

THE 9/11  
COMMISSION  
REPORT

diminish and their activities come under more scrutiny, and others have been put out of business, although controlling overseas branches of Gulf-area charities remains a challenge. The Saudi crackdown after the May 2003 terrorist attacks in Riyadh has apparently reduced the funds available to al Qaeda—perhaps drastically—but it is too soon to know if this reduction will last.

Though progress apparently has been made, terrorists have shown considerable creativity in their methods of moving money. If al Qaeda is replaced by smaller, decentralized terrorist groups, the premise behind the government's efforts—that terrorists need a financial support network—may become outdated. Moreover, some terrorist operations do not rely on outside sources of money and may now be self-funding, either through legitimate employment or low-level criminal activity.<sup>30</sup>

#### 12.4 PROTECT AGAINST AND PREPARE FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS

In the nearly three years since 9/11, Americans have become better protected against terrorist attack. Some of the changes are due to government action, such as new precautions to protect aircraft. A portion can be attributed to the sheer scale of spending and effort. Publicity and the vigilance of ordinary Americans also make a difference.

But the President and other officials acknowledge that although Americans may be safer, they are not safe. Our report shows that the terrorists analyze defenses. They plan accordingly.

Defenses cannot achieve perfect safety. They make targets harder to attack successfully, and they deter attacks by making capture more likely. Just increasing the attacker's odds of failure may make the difference between a plan attempted, or a plan discarded. The enemy also may have to develop more elaborate plans, thereby increasing the danger of exposure or defeat.

Protective measures also prepare for the attacks that may get through, containing the damage and saving lives.

##### **Terrorist Travel**

More than 500 million people annually cross U.S. borders at legal entry points, about 330 million of them noncitizens. Another 500,000 or more enter illegally without inspection across America's thousands of miles of land borders or remain in the country past the expiration of their permitted stay. The challenge for national security in an age of terrorism is to prevent the very few people who may pose overwhelming risks from entering or remaining in the United States undetected.<sup>31</sup>

In the decade before September 11, 2001, border security—encompassing

travel, entry, and immigration—was not seen as a national security matter. Public figures voiced concern about the “war on drugs,” the right level and kind of immigration, problems along the southwest border, migration crises originating in the Caribbean and elsewhere, or the growing criminal traffic in humans. The immigration system as a whole was widely viewed as increasingly dysfunctional and badly in need of reform. In national security circles, however, only smuggling of weapons of mass destruction carried weight, not the entry of terrorists who might use such weapons or the presence of associated foreign-born terrorists.

For terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons. Terrorists must travel clandestinely to meet, train, plan, case targets, and gain access to attack. To them, international travel presents great danger, because they must surface to pass through regulated channels, present themselves to border security officials, or attempt to circumvent inspection points.

In their travels, terrorists use evasive methods, such as altered and counterfeit passports and visas, specific travel methods and routes, liaisons with corrupt government officials, human smuggling networks, supportive travel agencies, and immigration and identity fraud. These can sometimes be detected.

Before 9/11, no agency of the U.S. government systematically analyzed terrorists’ travel strategies. Had they done so, they could have discovered the ways in which the terrorist predecessors to al Qaeda had been systematically but detectably exploiting weaknesses in our border security since the early 1990s.

We found that as many as 15 of the 19 hijackers were potentially vulnerable to interception by border authorities. Analyzing their characteristic travel documents and travel patterns could have allowed authorities to intercept 4 to 15 hijackers and more effective use of information available in U.S. government databases could have identified up to 3 hijackers.<sup>32</sup>

Looking back, we can also see that the routine operations of our immigration laws—that is, aspects of those laws not specifically aimed at protecting against terrorism—inevitably shaped al Qaeda’s planning and opportunities. Because they were deemed not to be bona fide tourists or students as they claimed, five conspirators that we know of tried to get visas and failed, and one was denied entry by an inspector. We also found that had the immigration system set a higher bar for determining whether individuals are who or what they claim to be—and ensuring routine consequences for violations—it could potentially have excluded, removed, or come into further contact with several hijackers who did not appear to meet the terms for admitting short-term visitors.<sup>33</sup>

Our investigation showed that two systemic weaknesses came together in our border system’s inability to contribute to an effective defense against the 9/11 attacks: a lack of well-developed counterterrorism measures as a part of border security and an immigration system not able to deliver on its basic commitments, much less support counterterrorism. These weaknesses have been reduced but are far from being overcome.

2003). For the request that the United States remain, see Kandahar province local leaders interview (Oct. 21, 2003). For the effect of the United States leaving, see Karim Khalili interview (Oct. 23, 2003).

14. Some have criticized the Bush administration for neglecting Afghanistan because of Iraq. Others, including General Franks, say that the size of the U.S. military commitment in Afghanistan has not been compromised by the commitments in Iraq. We have not investigated the issue and cannot offer a judgment on it.

15. Even if the U.S. forces, stretched thin, are reluctant to take on this role, "a limited, but extremely useful, change in the military mandate would involve intelligence sharing with civilian law enforcement and a willingness to take action against drug warehouses and heroin laboratories." United States Institute of Peace report, "Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan," Mar. 2004, p. 17.

16. For barriers to Saudi monitoring of charities, see, e.g., Robert Jordan interview (Jan. 14, 2004); David Aufhauser interview (Feb. 12, 2004).

17. For the Saudi reformer's view, see Members of *majles al-shura* interview (Oct. 14, 2003).

18. Neil MacFarquhar, "Saudis Support a Jihad in Iraq, Not Back Home," *New York Times*, Apr. 23, 2004, p. A1.

19. Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, "A Diplomat's Call for War," *Washington Post*, June 6, 2004, p. B4 (translation of original in *Al-Watan*, June 2, 2004).

20. President Clinton meeting (Apr. 8, 2004).

21. For Jordan's initiatives, see testimony of William Burns before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia of the House International Relations Committee, Mar. 19, 2003 (online at [www.house.gov/international\\_relations/108/burn0319.htm](http://www.house.gov/international_relations/108/burn0319.htm)). For the report, see United Nations Development Programme report, *Arab Human Development Report 2003: Building a Knowledge Society* (United Nations, 2003) (online at [www.miflah.org/Doc/Reports/Englishcomplete2003.pdf](http://www.miflah.org/Doc/Reports/Englishcomplete2003.pdf)).

22. DOD memo, Rumsfeld to Myers, Wolfowitz, Pace, and Feith, "Global War on Terrorism," Oct. 16, 2003 (online at [www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm)).

23. For the statistics, see James Zogby, *What Arabs Think: Values, Beliefs, and Concerns* (Zogby International, 2002). For fear of a U.S. attack, see Pew Global Attitudes Project report, *Views of a Changing World: June 2003* (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2003), p. 2. In our interviews, current and former U.S. officials dealing with the Middle East corroborated these findings.

24. For polling soon after 9/11, see Pew Research Center for the People and the Press report, "America Admired, Yet Its New Vulnerability Seen as Good Thing, Say Opinion Leaders; Little Support for Expanding War on Terrorism" (online at <http://people-press.org/reports/print.php3?ReportID=145>). For the quotation, see Pew Global Attitudes Project report, "War With Iraq Further Divides Global Publics But World Embraces Democratic Values and Free Markets," June 3, 2003 (online at [www.pewtrusts.com/ideas/ideas\\_item.cfm?content\\_item\\_id=1645&content\\_type\\_id=7](http://www.pewtrusts.com/ideas/ideas_item.cfm?content_item_id=1645&content_type_id=7)).

25. For the Occidental "creed of Islamist revolutionaries," see, e.g., Avishai Margalit and Ian Buruma, *Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies* (Penguin Press, 2004).

26. We draw these statistics, significantly, from the U.S. government's working paper circulated in April 2004 to G-8 "sherpas" in preparation for the 2004 G-8 summit. The paper was leaked and published in *Al-Hayat*. "U.S. Working Paper for G-8 Sherpas," *Al-Hayat*, Feb. 13, 2004 (online at <http://english.daralhayat.com/Spec/02-2004/Article-20040213-ac40bdaf-c0a8-01ed-004e-5c7ac897d678/story.html>).

27. Richard Holbrooke, "Get the Message Out," *Washington Post*, Oct. 28, 2001, p. B7; Richard Armitage interview (Jan. 12, 2004).

28. Testimony of George Tenet, "The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context," before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 24, 2004.

29. U.S. Department of Energy Advisory Board report, "A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Non-proliferation Programs with Russia," Jan. 10, 2001, p. vi.

30. For terrorists being self-funding, see United Nations report, "Second Report of the [UN] Monitoring Group, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1390," Sept. 19, 2002, p. 13.

31. For legal entry, see White House report, Office of Homeland Security, "The National Strategy for Homeland Security," July 2002, p. 20 (online at [www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/index.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/index.html)). For illegal entry, see Chicago Council on Foreign Relations task force report, *Keeping the Promise: Immigration Proposals from the Heartland* (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 2004), p. 28.

32. The names of at least three of the hijackers (Nawaf al Hazmi, Salem al Hazmi, and Khalid al Mihdhar) were in information systems of the intelligence community and thus potentially could have been watchlisted. Had they been watchlisted, the connections to terrorism could have been exposed at the time they applied for a visa or at the port of entry. The names of at least three of the hijackers (Nawaf al Hazmi, Salem al Hazmi, and Khalid al Mihdhar), were in information systems of the intelligence community and thus potentially could have been watchlisted. Had they been watchlisted, their terrorist affiliations could have been exposed either at the time they applied for a visa or at the port of entry. Two of the hijackers (Satam al Suqami and Abdul Aziz al Omari) presented passports manipulated in a fraudulent manner that has subsequently been associated with al Qaeda. Based on our review of their visa and travel histories, we believe it possible that as many as eleven additional hijackers (Wail al Shehri,

Waleed al Shehri, Mohand al Shehri, Hani Hanjour, Majed Moqed, Nawaf al Hazmi, Hamza al Ghamdi, Ahmed al Ghamdi, Saeed al Ghamdi, Ahmed al Nami, and Ahmad al Haznawi) held passports containing these same fraudulent features, but their passports have not been found so we cannot be sure. Khalid al Mihdhar and Salem al Hazmi presented passports with a suspicious indicator of Islamic extremism. There is reason to believe that the passports of three other hijackers (Nawaf al Hazmi, Ahmed al Nami, and Ahmad al Haznawi) issued in the same Saudi passport office may have contained this same indicator; however, their passports have not been found, so we cannot be sure.

33. Khalid Bin Attash, Ramzi Binalshibh, Zakariya Essabar, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, and Saeed al Ghamdi (not the individual by the same name who became a hijacker) tried to get visas and failed. Kahtani was unable to prove his admissibility and withdrew his application for admission after an immigration inspector remained unpersuaded that he was a tourist. All the hijackers whose visa applications we reviewed arguably could have been denied visas because their applications were not filled out completely. Had State visa officials routinely had a practice of acquiring more information in such cases, they likely would have found more grounds for denial. For example, three hijackers made statements on their visa applications that could have been proved false by U.S. government records (Hani Hanjour, Saeed al Ghamdi, and Khalid al Mihdhar), and many lied about their employment or educational status. Two hijackers could have been denied admission at the port of entry based on violations of immigration rules governing terms of admission—Mohamed Atta overstayed his tourist visa and then failed to present a proper vocational school visa when he entered in January 2001; Ziad Jarrah attended school in June 2000 without properly adjusting his immigration status, an action that violated his immigration status and rendered him inadmissible on each of his six subsequent reentries into the United States between June 2000 and August 5, 2001. There were possible grounds to deny entry to a third hijacker (Marwan al Shehhi). One hijacker violated his immigration status by failing to enroll as a student after entry (Hani Hanjour); two hijackers overstayed their terms of admission by four and eight months respectively (Satam al Suqami and Nawaf al Hazmi). Atta and Shehhi attended a flight school (Huffman Aviation) that the Justice Department's Inspector General concluded should not have been certified to accept foreign students, see DOJ Inspector General's report, "The INS' Contacts with Two September 11 Terrorists: A Review of the INS's Admissions of Atta and Shehhi, its Processing of their Change of Status Applications, and its Efforts to Track Foreign Students in the United States," May 20, 2002.

34. John Gordon interview (May 13, 2004).

35. For a description of a layering approach, see Stephen Flynn, *America the Vulnerable: How the U.S. Has Failed to Secure the Homeland and Protect Its People from Terrorism* (HarperCollins, 2004), p. 69.

36. The logical and timely rollout of such a program is hampered by an astonishingly long list of congressional mandates. The system originated in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 and applied to all non-U.S. citizens who enter or exit the United States at any port of entry. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), § 110. The Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 altered this mandate by incorporating a requirement for a searchable centralized database, limiting the government's ability to require new data from certain travelers and setting a series of implementation deadlines. Pub. L. No. 106-215, 114 Stat. 337 (2000), § 2(a). The USA PATRIOT Act mandated that the Attorney General and Secretary of State "particularly focus" on having the entry-exit system include biometrics and tamper-resistant travel documents readable at all ports of entry. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001), § 1008(a). In the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, Congress directed that, not later than October 26, 2004, the attorney general and the secretary of state issue to all non-U.S. citizens only machine-readable, tamper-resistant visas and other travel and entry documents that use biometric identifiers and install equipment at all U.S. ports of entry to allow biometric authentication of such documents. Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (2002), § 303(b). The Act also required that increased security still facilitate the free flow of commerce and travel. *Ibid.* § 102(a)(1)(C). The administration has requested a delay of two years for the requirement of tamper-proof passports. Testimony of Thomas R. Ige before the House Judiciary Committee, Apr. 21, 2004 (online at [www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=45&content=3498&print=true](http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=45&content=3498&print=true)). Program planners have set a goal of collecting information, confirming identity, providing information about foreign nationals throughout the entire immigration system, and ultimately enabling each point in the system to assess the lawfulness of travel and any security risks.

37. There are at least three registered traveler programs underway, at different points in the system, designed and run by two different agencies in the Department of Homeland Security (outside the U.S. VISIT system), which must ultimately be the basis for access to the United States.

38. For the statistics, see DOS report, "Workload Statistics by Post Regions for All Visa Classes" June 18, 2004. One post-9/11 screening process, known as Condor, has conducted over 130,000 extra name-checks. DOS letter, Karl Hofmann to the Commission, Apr. 5, 2004. The checks have caused significant delays in some cases but have never resulted in visas being denied on terrorism grounds. For a discussion of visa delays, see General Accounting Office report, "Border Security: Improvements Needed to Reduce Time Taken to Adjudicate Visas for Science Students and Scholars," Feb. 2004. We do not know all the reasons why visa applications have dropped so significantly. Several factors beyond the visa process itself include the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System, which requires additional screening processes for certain groups from Arab and Muslim countries; the Iraq war; and per-

# 9/11 AND TERRORIST TRAVEL

**Staff Report of the National Commission on  
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States**



## Preface

It is perhaps obvious to state that terrorists cannot plan and carry out attacks in the United States if they are unable to enter the country. Yet prior to September 11, while there were efforts to enhance border security, no agency of the U.S. government thought of border security as a tool in the counterterrorism arsenal. Indeed, even after 19 hijackers demonstrated the relative ease of obtaining a U.S. visa and gaining admission into the United States, border security still is not considered a cornerstone of national security policy. We believe, for reasons we discuss in the following pages, that it must be made one.

Congress gave the Commission the mandate to study, evaluate, and report on "immigration, nonimmigrant visas and border security" as these areas relate to the events of 9/11. This staff report represents 14 months of such research. It is based on thousands of pages of documents we reviewed from the State Department, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, approximately 25 briefings on various border security topics, and more than 200 interviews. We are grateful to all who assisted and supported us along the way.

[ The story begins with "A Factual Overview of the September 11 Border Story." This introduction summarizes many of the key facts of the hijackers' entry into the United States. In it, we endeavor to dispel the myth that their entry into the United States was "clean and legal." It was not. Three hijackers carried passports with indicators of Islamic extremism linked to al Qaeda; two others carried passports manipulated in a fraudulent manner. It is likely that several more hijackers carried passports with similar fraudulent manipulation. Two hijackers lied on their visa applications. Once in the United States, two hijackers violated the terms of their visas. One overstayed his visa. And all but one obtained some form of state identification. We know that six of the hijackers used these state issued identifications to check in for their flights on September 11. Three of them were fraudulently obtained. ]

The chronology that follows in chapter 2, "The September 11 Travel Operation," is a detailed account of how each hijacker acquired a visa and entered the United States. In all, they had 25 contacts with consular officers and 43 contacts with immigration and customs authorities. They began acquiring their visas in April 1999 and began entering the country in December 2000. They successfully entered the United States 33 times over 21 months, through nine airports of entry, most of which were on the East Coast. Neither the consular officers who adjudicated their visas nor the immigration inspectors who admitted them into the country had any knowledge of fraudulent al Qaeda documents.

The next chapter, "Terrorist Entry and Embedding Tactics, 1993 to 2001," explores the topic of fraudulent documents, which terrorists have long used to support their international travel. Indeed, the CIA studied these documents and published their commonalities as far back as the 1980s. They even made a training video for border inspectors to help them detect such fraud. This effort was abandoned in the early 1990s,

just as the United States experienced the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. We reviewed information available on terrorist travel practices in the 1990s and identified numerous entry and embedding tactics, unknown at the time of these earlier attacks in the United States owing to the lack of analysis. No government agency systematically would analyze terrorists' travel patterns until after 9/11, thus missing critical opportunities to disrupt their plans.

Chapter 4, "Immigration and Border Security Evolve, 1993 to 2001," provides an overview of counterterrorism activities as they relate to border security in the Intelligence Community, the State Department, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Here we explore the evolution of the terrorist watchlist and explain the process of applying for a visa and for gaining entry into the United States. The reader is introduced to the Bureau of Consular Affairs in the State Department and visa policy in general. The various INS units working on counterterrorism are discussed, along with enforcement of immigration law and the immigration benefits system.

Chapter 5, "Planning and Executing Entry for the 9/11 Plot," discusses visa issuance and admission into the United States as it specifically applied to the hijackers. Thus, visa policy in Berlin, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, where the hijackers received their visas, is explored in depth. Similarly, we review aspects of the admission of the hijackers in detail, noting the immigration violations they committed. On both topics, visas and entry, we include excerpts of interviews with consular, immigration, and customs officials involved in the admission of the hijackers. We conclude with an assessment of how well the State Department and the INS performed in the period prior to 9/11.

"Crisis Management and Response Post-September 11," chapter 6, reports on actions taken by the intelligence community, the departments of State and Justice, and the INS following the attacks, up to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security. Particular attention is paid to programs implemented by the Justice Department, in some cases as part of the interagency process, including the Interview Project, Visa Condor, the Absconder Apprehension Initiative, and NSEERS, the National Security Exit and Entry Registration System.

Appendix A contains graphics relevant to the 9/11 plot. In Appendix B, "The Saudi Flights," we examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the departure of Saudi nationals from the United States in the days after the 9/11 attack. The procedure followed for each flight, including the inspection of passengers and their belongings, is covered in detail. Finally, in Appendix C, we describe the immigration histories of certain terrorists.

*Federal News Service August 17, 2004 Tuesday*

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**August 17, 2004 Tuesday**

**SECTION:** PRESS CONFERENCE OR SPEECH

**LENGTH:** 29533 words

**HEADLINE:** PANEL I OF A HEARING OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY SUBJECT: TOWARDS A PARADIGM FOR HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION SHARING

CHAired BY: REPRESENTATIVE CHRISTOPHER COX (R-CA)

WITNESSES: THOMAS **KEAN**, CHAIRMAN, 9/11 COMMISSION; LEE HAMILTON, VICE CHAIRMAN, 9/11 COMMISSION

LOCATION: 2118 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

**BODY:**

REP. COX: (Sounds gavel.) Good morning. The Select Committee on Homeland Security will come to order. The prior business of the committee will stand adjourned, and the committee will proceed to hear testimony pursuant to notice on the 9/11 Commission recommendations concerning homeland security information sharing.

Let me welcome the distinguished chairman and vice chairman of the commission, Tom **Kean** and Lee Hamilton. We appreciate your appearance before us today. This committee, Republicans and Democrats alike, commends you for your work and for your significant contribution to our national effort to apply the lessons learned from the tragedies of September 11th.

This committee and the 9/11 commission both have a common origin. We were formed because of and in the wake of the catastrophic attacks against America. Both Congress and the president swiftly recognized that neither the executive nor the legislative branch of our government was organized to deal with this terrorist assault. This committee, as you know, represents the only structural change thus far in Congress since September 11th, which was undertaken specifically to deal with the threat of international terrorism to the United States. As such, you can understand why we are eager to conduct this hearing into your findings and your recommendations.

As chairman, I can report that this committee has consistently pursued a legislative and policy agenda to focus congressional attention on preventing and preparing for acts of terrorism targeting the United States. This has been a bipartisan effort, owing in part to the strong and able leadership of our ranking member, Jim Turner, and also to the recognition by all our members that the security of the American people must transcend politics, even in an election year. Partisanship will surely cause us to fail.

people if they plan to do things. There is a troubling tendency here to take this option of preemption which, seems to me, controversial enough in the international area and apply it domestically, and it is none of the business of law enforcement in the United States to preempting people of what they might think are wacky political views -- and I might think -- because they might be about to do something. We have this new notion of "free speech zones." You know, many of us had always thought that the free speech zone was called "the United States of America," and efforts to kind of make it anything less than that were grave error. In your judgment, you spent a great deal of time on this. Is there any reason why we should be having the FBI going around anticipatorily asking people if they know anybody who plans to divert attention? Is the FBI that deep in extra agents that they've got people with nothing else to do for the summer than go out and do this? I wonder whether this, in your mind, raises the concern that it raises in mine?

Let me just read in your report on page 75, you note Attorney General Levi, who did great work when he was under Gerald Ford in this regard and tried to clean it up, and then talked about Attorney General Smith's revision, and this is the key point -- Smith's guidelines, like Levi's, took account to the reality that suspicion of "terrorism" like suspicion of "subversion" could lead to making individuals targets for investigation more because of their beliefs than because of their acts. I'm wondering if you think -- have we gotten that out of our system? Is it coming back?

MR. KEAN: Well, I don't know what the effects of -- other than what you've read -- behind this particular case. What we do believe is that as we try to protect ourselves, there is always the danger, as we get into these new methods of protection, that our civil liberties will be jeopardized, and we have recommended creating something that does not exist right now, which is a board within the executive branch to examine these various things, and when cases like this are raised, to actually look and see is this getting unnecessarily into the jeopardies of a --

REP. FRANK: Well, thank you, gentlemen, and I would hope, very strongly, that we would make that part of any report, and I hope that we'll get the attention. Mr. Chairman, I'd ask -- inaudible -- consent to put into the record the "New York Times" article and the editorial without objection. One last question -- I was struck, when you talked about the failure of immigration enforcement to exclude some of the people who came in. I was involved, to state my vote here, during the '90s -- '80s and '90s -- trying to change the rules. I thought they were unduly restrictive on political grounds of people coming in. I take it, from reading your report, that you don't find that the problem is in the definition statutory of who can be excluded but rather in the failure to use that definition appropriately. Am I reading that accurately?

MR. KEAN: I think you're reading that accurately. I mean, we had a wonderful example of an immigration official in Orlando, Florida, who simply asked a couple of questions. A lot of these people just automatically granted access, even though they had --

REP. FRANK: -- can I just say that the key point is here -- under the statutes as they now exist, those people were excludable -- inaudible -- procedures --

MR. KEAN: That's exactly right.

REP. FRANK: It's not that the statute allows that people should be --

MR. KEAN: No, they were excludable, and they were not excluded, but what I'm saying there was at least one case of a very alert customs agent who simply started asking questions, and that was probably the 20th hijacker who was excluded because of a good civil servant who was doing his job.