Statement by Congresswoman Jane Harman

Congresswoman Jane harman - Press Release

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT

November 18, 2003

Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to instruct this bill's conferees to insist upon section 344 of the House-passed bill requesting an intelligence "lessons learned'' report and to include a requirement that this report be submitted as soon as possible.

Section 344 of the House bill requests within 1 year of enactment a report from the Director of Central Intelligence on intelligence lessons learned as a result of military operations in Iraq. But as we know all too well, the lives of American soldiers, sailors, airmen and -women, Marines and civilians are on the line in Iraq and Afghanistan today. There is an urgent need to identify what policymakers, military forces, and the intelligence community can be doing better today rather than months or years from now.

As we all know, Mr. Speaker, the war in Iraq is not over, and daily reports from Baghdad continue to be grave and disheartening. In the last several weeks, we have seen suicide bombings of the International Red Cross headquarters and several Baghdad police stations, a rocket attack on the al-Rashid Hotel where Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz was staying at the time, mortar attacks inside the U.S.-controlled Green Zone in central Baghdad, the downing of five U.S. Army helicopters, a suicide bombing of Italian military police in An Nasariyah, and a steady stream of improvised road-side explosive devices directed against U.S. and coalition soldiers.

Coalition forces are being attacked up to 35 times a day. As of today, Mr. Speaker, 181 U.S. soldiers have been killed in Iraq by hostile fire since the President announced the end of major combat operations on May 1. Clearly, our intelligence efforts on the ground are not where they should be. We are only now setting up information sharing fusion centers. We have just recently begun to increase the number of analysts and intelligence experts. The bottom line is that we still know very little about the nature of the insurgency.

Accurate and actionable intelligence is vital if we are to prevail in this continuing conflict, and I and other members of the Committee intend to do everything possible to provide our forces with the very best intelligence. Lessons learned with respect to both prewar intelligence and intelligence support to the war fighters during combat operations are a key ingredient in that effort. The intelligence community must understand what worked well and what did not work so well so that improvements in intelligence support to U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq today can be made as quickly as possible. Lessons learned are also important if future intelligence assessments of Iran, North Korea, and the war on terrorism in general are to be credible.

The gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) has said, and I agree, that intelligence community reform, or transformation, must be on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence's agenda next year. That effort should be informed by an understanding of where U.S. intelligence in Iraq needs to be better.

[Time: 17:15]
In the course of a 5-month investigation, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on a bipartisan basis has identified serious shortcomings in the prewar intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ties to terrorism. We found that sketchy and often circumstantial evidence produced estimates that likely were substantially wrong. At a minimum, the intelligence community overstated the strength of the underlying data supporting its conclusions.

Our Senate counterparts are engaged in a similar effort to identify intelligence shortcomings and recommend changes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have prepared their own assessment of strategic lessons learned from the Iraq war, and I strongly supported the Defense Authorization bill's requirement of a ``lessons learned'' report from the Department of Defense by March of next year.

Unfortunately, the intelligence community has yet to acknowledge any flaws in prewar intelligence. With American lives on the line, the problems with prewar intelligence must be addressed and analyzed now. An intelligence ``lessons learned'' study cannot await the conclusion of David Kay's ongoing WMD search in 9 months or a year from now. Regardless of what he finds, we already know there were problems with collection, analysis, and the way policymakers used the information.

Mr. Speaker, I offer this motion to instruct because the best intelligence is key to stopping the insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, which will then permit reconstruction and implementation of true self-government.

I am hopeful that the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) will accept my motion and that we will continue to work on a bipartisan basis to expedite the report and to implement its findings.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.