Management Response To The Draft Report

RESULTS IN BRIEF

Since our prior report, Opportunities Exist To Improve The Management Of The Sergeant At Arms (Report No. 96-SAA-13), dated December 31, 1996, the Sergeant at Arms (SAA) has continued to work towards further improving Office of the SAA operations and thus, towards achieving the Office of the SAA mission. Specifically, the SAA has made significant improvements in several Human Resources (HR) areas. During the course of this audit, we conducted interviews with both management and staff within the Office of the SAA. Based on these interviews we determined the Office of the SAA to be an organization that continually strives to achieve a high quality management process--encompassing competent leadership, goal setting, planning, communications, and morale. As a result, employee satisfaction appears to be high. Staff have been trained to a high standard in areas of security and intelligence, and the implementation of staff training programs, including cross training between Office of the SAA functions, contributes to further enhance staff morale. In addition, management has worked to develop an esprit de corps within the Office of the SAA workforce, using various initiatives, which include the "employee of the month" program and the provision of uniforms for parking and tour guide staff.

While these HR related improvements have significantly enhanced the performance of the Office of the SAA, additional actions are needed to further strengthen Office of the SAA capabilities. Specifically, there are no House-wide policies and procedures for the handling of security clearances and classified documentation. Also, there is no permanent facility or Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF) available to the Office of the SAA in which to discuss or view classified information. Therefore, there is a risk that information could be overheard, mislaid, or made available to persons who do not have appropriate clearances. The SAA has submitted a proposal to the Committee on House Oversight (CHO) to establish a House Office of Security under the control of the Office of the SAA. This proposal needs to be amended to include a request for a permanent facility and aggressively pursued by the SAA.

In addition, a designated secure waiting area for visiting dignitaries and other high ranking officials needs to be established. During the period January 1, 1997 to September 30, 1998, the Office of the SAA planned and participated in a total of 202 high ranking foreign dignitary visits, as well as a significant number of visits from high-ranking domestic officials. The SAA’s own office has often been used as a waiting area for these visitors, which caused disruptions within the SAA office. In addition, the Office of the SAA used a room provided by the Architect of the Capitol. However, that room was not always available and the room was not designed to accommodate visiting dignitaries. Alternatively, visitors have used a Member’s office if invited to do so by the particular Member. However, before the visitor may make use of such an office, the Office of the SAA staff must perform a security check in the interests of the visitor’s safety. Finally, there is an associated prestige issue with the House as a host to visiting dignitaries. The Office of the SAA’s efforts to ensure that arrangements are adequate are impaired by the fact that no permanent space has been made available for Office of the SAA use as a waiting room. The SAA needs to formally request the necessary facilities.

We recommend that the Sergeant at Arms (1) amend the current House Security Office proposal to include the requirement for an appropriate permanent facility to be used as a SCIF for classified discussions and viewing of classified documents and actively pursue approval from the CHO for the proposal and (2) develop and submit a formal proposal to the CHO requesting that an appropriate permanent facility and sufficient funds be provided to properly accommodate visiting dignitaries, and that this facility be placed under the control of the Office of the SAA.

On November 6, 1998, the SAA concurred with the findings and recommendations in this report (see Appendix). According to the response, the SAA agreed to immediately (1) submit a revised proposal to the July 22, 1997 memorandum to the CHO outlining the need for a House Security Office and reflecting the importance of acquiring a SCIF to support the integral requirements of the House Security Office and (2) draft and submit a proposal to the CHO requesting the designation of an appropriate waiting room for visiting foreign dignitaries and funding to support the integral requirements associated with hosting visiting foreign dignitaries in this space. The milestone date for completion of both actions is November 30, 1998.

The actions planned by the SAA are responsive to the issues identified and, when fully implemented, should satisfy the intent of these recommendations. The milestone date provided for the actions appears reasonable.

Election of the Sergeant at Arms (SAA). The Rules of the House of Representatives effective for the 105^th Congress (dated January 1, 1998) detail the duties of the Speaker of the House (Rule I), the Election of Officers (Rule II), the duties of the Office of the SAA (Rule IV) and the duties of the Standing Committees, including the Committee on House Oversight (Rule X 1.(h) and 4.(d)(1)).

Rule II for the election of Officers states:

Thus, the SAA is chosen, qualified, and submitted to the House for a voice vote. The SAA may be removed either by the entire House or by the Speaker.

Role of the Committee on House Oversight (CHO). The CHO has certain responsibilities detailed in Rule X 1.(h) regarding the SAA, including:

Despite the inability of the CHO to directly or indirectly hire or remove the SAA, the CHO has direct oversight of the SAA. The CHO also has the responsibility to oversee appropriations, personnel decisions, and expenditures of the SAA.

The CHO provides the following critical functions in relation to the Officers of the House:

• The three Officers of the House must work together on several administrative areas including: finance and accounting issues; purchasing and procurement issues; technology issues; issues relating to media and support services; and human resources (HR) issues. The CHO provides for the oversight to ensure that the three Officers work together on key cross organizational issues.
• Rule X 1.(h)(2) provides for the CHO to oversee the audit activities of the House. As such, the CHO functions as an Audit Committee to ensure that the House is accountable for its public funding.
• The CHO ensures that the goals and objectives of the Members in general, and of the Speaker in particular, are met to the extent appropriate, through the activities of the House Officers.
• The CHO operates as a bipartisan committee to provide oversight to each of the Officers. The Rules of the 105^th Congress continue the initiative of the 104^th Congress which replaced the House Administration Committee with the Committee on House Oversight. The new name of the Committee reflects the change in philosophy of the Committee from administration by elected officials to oversight of professional administrators by elected officials.

Role of the SAA. The SAA has certain responsibilities detailed in Rule IV regarding its interaction with the CHO and Speaker, including:

Thus, the SAA has a responsibility to provide the CHO an accounting of its operations as part of the oversight by the CHO.

The mission of the Office of the SAA. The mission of the Office of the SAA is to ensure the safety and security of Members, House staff, and the public on Capitol Hill and ensure that protocol and tradition are followed with respect to the Legislative body and its Members.

The main responsibilities of the Office of the SAA are to (1) oversee security on the House floor, gallery, and parking, (2) provide security to the Congressional Leadership, Members of Congress, and (3) ensure physical security of the Capitol and House Office Buildings and garages. The SAA has approximately 80 staff, with an operating budget for Fiscal Year 1998 estimated at $3,564,000. The Office of the SAA is comprised of the following six divisions:

• SAA Immediate Office. This office is responsible for the management and oversight of Office of the SAA operations.
• Police Services. Police Services division is responsible for coordinating the security of House of Representatives with the U.S. Capitol Police.
• Chamber Security. Chamber Security controls access to the House floor and gallery. The office also provides a messenger service to Members while they are on the House floor, relaying messages from staff, constituents, and others.
• House Garages and Parking Security. The Office of House Garages and Parking Security is responsible for the safety and security of vehicles and pedestrians in all House garage and parking areas.
• Special Events and Protocol. This office coordinates and ensures security arrangements for formal events (e.g., visiting foreign dignitaries) within the Capitol and House Office Buildings, and formal events conducted off-site, involving traveling delegations of Members of the House.
• Identification Services. This office provides identification cards to the spouses and immediate family of Members, permanent and temporary staff, interns, pages, liaison offices, and vendors.

Status of significant Office of the SAA activities. Since our prior report, entitled Opportunities Exist To Improve The Management Of The Sergeant At Arms (Report No. 96-SAA-13, dated December 31, 1996), the Office of the SAA organization has continued to work towards further improving Office of the SAA operations and thus, towards achieving the Office of the SAA mission. Specifically, the SAA has made significant improvements in several HR areas. During the course of this audit, we conducted interviews with both management and staff within the Office of the SAA. Based on these interviews we determined the Office of the SAA to be an organization that continually strives to achieve a high quality management process--encompassing competent leadership, goal setting, planning, communications, and morale. As a result, employee satisfaction appears to be high. Staff have been trained to a high standard in areas of security and intelligence, and the implementation of staff training programs, including cross training between Office of the SAA functions, contributes to further enhance staff morale. In addition, management has worked to develop an esprit de corps within the Office of the SAA workforce, using various initiatives, which include the "employee of the month" program and the provision of uniforms for parking and tour guide staff.

The objective of our review of the Office of the SAA was to provide an operational assessment of the Office of the SAA during the 105^th Congress. We conducted the work during the months of September through November 1998. We examined the adequacy and effectiveness of the operations of the Office of the SAA in the following areas:

1. Management and direction of each office.
2. Administrative controls.
3. Program procedures and controls over Office of the SAA operations, including the SAA Immediate Office, Police Services, Chamber Security, House Garages and Parking Security, Special Events and Protocol, and Identification Services.

We conducted our review in accordance with Government Auditing Standards, issued by the Comptroller General of the United States. Our review included the following procedures:

• Entrance interview with the SAA and Deputy SAA.
• Interviews and walk-through tours with each Office of the SAA division head and other Office of the SAA staff; and
• Collection and analysis of documents related to operations, organization, staffing, policies and procedures, performance standards, and prior reviews and audits.

We assessed the control environment, including those over the management and direction of each SAA office, administrative functions, and programs. Weaknesses in the internal control environment are described in the "Findings and Recommendations" section of this report.

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) has conducted a number of audits of the Office of the SAA. The Exhibit of this report summarizes the current status of all prior Office of the Clerk audit recommendations which had not been previously implemented. These recommendations are contained in the following reports that were issued during the 104^th and 105^th Congresses:

OIG audit report, entitled Parking Operations Would Benefit From Further Improvements (Report No. 97-SAA-01, dated February 13, 1997). This audit evaluated the effectiveness of House parking operations. We followed up on four recommendations from this report. We found that two were fully implemented, one was otherwise resolved, and one was partially implemented.

OIG audit report, entitled Opportunities Exists To Improve The Management Of The Sergeant At Arms (Report No. 96-SAA-13, dated December 31, 1996). This audit provided an operational assessment of the Office of the SAA during the 104th Congress. We followed up on three recommendations from this report. We found that one was fully implemented, one was otherwise resolved, and one was partially implemented.

OIG audit report, entitled Poor Planning, Questionable Contracting, And Numerous Internal Control Deficiencies Undermine Integrity and Usefulness of House Identification System (Report No. 96-SAA-03, dated March 5, 1996). The objectives of this audit were to (1) obtain an overview of the House Identification (ID) system, (2) determine the effectiveness of management and application controls associated with the House ID system and services, and (3) determine whether the system satisfied the needs of the House. We followed up on four recommendations from this report. We found that three were fully implemented and one was otherwise resolved.

OIG audit report, entitled Opportunities Exist To Improve Resource Utilization In The Office Of The Sergeant At Arms (Report No. 95-SAA-14, dated July 18, 1995). The objective of the audit was to determine if the House Chamber Security, House Parking, and Identification Office efficiently used staff resources. We followed up on two recommendations from this report. We found that one was fully implemented and one was otherwise resolved.

OIG audit report, entitled The House Needs To Integrate Planning And Financial Management To Improve Productivity, Performance, And Accountability (Report No. 95-CCS-12, dated

July 18, 1995). This audit assessed opportunities to improve planning and financial management. We followed up on two recommendations from this report. We found that both of these recommendations were partially implemented.

There are no House-wide policies and procedures for the administration of security clearances and handling of classified documents. Therefore, there is a risk that classified information will be made available to persons who do not have the appropriate clearances. In addition, there is also no permanent facility assigned for conducting classified discussions and to review classified documents. In contrast, the Senate Security Office has several SCIFs under its control for these purposes. The Office of the SAA, Capitol Police, Members, and Committees conduct classified discussions and view classified materials at least several times a week. However, there are no designated permanent Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) available on an ongoing basis to provide to these groups. Thus, there is a risk that information could be overheard, mislaid, or made available to persons who do not have appropriate clearances.

In July 1997, the SAA developed and submitted a proposal to the CHO to establish a House Office of Security under the control of the Office of the SAA. In September 1997, the CHO submitted questions to the SAA regarding this proposal. The SAA subsequently responded to the CHO questions in June 1998. Currently, the proposal is pending approval by the CHO. The proposal provides two organizational options—centralized and decentralized—and the associated staffing requirements for each option, sample position descriptions, and a security manual with the policies and procedures necessary for implementing and maintaining a House-wide security program. However, the proposal does not include a request for a permanent SCIF. The SAA needs to amend the proposal to include a request for a permanent SCIF and aggressively pursue approval of this proposal through the CHO.

Many Federal agencies have established policies and procedures for providing security clearances based on background investigations for employees and contractors in sensitive positions within their agencies. In addition, some agencies, like the Department of Defense (DOD), have policies and procedures for handling of classified documents and conducting classified discussions. Good security policies and procedures help ensure that personnel entrusted with classified information (1) are properly cleared to access such information, (2) understand security procedures to protect the information, and (3) have access to safe facilities where they can discuss classified information.

Security Clearances. There is no centralized process within the House to issue and maintain security clearances. In some cases, the requests for clearances are sent to the Office of the SAA and then routed to the U.S. Capitol Police for processing by appropriate Federal agencies such as DOD. In other cases, the requests are handled by House committees which contact Federal agencies directly for processing. This de-centralized process lacks a number of key controls over clearances. Specifically, it does not provide:

• Criteria for positions needing security clearances, the level of security required for specific positions (i.e., designation of sensitive positions), and the associated type of background required for each position;
• Limitations associated with each level of clearance (e.g., positions with "Secret" clearances cannot view "Top Secret" documents);
• Requirements for updating investigations and clearances;
• Policies and procedures for initiating, coordinating, and maintaining security clearances and background investigation which must be adopted House-wide;
• A clearinghouse to (1) monitor the need for clearances, (2) update or terminate clearances, and (3) access clearance information; and
• Training for personnel with clearances so they are familiar with security procedures.

Without these controls, the House cannot be assured that only valid clearances are issued, personnel are familiar with security procedures, and classified documents are only accessed by appropriately authorized personnel. Delays have occurred in transferring classified documents from Federal agencies because there has been a need to verify clearances for House personnel and the information has not been readily available.

Classified Documents. There are no House-wide policies or procedures or central office for the issuance, handling, and storage of classified documents. Instead, each House office and committee handles classified documents according to their own policies and procedures, or those of the Federal agency providing the documents.

Under the current system, classified documents are delivered directly to House offices, primarily House committees. For example, DOD delivers classified materials to the Committee on House Appropriations every day and to other House committees as required. When these documents are accepted by the recipient, they become the property of that office. The documents are stored in whatever facilities are available to the recipient. This current system is not conducive to good security in that it does not ensure:

• Consistent policies and procedures for users to follow in receiving, safeguarding, transmitting or transferring classified documents;
• A clearinghouse for (1) properly classifying documents and (2) tracking and accounting for classified documents;
• Storage facilities where documents can be fully protected; and
• Security briefings for personnel who receive or return classified documents.

Without adequate protection over classified documents, there is no assurance that all documents are accounted for, stored properly, and that personnel know what is expected of them in handling documents.

Designated Areas for Classified Discussions. Members, committees, the Capitol Police, and the Office of the SAA conduct discussions involving classified information several times a week. These discussions are conducted in SCIFs under the control of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence when they are available. However, they are not readily available to other House offices, because they are frequently in use by that committee. There are no designated permanent SCIFs available on an ongoing basis to other House offices, similar to the Senate—the Senate Security Office controls several SCIFs that are made available to their Members, committees, and other Senate offices. Thus, there is a risk that House staff may be discussing confidential matters in unsecured areas.

The House has not established a Security Office responsible for establishing and implementing policies and procedures related to security clearances, classified documents, and conducting classified discussions. However, the SAA submitted a detailed proposal to the CHO in July 1997 requesting the establishment of a House Security Office, similar to the Office of Senate Security, under the Office of the SAA. The proposal provided two organizational options—centralized and decentralized—and the associated staffing requirements for each option. The proposal also provided sample position descriptions. In addition, the proposal provided a security manual with the policies and procedures necessary for implementing and maintaining a House-wide security program. The policy manual covered requirements for (1) personnel security including the initiation, processing, and maintenance of security clearances, (2) handling of classified information, and (3) conducting classified meetings and discussions. In September 1997, the CHO submitted questions to the SAA regarding the proposal. The SAA subsequently responded to the CHO questions in June 1998. However, the proposal does not include a request for a permanent SCIF. The SAA needs to amend the proposal to include a request for a permanent SCIF and aggressively pursue approval of this proposal through the CHO.

We recommend the Sergeant at Arms amend the current House Security Office proposal to include the requirement for an appropriate permanent facility to be used as a SCIF for classified discussions and viewing of classified documents and actively pursue approval from the CHO for the proposal.

On November 6, 1998, the Office of the SAA concurred with this finding and recommendation (see Appendix). According to the response, the Office of the SAA agreed to immediately submit a revised proposal to the July 22, 1997 memorandum to the CHO outlining the need for a House Security Office and reflecting the importance of acquiring a SCIF to support the integral requirements of the House Security Office. The milestone date for completion is November 30, 1998.

The action planned is responsive to the issue identified and, when fully implemented, should satisfy the intent of the recommendation. Furthermore, the milestone date for completing the action appears reasonable.

During the period January 1, 1997 to September 30, 1998, the Office of the SAA planned and participated in a total of 202 foreign dignitary visits, as well as a significant number of visits from high-ranking domestic officials. The SAA’s own office has often been used as a waiting area for these visitors, which caused disruptions within the SAA office. In addition, the Office of the SAA used a room provided by the Architect of the Capitol. However, that room was not always available and the room was not designed to accommodate visiting dignitaries. Alternatively, visitors have used a Member’s office if invited to do so by the particular Member. However, before the visitor may make use of such an office, the Office of the SAA staff must perform a security check in the interests of the visitor’s safety. Finally, there is an associated prestige issue with the House as a host to visiting dignitaries. The SAA’s efforts to ensure that arrangements are adequate are impaired by the fact that no permanent space has been made available for Office of the SAA use as a waiting room. The SAA needs to formally request the necessary facilities.

One of the key duties assigned to the Office of the SAA is to ensure that the security arrangements for visiting officials are adequate, and that an appropriate waiting area is provided while those officials are visiting the House. These duties include the coordination of events and dissemination of information to ensure that the visitor’s safety is maximized. The Office of the SAA collates information prior to a visit, including data on terrorism threats and other associated issues. This information is shared between Office of the SAA staff and the Capitol Police, who then work together to provide adequate protection.

The visitors include foreign and domestic dignitaries. Examples include the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the Crown Prince of the United Arab Emirates, and the President of the United States. Between January 1, 1997 to September 30, 1998, the Office of the SAA provided security and facilities for 202 high-ranking foreign dignitaries. In addition, the Office of the SAA supported a significant number of visits from high ranking domestic dignitaries and lower ranking foreign and domestic officials.

Figure: Analysis of visiting foreign dignitaries during the period January 1, 1997 to September 30, 1998 (Source: SAA semi-annual reports).

The SAA’s efforts to ensure that arrangements are adequate are impaired by the fact that no permanent space has been made available for Office of the SAA use as a waiting room. The SAA’s personal office is often used as a waiting area, which causes disruptions within the office. Alternatively, visitors use a Member’s office at that Member’s invitation. However, before the visitor may make use of a Member’s office, the Office of the SAA staff must perform a security check in the interests of the visitor’s safety. There is also a waiting room in the Capitol, under the control of the Architect of the Capitol, which is not always available and is planned to be used as part of the proposed Capitol Visitors’ Center.

There is also an associated prestige issue with the House as a host to visiting dignitaries, and none of the rooms being used are designed to accommodate visiting dignitaries. An appropriate waiting room for dignitaries would normally require telephones, a fax machine, and accommodations for conducting small meetings. In addition, the decor and furnishings of the waiting room should be appropriate to ensure the comfort of visiting dignitaries. It would also need to be easily secured. It may be practical to locate such a waiting room close to the SAA offices, where Office of the SAA staff can be readily available.

The Office of the SAA has taken on this function, having developed a mission statement which encompasses visiting dignitaries, but has not sought to formally request the necessary facilities by way of a formal proposal specifying needs.

We recommend that the Sergeant at Arms develop and submit a formal proposal to the CHO requesting that an appropriate permanent facility and sufficient funds be provided to properly accommodate visiting dignitaries, and that this facility be placed under the control of the Office of the SAA.

On November 6, 1998, the Office of the SAA concurred with this finding and recommendation (see Appendix). According to the response, the Office of the SAA agreed to immediately draft and submit a proposal to the CHO requesting the designation of an appropriate waiting room for visiting foreign dignitaries and funding to support the integral requirements associated with hosting visiting foreign dignitaries in this space. The milestone date for completion is November 30, 1998.

The action planned is responsive to the issue identified and, when fully implemented, should satisfy the intent of the recommendation. Furthermore, the milestone date for completing the action appears reasonable.