SANCTIONS ON RUSSIAN ENTITIES
July 22, 1997
Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing bipartisan legislation to express
congressional sentiment that the proliferation of missile technology
to Iran from any source in Russia be stopped.
There is substantial evidence in support of allegations that Russian
entities have provided assistance to Iran's missile program. According
to February 1997 reports by the Los Angeles Times and the Washington
Times, Russia has transferred SS-4 guidance components to Iran. In May,
the Washington Times further reported that two Russian companies, the
Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute and Inor, had contracted with Iran
to supply missile parts and technology, including a wind tunnel for
missile design, missile design software, and laser equipment. In a recent
unclassified report, the CIA said that Russia has been a primary source
of missile-related goods to Iran.
The transfer of this technology is serious. Missiles modeled on the
Russian SS-4 would have a reach of 2000 km--enough to threaten United
States installations in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, Israel, and
our NATO ally Turkey. Ironically such capabilities also threaten the
territory of Russia itself.
Let's not forget the lessons of the Persian Gulf war, when Iran targeted
Israel with SCUD missiles: rogue countries that have these capabilities
will not be deterred. Next time they may choose to add chemical or biological
warheads.
I have expressed these concerns regarding Russian assistance to Iran
to Vice President Gore, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, and
the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. They assured me that the
Administration would address this issue and subsequently, it did raise
it with the highest levels of the Russian Government.
In several meetings, I have also expressed my strong concern to Russian
Ambassador Yuliy Vorontsov. The Ambassador told me that the Russian
Government shares our concern about the threat of proliferation. He
said it is investigating seriously these allegations to determine responsibility.
Yet, we have not seen any tangible efforts so far that
Russia has tried to punish those entities responsible for exporting
missile technology to Iran.
Mr. Speaker, this resolution expresses the sense of Congress that the
Russian Government take all appropriate steps to cease the cooperation
between Russian entities and Iran. The Russian Government has the legislative
and regulatory tools at its disposal to stop unauthorized transactions
of missile technology. We are asking that they use them.
If we do not see clear evidence that Russia has taken practical steps
to stop missile assistance to Iran, the resolution calls on the United
States to enact the sanctions provided for in Presidential Executive
Order 12938 on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. This
means freezing the assets and seizing the property of those entities
responsible for proliferation.
The resolution also calls for tougher standards for providing United
States aid to Russia.
Lastly, the resolution urges our European allies to join us in taking
action against those Russian organizations and individuals responsible
for exports that violate international agreements.
Mr. Speaker, we are aware of the special constraints on the Russian
Federation as it seeks to improve its export control system--not the
least of which are the economic conditions of that country. But stopping
missile technology proliferation to Iran is in everyone's interest.
It is time for Russia to act.
I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan concurring resolution
