special Events and Protocol, and Identification Services.

We conducted our review in accordance with *Government Auditing Standards*, issued by the Comptroller General of the United States. Our review included the following procedures:

- Entrance interview with the SAA and Deputy SAA.
- Interviews and walk-through tours with each Office of the SAA division head and other Office of the SAA staff; and
- Collection and analysis of documents related to operations, organization, staffing, policies and procedures, performance standards, and prior reviews and audits.

Internal Controls

We assessed the control environment, including those over the management and direction of each SAA office, administrative functions, and programs. Weaknesses in the internal control environment are described in the “Findings and Recommendations” section of this report.

Prior Audit Coverage

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) has conducted a number of audits of the Office of the SAA. The Exhibit of this report summarizes the current status of all prior Office of the Clerk audit recommendations which had not been previously implemented. These recommendations are contained in the following reports that were issued during the 104th and 105th Congresses: OIG audit report, entitled *Parking Operations Would Benefit From Further Improvements* (Report No. 97-SAA-01, dated February 13, 1997). This audit evaluated the effectiveness of House parking operations. We followed up on four recommendations from this report. We found that two were fully implemented, one was otherwise resolved, and one was partially implemented.

OIG audit report, entitled *Opportunities Exists To Improve The Management Of The Sergeant At Arms* (Report No. 96-SAA-13, dated December 31, 1996). This audit provided an operational assessment of the Office of the SAA during the 104th Congress. We followed up on three

recommendations from this report. We found that one was fully implemented, one was otherwise resolved, and one was partially implemented.

OIG audit report, entitled *Poor Planning, Questionable Contracting, And Numerous Internal Control Deficiencies Undermine Integrity and Usefulness of House Identification System* (Report No. 96-SAA-03, dated March 5, 1996). The objectives of this audit were to (1) obtain an overview of the House Identification (ID) system, (2) determine the effectiveness of management and application controls associated with the House ID system and services, and (3) determine whether the system satisfied the needs of the House. We followed up on four recommendations from this report. We found that three were fully implemented and one was otherwise resolved.

OIG audit report, entitled *Opportunities Exist To Improve Resource Utilization In The Office Of The Sergeant At Arms* (Report No. 95-SAA-14, dated July 18, 1995). The objective of the audit was to determine if the House Chamber Security, House Parking, and Identification Office efficiently used staff resources. We followed up on two recommendations from this report. We found that one was fully implemented and one was otherwise resolved.

OIG audit report, entitled *The House Needs To Integrate Planning And Financial Management To Improve Productivity, Performance, And Accountability* (Report No. 95-CCS-12, dated July 18, 1995). This audit assessed opportunities to improve planning and financial management. We followed up on two recommendations from this report. We found that both of these recommendations were partially implemented.

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II. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Finding A: A Security Office Needs To Be Established

There are no House-wide policies and procedures for the administration of security clearances and handling of classified documents. Therefore, there is a risk that classified information will be made available to persons who do not have the appropriate clearances. In addition, there is also no permanent facility assigned for conducting classified discussions and to review classified documents. In contrast, the Senate Security Office has several SCIFs under its control for these purposes. The Office of the SAA, Capitol Police, Members, and Committees conduct classified discussions and view classified materials at least several times a week. However, there are no designated permanent Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) available on an ongoing basis to provide to these groups. Thus, there is a risk that information could be overheard, mislaid, or made available to persons who do not have appropriate clearances.

In July 1997, the SAA developed and submitted a proposal to the CHO to establish a House Office of Security under the control of the Office of the SAA. In September 1997, the CHO submitted questions to the SAA regarding this proposal. The SAA subsequently responded to the CHO questions in June 1998. Currently, the proposal is pending approval by the CHO. The proposal provides two organizational options—centralized and decentralized—and the associated staffing requirements for each option, sample position descriptions, and a security manual with the policies and procedures necessary for implementing and maintaining a House-wide security program. However, the proposal does not include a request for a permanent SCIF. The SAA needs to amend the proposal to include a request for a permanent SCIF and aggressively pursue approval of this proposal through the CHO.

Centralizing security policies and procedures is a best practices

Many Federal agencies have established policies and procedures for providing security clearances based on background investigations for employees and contractors in sensitive positions within their agencies. In addition, some agencies, like the Department of Defense (DOD), have policies and procedures for handling of classified documents and conducting classified discussions. Good security policies and procedures help ensure that personnel entrusted with classified information (1) are properly cleared to access such information, (2) understand security procedures to protect the information, and (3) have access to safe facilities where they can discuss classified information.

The House has no centralized process to handle security clearances, classified documents, and conducting classified discussions

Security Clearances. There is no centralized process within the House to issue and maintain security clearances. In some cases, the requests for clearances are sent to the Office of the SAA and then routed to the U.S. Capitol Police for processing by appropriate Federal agencies such as DOD. In other cases, the requests are handled by House committees which contact Federal agencies directly for processing. This de-centralized process lacks a number of key controls over clearances. Specifically, it does not provide:

- Criteria for positions needing security clearances, the level of security required for specific positions (i.e., designation of sensitive positions), and the associated type of background required for each position;
- Limitations associated with each level of clearance (e.g., positions with “Secret” clearances cannot view “Top Secret” documents);
- Requirements for updating investigations and clearances;
- Policies and procedures for initiating, coordinating, and maintaining security clearances and background investigation which must be adopted House-wide;
- A clearinghouse to (1) monitor the need for clearances, (2) update or terminate clearances, and (3) access clearance information; and
- Training for personnel with clearances so they are familiar with security procedures.

Without these controls, the House cannot be assured that only valid clearances are issued, personnel are familiar with security procedures, and classified documents are only accessed by appropriately authorized personnel. Delays have occurred in transferring classified documents from Federal agencies because there has been a need to verify clearances for House personnel and the information has not been readily available.

Classified Documents. There are no House-wide policies or procedures or central office for the issuance, handling, and storage of classified documents. Instead, each House office and committee handles classified documents according to their own policies and procedures, or those of the Federal agency providing the documents.

Under the current system, classified documents are delivered directly to House offices, primarily House committees. For example, DOD delivers classified materials to the Committee on House Appropriations every day and to other House committees as required. When these documents are accepted by the recipient, they become the property of that office. The documents are stored in whatever facilities are available to the recipient. This current system is not conducive to good security in that it does not ensure:

- Consistent policies and procedures for users to follow in receiving, safeguarding, transmitting or transferring classified documents;
- A clearinghouse for (1) properly classifying documents and (2) tracking and accounting for classified documents;
- Storage facilities where documents can be fully protected; and
- Security briefings for personnel who receive or return classified documents.

Without adequate protection over classified documents, there is no assurance that all documents are accounted for, stored properly, and that personnel know what is expected of them in handling documents.

Designated Areas for Classified Discussions. Members, committees, the Capitol Police, and the Office of the SAA conduct discussions involving classified information several times a week. These discussions are conducted in SCIFs under the control of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence when they are available. However, they are not readily available to other House

offices, because they are frequently in use by that committee. There are no designated permanent SCIFs available on an ongoing basis to other House offices, similar to the Senate—the Senate Security Office controls several SCIFs that are made available to their Members, committees, and other Senate offices. Thus, there is a risk that House staff may be discussing confidential matters in unsecured areas.

The House needs a Security Office

The House has not established a Security Office responsible for establishing and implementing policies and procedures related to security clearances, classified documents, and conducting classified discussions. However, the SAA submitted a detailed proposal to the CHO in July 1997 requesting the establishment of a House Security Office, similar to the Office of Senate Security, under the Office of the SAA. The proposal provided two organizational options—centralized and decentralized—and the associated staffing requirements for each option. The proposal also provided sample position descriptions. In addition, the proposal provided a security manual with the policies and procedures necessary for implementing and maintaining a House-wide security program. The policy manual covered requirements for (1) personnel security including the initiation, processing, and maintenance of security clearances, (2) handling of classified information, and (3) conducting classified meetings and discussions. In September 1997, the CHO submitted questions to the SAA regarding the proposal. The SAA subsequently responded to the CHO questions in June 1998. However, the proposal does not include a request for a permanent SCIF. The SAA needs to amend the proposal to include a request for a permanent SCIF and aggressively pursue approval of this proposal through the CHO.

Recommendation

We recommend the Sergeant at Arms amend the current House Security Office proposal to include the requirement for an appropriate permanent facility to be used as a SCIF for classified discussions and viewing of classified documents and actively pursue approval from the CHO for the proposal.

Management Response

On November 6, 1998, the Office of the SAA concurred with this finding and recommendation (see Appendix). According to the response, the Office of the SAA agreed to immediately submit a revised proposal to the July 22, 1997 memorandum to the CHO outlining the need for a House Security Office and reflecting the importance of acquiring a SCIF to support the integral requirements of the House Security Office. The milestone date for completion is November 30, 1998.

Office of Inspector General Comments

The action planned is responsive to the issue identified and, when fully implemented, should satisfy the intent of the recommendation. Furthermore, the milestone date for completing the action appears reasonable.

Finding B: A Designated Secure Dignitaries’ Waiting Area Needs To Be Established

During the period January 1, 1997 to September 30, 1998, the Office of the SAA planned and participated in a total of 202 foreign dignitary visits, as well as a significant number of visits from high-ranking domestic officials. The SAA’s own office has often been used as a waiting area for these visitors, which caused disruptions within the SAA office. In addition, the Office of the SAA used a room provided by the Architect of the Capitol. However, that room was not always available and the room was not designed to accommodate visiting dignitaries. Alternatively, visitors have used a Member’s office if invited to do so by the particular Member. However, before the visitor may make use of such an office, the Office of the SAA staff must perform a security check in the interests of the visitor’s safety. Finally, there is an associated prestige issue with the House as a host to visiting dignitaries. The SAA’s efforts to ensure that arrangements are adequate are impaired by the fact that no permanent space has been made available for Office of the SAA use as a waiting room. The SAA needs to formally request the necessary facilities.

One of the key duties assigned to the Office of the SAA is to ensure that the security arrangements for visiting officials are adequate, and that an appropriate waiting area is provided while those officials are visiting the House. These duties include the coordination of events and dissemination of information to ensure that the visitor’s safety is maximized. The Office of the SAA collates information prior to a visit, including data on terrorism threats and other associated issues. This information is shared between Office of the SAA staff and the Capitol Police, who then work together to provide adequate protection.

The visitors include foreign and domestic dignitaries. Examples include the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the Crown Prince of the United Arab Emirates, and the President of the United States. Between January 1, 1997 to September 30, 1998, the Office of the SAA provided security and facilities for 202 high-ranking foreign dignitaries. In addition, the Office of the SAA supported a significant number of visits from high ranking domestic dignitaries and lower ranking foreign and domestic officials.




Figure: Analysis of visiting foreign dignitaries during the period January 1, 1997 to September 30, 1998 (Source: SAA semi-annual reports).

The SAA's efforts to ensure that arrangements are adequate are impaired by the fact that no permanent space has been made available for Office of the SAA use as a waiting room. The SAA's personal office is often used as a waiting area, which causes disruptions within the office. Alternatively, visitors use a Member's office at that Member's invitation. However, before the visitor may make use of a Member's office, the Office of the SAA staff must perform a security check in the interests of the visitor's safety. There is also a waiting room in the Capitol, under the control of the Architect of the Capitol, which is not always available and is planned to be used as part of the proposed Capitol Visitors' Center.

There is also an associated prestige issue with the House as a host to visiting dignitaries, and none of the rooms being used are designed to accommodate visiting dignitaries. An appropriate waiting room for dignitaries would normally require telephones, a fax machine, and accommodations for conducting small meetings. In addition, the decor and furnishings of the waiting room should be appropriate to ensure the comfort of visiting dignitaries. It would also need to be easily secured. It may be practical to locate such a waiting room close to the SAA offices, where Office of the SAA staff can be readily available.

The Office of the SAA has taken on this function, having developed a mission statement which encompasses visiting dignitaries, but has not sought to formally request the necessary facilities by way of a formal proposal specifying needs.

Recommendation

We recommend that the Sergeant at Arms develop and submit a formal proposal to the CHO requesting that an appropriate permanent facility and sufficient funds be provided to properly accommodate visiting dignitaries, and that this facility be placed under the control of the Office of the SAA.

Management Response

On November 6, 1998, the Office of the SAA concurred with this finding and recommendation (see Appendix). According to the response, the Office of the SAA agreed to immediately draft and submit a proposal to the CHO requesting the designation of an appropriate waiting room for visiting foreign dignitaries and funding to support the integral requirements associated with hosting visiting foreign dignitaries in this space. The milestone date for completion is November 30, 1998.

Office of Inspector General Comments

The action planned is responsive to the issue identified and, when fully implemented, should satisfy the intent of the recommendation. Furthermore, the milestone date for completing the action appears reasonable.

EXHIBIT

Status Of Implementation Of Prior Audit Report Recommendations

Recommendation Number	RECOMMENDATIONS ACTIONS COMPLETED TO DATE ACTIONS NEEDED FOR CLOSURE	STATUS TARGET DATE
Audit Report No. 97-SAA-01, entitled <i>Parking Operations Would Benefit From Further Improvements</i>, dated February 13, 1997:		
1	<p>RECOMMENDATION: Direct parking management to more uniformly enforce established Parking Rules regarding the proper use of Congressional License Tags and displaying of positive identification for admittance to garages and lots.</p> <p>ACTIONS COMPLETED TO DATE: All persons entering the parking areas are required to show their House ID. Members are identified by their license plates whereas all other parking permits have a hologram on the tag. All permits for which replacements have been issued are maintained on a "hot list"; if any cars are seen with a tag which is on the hot list the police are called in to intervene. The parking attendants have also begun to check the permits hanging in cars to the information listed on a spreadsheet which contains the make, model, year, etc. of the car to which the permit was issued. For any cars which do not match the spreadsheet info, the police are called in to intervene.</p>	Actions Completed
2	<p>RECOMMENDATION: Develop a proposal, for approval by the Committee on House Oversight (CHO), to require former Members to obtain temporary parking permits.</p> <p>ACTIONS COMPLETED TO DATE: Former Members must show their former Member ID upon entrance to the parking facilities and must leave their old Member plate visible in the car to be easily identified.</p>	Otherwise Resolved
3	<p>RECOMMENDATION: Review whether central pedestrian entrances for garages are feasible.</p> <p>ACTIONS COMPLETED TO DATE: The Office of the SAA conducted a survey to determine whether central pedestrian entrances were feasible. After consultation with the CHO, it was determined that pedestrians would continue to have access at all entrances. However, the office is undertaking a comprehensive security survey which addresses this issue again.</p> <p>ACTIONS NEEDED FOR CLOSURE: Complete the comprehensive security survey (which is currently underway).</p>	Some Progress 12/31/98
4	<p>RECOMMENDATION: Establish an official speed limit for all parking facilities which is uniformly posted and enforced.</p> <p>ACTIONS COMPLETED TO DATE: An official speed limit of 10 mph was established. Signs are posted in the parking facilities and the speed limit is enforced.</p>	Actions Completed
Audit Report No. 96-SAA-13, entitled <i>Opportunities Exist To Improve The Management Of The Sergeant At Arms</i>, dated December 31, 1996:		
A	<p>RECOMMENDATION: Prepare a proposal, for approval by the CHO, based upon one of the following options: (1) pay Chamber Security Aides on an hourly basis, with overtime accrued after a 40-hour workweek, (2) pay Chamber Security Aides on an hourly basis, with overtime accrued after an 8-hour day, (3) reduce the "Belo" agreements to amounts more</p>	Otherwise Resolved

EXHIBIT

Recommendation Number	RECOMMENDATIONS ACTIONS COMPLETED TO DATE ACTIONS NEEDED FOR CLOSURE	STATUS TARGET DATE
	consistent with the workload, and re-evaluate "Belo" calculations biannually. ACTIONS COMPLETED TO DATE: The Office of the SAA investigated methods of varying the contracts of employment. However, the employees are union members subject to a collective agreement. In addition, the SAA needs to retain the existing staff who are familiar with their responsibilities. After consideration, it was decided that the expense of attempting to vary contracts of employment subject to a collective agreement outweighs the savings that could be made by varying 20 employees' contracts.	
OM1	RECOMMENDATION: Work with the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and the Clerk to establish a consistent system for tracking and managing the implementation of prior audit recommendations. ACTIONS COMPLETED TO DATE: The Office of the SAA is currently using the tracking system provided by the Office of Inspector General (OIG).	Actions Completed
OM2	RECOMMENDATION: We recommend that the Sergeant at Arms establish target dates for all unimplemented prior audit recommendations. ACTIONS COMPLETED TO DATE: Most audit recommendations have been acted upon. ACTIONS NEEDED FOR CLOSURE: Provide target dates for the remaining open recommendations.	Substantial Progress To be determined (TBD)
Audit Report No. 96-SAA-03, entitled <i>Poor Planning, Questionable Contracting, And Numerous Internal Control Deficiencies Undermine Integrity and Usefulness of House Identification System</i>, dated March 5, 1996:		
A5	RECOMMENDATION: Adopt System Development Lifecycle (SDLC) policies and procedures that are being developed by House Information Resources in response to OIG recommendations contained in Report No. 95-CAO-20 for future system development/procurement efforts. ACTIONS COMPLETED TO DATE: The Office of the SAA has adopted the SDLC policies and procedures developed by HIR.	Actions Completed
B	RECOMMENDATION: In conjunction with the CAO, develop a proposal to the CHO to establish a House-wide pre-exit clearance procedure for all paid and non-paid employees who are terminated that will require, among other things: (1) withholding final paychecks for paid employees until ID cards are returned and the exit clearance process completed, or (2) holding the employing office responsible, both procedurally and financially, for all non-paid employees to successfully complete the pre-exit clearance process and return ID cards. ACTIONS COMPLETED TO DATE: The SAA is not legally permitted to withhold employees' final paychecks. As a result, there is no effective way to ensure IDs are turned in when an employee leaves. Therefore, the Identification Services Office (ISO) has taken several proactive steps to ensure that terminated employees will not be able to use IDs.	Otherwise Resolved

EXHIBIT

Recommendation Number	RECOMMENDATIONS ACTIONS COMPLETED TO DATE ACTIONS NEEDED FOR CLOSURE	STATUS TARGET DATE
	They are: (1) for non-permanent employees, expiration dates are printed in a bold red font—persons with expired IDs will be denied admittance; and (2) the ID design is changed with every new incoming Congress—persons with designs from previous years will be spotted and denied admittance. Additionally, with the next change of Congress, the ISO plans to incorporate a hologram onto the ID to prevent duplication. Also, offices are periodically provided with a listing of outstanding ID cards by the ISO in an attempt to encourage the turning in of IDs.	
C13	RECOMMENDATION: Implement a structured methodology to ensure that system access is granted based upon job function. ACTIONS COMPLETED TO DATE: With the implementation of the new ID System, a procedure was defined to ensure that access to the badging system database is granted based upon job function (i.e., “profiles” are created). Every Office of the SAA employee receives a user ID with the appropriate access capabilities, based on his/her job description.	Actions Completed
D7	RECOMMENDATION: Identify all management reporting requirements for the House ID System and establish reporting formats to generate necessary reports on a scheduled basis. ACTIONS COMPLETED TO DATE: With the implementation of the new ID system, a list of necessary reports was given to the vendor. These reports were created within the system. (Such reports include listing of outstanding IDs, etc.) Additional reports may be developed by ID Services staff, as necessary.	Actions Completed
Audit Report No. 95-SAA-14, entitled <i>Opportunities Exist To Improve Resource Utilization In The Office Of The Sergeant At Arms</i>, dated July 18, 1995:		
A	RECOMMENDATION: Prepare a proposal, for approval by the CHO, based on one of the following options: (1) pay Chamber Security Aides on an hourly basis or (2) reassign Chamber Security Aides to other duties when the House is not in session. ACTIONS COMPLETED TO DATE: The recommendation to pay Chamber Security Aides on an hourly basis was rejected, as this would cause a huge decrease in pay. The Director of Chamber Security believes that minimal turnover is key to maintaining superior service in this department, as many of the duties require familiarity with the rules of the House as well as its 400+ members. A drastic decrease in pay would result in a lower quality employee and higher turnover. An effort is made to reassign the Aides while the House is not in session, and most training is done during this timeframe; however, reassignments are only made on an as needed basis, resulting in some inevitable downtime. Office of the SAA has taken action on this issue as far as practical.	Otherwise Resolved
D	RECOMMENDATION: Assign parking permits by a unique, unalterable identifier—such as the House employee identification number to ensure that only one parking permit is issued per employee. ACTIONS COMPLETED TO DATE: A controlled system is in place which ensures that each permit is numbered with a hologram so that accountability is present for each permit. Permits for which replacements have been issued are maintained on a “hot list”, and the letters A, B, and C, respectively, are placed on duplicate tags issued so that parking	Actions Completed

EXHIBIT

Recommendation Number	RECOMMENDATIONS ACTIONS COMPLETED TO DATE ACTIONS NEEDED FOR CLOSURE	STATUS TARGET DATE
	attendants are aware which cars have been issued duplicate tags. All unused tags are kept in a locked safe.	
Audit Report No. 95-CCS-12, entitled <i>The House Needs To Integrate Planning And Financial Management To Improve Productivity, Performance, And Accountability</i>, dated July 18, 1995:		
A	<p>RECOMMENDATION: Implement policies and procedures to establish a coordinated, strategic planning, and performance measurement process.</p> <p>ACTIONS COMPLETED TO DATE: The SAA has developed a mission statement which is supported by the submission of a semi-annual report to the CHO outlining past achievements as well as future initiatives. However, although future initiatives are outlined, the resources which will be required to accomplish these initiatives have not been documented, and no attempt to tie the costs of these future initiatives directly to the budget has been made.</p> <p>ACTIONS NEEDED FOR CLOSURE: Work with the CAO staff to develop a meaningful strategic plan and performance measurement process which builds on the Office of the SAA mission statement.</p>	<p>Significant Progress</p> <p>TBD</p>
B	<p>RECOMMENDATION: Integrate budget formulation and financial management into the planning process.</p> <p>ACTIONS COMPLETED TO DATE: The SAA works closely with the CAO in budget formulation. The CAO is responsible for presenting the budget request of the SAA. Proposed future initiatives included in the semi-annual report are not linked to the budget request as required resources to complete the future initiatives are not projected.</p> <p>ACTIONS NEEDED FOR CLOSURE: Work with the CAO staff to develop an integrated budget formulation and financial management/planning process.</p>	<p>Limited Progress</p> <p>TBD</p>

BILL LIVINGOOD
SERGEANT AT ARMS

JIM VAREY
DEPUTY SERGEANT AT ARM

Office of the Sergeant at Arms
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-6634

November 6, 1998

MEMORANDUM

To: Robert B. Frey III
Deputy Inspector General

From: Jim Varey 
Deputy Sergeant at Arms

Subject: Draft Audit Report – Continued Improvements in the Management and Operations of the Sergeant at Arms

This is in response to your memo dated November 2, 1998 concerning the above subject. We have reviewed the draft report and concur with your findings and recommendations to (1) amend the current House Security Office proposal to include the requirement for an appropriate permanent facility to be used as a SCIF for classified discussions and viewing of classified documents and actively pursue approval from the Committee on House Oversight; and (2) to develop and submit a formal proposal to the Committee on House Oversight requesting an appropriate permanent facility and sufficient funds be provided to the Office of the Sergeant at Arms to properly accommodate visiting dignitaries.

With regard to recommendation number one (1), we will immediately submit a revised proposal to the July 22, 1997 memorandum to the Committee on House Oversight outlining the need for a House Security Office. Our revision will reflect the importance of acquiring a SCIF to support the integral requirements of the House Security Office.

With regard to recommendation number two (2), the Sergeant at Arms will immediately draft and submit a proposal to the Committee on House Oversight requesting the designation of an appropriate holding room for visiting foreign dignitaries. We will also request funding to support the expenditures associated with hosting visiting foreign dignitaries in this space.

We anticipate implementing these recommendations by November 30, 1998. Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at x5-2456.