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I am very pleased to bring the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2004 to the floor today. As always, this authorization
is the culmination of both an intensive review of the intelligence budget
request and the rigorous oversight of the Intelligence Community that
the committee conducts on an ongoing basis. And I mean ongoing basis.
That involves Members and staff here in Washington and elsewhere around
the globe. I am pleased to say that our intelligence authorization comes very close to the number that the President has asked for. In dollar terms, we have basically come in at exactly the level of the President's request. Within that framework and building on the progress made to date, the committee has been able to accomplish quite a bit. Among other things, the bill before us provides full support for the Intelligence Community's efforts in the war on terrorism, job one. It postures the United States for the future with a unified overhead imagery intelligence architecture. I just can put it this way. We have been well served by technology for a number of years. Technology gets old, just like the rest of us, and gets fragile. We need to be in a position to keep a robust architecture of the best technology available and this bill goes a long way to doing that. This bill also makes needed investments in analysis and analytic tools. Anybody who has followed the progress of the 9/11 joint review done with our colleagues in the Senate and our committees have come to the conclusion that a big part of the problem lies in the coordination and making the whole analytical piece work better. We have focused rather extensively on that this year. It is not a new subject for us. We also address counterintelligence concerns stemming from such celebrated cases tragically as the Hanssen case and the Montes espionage cases. These cases did do us damage and there are others that can as well. Counterintelligence becomes even more important because we understand counterintelligence may stop people from doing damaging things to Americans here at home. In addition, the bill continues the committee's push for improved and aggressive human intelligence tools and capabilities. Human intelligence, spying, espionage, getting enemies' plans and intentions is the core business of intelligence. On the homeland front, homeland security is very much part of our mission in the sense that we must authorize the establishment of some connection between our foreign intelligence and our domestic authorities who are dealing with the problems on the homeland. So we authorize the establishment of a pilot program to enable State and local authorities to gather terrorist threat related information and push it upward to the Federal level. The Intelligence Community must be forward leaning on this. As we have discovered consistently through our oversight and through the joint inquiry into the events of September 11, the United States does not have the luxury to be complacent about its national security requirements. Risk aversion, inattention to detail, lack of investment in capabilities, these are not options that the American people are willing to accept and certainly the committee is not willing to accept. Mr. Chairman, I am also pleased that H.R. 2417 continues the nonpartisan tradition of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of reaching consensus. This is entirely appropriate because partisanship has no place in a debate over America's security. None at all. This measure was reported out of the committee by a unanimous vote of 16-0. And I daresay, we did not start with a piece of paper that we all agreed on. We got to 16-0 by dealing with some things that we did not necessarily all agree on but we did it in a responsible and, I would say, adult way, understanding that the flag we work for is the flag of this country, not the flag for any other agenda. I urge the House to support H.R. 2417. I will look forward to making comments on individual amendments as they come along. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume and rise in support of H.R. 2417. First, I want to thank the chairman of our committee for the way he runs the committee. His approach is constructive, collaborative and cooperative and shows a real willingness to work with every member of the committee. I have had the privilege of serving on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for 6 years. Chairman GOSS has gracefully and competently chaired the committee since 1997 and my predecessors as ranking member during my service include the late and great Julian Dixon and our able leader the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi). The membership of our committee is truly talented, diverse and hardworking, and deeply committed to fulfilling its oversight duties and responsibilities to the House. By the way, Mr. Chairman, so is our staff. Committee members and staff worked closely together to craft a bill that provides new and better capabilities to fight the war on terrorism as well as address a range of global challenges. As we have just heard from our chairman, it is a good bill and it received the unanimous vote of our committee. An excellent summary of the public portions of our bill has been presented by the chairman, so I will not repeat it. The committee made thorough but sensible decisions to focus resources on the highest priority intelligence collections programs and placed limitations on certain new programs until they are defined in more detail. The bill also supports the strategic vision of the committee for strengthening the Intelligence Community. It provides additional support for all-source analysis and encourages virtual reorganization for better information sharing and collaboration across the agencies. Mr. Chairman, whatever the details of this intelligence authorization bill, we all know that it was developed at a time of heightened concern about the nature and quality of the intelligence that led to the decision to go to war in Iraq. I know that there are questions on both sides of the aisle about this intelligence, questions which our committee is already asking. While an independent commission or other mechanism might be needed at some later date, the members of our committee have now initiated an investigation and I would like to spend a few minutes discussing our effort. As our colleagues know, I voted to authorize the use of military force against Iraq because I believed the intelligence case was compelling. The Intelligence Community judged that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and the danger, in the President's words, was grave and gathering. The aftermath of the war has revealed just how brutal Saddam Hussein's regime was. The discovery of mass graves in Iraq and the gut-wrenching grief of families victimized by the regime speak for themselves. To date, however, coalition forces have only uncovered two suspected Iraqi mobile biological warfare agent production plants. Coalition forces have yet to uncover chemical or biological weapons or further evidence of Iraqi links to terrorism. Where are Iraq's chemical and biological weapons? Why can't our forces find them? For our committee, these questions have loomed over the preparation of this authorization bill. It has been anything but business as usual. On May 22, Chairman GOSS and I sent a letter to the Director of Central
Intelligence, George Tenet, expressing the committee's interest in learning
in detail how the intelligence picture regarding Iraq's WMD and ties to
terrorism was developed. The chairman and I have also met twice with the
Director on this subject. In response to our request, the Intelligence
Community has provided 19 volumes of information on Iraq's WMD programs
and ties to terrorism. On June 12, the chairman and I announced the bipartisan
and unanimous commitment of our committee to a serious, focused, comprehensive
review of the quality and objectivity of prewar intelligence. We announced
that we would hold hearings, closed and open--open means public--to question
senior administration and intelligence officials about the prewar intelligence
on Iraq's WMD and its links to terrorism. Last week our committee held two hearings in connection with our investigation, one examining the October, 2002, National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and the other on the current search for Iraq's weapons. While we are still at an early stage in this investigation, I want to comment on what we have reviewed so far. First, past possession of WMD. We know that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons in the past. In the 1980s the Iraqi military used chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurds. In the 1990s Iraq admitted to U.N. weapons inspectors that it had produced over 8,400 liters of anthrax and 3.9 tons of the chemical warfare agent VX. Drawing on both direct and circumstantial evidence collected over many years, the intelligence community also concluded that Iraq had people, planning documents, and equipment to support WMD production. Number two, hiding WMD. The agents that comprise weapons of mass destruction are exceedingly easy to hide, a point neither the administration nor the intelligence community made adequately clear before the war in Iraq. Five hundred metric tons of bulk chemical agents would fill a backyard swimming pool. Biological agents can be hidden in small vials in private residences. But it is not so easy to hide delivery vehicles like unmanned aerial drones, missiles, or munitions. That none of these other harder-to-hide items has been found is cause for real concern. Number three, overstating the case. When discussing Iraq's WMD, administration officials rarely included the caveats and qualifiers attached to the intelligence community's judgments. Secretary of State Powell, for example, told the U.N. Security Council that ``we know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction ..... '' On the eve of war, President Bush said, ``Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised.'' And on a March 30 Sunday news show, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld said that he knew where the WMD were located. Bogus information on Iraq's alleged nuclear connection to Niger was even included in the President's State of the Union Address. For many Americans, the administration's certainty gave the impression that there was even stronger intelligence about Iraq's possession of and intention to use WMD. Number four, circumstantial evidence. The committee is now investigating whether the intelligence case on Iraq's WMD was based on circumstantial evidence rather than hard facts and whether the intelligence community made clear to the policy-makers and Congress that most of its analytic judgments were based on things like aerial photographs and Iraqi defector interviews, not hard facts. This is an issue that we have to explore. And, finally, number five, weak ties to al Qaeda. Iraq did have ties to terrorist groups, but the investigation suggests that the intelligence linking al Qaeda to Iraq, a prominent theme in the administration's statements prior to the war, contradictary contrary to what was claimed by the administration. Much remains to be investigated in this area. Mr. Chairman, the highest priority of our committee, and I think of our Nation, remains finding and dismantling Iraq's WMD. It is counterintuitive to think that Iraq destroyed its weapons and did not report this to the United Nations. It is conceivable that Saddam destroyed them on the eve of or even after the start of the war once he recognized the futility of using them and the political advantage of keeping the United States from finding them; but the more likely scenario is that he buried or dispersed his weapons of mass destruction and that some may now be in the hands of terrorist groups outside of Iraq or counterinsurgents in Iraq who continue to harm and kill U.S. and British troops. But even if Iraq's chemical and biological weapons are found tomorrow, and I hope they are, these issues warrant scrutiny by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. It is already clear that there were flaws in U.S. intelligence. Iraq's WMD was not located where the intelligence community thought it might be. Chemical weapons were not used in the war despite the intelligence community's judgment that their use was likely. I urge this administration not to contemplate military action, especially preemptive action, in Iran, North Korea or Syria until these issues are cleared up. Certainly this Member would not support such action until these matters are cleared up. As the committee moves forward with its investigation, we need also be mindful of the burden the intelligence agencies are carrying, not only in Iraq but also in the war on terrorism in other areas of the world. Our Nation is best served by an effective intelligence community, not one hobbled by risk aversion and finger-pointing. The committee's review must be based on facts, which I and others intend to follow unflinchingly wherever they may lead. Our Nation needs a robust intelligence budget, which this authorization bill supports. At the same time, the committee's immediate priority is to resolve the questions regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ties to terrorist groups. If the answers dictate changes in the future intelligence budgets or policy, I am committed to bringing those recommendations forward. Meanwhile, this authorization bill deserves our strong support. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time. Home | Lobby | Congresswoman Harman's Office | Press | Issues | Casework | District Office | Library | Webmaster | Privacy Policy | Contact
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