(Washington, DC) - I want to thank the U.S.-Korea Institute for inviting me to be here this morning and I’d like to recognize Jessica Einhorn, Dean of the School of Advanced International Studies, Hak-joon Kim, Chairman of Donga Ilbo, Don Oberdorfer, Chairman of the U.S.-Korea Institute and Byungki Kim, Professor, Korea University. I’d also like to say hello to Ambassador Lee Tai Sik.  I am pleased to be addressing such a distinguished group of Korea scholars and policy-makers during the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Korea and during Asian Pacific American Heritage Month. 

Relations between the United States and South Korea are not really a foreign policy issue for me.  As Tip O’Neill said “all politics is local.” And U.S.-Korea relations are in fact domestic policy because I have the honor of representing one of the most diverse congressional districts in the nation.  50% of the residents in my district were born outside the United States.  Although a few of my colleagues may take exception, I believe the 5th Congressional district of New York is home to the largest number of Korean-Americans in the nation.  In Flushing we vie with Fort Lee, New Jersey for the most Korean Americans.  Now Fort Lee is claiming to be named after a Korean.  Just drive through Flushing and you can literally see signs of a thriving Korean community everywhere, shops, restaurants, churches, all with signs in Korean and some even in English.  There are 6 24 hour restaurants so you can get round the clock kimchi.  So my constituents don’t just want me to be knowledgeable about foreign policy, they expect me to be knowledgeable.  And while I have followed events on the Korean peninsula closely over my 25 years in the House, it is with some humility that I offer to a roomful of real Korea experts my modest take on the direction of U.S.-Korea relations. 

The next president, whoever he or she may be, will face a vast array of problems, make that crises, around the world.  And that new president will need friends to help address those crises.  South Korea is, and has been, one of those friends and it is that friendship that will allow the next president to take U.S.-Korea relations to a truly different level, one where Korea is no longer a junior regional partner but a full-fledged global partner.  But for the seven years before the visit last month of President Lee, it looked as though U.S.-Korea relations were headed in a decidedly different direction.

The Bush Administration entered office in 2001 determined to abandon any policies that had been pursued by the Clinton Administration. 
In fact the Bush Administration seems to think that hating Bill Clinton is a substitute for having a foreign policy.  So from the beginning of the Administration there was an internal struggle for the soul of American Korea policy.  That struggle played itself out sometimes in very public and embarrassing ways, starting with the visit in March of that year of former President Kim Dae Jung.  Among the first heads of state to visit President Bush, President Kim had hoped to secure continued U.S. support for engagement with North Korea.  Instead, President Bush suggested that the United States needed to review its policy before going forward with discussions with North Korea.

I believe that President Bush missed a critical and timely opportunity to advance peace and security on the Korean peninsula. Instead of heeding the advice of then Secretary of State Colin Powell, to resume talks with North Korea where the Clinton administration left off, President Bush sent an unmistakable signal that U.S. engagement with North Korea would not take place any time soon.  I warned them that they were making a big mistake walking away from the four party talks, beating their hairy chests and proclaiming that they would not talk to communists.  I warned them that the day would come when they would have to talk and that they would buy the same carpet that the Clinton Administration bought but at a higher price.  So when it came time for them to talk, they couldn’t go back to the four party talks so they needed the next highest even number.  The President consulted the Secretary of Math who told him that the next highest even number was 6.  So we got the 6 Party Talks.  Not only didn’t engagement take place anytime soon, it took the Administration 4 full years before it settled on a policy of engaging North Korea through the Six Party Talks.  Over the course of those 4 years, North Korea went on to become a de facto nuclear weapons state while U.S.-South Korea relations steadily deteriorated. 

After an Army court-martial acquitted American soldiers on charges of criminal negligence in the killing of two schoolgirls in a traffic accident, anti-American sentiment peaked in South Korea in 2002.  This was followed closely by the Bush Administration’s jarring decision to reduce the number of U.S. forces stationed in South Korea to 25,000 and to change the Combined Forces Command to turn operational control of South Korean forces back to the government in Seoul.  In hindsight, these changes make sense and the remaining issues surrounding them, such as timing and cost sharing, can be dealt with through effective alliance management, but at the time these changes looked to many in Korea and to some of us on Capitol Hill as though the Administration was turning its back on a very valued friend and important ally.  Subsequent visits by President Roh to Washington were remarkably successful only because they didn’t result in his public humiliation by the Bush Administration.  He simply got the cold shoulder.  Even though South Korea contributed troops to Afghanistan, and then to Iraq the Administration didn’t seem much interested in reciprocating and was openly dismissive of President Roh’s North Korea policy.

Fast forward through a few years of alliance mismanagement and American policy drift and suddenly you get the success of the recent visit of President Lee and the revival of a once close relationship.  I don’t do it often and I’ll try not to make it a habit, but I have to commend President Bush for conducting a summit that has helped put relations with South Korea back on solid ground.  From the outset, it was clear that the administration wanted a different outcome from this visit.  Inviting President Lee to be the first Korean President to visit Camp David was an important symbolic gesture indicating that the Administration wanted to restore U.S.-Korea relations.  The substance of the summit:  the agreements on the visa waiver program; U.S. exports of beef; U.S. troop levels; continued support for engagement with North Korea through the Six Party process; and support for allowing South Korea to be treated like a NATO member for arms sales also bodes well for our relationship going forward.   But lest anyone think things will be sunshine and roses from now on, there’s still a lot of work to be done and much of it by the Congress. 

With 750,000 South Korean business people and tourists visiting the United States every year and another 100,000 students coming here to study, the practical as well as symbolic value of the Visa Waiver Program agreement shouldn’t be underestimated, but the statement issued by the Department of Homeland Security sounds to me more like hurry up and wait instead of ya’ll come.  Given this Administration’s track record implementing programs, I think the idea that the electronic system of passenger verification called for will be up and running by the end of the year is doubtful.  As a result, despite the goodwill and effort on the part of South Korea, we shouldn’t be surprised if it is still some time before Korean citizens no longer have to apply for a visa to visit to the United States.

Likewise, the agreement to resume beef exports has removed a major obstacle to consideration of the KORUS Free Trade Agreement.  But that wasn’t the only obstacle to this deal and may not have been the most difficult.  The problem is not that KORUS is, on its face, unacceptable, although it has its share of problems on autos and steel.  The real problem is that President Bush by sending the Colombia FTA to Congress without the time-honored agreement from the Speaker that a vote would be scheduled has poisoned the well and turned the trade debate in Washington, already difficult, into a test of partisan strength.  In this context, Democrats in the House will side with the Speaker, regardless of their views on the underlying agreement.  Given the current situation, I don’t see how Congress considers KORUS without first resolving the political stand-off over the Colombia deal.  And with so few days of session left in this Congress, I really don’t see how the Korea-U.S. agreement could come up until the next Congress and in a new Administration.  In the meantime, we will continue to work it and work it hard.

A new Congress and new Administration will also still have to deal with North Korea.  President Bush’s decision in 2005 to try and resolve through multilateral diplomacy what his Administration could not resolve through obfuscation, bureaucratic infighting and neglect has in fact yielded a result that might produce an accounting of North Korea’s nuclear program and the dismantling of that program.  But there are still significant issues to be sure.  As though there wasn’t enough skepticism on Capitol Hill about whether the North Koreans would provide complete disclosure of both plutonium and highly enriched uranium programs the revelations involving Syria simply amplified those concerns.  When we saw the destruction of the Syrian reactor by Israel, it reminded me of the jokes we used to tell about morons in my old neighborhood.  We told jokes about morons because we didn’t want to pick on any particular ethnic group lest we get beaten up by members of that group.  At any rate, a moron was arrested for rape and put in a line-up with other suspects.  When the police brought the woman in to identify her attacker, the moron jumped out of line and shouted “That’s her officer!  That’s the woman.” That was North Korea’s reaction while everyone else kept silent.  As a result, last week the House Foreign Affairs Committee gave its tacit blessing to the “Singapore deal” by approving legislation granting the Administration the waiver of the Glenn amendment sanctions it sought in order for the Department of Energy to continue its work dismantling the Yongbyong facility.  But in doing so, the Committee also limited the duration of the waiver, required the president to make periodic certifications regarding North Korea’s adherence to the September 2005 Joint Declaration and required that the waiver terminate if evidence of North Korean proliferation activity after that date surfaces.  When it comes to the U.S. end of the bargain, Congress will expect not only that North Korea adhere to the agreement but that the concerns of all parties to the talks be addressed before North Korea is removed from the list of state sponsors of terror and trade sanctions are lifted.  On the whole, I think the “Singapore deal” is progress and represents the possibility that a nuclear free Korean peninsula could be achievable but there are many in Congress, as cited by Mr. Kim moments ago, who don’t share that view and there is still considerable work to be done to get the wavier through both the House and Senate and onto the President’s desk. 

On another security matter and an important one, the Foreign Affairs Committee also voted to upgrade South Korea’s status to that of NATO, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand when it comes to purchasing arms from the United States.   Since South Korea bought $3.7 billion worth of military hardware last year, making it easier to buy from us makes good economic sense and demonstrates how seriously the United States views our alliance relationship with South Korea.  I want to commend Mr. Royce for introducing that bill and I was pleased to be a co-sponsor and strong supporter.

The next President will be cleaning up the wreckage left by the current one.  In the case of South Korea, there’s less to clean-up but much important and difficult work still ahead if we are to make the U.S.-Korea alliance the type of global partnership I mentioned at the beginning.  It means that the United States will have to take seriously South Korea’s concerns both on the peninsula and in the region generally and consult as equals on the best way to address those concerns.  It means that we, the Congress and the President are going to have to find a way forward that addresses the legitimate concerns of manufacturers and labor before we proceed with KORUS. It is too important a deal strategically and economically for it simply to remain in limbo.  It means that we will have to continue working closely with Seoul to ensure that our policies on North Korea don’t diverge again as they did a few years ago.  In thinking about that, I’m reminded of my favorite philosopher, my mother.  She always said “If you want to help me, help me my way.”  Maybe its time we asked our friend how we can help their way.

The new American president will have a full term with President Lee in order to develop a personal relationship and if the new American Administration doesn’t decide to start from scratch the opportunity for genuine partnership is there.

We have the beginnings of such a relationship in the most recent summit.  We have the foundation for it in the 2 million Korean Americans whose energy and entrepreneurial spirit have contributed to the vibrant diversity of our country and who want very much to see the country in which they live and the country of their ancestry bound ever more closely together.  Now we just need the right leadership to get it done.

Thank you. 

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