CHAPTER 5 TEXT | CHAPTER 5 NOTES
Chapter 5 Contents
CHAPTER SUMMARY
OPTUS B2, APSTAR 2 LAUNCH FAILURES:
PRC GAINS
SENSITIVE KNOWLEDGE FROM HUGHES INVESTIGATIONS
THE PROHIBITION AGAINST TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER
IN FOREIGN LAUNCHES
International Traffic in Arms Regulations
and the U.S. Munitions List
OPTUS B2
The Optus B2 Fails To Achieve Orbit
Hughes' Export Administrators Deal
with the Licensing QuestionA 'Political' Business Solution
The Optus B3: Hughes' Efforts to Improve
the Long March Continue
APSTAR 2
Failure Investigation Schedule
Commerce Department Conference
Same Fairing Failure Identified by Hughes
A 'Political' Business Solution, Again?
The Commerce Department Approves Data Release to the PRC
Hughes Tries to Get the PRC to Accept Its Findings
Final Failure Investigation Report Released
to the PRC by the Commerce DepartmentImplementing the 'Consolidated Solution'
U.S. Government Actions Following
the Apstar 2 Launch FailureDefense Department Assessments
of Damage to National SecurityDamage to National Security from
the Apstar 2 Failure InvestigationDamage to National Security from the Sharing
of Coupled Loads AnalysisOther Information Learned by the PRC,
and Defense Department ReactionState Department Assessments of Damage to National Secuirty
Damage to National Security Identified
by the Select Committee's Technical Consultant
CHARLIE TRIE, THE PRC, AND HUGHES ELECTRONICS
FURTHER INVESTIGATION WARRANTED
TECHNICAL AFTERWORD: Nose Fairings
on Rockets
and Ballistic Missiles
CHAPTER 5 NOTES
Chapter 5 Summary
ughes Space and Communications International, Inc. (Hughes) attempted
to launch two communications satellites from the PRC on Long
March rockets which exploded before reaching orbit, one in
1992 and one in 1995. Allegations regarding technology transfer
arose in connection with failure analysis investigations conducted
by Hughes employees in the aftermath of these failed launches.
Specifically, in 1992 and 1995, China Great Wall Industry Corporation,
a PRC government entity, launched two Hughes satellites manufactured
for Australian (Optus B2) and Asian (Apstar 2) customers from
a PRC launch facility in Xichang, PRC.
Both satellites were launched on a Long March 2E rocket. In both cases, an explosion occurred after take-off and before separation of the satellite. Hughes investigated the causes of both of these failed launches and determined that the rocket was the cause of the failures.
In the course of the investigations, Hughes communicated technical information regarding the rocket to the PRC that assisted the PRC in improving the Long March 2E rocket. The activities of Hughes employees in connection with the investigation of the failed launch in 1992 resulted in the transmission to the PRC of technical information that appears to have been approved by a U.S. Government representative but not properly licensed. In the case of the 1995 Hughes failure investigation, Hughes employees exported technical information that also was approved by a U.S. Government representative but should not have been authorized for export to the PRC.
In both cases, Hughes disclosed information to the PRC that related to improving the Long March 2E fairing, a portion of the rocket that protects the payload during launch. Such information was outside the scope of the original licenses Hughes obtained from the State and Commerce Departments, respectively, with respect to the export and launch of the Optus B2 and Apstar 2 satellites. Hughes claims that the 1993 Optus B2 failure analysis disclosures were cleared in advance by U.S. Government officials, but neither Hughes nor the pertinent U.S. Government agencies retained records that would substantiate this claim fully.
The lessons learned by the PRC from Hughes during the 1995 Apstar 2 failure investigation are directly applicable to fairings on other rockets, including those used to launch PRC military satellites.
Although the Long March 2E has not been used since 1995, it is possible that the PRC may have transferred the lessons learned from this launch failure investigation to its ballistic missile programs. These lessons could lead to the development of a more reliable fairing for use with advanced payloads on military ballistic missiles.
Hughes obtained a clearance for the 1995 disclosures that was improperly issued by a Commerce Department official. Hughes was confident that the cause of the 1992 launch failure on the PRC's Long March 2E rocket was the fairing. Hughes then ascertained with more certainty that the fairing was responsible for the 1995 launch failure. Hughes required that the PRC take appropriate corrective measures so that future launches of Hughes satellites on the Long March 2E rocket could occur and be insured.
Hughes employees conveyed to the PRC the engineering and design information necessary to identify and remedy the structural deficiencies of the fairing. At the time of the 1992 failure, the export of both the satellite and any information that might improve the rocket were subject to State Department licensing jurisdiction.
Hughes knew that the fairing was part of the rocket and that a State Department license was required to discuss improvements with the PRC. Although Hughes did not have a license to disclose information to the PRC relating to improvement of the fairing, Hughes, nonetheless, made such disclosures. Hughes claims that each disclosure was authorized by the Defense Technology Security Administration monitor. Contemporaneous Hughes records partially support this assertion. The monitor says he doubts that he in fact approved the disclosure, but says he cannot fully recall these matters.
Neither Hughes nor any relevant U.S. Government agency has been able to produce records substantiating all of the claimed approvals. Even if such approvals were in fact given, they would have exceeded the authority of the Defense Technology Security Administration monitor since he was not empowered to expand the scope of the license granted by the State Department. The monitor also should have known that a separate license was needed for the launch failure analysis activities. By the time of the 1995 failure investigation, partial jurisdiction for commercial satellites had been transferred to the Commerce Department, but licensing for improvements to any part of the rocket, such as the fairing, remained with the State Department.
Hughes officials who were responsible for the launch failure investigation in 1995 knew that technical information that would improve the rocket, including the fairing, was still subject to State Department jurisdiction and was not licensed for export. Nonetheless, Hughes sought Commerce Department approval to disclose information regarding the fairing to the PRC. A Commerce Department official, without consulting with Defense Department or State Department experts, approved that disclosure, he says, on the assumption that the fairing was part of the satellite, not the rocket. He now acknowledges that this decision was a mistake.
The Defense Department recently determined that the information Hughes made available to the PRC was sufficiently specific to inform the PRC of the kinds of rocket changes and operational changes that would make the Long March 2E, and perhaps other rockets, more reliable. In particular, Hughes assisted the PRC in correcting the deficiencies in its models of the stresses or loads (such as buffeting and wind shear) that the rocket and payload experience during flight.
There are differing views within the U.S. Government as to the extent to which the information that Hughes imparted to the PRC may assist the PRC in its ballistic missile development. There is agreement that any such improvement would pertain to reliability and not to range or accuracy. It is not clear, at present, whether the PRC will use a fairing that was improved as a result of Hughes' disclosures in a current or future ballistic missile program. Currently-deployed PRC ballistic missiles do not use fairings, and the PRC's future mobile land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles will probably not use a fairing. However, fairings are used by the PRC in launching military communications satellites and could be used for a submarine-launched ballistic missile.
In the opinion of the Select Committee's independent expert, Dr. Alexander Flax, fairing improvements could also be of benefit to multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) development, should the PRC decide to move in that direction. (See the Technical Afterword at the end of this chapter for additional details on the possible uses of fairings in intercontinental ballistic missiles.)
Hughes also provided the PRC with practical insight into diagnostic and failure analysis techniques for identifying and isolating the cause of a launch failure. Whether or not the structural improvements to the fairing suggested by Hughes are of immediate use to the PRC's missile programs, that information expanded the PRC's repertoire of available technical solutions to future problems that it may encounter in its space and missile programs.
Finally, the Select Committee's independent expert has concluded that Hughes provided the PRC with the benefit of its engineering experience and know-how. As a result, PRC engineers better understand how to conduct a failure analysis and how to design and build more reliable fairings for rockets: "This will stand them in good stead in developing fairings (or shrouds) for ballistic missiles."
Chapter 5 Text
OPTUS B2,
APSTAR 2 LAUNCH FAILURES
PRC GAINS SENSITIVE
KNOWLEDGE FROM
HUGHES INVESTIGATIONS
n 1992 and 1995, two Hughes Space and Communications International,
Inc. (Hughes) satellites were launched from the People's Republic
of China on Long March 2E rockets and failed to achieve orbit.
It has been alleged that, in the failure investigations that
followed, Hughes provided technical information to the PRC that
assisted the PRC in improving the Long March 2E. This portion
of the report examines the events that underlie those allegations.
The 1992 failure involved the Optus B2 satellite, while the Apstar 2 satellite was destroyed in 1995.
For each event, provided below is a brief discussion of the export licenses for the satellite, and the restrictions that the licenses contained.1 A short discussion of the actual events of the failed launches follows, along with a detailed review of the failure investigations that Hughes conducted and of the U.S. Government's actions that related to those investigations.
Hughes' efforts during the investigations to provide technical information to the PRC for the purpose of assuring success in future launches are explained, as is the extent of the U.S. Government's knowledge and approval of Hughes' actions.
Finally, the actual improvements that were made to the Long
March 2E by the PRC, and assessments of the potential damage
to national security resulting from those improvements, are discussed.
The Prohibition Against Technology
Transfer
In Foreign Launches
International
Traffic in Arms Regulations
and the U.S. Munitions List
Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act2 (AECA) authorizes the President to control the export and import of defense articles and services. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (April 1, 1992 edition) contain the following definitions of defense articles and defense services:3
Section 120.7 Defense article.
Defense article means any item designated in Section 121.1. This term includes models, mockups, and other such items which reveal technical data directly relating to items designated in section 121.1
Section 120.9 Defense service.
Defense service means:
(a) The furnishing of assistance (including training) to foreign persons whether in the United States or abroad in the design, engineering, development, production, processing, manufacture, use, operation, overhaul, repair, maintenance, modification or reconstruction of defense articles, whether in the United States or abroad...
The U.S. Munitions List also enumerates articles that are controlled under the authority of the AECA in relevant part as follows:
Section 121.1 General. The United States Munitions List
(a) The following articles, services and related technical data are designated as defense articles and services.
Category IV Launch Vehicles [rockets].
(b) Launch vehicles and missile and anti-missile systems including but not limited to guided, tactical and strategic missiles, launchers, and systems.
(h) All specifically designed or modified components, parts, accessories, attachments and associated equipment for the articles in this category.
Department of Defense Monitoring Role
U.S. Air Force Instruction 10-1210, "Technology Safeguard Monitoring for Foreign Launches of US Commercial Satellites," identifies the Defense Technology Security Administration4 as having responsibility for the objectives of the technology safeguard program, which include:
to support the US non-proliferation policy for space
and missile technology, . . . the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations, and the US Munitions List.5
Defense Technology Security Administration monitors are responsible for "controlling the disclosure of technical information."6
The U.S. Air Force Technology Safeguard Monitor Handbook describes the role of the Defense Technology Security Administration monitor in debris recovery and accident investigations as follows: "If an anomaly (i.e., crash) occurs during the launch campaign you will need to prevent technology transfer throughout the debris recovery and accident investigation." 7 It continues:
after an anomaly occurs, the chance for technology transfer is the highest. As a US government technology safeguard monitor you will be overseeing the accident investigation discussions. Failure analysis discussions are sensitive because both sides want explanations and ask technical questions. The worst case for possible technology transfer occurs when both the spacecraft [satellite] and launch vehicle [rocket] are suspect; however, technology transfer is still a problem even if the anomaly was clearly caused by a launch vehicle [rocket] problem.
Optus B2
On May 2, 1991, the U.S. Department of State issued export license 483414, renewing license 384476, dated March 16, 1989. The 1991 license permitted the export of two Hughes Model HS-601 satellites (see illustration) to Australia for delivery in space to Aussat (later renamed Optus), Australia's national communications satellite company.
The foreign intermediate consignee was Hughes, in care of China Great Wall Industry Corporation, Xichang Satellite Launch Center, Xichang, PRC.
The license was qualified by a letter dated May 2, 1991 from the Office of Defense Trade Controls of the State Department that sets forth limitations and provisos. In relevant part:
1. Hughes (which term includes all Hughes employees and agents) must conform strictly to the terms of Hughes own technology control plan with the China Great Wall Industry Corporation, as well as to the terms of the Satellite Technology Safeguards Agreement between the U.S. Government and the People's Republic of China (the Agreement) and the U.S. Government's measures for the implementation of that agreement.
* * * 5. Unless it obtains the prior separate approval of the Office
of Defense Trade Controls of the U.S. Department of State, Hughes must not provide any hardware or technical assistance whatsoever to its Chinese counterparts which might assist China to design, develop, or enhance the performance of any of its contemplated or existing Long March launch vehicles or missiles.
The Optus B2 Fails To Achieve Orbit
On December 21, 1992, the Hughes-manufactured Optus B2 satellite was launched from Xichang Launch Center in the PRC.
The following description of the failure is excerpted from the Hughes report:
A normal performing launch vehicle [rocket] would have passed through the point of maximum dynamic pressure at 62 seconds after liftoff. The failure occurred approximately 48 seconds after liftoff. The launch vehicle [Long Mrach 2E rocket] was in the transonic buffeting period of its flight, at an altitude of approximately 7000 meters, when the failure occurred . . .8
Debris recovery began almost immediately and continued for about three weeks.
Officials from the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) and Hughes began to investigate the cause of the crash. Hughes President and CEO Steven Dorfman appointed Vice President Donald Cromer to lead the Hughes investigation to determine the cause of the failure.9
Before joining Hughes, Cromer, had been an Air Force Lieutenant General, and had managed the Space Division of Air Force Systems Command. In that position, he was responsible for the design, development, and acquisition of Air Force space launch, command and control, and satellite systems.10
Cromer's principal assistant in directing the Optus B2 failure investigation was Dr. Stephen L. Cunningham, a senior-level Hughes executive and Ph.D. physicist who has worked in satellite programs at Hughes since 1977.11
Hughes established several teams to conduct the Optus B2 launch failure investigation. The teams comprised 27 individuals, and their activities covered over 20 days of meetings with the PRC, including at least 15 days of meetings in the PRC.
A Failure Investigation Team was chartered to examine all aspects of the failure, including both the satellite and the rocket.
A second team, called the Spacecraft Focus Team, was to limit its focus to the satellite.
A third team, the Independent Review Team, was made up of experts from outside the Hughes organization. It was charged with reviewing the work of the other two Hughes teams and with making an independent assessment of the failure.
Finally, because Hughes recognized that the findings of its
teams could be in conflict with those of the PRC accident investigators
representing the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT),
it established the International Oversight Team made up of three
members: one from Intelsat, one from the China Aerospace Corporation
(CASC), and the Chairman of the Hughes Independent Review Team.
The Hughes teams were organized by functional specialties as illustrated in the chart previous.12
The organization chart identifies Peter M. Herron, who was the Optus B2 Assistant Program Manager, as responsible for U.S. Government/PRC coordination for the failure investigation. In this role, Herron was the person responsible for obtaining U.S. Government approval for all information transfers from Hughes to the PRC during the failure investigation.13
The failure investigation began immediately, and proceeded
as shown below.14
As the debris recovery progressed, Defense Technology Security Administration monitors who were present for the launch continued to monitor the recovery efforts.15 Defense Technology Security Administration monitors were also present during the subsequent failure investigation, both in Beijing and Xichang, whenever Hughes employees had meetings with PRC officials.
U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Allen Coates was one of the Defense Technology Security Administration monitors. He was present in Beijing from January 4 to 14, 1993 as a Defense Technology Security Administration monitor for the failure investigation.
Lt. Col. Coates specifically recalls informing Hughes senior management, including Vice President Donald Cromer, Chief Technologist Al Wittmann, Chief Scientist Robert Steinhauer, and Optus B2 Assistant Program Manager Peter Herron of the restrictions in Hughes' export license regarding the transfer of any information related to the design of the satellite or the rocket.16 He additionally advised Hughes personnel there, specifically Herron, and possibly Steinhauer and Wittmann, that Hughes could not discuss modifications to the fairing.17 At that time, Al Wittmann, Chief Technologist at Hughes, reported directly to CEO Steven Dorfman.18
In the early stages of the investigation, the PRC focused its analytic efforts on the rocket, and Hughes examined the satellite. Both the PRC and Hughes were seeking to determine whether their respective hardware was responsible for the failure. Because the first visible sign of an explosion appeared as a flame at the top of the rocket, there was some question as to whether the satellite could have exploded.
As part of the investigation, Wittmann, Hughes' Chief Technologist, and the other engineers first looked into the possibility that the satellite fuel tank structures failed. They later determined the fuel tanks did not fail.19
Upon his return from the PRC, Wittmann had an accident that forced him to recuperate at home. During his recuperation, he was assisted by Spencer Ku, another Hughes engineer. In reviewing some of Ku's analysis, it occurred to Wittmann that statements made to him by PRC personnel regarding the structure and materials strength of the rocket's fairing (that is, the portion of the rocket including the nose cone that surrounds the satellite) were not realistic.20
Wittmann was sure in January 1993, while still in recuperation, that the fairing21 that surrounds the satellite failed, thus collapsing and crushing the satellite.22
As the investigation progressed, Hughes scientists became more and more certain that the fairing on the Long March 2E rocket had indeed failed, causing the launch failure.
Hughes' Export Administrators Deal with the Licensing Question
Hughes' Technology Export Control Coordinator, Donald Leedle, was the focal point in the company from 1992 until 1996 for technology licensing issues. A program or contracts manager who needed to export a satellite would consult him for information regarding licensing requirements. He was responsible for maintaining current knowledge of governmental regulations related to export licensing.23
Leedle describes himself as one of the most knowledgeable Hughes employees on the subject of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations as they relate to communications satellites. He says he was responsible for briefing Hughes program managers on these regulations. He was also responsible for coordinating licensing conditions and requirements for the Hughes programs. He consulted with Hughes Electronics' corporate International Traffic in Arms Regulations expert, Dar Weston, when necessary.24
Leedle says that the Optus B2 licenses, as many as 18, had been approved before he was involved in the Optus program. Some licenses had expired, however, and he was involved in the renewal by the State Department of the expired licenses.25
In response to a general question about the need for a license for a failure investigation, Leedle says that an accident investigation might be covered by the original license, or it might need a new license, but such a decision would be made by the U.S. Government. He advises that technical data would require different State Department licenses than the satellite hardware. Further, he says that Hughes was not permitted under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations to make suggestions that would help improve PRC rockets.26
Leedle is aware that rockets are included on the Munitions List and that a fairing is a part of the rocket.27
Sometime after the Optus failure, Leedle met with a group of Hughes employees, among them Hughes attorney Jennifer Smolker28 and Peter Herron, who had been the Assistant Program Manager for the Optus B2 satellite, to determine whether a license was needed for the failure investigation.29 Hughes CEO Dorfman describes Smolker as "the first point of accountability, from my perspective, on the whole licensing process." 30
In April 1993, Leedle most likely contacted Donald E. Majors, Director for International Affairs at Hughes' Washington, D.C. office, regarding Hughes communications with the PRC concerning Long March 2E rocket fairing deficiencies. Although he does not specifically recall the conversation, he says that he talked frequently to Majors during that period.31
On April 9, 1993, Majors wrote a memorandum to Leedle on "License Requirements for Long March Fairing Discussions," in which he summarized informal discussions with the State Department regarding the Optus B2 launch failure investigation.32 The text read:
1. In response to our informal inquiry, the cognizant State Department licensing official expressed the following views:
a. Information or professional opinion on fairing deficiencies as a potential cause of the Optus B2 launch failure probably constitutes technical data as defined in ITAR [International Traffic in Arms Regulations]. If Hughes decides this is in fact the case, an export license would be required to provide such information or opinion to the PRC. If Hughes decides otherwise, the subject is moot.
b. If a license is required, chances of obtaining it would
be good if Hughes could make an unequivocal case that the technical data to be transferred could not be used for any purpose other than increasing the safety of the spacecraft
during a new launch.c. A license request would almost certainly be denied if even the slightest possibility or inference, real or perceived, remained undispelled that the technical data could directly or indirectly impact PRC ballistic missile interests.
2. Should [Hughes] elect to submit a license application on this subject we recommend that (a) all the technical data to be transferred be precisely stated and (b) detailed rationale be included to counter all potential arguments that the data could in some way enhance PRC ballistic missile capabilities.
3. Considering the extreme sensitivity that certain USG agencies attach to technology transfers to the PRC, we should also give some thought to an advance softening up process. This could include advance technical level briefings for friends and adversaries alike, and a degree of precoordination of the data to be released. [Emphasis added]
Majors' memorandum to Leedle was also sent to Herron and Smolker. Additionally, copies of the memorandum were forwarded to the following Hughes executives: CEO Steven Dorfman, P. C. Dougherty, M. J. Houterman, W. D. Merritt and J. S. Perkins.
Majors' office served as the Washington liaison between Hughes corporate offices and the State Department on licensing issues. His primary contact on satellite issues at the State Department licensing office was Kenneth Peoples.33
Peoples had issued State Department export license number 483414 to Hughes for the export of the Aussat B (later Optus B) satellite. He says that the license defined authorized activities, and that any activity not specifically authorized by a license is prohibited.34
Peoples advises that rockets are on the Munitions List and that a fairing, the nosecone that protects the satellite, is a part of a rocket.35 Peoples does not specifically recall speaking to Majors about the fairing, but he describes the recommendation in Majors' memorandum as "excellent advice." The fact that rocket information was on the Munitions List in 1993 was well-known, he says, and Peoples has difficulty accepting that Hughes officials would not have been aware at that time that a license would be needed to convey to the PRC information related to rockets.36
Mere unlicensed discussion of technical data with foreign nationals is sufficient to constitute a violation of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, in Peoples' opinion. In addition to the license restrictions, Hughes was prohibited from transferring technology to the PRC by provisions of the U.S./PRC nation-to-nation agreement on technology transfer.37
Stephen Cunningham, who led the Optus B2 launch failure investigation, had also been the Program Manager for the Optus B1, which was launched in the PRC in August 1992. He is familiar with the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the Munitions List. Cunningham agrees that Hughes needed prior, separate approval from the State Department to provide any technical assistance that might assist the PRC in enhancing the performance of its Long March rockets.38
Around the time of Majors' April 9, 1993 memorandum, Cunningham recalls "specific discussions with [Defense Technology Security Administration monitor Lt. Col.] Al Coates regarding whether the fairing we are talking about had any relevance to ballistic missiles, and we did not receive a specific answer from Al Coates, but he said he would go find out from his sources." 39
Cunningham says that Hughes hypothesized that the fairing on a commercial satellite had no relevance to ballistic missiles:
We were all very sensitive to the issue on anything that would help the ballistic missile interest, but - and there are a lot of things in the commercial satellite business that are irrelevant to weapons use and so the real question was, in our minds, is the fairing that we are talking about in the category of commercial use only or is it in the category of missile technology? 40
On April 19, 1993, ten days after the Majors memorandum, a senior level staff meeting took place at Hughes to discuss how to deal with the fairing issue. Officials at the highest levels of Hughes, including possibly Vice President Cromer, attended the meeting, which was held to discuss a planned trip to the PRC regarding both the Optus B2 failure and the future launch by the PRC of Optus B3, the satellite that was to replace the destroyed Optus B2.41
Cunningham's participation in the trip to the PRC was in connection with his duties to discuss and resolve issues related to the Optus B2 failure. While on the same trip, his colleague Peter Herron was involved in negotiations regarding the Optus B3.42
By April 1993, Cunningham says, "We strongly believed that the fairing caused the problem . . . We believed that the fairing had to be modified in order to get insurance to launch." 43
Herron had prepared view graph slides, outlining the issues and alternatives for senior management to consider at the strategy meeting. One of the slides used in the briefing stated the following:
We are concerned about several aspects of the design [of the Long March 2E fairing]. What do they fix? How do they validate the redesign?
The USG will require a specific license if we want to discuss the design problems. It is unlikely that we could get the license.
We would have to show that there would be no resultant improvement in the Chinese ICBMs.44
A 'Political' Business Solution
Hughes' Director of Launch Service Acquisition, John S. Perkins, was responsible for the negotiation of the Optus B3 launch services contract with the PRC. In that role, he had contact with the team investigating the Optus B2 failure. Although he was not part of the Optus B2 failure investigation team, he was in the PRC conducting Optus B3 negotiations while the failure investigation was proceeding.45
Perkins recalls being aware during the failure investigation that some Hughes engineers thought that the fairing on the Long March 2E rocket may have failed. He recalls that there were discussions within the company that Hughes would require the PRC to improve the fairing, and that without improvements to the fairing, the Optus B3 would not be launched.46 Perkins says that the negotiations for an agreement to announce the conclusion of the Optus B2 failure investigations took several weeks of "wordsmithing to subtly try to imply the other party was at fault, without being at fault, to point the finger at us or to point the finger at the Chinese." 47
The negotiations for Optus B3 were difficult, because the PRC would not acknowledge any fault in the Optus B2 failure. It is Perkins' belief that the Defense Technology Security Administration eventually approved some discussions with the PRC about fairing improvements.48
Perkins also participated in discussions with the PRC that led to a written agreement that took the following form:
MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN BEIJING
ON 11 TO 12 MAY 1993
BETWEEN HUGHES AND CGWIC
REGARDING THE CONCLUSION
OF THE OPTUS B2 FAILURE INVESTIGATIONS1. On December 21, 1992 the Optus B2 satellite was launched on an LM-2E Launch Vehicle from Xichang Satellite Launch Center, China. At approximately 48 seconds into the flight, the Optus B2 spacecraft exploded.
2. Based on analysis of the Launch Vehicle telemetry, inspection of the Launch Vehicle fairing debris and special tests, it was determined by CGWIC/CALT [China Great Wall Industry Corporation/ China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology] that there is no design or manufacturing or integration flaw in the Launch Vehicle or the fairing which caused the failure. Hughes accepts this conclusion.
3. Based on analysis of the Launch Vehicle telemetry, inspection of the spacecraft debris, and special tests, it was determined by Hughes that no design or manufacturing flaw can be found in the spacecraft which caused the failure. CGWIC/CALT accepts this conclusion.
4. Both CGWIC/CALT and Hughes agreed to conclude the Optus B2 investigation and use their best effort to launch another Optus satellite by June 94.
5. During the Optus B2 failure investigation, both CGWIC and Hughes observed strictly the requirements of the USA/PRC agreements on technical security.
6. Both parties expressed the same willingness to promote the existing friendly cooperation between them. Hughes expressed the willingness to purchase Long March launch services for other future satellite programs, and CGWIC expressed the willingness to influence its partners to purchase Hughes' satellites.
Signed on the 12th day of May 1993
Donald L. Cromer Wang Dechen
John S. Perkins Chen Shouchun
Perkins describes this agreement as an agreement not to publicly blame the fairing as the cause of the failure. Perkins says of the agreement:
Politically we could not write down on paper that the fairing had failed and that they were at fault. It was a non-starter in China. They were very concerned that we would say that. This document was trying to say we are not going to say that. Now, go fix the fairing. 49
Hughes' intermediary in the PRC was Bansang "Bill" W. Lee, who worked in the Hughes Beijing office from 1991 until around October 1994 as a salaried employee.50 As Hughes' chief representative in Beijing, he had three duties: marketing Hughes satellites in the PRC; serving as a liaison between various Hughes organizations and the PRC; and providing logistics support for all Hughes visitors to the PRC.51
Although Bansang Lee was not actually a member of the Optus B2 failure investigation team, he was present at meetings in the PRC and was involved in the negotiations that led to the May 12 agreement between Hughes and China Great Wall Industry Corporation not to blame each other for the launch failure. He was also involved in negotiations for the Optus B3 launch.52
Lee's major involvement in the failure investigation was crafting an acceptable public explanation as to the cause of the failure. The PRC would not accept that the Long March 2E rocket was at fault, and Hughes was almost certain that the satellite had not caused the failure. Lee says that in the May 12, 1993 agreement each side stated: "I have no objection to your position . . . and you have no objection to my position. Basically, the conclusion is no conclusion." 53
Lee says that his involvement in efforts between April and October 1993 was generally along the lines of persuading each side not to point fingers at the other. He says that he was not directly involved in attempts by Hughes to convince the PRC that the fairing was the problem, although he was aware that a number of people within Hughes believed that. He was also aware of at least one, Harold Rosen, who did not hold that belief.54
Lee further says that in the negotiations, during which Lee served as Hughes CEO Dorfman's liaison to PRC Minister Liu Jiyuan,55 Minister Liu confirmed Hughes' understanding that once a suitable agreement had been signed, the PRC would be willing to consider making modifications to the Long March 2E rocket before the next launch.56
In addition, Lee says that Hughes "is not saying how to fix it, but wording [sic] requirement that they have to finally fix it." Lee says he was aware that a number of Hughes engineers, particularly Al Wittmann, believed that the fairing had indeed failed.57
In June 1993, Hughes Chief Technologist Al Wittmann wrote a paper analyzing how he thought the fairing had failed, and how the fairing could be improved to prevent a similar failure in the forthcoming Optus B3 launch. The paper sought permission within Hughes to communicate the results of his analysis to the PRC. Wittmann says he discussed the recommendations in his paper with Peter Herron, who was coordinating the launch failure investigation with the PRC; Hughes Vice President Donald Cromer; and Stephen Cunningham, who was heading up the launch failure investigation.58
Wittmann recommended that Hughes not launch the Optus B3 on the Long March 2E rocket unless the PRC made improvements to the fairing. He says that 70 to 80 percent of the Hughes team members agreed with him, and that Cromer, Cunningham, and Herron supported his view that the Optus B3 should not be launched without changes to the fairing.59
When Wittmann discussed his paper with Herron, Herron responded by telling Wittmann that, unless the fairing recommendations in the paper were simplified considerably, he was not willing to ask the U.S. Government for approval to share it with the PRC. Wittmann says Cunningham had also asked him to revise the paper for the same reason. 60
Hughes CEO Dorfman also recalls discussions with Wittmann about the fairing:
Q: Would you describe the changes that . . .Wittmann may have brought to your attention as changes which would improve the fairing?
A: Well, the only thing I can remember is that Mr. Wittmann . . . felt that the fairing . . . had an overlap problem, and that there would be a gap that could be caused during ascent between the two halves of the fairing, and that that gap might cause a pressure differential which would separate the fairing.
Q: Would that suggestion constitute, in your view, an improvement to the fairing?
A: I don't know.
Q: Is it a modification to the fairing?
A: If they made a change, it would have been a modification.
Q: So Mr. Wittmann recommended something which, if it had been accomplished, would have been a modification to the fairing?
A: Yes. 61
Additionally, Hughes Vice President Cromer recalls the following discussion with Wittmann about the fairing:
Q: When Mr. Wittmann first approached you about his concerns regarding the fairing, do you recall some of the technical aspects that he mentioned . . . ?
A: Yes.
Q: Can you tell us what some of those were?
A: He was concerned about two aspects particularly. One is the strength of the rivets that held the fairing together and this was an issue of having adequate strength to withstand the launch loads but still having sufficient ability to open the fairing when you needed to. So it's a balance of strength versus separating the fairing under the right conditions. Also the nose cap and its design and how it might be affected by the loads during the ascent. 62
Hughes launch failure investigators Herron and Cunningham subsequently prepared a group of viewgraph slides that simplified the contents of Wittmann's paper. Herron, who was responsible for coordinating with the PRC, then submitted these to Defense Technology Security Administration monitor Al Coates for approval. Coates' signature approving the transfer of this information to the PRC appears on a facsimile transmittal sheet, dated June 25, 1993.
Lt. Col. Coates says he does not recall approving this transfer, and he doubts that he would have ever approved the disclosure of such prohibited information. He further says he did not have the authority to approve the disclosure of information that could have improved the PRC rocket. He also says that it was always clear to Hughes that no data that could improve the rocket could be transferred to the PRC.63
Generally, Coates recalls that the Defense Technology Security Administration always emphasized in briefings for Hughes employees the prohibition against improving the rocket. He says that Hughes personnel were very knowledgeable about the export control process, and that Herron undoubtedly knew of the restrictions regarding rocket improvements.64
Coates specifically recalls telling Herron that he could not discuss the design of the fairing with the PRC.65
Coates says he maintained a program file at the Defense Technology Security Administration that contained all his approvals related to the Optus B2.66 Such a file could not be found among the materials provided to the Committee by the Defense Technology Security Administration.
Hughes failed to respond to the Committee's interrogatories (which included a request for documents) regarding these approvals.
Donald Leedle, who was responsible for Hughes' technology export control, says Herron contacted him to inform him that Coates had approved communicating the information on improving the fairing to the PRC. In Leedle's deposition, the following exchange regarding improvements to the Long March 2E rocket occurred:
Q: Does this document suggest specific changes to the Long March 2E fairing for the Hughes satellite that would improve the fairing?
A: At the bottom of the page it says. 'Add a bracket or block to prevent any possibility of overlap of the two fairing halves.'
Q: What about on page 2?
A: 'Increase the strength of the rivets along the separation line.'
Q: So, in your view, does this document propose specific technical improvements to the fairing?
A: I think they are fairly generic. Add a bracket and strengthen a rivet is not very specific.
Q: Are those improvements to the fairing?
A: They may be.
Q: Is Mr. Herron suggesting in his letter that they are?
A: He certainly feels that if these things are accomplished, that there is less likelihood of it failing.
Q: So would you view this letter as Mr. Herron's statement that these changes would improve the fairing?
A: Well, I'm not sure 'improve' is a difficult word. It would prevent failure It might prevent a failure.
Q: Mr. Wittmann suggested improvements to the fairing in his letter, correct?
A: Uh-huh.
Q: Mr. Herron in a letter to Mr. Lee is now suggesting changes need to be made to the fairing. Those changes presumably would improve the fairing, would they not?
A: I don't know the answer to that.
Q: I'm asking you to look at Mr. Herron's letter you had discussions with Mr. Herron and tell me whether you think he is suggesting things that would improve the fairing?
A: He is making recommendations to prevent a failure.
Q: By 'prevent a failure,' would you say that improving the fairing would help prevent a failure?
A: Something would have to be done to the fairing to prevent a failure.
Q: Improving the fairing is what this letter is about; is that correct?
A: Uh-huh.
Q: And you've already told us that the fairing is a part of the launch vehicle; is that correct?
A: That's correct.
Q: So the improvements to this fairing, it logically follows, would result in improvements to the launch vehicle. Do you agree?
A: If they were actually improvements.67
In Cunningham's deposition, the following exchange about improvements to the fairing took place:
Q: So, in your view, that doesn't constitute an improvement in the fairing?
A: If they do these correctly, and they have to define correctly, this would improve the fairing. But if they do but without further analysis, this would not improve the fairing. This in itself does not improve the fairing.
Q: Is it a modification of the fairing?
A: Yes.
Q: I want to go back just briefly to Exhibit 1, paragraph 120.9, defense service; it's on the second page of Exhibit 1.
'120.9 (a), Defense service means: the furnishing of assistance to foreign persons,' skip a little bit,'whether in the United States or abroad in the design, development, engineering, manufacture, production, assembly, testing, repair, maintenance, modification, operations, demilitarization, destruction, processing or use of defense articles.'
Is - would these suggested improvements constitute a modification of the fairing?
A: Yes, they would.
Q: To modify a fairing or to modify a defense article, do you need a license - according to what you read in ITAR [International Traffic in Arms Regulations] earlier?
A: Yes, we do.
Q: And did you obtain a license to provide this information to the Chinese?
A: No.68
Leedle says he was surprised that Herron, Hughes' Assistant Program Manager for the Optus B2 and the person responsible for coordinating the failure investigation with both the U.S. Government and the PRC, bypassed him and approached the Defense Department's Coates directly. Leedle acknowledges that the purpose of Wittmann's fairing recommendations was to prevent the rocket from failing in future launches. Leedle and Cunningham acknowledge that improvements to the rocket required a State Department license, and that, to the best of their knowledge, no such license was ever applied for.69
On July 15, 1993, Hughes CEO Dorfman wrote expressing his concerns about the cause of the Optus B2 launch failure to PRC Minister Liu Jiyuan, President of China Aerospace Corporation, in care of Hughes' Bansang Lee, stating in part:
After listening to Wang Dechen's [the PRC designer of the Long March 2E rocket] presentation last week, I've become very concerned that we will not convince our customer and insurers that it is safe to launch Optus B3.
I emphasize that you must 1) demonstrate a thorough and objective evaluation of potential causes for the accident, and 2) make appropriate design and process changes to prevent recurrence, even if a definitive cause cannot be identified.
Our people have made some specific suggestions which I urge you to consider.70 [Emphasis added]
On July 18, 1993, Bansang Lee reported to Dorfman the results of the meeting with Minister Liu at which he delivered Dorfman's letter. Lee wrote about the PRC's strong negative reaction to Hughes' statements that appeared to blame the PRC rocket for the Optus B2 failure, in violation of the May 12 agreement:
Mr. John Perkins letter of July 9, 1993 clearly pointed out the [Long March 2E rocket's] fairing was the cause of the launch failure . . .
It is true that it looks like the whole world appears to believe the trouble was caused by the rocket . . . CGWIC [China Great Wall Industry Corporation] has reasons to believe that Hughes is making a trap to get them . . . If they agree to make any change to the fairing now, they are walking into the trap themselves.71
As Bansang Lee continued to negotiate, he says he thought that Hughes Chief Scientist Robert Steinhauer, who had worked closely with the PRC for almost ten years, might be able to help allay the PRC's concerns.
On August 5, 1993, Bansang Lee wrote to Hughes CEO Dorfman suggesting that Steinhauer bring the Optus B2 failure report to the PRC and meet with the chief designer of the Long March 2E rocket, Wang Dechen, to go over the findings.72
On August 15, 1993, Hughes and China Great Wall Industry Corporation issued a joint news release, reported in Space News, stating that although no design flaws were found, both companies would make improvements to their products. Space News quotes an insurance broker as saying that, "evidence points to a structural flaw in the rocket's fairing which probably imploded during launch." It also quotes a U.S. satellite underwriter as saying the companies
had narrowed the cause of the launch failure to a few possibilities, but struck a compromise on the announcement because they are still doing business together.
Hughes also wants to support the Long March because the company is concerned about becoming overdependent on the Arianespace launch consortium of Evry, France.73
On August 23, 1993, Steinhauer went to the PRC and met with the designer of the Long March 2E rocket, Wang Dechen. Since 1985, Steinhauer had been Hughes' primary contact with the PRC on the use of their rockets. He also served as a consultant to the Optus B2 failure investigation team from January 1993 through October 1993, attending many of the failure investigation team meetings, and also meeting with the PRC regarding the failure investigation.
The purpose of Steinhauer's August meeting in the PRC was to try to help resolve things between the two companies. In particular, Steinhauer focused on Wang Dechen, the designer of the Long March 2E. Hughes believed that Wang Dechen was the key PRC individual who had to be turned around.
On September 14, 1993, Hughes Chief Scientist Steinhauer wrote a memorandum to Hughes Vice President Cromer suggesting a hard negotiating position with the PRC on the issue of the fairing failure. The memorandum said: ". . . Hughes should make an unequivocal statement to Minister Liu Jiyuan that Optus B3, or any other Hughes spacecraft, will not fly on the LM-2E without modifications to their launch vehicle fairing."
The memorandum also describes Wang Dechen as "digging in his heels" against the idea of a unified presentation identifying the failure cause for the insurance community. Cunningham advises that earlier in the investigation Wang Dechen had publicly stated that the rocket was not the cause of the failure.74
Hughes Vice President Donald Cromer says that it was his decision whether Hughes would launch Optus B3 on a Long March 2E rocket. His decision was that Hughes would not launch unless the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology made improvements to the fairing.75
In a September 9, 1993 message to Cromer, Bansang Lee made a number of recommendations related to future business relations between Hughes and the PRC in preparation for the Optus B3 insurance underwriters' briefing that was scheduled later in September. Bansang Lee wrote:
In reality by insisting that the rocket has a problem at the fairing will do [sic] harm to Hughes in the following major areas:
It will be even more difficult for the rocket to obtain insurance. This will make the Optus B3 program more expensive and more difficult to resolve.
Furthermore, it will make the APT II [the PRC-controlled Asia Pacific Telecommunications Satellite Co.'s next Hughes satellite] more difficult to obtain insurance as well. This will hurt Hughes a lot more than CGWIC [China Great Wall Industry Corporation].
We will have a 'war' to fight, not only with CGWIC, but with China in general. This will not only hurt our satellite
business in China but will generally be harmful to all Hughes activities in China for years to come.What do we get out from [sic] this? I could not think of any [sic] that is good and useful to Hughes. The only small thing that I could think of is that in the future we could claim better reliability statistics on our satellites.
If we swallow this one and let our Chinese friends off the hook, it will actually do more good for Hughes . . .76
On September 10, 1993, Hughes Vice President Cromer asked Bansang Lee to bring Cromer's concerns to the attention of the highest levels of the PRC:
However, of even greater disappointment is the continued insistence by Wang Dechen [the PRC's Long March 2E rocket designer] that we change the conclusion of our failure investigation. He has signed an agreement that he accepts the results of our investigation yet he continues to demand we modify the results to suit his view of the accident . . .
We (Hughes and CALT) must make a full disclosure of all relevant facts and data surrounding the accident to the insurance community . . .
It is mandatory that we both make whatever changes are necessary to add margin to our designs. We are doing so on the satellite side and are prepared to disclose these at the insurance briefing. The Chinese must be able to state that they will do likewise . . .
They cannot be superficial improvements - they must be substantial and directly related to a possible failure cause.77
On September 15, 1993, the Hughes official coordinating the launch failure investigation with the PRC, Peter Herron, wrote to Bansang Lee about the insurance briefings. Herron asked Lee to inform the PRC that Hughes was willing to remove all information from the insurance briefing related to the Long March 2E rocket from its presentation at the insurance briefing. But Hughes would do this only if the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology presented the data that Hughes was deleting. In his letter, Herron wrote:
While we would not plan to talk about the fairing debris, it is important for full disclosure that CALT [China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology] also address the following:
Debris - The CALT report makes blanket statements that there were no delaminations. However, it is obvious that there were a number of small delaminations, both on the inside of the cylindrical portion of the fairing and along one edge of the nose cap. They [CALT] must explain why they think these occurred and what the relationship to the event [crash of the Long March 2E] is, if any . . .78
By late September, Hughes and the PRC had decided, pursuant to their May 1993 agreement, that Hughes would not brief the issue of the fairing to the insurers.
The PRC had earlier signaled to Hughes' Bansang Lee that it would consider making modifications to the fairing for the Optus B3 launch.79 Hughes Vice President Cromer confirms that Hughes made a decision to go forward with Optus B3 because the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology had committed itself to modifications to the Long March 2E rocket's fairing.80
On September 30, 1993, Hughes and PRC representatives met with the Optus B3 space insurance underwriters in London to discuss the conclusions and results of the Optus B2 failure investigation. Cunningham, as the head of the Hughes failure investigation, led the company's presentation.81
At the time of the insurance briefing, the Hughes final investigation report was not yet finished. Although Cunningham was the author of the Hughes Optus B2 Failure Report, he says he did not distribute the report to anyone outside of Hughes, and he does not know whether anyone else at Hughes did so.82
Cunningham says that the Hughes failure investigation report was sufficiently technical that Defense Technology Security Administration approval would have been necessary for it to be exported. He does not know whether the report was ever given to the PRC, but he doubts it was.83
Cunningham says that the U.S. insurance underwriters may have been separately briefed by Hughes about its concern that the Long March 2E fairing was defective and needed modifications. Hughes claims that the Defense Technology Security Administration was not present at the insurance briefing because it chose not to attend. Defense Department monitor Coates claims he was told by Hughes that no PRC representatives would be present at the briefing.84
Hughes Vice President Cromer testified that C. Michael Armstrong, at that time Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Hughes Electronics Corporation, was generally aware of the analysis of the 1992 failure. Cromer updated Armstrong on the progress of the investigation.85
Armstrong, however, testified that although he was aware of the Optus B2 failure, he could not recall any information about a failure investigation.86
The
Optus B3: Hughes' Efforts to Improve
the Long March Continue
Between October 1993 and August 1994, when the Optus B3 was successfully launched, Hughes continued its efforts to have the PRC improve the Long March 2E fairing.
On October 13, 1993, Peter Herron, in his role as Program Manager for Optus B3, wrote to Bansang Lee regarding changes to the Long March 2E. Herron wrote, in part:
4. We need to discuss the possible changes to the LM-2E [Long March 2E]. How do we get the changes made?
I suspect it is unlikely that CALT [China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology] will recommend changes to the fairing, since that might be seen by them as an admission that something was wrong. (Why else make a change?)
They have stated that they would make changes that their customers require. This was stated in the press release, was stated by Wang Liheng at the dinner with Don Cromer in September, and was stated by Wang Dechen during the meeting with the underwriters in London. However, we are not LV [rocket] experts and are not in a position to make
recommendations for improvements.Further, the USG would not be likely to allow us to make recommendations in the current environment.
This is my idea. Last summer we requested that CALT respond to our concern with the nose cap (you will recall the four viewgraphs we prepared and showed to Wang Dechen [the PRC's Long March 2E designer] as well as the bad reaction that resulted).
I think we can use these same viewgraphs to request that CALT examine some 'Hughes requested' changes to the fairing. Specifically, we can ask for CALT ideas on how they would implement changes that would,
1. Add a bracket or block to prevent any possibility of overlap of the two fairing halves,
2. Increase the strength of the rivets along the separation line. . . [Emphasis added]
The Defense Department's Lt. Col. Coates says that, had he been asked, he would not have approved the transmittal of this information to the PRC. He also says that Hughes personnel knew that each separate transmission of information to the PRC required specific approval.87
On October 20, 1993, Peter Herron, Hughes' program manager for the Optus B3, wrote to Chen Shouchun, Vice President of the China Great Wall Industry Corporation, regarding Optus B3 meetings scheduled for November 1993 at Hughes. One topic of Herron's letter is ". . . discussions of ways to improve margins for the next launch. CALT [the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology] has already committed to make some changes to the LM-2E [Long March 2E rocket] in accordance with our needs."
Hughes and the PRC held design meetings in November 1993, to discuss the proposed modifications to the fairing.
The Optus B3 was licensed by the Commerce Department, not the State Department. Other than the license for the Optus B3, which was approved by the Commerce Department, Herron did not submit any Optus B3 fairing improvement documents to the U.S. Government for approval.
Steven Burke, a structural analysis engineer at Hughes and principal investigator on the Optus B2 investigation, recalls attending a number of Optus B3 design review meetings with the PRC. During the early portion of the Optus B2 failure investigation, Burke had been responsible for analyzing Optus B2 rocket telemetry data supplied by the PRC. Burke and fellow engineer Spencer Ku had determined, along with Hughes' Chief Technologist Al Wittmann, that the fairing had caused the failure.88
On May 9, 1994, Burke wrote a detailed technical paper entitled "Optus B3/LM-2E Fairing Design Review," discussing a meeting with the PRC that occurred on May 2, 1994 regarding fairing improvements to the Long March 2E needed for the upcoming Optus B3 launch. He says the meetings were both political and technical in nature: political in that the PRC was unwilling to admit fault, while from a technical perspective, they were willing to make changes.
Burke further says that as a result of the Hughes investigation, Hughes had asked the PRC to strengthen the weak parts of the fairing.89
In the paper, Burke wrote that the PRC proposed changes to what it termed the "already adequate" capabilities of the fairing. His paper continued, identifying PRC proposals for the following changes to the Long March 2E rocket's fairing:
a. Increased number of nose cap attachment screws from 21 to 41. Increased number of cover strip attachment screws from 12 to 23.
Comment: These changes add strength to joints that would not need strengthening if the dome were stiff enough.
In my opinion, these changes do not address the real problem with the nose cap design, nor do they constitute an effective "crutch" that would preclude another fairing failure. They do offer some integrity enhancement, but against loads that could best be
limited by maintaining the as-designed dome configuration.In short, these [the fairing changes proposed by the PRC] are token changes that are easy to implement but do not preclude another fairing failure because they neither stiffen the sawcut edges of the dome halves nor stiffen the dome base frame at its discontinuities.90
Burke's paper went on to discuss other technical deficiencies and questioned how Hughes could get the PRC to propose truly effective changes to the Long March 2E rocket's fairing design.91
Burke recalls Peter Herron, who was now Program Manager for the Optus B3 satellite, telling him that Herron had provided documentation to the PRC suggesting changes to the Long March 2E rocket's fairing during the Optus B2 failure investigation.92
On July 30, 1994, Herron wrote to the PRC requesting additional information about the PRC changes to the fairing. Herron showed his letter to Burke, and asked for his views on the additional modifications proposed by the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology. Burke says that he and others provided Herron with questions on the CALT proposed changes.93
On August 4, 1994, Hughes' Chief Technologist Al Wittmann wrote to Vice President Donald Cromer, stating that he believed the changes to the fairing proposed by the PRC were adequate for the upcoming Optus B3 launch.94
In August 1994, Burke says he attended a Hughes senior management meeting to review the changes made by the PRC to the fairing for the scheduled Optus B3 launch. The briefing slides for the meeting are dated August 8, 1994. By the time of this meeting, Burke says that Wang Dechen, the PRC designer for the Long March 2E rocket, had told him that the PRC had made improvements to the rocket's fairing. Burke further says that his review of the documents from the August 8 briefing show that the changes made were a combination of PRC ideas and Hughes ideas.95
According to Donald Leedle, responsible for Hughes' technology export controls, a design review in which Hughes provided information to the PRC should have required a State Department license.96
The Optus B3 was launched successfully on August 28, 1994, aboard a PRC Long March 2E rocket.
Yah Lin "Charlie" Trie,
a former Little Rock, Arkansas restaurateur and friend of President
Clinton, was indicted on January 28, 1998 and charged with participating
in a conspiracy by, among other activities, attempting to obtain
benefits by circumventing the Federal Election Campaign Act.188
