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July 17, 2002 HARMAN STATEMENT ON RELEASE OF HOUSE INTELLIGENCE SUBCOMMITTEE 9/11 REPORT- "The goal here is to prevent the next 9/11.
More needs to be done quickly WASHINGTON - The following is the opening statement (as prepared for delivery) by Congresswoman Jane Harman (D-CA), Ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, from today's press conference on the release of the subcommittee's report Counterterrorism Intelligence Capabilities and Performance prior to 9/11: This is a report about gaps in the performance of several intelligence agencies. It is not about gaps in the dedication, commitment, and patriotism of the thousands of Americans who work in them -- both here and abroad. Members of this Subcommittee have traveled all over the world. We have met U.S. intelligence personnel working in shabby and often dangerous conditions. They do this despite their families' fears that they could be in harm's way. Those fears are, unfortunately, well founded. Johnny Michael Spann was the first CIA agent to die in Afghanistan in this war on terror. His star will join others-some declared and some still secret - on the wall of honor in the lobby of the CIA. Other deaths have followed and more may come. This report is designed to give good people better tools - more resources, access to watch lists, digital technologies, advanced platforms, better language training and career support. Let me address our findings on the CIA and NSA, two of the four subjects we addressed in depth. The others are the FBI and the organization of Congress. CIA The CIA and other agencies thwarted the Millennium threat - a huge success. But our subcommittee found deficiencies which help explain why some critical clues were missed on 9/11. 1) Inadequate penetration of the al-Qa'ida target. The problem, in large part, stemmed from too few resources devoted to counter terrorism. In addition, CIA personnel in the field reported that the vetting process for spies impaired recruitment of informants capable of getting critical HUMINT (human intelligence) about the terrorist threat. Our report recommends making HUMINT collection a central core competency and criticizes the agency for failing to follow the law on changing the vetting process for spies. 2) Technology. I represent the district that makes most of our nation's advanced intelligence satellites. Penetration of the al-Qa'ida target requires multi-year investments in cutting edge technologies so the U.S. can, if necessary, have unilateral capability to collect SIGINT (signals intelligence). 3) Inadequate Watchlisting. As public sources have documented, several 9/11 hijackers were allowed to enter and leave the U.S. although the CIA believed they posed a terrorist threat to the U.S. Our report calls the CIA to lead a government-wide effort to ensure common access to a comprehensive watchlist of terrorist suspects. 4) Inadequate Language Skills. It remains true that the lack of language ability prevents infiltration and translation of SIGINT and other collected intelligence. Our report recommends that CIA personnel achieve "Level 3" (level 5 is the highest) proficiency before deployment and be rewarded for proficiency in their performance evaluations. 5) Inadequate support for the counter terrorism career path. 6) Too low a threshold for issuing intelligence reports. More discretion must be issued to confine such reporting to "actionable threats." NSA The National Security Agency has the enormous task of monitoring communications and other SIGINT. More than human intelligence at the CIA or investigations at the FBI, these NSA responsibilities have expanded extensively due to modern information technology and telecommunications. 1) We know that al Qa'ida is a digital organization - existing in disparate cells and planning attacks using the Internet and disposable cell phones. The NSA must counter this technology with better technology of its own. Our report recommends improvements to the acquisition and use of such technology. 2) Focus and inadequate language training are problems here too. A bigger problem is the need to integrate collection across the spectrum of new technologies - fiber-optics, Internet, packet- switches, mobile. This requires a workforce and digital management system of the highest caliber. 3) Most importantly, the culture of NSA must change from that of a "gatherer"
of information to a "hunter." There is simply too much information
out there. The challenge is to go after the Conclusion The goal here is to prevent the next 9/11. There is no guarantee we can do this, but new strategies, tools and resources will improve the odds. These agencies are changing. Tradecraft is better and the counter-terrorism function is enhanced. But more needs to be done quickly to honor the memory of those who died on 9/11 and to protect America. ### Home | Lobby | Congresswoman Harman's Office | Press | Issues | Casework | District Office | Library | Webmaster | Privacy Policy | Contact
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