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March 13, 2003

Considering Iraq

By Congressman Neil Abercrombie

March 2003

ARMIES MAKE PLANS

JOHN KEEGAN

The First World War 

EVERYBODY’S GOT A PLAN ‘TIL THEY GET HIT

ROCKY MARCIANO

HEAVYWEIGHT CHAMPION 

On October 10, 2002, I voted against House Joint Resolution 114, a measure which grants the President a blank check to launch a war in Iraq.  

We all recognize that Saddam Hussein is a tyrant and that he is a dangerous enemy.  The question is whether President Bush’s policy is the right way to address the threats presented by his regime. 

The administration says that Iraq presents an imminent threat to the United States, that unless we are prepared to launch a unilateral, preemptive attack, we will be subject to attack by weapons of mass destruction. 

No one needs to convince us of the horror of weapons of mass destruction or the evil intentions of Saddam Hussein.  But the Administration has not proved its case.  It has presented no credible evidence that the United States faces imminent attack.  It has presented no credible evidence that Iraq was involved in the September 11^th terrorist attacks or that it is giving material aid to those involved in those attacks. 

The evidence of imminent threat should be credible, conclusive and irrefutable before the United States embarks on a war which will:

(a)                cost the Treasury $100-$200 billion

(b)               put our military personnel in harm’s way,

(c)                deepen the already serious damage to relations with our allies

(d)               put intolerable strain on a military force which is already stretched too thin 

President Bush has chosen to follow the path of diplomacy in dealing with the nuclear weapons program of North Korea, a charter member (along with Iraq and Iran) of his Axis of Evil.  North Korea is further along than Iraq in developing weapons of mass destruction and both are ruled by unpredictable tyrants.  Why are we using diplomacy in Korea, but appear to be determined to go to war against Iraq?  And how will we respond to the news that Iran has a nuclear weapons program much farther advanced than previously believed? 

Striking the first blow is unprecedented in American history.  It has always been a point of honor that the United States does not start wars.  If we are going to depart from a fundamental principle that has guided U.S. foreign policy for more than 200 years, the evidence of necessity must be ironclad. 

This is much more than a point of pride or an abstract argument.  If we strike first, the world’s only remaining superpower is saying that any nation which claims to feel threatened or aggrieved can unilaterally and preemptively attack another.  This is why many of our friends and allies overseas are so opposed to President Bush’s policy. 

We are setting a precedent.  What if, tomorrow, India or Pakistan says the other constitutes an unacceptable threat?  Would this justify one of these nuclear-armed countries attacking the other?  What about China and Taiwan?  What about any number of countries whose relations with a neighbor are beset with tension, suspicion, threats, and insecurity? 

We are damaging our relations with our allies, the nations we depend on to help us keep the peace and bear the burden of protecting our interests.  We should be careful not to initiate a new age of American unilateralism that leaves us without allies.  If our alliances fray and disintegrate, it is certain that there will come a time when we need them.  Will they be there for us?  Maybe, maybe not.  But it is foolhardy to ignore our allies’ importance to the system of international relations and the maintenance of America’s prosperity and national security interests. 

I have every confidence that U.S. troops will display the bravery and professionalism we have come to expect from them.  But the consequences of a U.S. victory are liable to be a huge burden for the United States.  We will be taking on the responsibility for peace and order, for feeding and sustaining an entire population, and guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Iraq – all this in the context of a population which may or may not be receptive to the presence of our armed forces.  We will have to counter the centrifugal dynamics that drive the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south away from the Iraqi state.  We will be responsible for defending Iraq’s long border with Iran against incursions.  We are talking about committing hundreds of thousands of troops, perhaps hundreds of billions of dollars, for many years, maybe decades. 

And what will be the impact of an invasion on other Mideast countries?  The reaction will not be an outpouring of support for the United States.  It will feed the flames of fanaticism.  It could well destabilize Egypt and Jordan and make more distant the day Israelis and Palestinians come to a settlement.  Will we have to commit more troops, more money, and more prestige to shoring up these governments? 

Finally, we must face the implications of a war which will reverberate at every level of the Department of Defense.  The military faces problematic issues today: global international commitments, increased personnel tempo, and over-reliance on the Reserves and National Guard.  These difficulties will only worsen when military requirements for Iraq are thrown in the mix.  Already, stop-loss is the order of the day, with many of our military personnel being held over involuntarily past their retirement dates and expiration of their enlistments. 

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld testified before the House Armed Services Committee that no increase in troop end strength is necessary to carry out an invasion and peacekeeping activities in Iraq.  No one else to whom our Committee spoke held this opinion.  In fact, retired flag officers and distinguished military analysts all agreed that increased end strength was imperative for the ultimate success of our reconstruction of Iraq. 

The personnel problem extends far beyond the full time, active duty forces.  Since the Persian Gulf, our reliance on the Reserves and National Guard has grown to the point where it would be impossible for the DoD to meet its worldwide commitments without these units.  Reservists and Guardsmen are no longer rarely mobilized in support of a national emergency.  Some units routinely deploy overseas alongside their active duty counterparts.   Already, the Army is reporting that it failed to meet its Reserve recruitment targets for January and February 2003. How long can we continue to call upon these volunteers to shoulder more than their fair share?  How long can we ask civilian employers and families of our Guard and Reserve to carry on without them? 

To those who dismiss all these concerns as needless hand wringing, this is the way it’s supposed to work: 

Lightening air and land attack – pinpoint lethality and civilian casualties minimal – Iraqi military collapses in mass surrender – Iraqi population united in its approval of U.S. liberation – Saddam Hussein killed or captured and tried (it gets a little vague here) – Oil wells on the whole intact – missile attacks on Israel, if any, intercepted – chemical and biological retaliation localized and contained – government of national unity emerges – spillover of democratic elements begin to take hold in Middle East – Islamic nationalism forced to retreat – European allies get back on board the victory train 

Military action, in other words, will beget a political policy which will launch a new American dominion as embodied in the Bush Doctrine enunciated at West Point, June 1, 2002:  Pre-emptive military strikes, universality of its application and intention to continue as the only super power in the world, all in the name of freedom—as defined by the Bush Administration. 

As Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol note in their brief for the Bush Doctrine, The War Over Iraq:  Saddam’s Tyranny and America’s Mission, the doctrine was incorporated into the national security strategy of the United States in a document presented to the House Armed Services Committee, on which I serve, in September 2002.  In his introduction, President Bush states, “…The United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe ….  The United States welcomes our responsibility to lead in this great mission.” 

For Kaplan and Kristol, acolytes in this mission quest, “The national security strategy seeks to minimize the gap between ideals and interests, between morality and power.  It gathers in one place all the major strands of a distinctly American internationalism” (emphasis added). 

What needs to be understood as we address the implication of an attack on Iraq is that they see this as but the first step in the march toward establishing a world-wide Pax Americana.  It is no mistake that President Bush’s initial reaction to the September 11^th attacks involved the image of a new crusade. 

One could argue these expressions are just the latest version of manifest destiny.  After all, Territorial Hawaii and the Philippines are well acquainted with one of its previous appearances.  But, the Bush Doctrine moves from a call to action having been thrust upon us presumably unwillingly to conscious initiation by the United States supported by an increasingly vocal secular evangelism. 

This mission finds its face in the snide battering of the United Nations and more particularly, the Security Council, by the Bush Administration and its satellite commentators’ serious misconstruction of the fundamental purpose of the institution.  The U.N.’s power derives from its prominence in the world’s eyes as the principal forum of international debate.  Its resolutions are not ends in themselves but rather the infrastructure upon which solutions evolve.  Its underlying premise is the avoidance of armed force, “save in the common interest”, in the words of the U.N. Charter.  It has no armed forces of its own.  Therefore, to dismiss its efforts as irrelevant, unless they conform to our version of what constitutes the common interest, returns us to the world of the super power politics standoff of the Cold War. The irony is that to succeed the U.N. needs the willing participation, patience and good will of the remaining global super power of the Cold War era – the United States – precisely because we are the only power that possesses the unilateral capacity to strike militarily anywhere at anytime.  Unfortunately, the domineering attitude we are displaying was illustrated in career diplomat John Brady Kiesling’s resignation in protest of our Iraq policy.  In part, it reads … “Has orderint dum metuant really become our motto?”  It translates approximately as “let them hate as long as they fear”, according to the New York Times columnist Paul Krugman.  He also noted it was a favorite observation of Emperor Caligula.  Thus has the Bush Doctrine driven even foreign policy professionals from service. 

Central to any pathway away from war in cooperation with the U.N. is refocusing attention on the “roadmap” to Israeli-Palestinian peace.  Mr. Bush has put forward the rather astounding proposition that we must go to war in Iraq in order for peace to break out not only there but throughout the Middle East, this to be followed by a kind of domino of democracy effect in the region.  His prime example: a democratic Palestinian state. Yet how this is to be achieved with bombs on Baghdad is left unexplained.  Unfortunately, there is a perception in the Arab world that U.S. policy is tied to support for the policies of Israel’s Likud government.  By being identified with the Likud’s policies Mr. Bush reduces or even eliminates his options to promote reform and positive change in the Palestinian Authority.   

The result is that failure to support Mr. Bush’s attack on Iraq is equated with failure to support Israel. Conversely, supporting Mr. Bush is seen as opposing the Palestinians, granting Saddam Hussein support by default.  This is an especially egregious argument and outcome, because success in addressing the Israeli-Palestinian question would achieve the most beneficial effect in combating terrorism’s message in the Middle East, gaining support for neutralizing Saddam Hussein and insuring Israel’s continued existence as a democratic state. 

Devastating Iraq will only exacerbate Anti-Americanism, both in the Middle East and throughout the Islamic world.  Reaching out to the next generation of Palestinian leadership and Muslims of good will who support them will undermine as can no other action Osama bin Laden’s call to religious arms. 

Attacking Iraq as a way of advancing a peaceful end to the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation can only result in its fearful opposite – a new spasm of pain, terror and bloodshed.  The same may be said of Iraq itself.   

What can we expect to accomplish in a post-attack Iraq by way of establishing democracy and providing hope for its children’s future?  A look at Afghanistan is instructive.

Many young refugees from Afghanistan remain in Pakistan today in Taliban controlled religious schools.  The Taliban are re-emerging in Afghanistan.  Its new president cannot travel outside Kabul in safety.  We are assured this picture will not be redrawn in Iraq.  It may not be.  It may be much worse. 

In his latest attempt at justifying attacking Iraq, Mr. Bush cited the September 11^th terrorist actions repeatedly, asserting that somehow Iraq is a direct threat to the security of the United States.   

In his news conference of March 6^th he said:

            “I will not leave the American people at the

mercy of the Iraqi dictator and his weapons.” 

Yet he portrayed North Korea’s program of producing nuclear weapons capable of being launched on intercontinental ballistic missiles already in its possession as a “regional issue” to be handled multilaterally.   

The dangers associated with North Korea require, in Mr. Bush’s view, cooperation and collective effort.  On Iraq, however, “we don’t need anybody’s permission” to launch an attack.  This despite Russia’s concern in its Security Council veto consideration than an invasion will trigger reinvigorated recruitment by Islamic terrorists and renewed attacks against Russia and the West; despite Pakistan’s fear that a favorable vote might undermine its stability politically up to and including President Musharref’s ability to govern; despite France and Germany’s domestic political questions regarding the rising numbers of their Muslim populations. 

The point is not whether a veto in the Security Council is meant as a challenge to the United States by ungrateful recalcitrants jealous of our power.  It is rather an expression of genuine hesitation over whether an attack will unleash forces beyond the control of American military might and for which scornful commentary provides no answers.  Disdain is not a policy. 

It may be fairly asked then what alternatives exist.  Here it is instructive to refer to what those of us who opposed unilateral action in Kosovo and the then Yugoslavia advocated.  Key to it was supporting establishment of a U.N. Tribunal to indict and try Slobodan Milosevic and others for crimes against humanity well before Milosevic fell from power.  It is heartening that national religious leaders as well as the coalition of secular and religious groups – Win Without War – have presented a similar proposal as part of an overall plan.  There are many good candidates for regime change after all. 

Continued intensive inspections and disarmament action as proposed by the Chief U.N. Weapons Inspector Hans Blix would lay the groundwork for bringing resolution of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict to the forefront and allow for preparation of U.N. sponsored humanitarian assistance to Iraq and the Middle East, which is now woefully under-funded. 

Under such conditions it will be much more likely other nations would join together to provide military, logistical and financial support to enforce the disarmament process.  Patience and persistence won the Cold War.  Commitment is not measured solely in blood shed.  If we do not have the patient will to contain and disarm Iraq over a period of weeks and months it is doubtful we will find the political will to sustain a struggle years in duration as Iraq descends into murderous clashes of Sunnis and Shiites or Turks and Kurds against a backdrop of vengeance and retribution.  The territorial “integrity” of Iraq is nothing but a Western construct of post-World War I imperial politics.  We would do well to heed the warning of Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki that hundreds of thousands of U.S. soldiers would be needed to cope with the potential instability and chaos. 

But Mr. Bush is now snared in a trap of his own making.  The economy is stagnant at best; the deficit and national debt careening out of control; the Social Security and Medicare trust funds in the process of being drained; the Euro pounding the strength of the dollar; and the good will generated post-September 11^th utterly dissipated.  His tax cuts, Social Security and Medicare privatization, and efforts to neutralize the environmental and labor movements are all in limbo.  Everything rides on victory – quick victory-- in Iraq.  It must be done and soon regardless of cost or condemnation. 

I opposed the prosecution of the Vietnam War primarily because military action first became a substitute for political direction and then became a political end in itself as any semblance of political rationale collapsed.  The chilling aspect of this process in regard to Iraq is that we are already at the nadir of military action as its own political imperative and justification. 

The sad spectacle of politicians cynically urging support for the attack on Iraq as being synonymous with support for the troops is well underway.  To prey on the fears and anxieties of military families by equating opposition to Mr. Bush with indifference to the fate of those ordered into action is among the more sorry reflections on the paucity of Mr. Bush’s vision. 

There has been nothing in the way of a national discussion on whether we wish to become New Rome.  American domination of the world is a role and characterization I suspect most Americans would reject and oppose.  Yet this is the thrust and logic of the Bush Doctrine.  In the months to come and in the economic turmoil and political maelstrom which will follow the attack on Iraq no American can stand aside from the responsibility to decide our direction in the elections of 2004. The possibility of democracy among nations is indeed at stake.  The question is: Will the United States contribute to its continuing emergence or by precipitous unilateral action propel the world into convulsion?  It may prove a savage irony to win a war and lose a lasting peace. 

The most serious questions about war in Iraq are the ones no one can anticipate.  War has a way of creating new realities, new dynamics and unleashing new forces in the world.  All too frequently, those consequences are inimical to the interests of established powers.  Those who see the dawn of a new era of peace, stability and democracy in the Middle East as a result of a strike against Iraq would do well to think again.  Arrogance can be the light that blinds.

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