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April 1, 2004
CONGRESSWOMAN HARMAN URGES PRESIDENT
BUSH TO TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO IMPROVE INTELLIGENCE,
INTRODUCES LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE
- Harman and Intelligence Dems Outline
10 Recommendations For Immediate Action -
WASHINGTON, DC - In an effort to fix the many problems that have plagued
United States intelligence in the post-Cold War era, Congresswoman Jane
Harman (CA-36), Ranking Member of the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, with her Democratic colleagues on the Committee, sent
a letter to President Bush calling on him to acknowledge shortcomings
in prewar intelligence and outlining steps that he can take now to improve
intelligence. U.S. intelligence is a vital weapon in the war on terrorism
and a critical tool for preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
Harman and her Democratic colleagues also introduced a sweeping legislative
reform package to modernize and transform the Intelligence Community.
The Intelligence Transformation Act will, among other things, create a
Director of National Intelligence (DNI), who will have statutory and budget
authority over all aspects of the Intelligence Community. Creating a DNI
was one of the major reforms recommended by the bipartisan, bicameral
Joint Congressional Inquiry into 9/11.
The Intelligence Transformation Act would establish a "dual-hatted"
Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence as the Deputy Director of National
Intelligence. The legislation also proposes "jointness" in the
collection and analysis of intelligence, modeled after the changes to
the military that Congress mandated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.
In addition, the Act would create a modern technological infrastructure
to improve intelligence analysis and collaboration across agencies, and
a new WMD Proliferation Threat Integration Center (PROTIC) to provide
integrated tasking of collection and analysis on the WMD proliferation
threat.
In announcing the legislation, Congresswoman Harman said: "The terrorists
and the enemies of the United States will not wait until after November
to plot their attacks - nor will they check our party registration before
they launch those attacks against us. We cannot afford to wait. This task
is urgent."
All Committee Democrats endorsed the legislation including: Alcee Hastings
(FL); Silvestre Reyes (TX); Leonard Boswell (IA); Collin Peterson (MN);
Bud Cramer (AL); Anna Eshoo (CA); Rush Holt (NJ); and Dutch Ruppersberger
(MD).
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April 1, 2004
President George W. Bush
The White House
Washington, DC 20500
Dear Mr. President:
Nearly a year ago, following the initial failure to find weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
undertook an inquiry into the pre-war intelligence underlying the judgments
that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction and had ties to terrorists.
While aspects of the inquiry are still ongoing, we believe steps can and
should be taken now to correct some of the deficiencies already identified.
We are mindful of the many intelligence successes of the brave and dedicated
cadre of people serving our country as intelligence officers - many of
whom are overseas at this very hour, risking their lives for our freedom.
To keep faith with them, we must ensure they have all the tools they need
to succeed.
The problems that have plagued our intelligence over the years must be
fixed now in order to protect our troops in Iraq, to win the war on terrorism,
and to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction. It is in this spirit
that we issue this urgent call to action.
We urge you to act immediately on the following near-term recommendations:
Refrain from tainting the various inquiries into 9/11 and Iraq's WMD
programs. We support greater declassification of material that can help
inform the American people of what happened in these two matters. However,
we believe that it is inappropriate for the White House to be involved
in the declassification decisions. White House involvement will only raise
suspicions that critical classification decisions are being made for partisan
political reasons. We, therefore, urge the White House to recuse itself
from all declassification decisions involving 9/11 or the Iraq WMD inquiry
and ask the CIA to appoint a professional, non-partisan review panel to
make declassification recommendations.
Acknowledge the problems in pre-war intelligence. It is difficult for
the Intelligence Community to talk about shortcomings in intelligence
if senior policy leaders still insist that there were no serious problems.
Acknowledging the problems will allow the intelligence community to move
aggressively to fix them.
Direct the intelligence agencies to scrub immediately all WMD intelligence
estimates worldwide and forward updates on all areas of serious concern.
The systemic analytic deficiencies that plagued estimates of Iraq's WMD
programs could also have affected other estimates, including on the nuclear
programs of North Korea and Iran.
Direct the Intelligence Community to: (1) improve collection and vetting
of hard-target information, to include new ways of deploying human intelligence
collectors; and (2) adopt a more aggressive plan for diversifying the
human intelligence (HUMINT) collector workforce with people who understand
the cultures and speak the languages of targeted countries and groups.
The Intelligence Community failed to develop reliable human intelligence
sources that could provide accurate information on the true state of Iraq's
WMD programs or Iraq's ties to al-Qa'ida.
Direct a crash program to develop technical tools for detecting and accurately
characterizing WMD programs. Current technical collection programs, such
as satellite imagery, were unable to answer key questions regarding Iraq's
WMD programs prior to the war.
Direct the National Security Council to review, and report back within
30 days, options for taking immediate steps to strengthen and reinvigorate
international inspections. The IAEA Iraq Action Team, UNSCOM, and the
UNMOVIC not only hampered Saddam's WMD pursuits, they also provided some
of the clearest insights into those programs. Stronger international inspection
regimes could assist the Intelligence Community in overcoming uncertainties
about other nations WMD programs.
Direct the DCI to take specific steps to improve the way the Intelligence
Community analyzes intelligence and conveys that information to policymakers.
Three of the most important pre-war intelligence judgments - that Iraq
had stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, was reconstituting
its nuclear weapons program, and was developing unmanned aerial vehicles
probably intended to deliver biological warfare agent and could threaten
the U.S. homeland - were seriously flawed.
It is now clear that analysts did not adequately challenge assumptions
stemming from old information, such as Iraq's use of WMD in the 1980s
and Iraq's failure during U.N. inspections to account for WMD-related
equipment and materials. The absence of proof that stockpiles had been
destroyed was taken as proof that they still existed. The pre-war analysis
also stated bold conclusions - such as "Baghdad has chemical and
biological weapons…" - that the underlying data did not adequately
support.
Ensure intelligence analysts are encouraged to provide their best possible
judgments, without pressure from senior policymakers. In our review, we
have learned that intelligence analysts examining Iraq's ties to al-Qa'ida
were subjected to intense pressure from senior policymakers to find connections
between Iraq and al-Qa'ida. We believe that analysts must be encouraged
to say when the reporting they are drawing on is not deep enough or sufficiently
reliable to reach definitive judgments.
Ensure that intelligence information provided to policymakers is adequately
vetted. Offices reporting to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy,
particularly the Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special
Plans, provided summaries of terrorism intelligence, including information
on Iraq's ties to al-Qa'ida, to senior Defense Department policymakers,
the National Security Council staff, and the Office of the Vice President.
These analyses were based in part on unreliable or unvetted information.
The Director of Central Intelligence, who is the President's ultimate
arbiter of intelligence judgments, was apparently not aware that these
materials were briefed to the Office of the Vice President. While policymakers
have every right to seek information from a variety of sources, there
is an inherent danger in setting up a stovepipe that forwards raw intelligence
to policymakers without sufficient peer review.
Ensure public presentations of intelligence are accurate. Policymakers
overstated or misstated the intelligence case with regard to Iraq's WMD
programs, using phrases like "there is no doubt" and "there
is no question" in public statements. While the pre-war intelligence
was inappropriately categorical in several key respects, policymaker statements
went even further in creating the impression that the information was
even more solid than it was.
In the case of statements regarding Iraq's ties to al-Qa'ida, policymakers
also often omitted important caveats. For example, they often failed to
note that the reporting on Iraq's ties to al-Qa'ida was fragmentary and
conflicting and from sources of varying reliability. Nor did they make
clear that in the fall of 2002 the Intelligence Community had said that
there was no credible information that Iraq was complicit in or had foreknowledge
of any al-Qa'ida attack, including 9/11.
The DCI said in March 2004, "The steady spread of Usama bin Ladin's
anti-US sentiment… ensures that a serious threat will remain for
the foreseeable future . . . with or without al-Qa`ida in the picture"
and "…that this enemy remains intent on obtaining, and using,
catastrophic weapons." We need the very best intelligence now. Time
is not on our side.
Sincerely,
JANE HARMAN
Ranking Democrat
ALCEE L. HASTINGS
Member of Congress
SILVESTRE REYES
Member of Congress
LEONARD L. BOSWELL
Member of Congress
COLLIN C. PETERSON
Member of Congress
ROBERT E. (BUD) CRAMER, JR.
Member of Congress
ANNA G. ESHOO
Member of Congress
RUSH D. HOLT
Member of Congress
C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER
Member of Congress
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