June 25, 2003

HARMAN REMARKS ON THE FY2004
HOUSE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION BILL
AND INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE WMD INVESTIGATION

Washington, D.C. - U.S. Representative Jane Harman (D-Venice), Ranking Member on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, today released the following portion of her floor statement on the Fiscal Year 2004 Intelligence Authorization bill:

The Intelligence Authorization bill was developed at a time of heightened concern about the nature and quality of the intelligence that led to the decision to go to war in Iraq. I know there are questions on both sides of the aisle about this intelligence, questions the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is already asking. While an independent commission or other mechanism might be needed at some later date, the Members of the committee have now initiated an investigation and I would like to spend a few minutes discussing this effort.

As my colleagues know, I voted to authorize the use of military force against Iraq because I believed the intelligence case was compelling. The Intelligence Community judged that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and the danger, in the President's words, was 'grave and gathering.' The aftermath of the war has revealed just how brutal Saddam Hussein's regime was. The discovery of mass graves in Iraq and the gut-wrenching grief of families victimized by the regime speak for themselves. To date, however, Coalition forces have only uncovered two suspected Iraqi mobile biological warfare agent production plants. Coalition forces have yet to uncover chemical or biological weapons or further evidence of Iraqi links to terrorism.

Where are Iraq's chemical and biological weapons? Why can't our forces find them? For our Committee, these questions have loomed over the preparation of this authorization bill. It has been anything but business as usual.

On May 22, Chairman Goss and I sent a letter to Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet expressing the Committee's interest in learning, in detail, how the intelligence picture regarding Iraq's WMD and ties to terrorism was developed. The Chairman and I have also met twice with the DCI. In response to our request, the Intelligence Community has provided 19 volumes of information on Iraq's WMD programs and ties to terrorism.

On June 12, the Chairman and I announced the bipartisan and unanimous commitment of our Committee to a serious, focused, comprehensive review of the quality and objectivity of pre-war intelligence. We announced that we would hold hearings, closed and open, to question senior administration and intelligence officials about the pre-war intelligence on Iraq's WMD and its links to terrorism. I think it is very important that the Committee holds public hearings and I have Chairman Goss's personal commitment that we will. I hope our first hearing will occur in early July. Our Committee also decided to produce a written, unclassified report, as promptly as possible. In addition, we agreed to give all House Members access to the materials provided by the Intelligence Community in response to the committee's request, under appropriate security conditions and House rules.

Last week, the Intelligence Committee held two hearings in connection with our investigation, one examining the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and one on the current search for Iraq's weapons.

While we are still at an early stage in this investigation, I want to comment on what we have reviewed so far:

PAST POSSESSION OF WMD

We know that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons in the past. In the 1980s, the Iraqi military used chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurds. In the 1990s, Iraq admitted to U.N. weapons inspectors that it had produced over 8,400 liters of anthrax and 3.9 tons of the chemical warfare agent VX. Drawing on both direct and circumstantial evidence collected over many years, the Intelligence Community also concluded that Iraq had people, planning documents and equipment to support WMD production.

HIDING WMD

The agents that go into WMD are exceedingly easy to hide, a point neither the Administration nor the Intelligence Community made clear before the war. Five hundred metric tons of bulk chemical agents would fill a backyard swimming pool. Materials can be hidden in small vials in private residences. But it is not so easy to hide delivery vehicles like unmanned aerial drones, or missiles, or munitions. That none of these other, harder-to-hide items has been found is cause for real concern.

OVERSTATING THE CASE

When discussing Iraq's WMD, Administration officials rarely included the caveats and qualifiers attached to the Intelligence Community's judgments. Secretary of State Powell, for example, told the UN Security Council: 'We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction…'. On the eve of war, President Bush said, 'Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised.' And on a March 30 Sunday news show, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld said that he knew where the WMD was located. Bogus information on Iraq's alleged nuclear connection to Niger was even included in the President's State of the Union address. For many Americans, the Administration's certainty gave the impression there was even stronger intelligence about Iraq's possession of and intention to use WMD.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

The Committee is now investigating whether the intelligence case on Iraq's WMD was based on circumstantial evidence rather than hard facts - and whether the Intelligence Community made clear to policymakers and Congress that most of its analytic judgments were based on things like aerial photographs, Iraqi defector interviews - not hard facts.

WEAK TIES TO AL QA'IDA

Iraq did have ties to terrorist groups. But, the investigation suggests that the intelligence linking al-Qa'ida to Iraq, a prominent theme in Administration statements prior to the war, is conflicting - contrary to what was claimed by the Administration. Much remains to be investigated in this area.

Mr. Chairman, the highest priority remains finding and dismantling Iraq's WMD. It is counterintuitive to think that Iraq destroyed its weapons and did not report this to the United Nations. It is conceivable that Saddam destroyed them on the eve of, or even after the start of, the war once he recognized the futility of using them and the political advantage of keeping the United States from finding them. But the more likely scenario is that he buried or dispersed the WMD, and that some may now be in the hands of terrorist groups outside of Iraq or counterinsurgents in Iraq who continue to harm and kill US and British troops.

But even if Iraq's chemical and biological weapons are found tomorrow - and I hope that they are - these issues warrant scrutiny by the Intelligence Committee. It is already clear that there were flaws in U.S. intelligence. Iraq's WMD was not located where the Intelligence Community thought it might be. Chemical weapons were not used in the war, despite the IC's judgment that their use was likely. I urge this Administration not to contemplate military action (especially preemptive action) in Iran, North Korea, or Syria until these issues are cleared up. Certainly, this Member would not support it.

As the Committee moves forward with its investigation, we need also be mindful of the burden the intelligence agencies are carrying, not only in Iraq, but also in the war on terrorism and other areas of the world. Our nation is best served by an effective Intelligence Community, not one hobbled by risk-aversion and finger-pointing. The committee's review must be based on facts - which I and others intend to follow unflinchingly wherever they may lead.

Our nation needs a robust intelligence budget, which this authorization bill funds. At the same time, the Committee's immediate priority is to resolve the questions regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ties to terrorist groups. If the answers dictate changes in future intelligence budgets or policy, I am committed to bringing those recommendations forward.

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