

Winning the War on Terror

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Winning the War on Terror

Introduction

Winning the war against our terrorist enemies is the central challenge of our times. The United States has faced other great challenges in our modern history. What we now call our “greatest generation” confronted and defeated fascism in Europe and Asia. A sustained campaign against communism over a fifty year period won the Cold War. Today we face a new type of evil. At the moment, the public face of our enemy is Osama bin Laden and the global al-Qaeda network. But over the long term, we are at war with a brand of radical Islamic fundamentalism that is extremely dangerous, is growing, and is a true threat to our people, our economy, and our way of life.

Let us be clear – this is a war for nothing less than our survival. Al-Qaeda and likeminded groups across the globe are limited only by the weapons they are able to obtain. There is no doubt that if they acquire chemical, biological, radiological, or even nuclear weapons, they will one day try to use them. And if they succeed, many, many lives will be lost and our world will be forever changed.

Our goal must be to win this war; to defeat the enemy. We should not be satisfied with merely reducing the risk of attack. We should not accept that this war will go on forever. Just as we no longer train schoolchildren to run into underground shelters for fear of a Soviet nuclear attack, we should aspire to a future where we no longer live with the uncertainty of catastrophic terror at our doorstep.

A Strategy to Win the War

To prevail in the war on terror our strategy must be bold – we must be willing to exercise every aspect of national power to achieve our goals. Our strategy must be comprehensive – it must deal with every aspect of the challenges we face. And our strategy must be geared not only toward short term gains, but to building and sustaining a global campaign against the evil we face so that one day we can say – “the war on terror is over and we have won.”

To win the war on terror, we must carry out three missions: we must aggressively attack the terrorists and the infrastructure that supports them; we must protect the homeland; and we must prevent the rise of future terrorists.

It is essential that we carry out all three missions at the same time. Identifying and locating our terrorist enemies through the global collection and sharing of intelligence, taking the battle to the terrorists, wherever they may be, and cutting off terrorists’ sources of financing is the right strategy and it must be pursued with vigor. But attacking the terrorists cannot be an exclusive strategy.

As we seek to destroy our terrorist enemies, the American people rightly demand that the government provide a greater level of protection from terrorist attacks than it did on September 11. Our homeland security must be comprehensive, effective, and proportionate to the threats we face. As the citizens of Bali, Istanbul, Riyadh, and Madrid have sadly learned, even when the terrorists are on the run, they can still kill. We must take whatever steps possible to stop them.

But even attacking and protecting against terrorists is not enough. To win the war on terror we must prevail in the battle of ideas. Ironically, it is on this battleground that the terrorists are at their weakest, but it is also where we are losing ground the most quickly. To win the war on terror, we need to take aggressive action to prevent the rise of future terrorists. We must do this through exercising non-military aspects of American power: public diplomacy, economic development, trade, educational exchanges, stability operations, and democracy promotion. These parts of our arsenal are not as awesome as our weapons of war, but over the long run they are necessary to win over the hearts and minds of the populations that, right now, are fertile recruiting grounds for our enemies.

If we are honest with ourselves, we must admit that today we are far from winning the war on terror. Our attacks against the terrorist groups have been only a partial success. While many al-Qaeda leaders have been captured or killed, this has not diminished the lethality of the now semi-autonomous terrorist cells dispersed across the globe, as the deadly Madrid rail attacks demonstrated. One day, bin Laden and his chief lieutenants will be eliminated. That will be a great day for justice, but it will probably not have a practical effect on the long-term war against terror. For the war on terror is not about one man, or even one organization. To win the war on terror, we need an aggressive, robust set of military, diplomatic, and protective policies designed to suppress the growth and power of radical Islamic fundamentalism across the globe. Today, we are not executing such a strategy.

Attacking the Terrorists

Attacking the terrorists requires us to reform the intelligence agencies that failed to detect and prevent September 11, restructure parts of our Armed Forces so they are better suited to finding and capturing or killing terrorists, strengthen clandestine activities at the Central Intelligence Agency, transform the Federal Bureau of Investigation into an effective counterterrorism force, and develop strong domestic and international programs and policies to cut off terrorists' financing.

Remarkably, two and a half years after September 11, the intelligence bureaucracy that failed so miserably that day is relatively unchanged. Few of the bipartisan recommendations issued by the congressional intelligence committees following their joint inquiry into September 11 have been acted upon. To remedy these problems, we must create a "Director for National Intelligence" to coordinate the disparate agencies of the Intelligence Community, one who does not also serve as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. We should also make the long term investments necessary to develop better human sources of intelligence on terrorist networks and to increase the language skills of agency personnel.

We are lacking an information sharing system suitable for fighting the war on terror. Such a system must be so technically advanced that once a person has been identified as a terrorist suspect that information is made available, in real time, to all our intelligence analysts, law enforcement,

border security officials, and consular officers. The Terrorist Screening Center that is finally being developed after two years of delay is not much more than a call-in center. While a step in the right direction, it is not the advanced capability we need.

Likewise, despite the best intentions of some Pentagon reformers, our military has not yet been transformed to adapt to the new security environment of the 21st century. To do so, we need to double the Special Forces to 100,000 troops over the next decade, obtain weapons and technologies that are lighter, quicker, and stealthier in order to better track down and attack terrorist cells, and utilize covert strikes executed with speed and precision that are less likely than traditional military operations to provoke resentment against the United States and contribute to the recruitment of future terrorists. To promote partnerships that will make our offensive strategy more effective, we should develop both NATO Special Forces units and Joint Commando Forces with Arab and Muslim nations. Joint, internationally sanctioned forces are necessary to provide consensus for rapid engagement of the enemy around the world.

With respect to terrorist financing, the immediate reaction to September 11 was swift and strong. But far more must be done to reinvigorate this effort and dig deeper into the network of cover organizations and financiers around the globe that continue to provide financial support for al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. We need a national and international plan to crack down on *hawala* brokers who use informal transaction systems to circumvent anti-terrorism and money laundering rules.

To attack effectively a global network of terrorists through intelligence gathering, military operations, and financial regulation, we must have international partners. No foreign nation or international organization will ever have a veto over American security. But when we take military action, as part of the war on terror or in furtherance of other objectives, we must strive to do so in a way that promotes our long term interest in defeating the terrorists, and that means acting in a way that strengthens our partnerships with other countries.

In the aftermath of September 11, conditions were ripe for the creation of a global, long-term coalition against the terrorists; a coalition that would include not only our traditional allies, but critical countries in Asia and the Middle East where intelligence gathering and operational activities could make a real difference. But in the two and a half years since September 11, the goodwill of the world toward the United States has been diminished. In Afghanistan, we ignored the unprecedented NATO invocation of Article 5 of its charter stating that an attack against one member is an attack against the Alliance itself, in favor of a go-at-it-alone approach. And in Iraq, we insisted on invading at a time, place, and manner of our own choosing. Having exhibited disregard toward the international community, we now bear the principal burden in Iraq, attempting to quell an insurgency, reconstruct an economy, and develop viable political institutions.

While the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has undermined the key and most compelling justification for the invasion of Iraq, let there be no doubt that failure to complete the task of stabilizing post-invasion Iraq will increase the threat of international terrorism. The full support of the world community is necessary to achieve peace and democracy in Iraq. Our success in achieving that support will determine whether we can build a foundation for success in the broader war on terror.

Protecting the Homeland

Protecting the homeland is an essential part of a strategy to win the war on terror. Despite the glaring vulnerabilities that were exposed by the September 11 attacks, and despite the action of the President and Congress to create the Department of Homeland Security and take other actions in response to those attacks, America is not as safe as it needs to be in light of the terrorist threats we currently face.

The Administration's approach to homeland security has been strong on rhetoric and weak on action. America continues to face security gaps across the board. We are not prepared to deal with a major bioterror attack in the United States. Our aviation system is still not as secure as it needs to be and our commercial aircraft are highly vulnerable to attack from shoulder fired missiles. Our borders are still porous. We barely scrutinize the 20 million cargo containers that enter the United States each year, even though they could carry nuclear or radiological materials into the heart of America. Chemical manufacturing facilities have little meaningful security to prevent a release that could kill millions. Little has been done to provide greater security on our rail and transit systems, which are prime terrorist targets. Infrastructures upon which we depend (energy facilities, telecommunications, and financial networks) are vulnerable to both physical and cyber attacks. Law enforcement is still not receiving sufficient intelligence information to prevent terrorist attacks. First responders in our communities still do not have the equipment and training they need to properly protect us. And we do not have a government-wide information technology architecture to facilitate real-time collection and dissemination of terrorist threat information.

One of the greatest threats we face comes from unsecured stockpiles of materials that could be used to create weapons of mass destruction. These materials are spread across the globe. Little is being done to prevent terrorists from getting their hands on them. A decade ago, Senators Nunn and Lugar had the foresight to draw the government's attention to this massive threat to our national security. Yet, the difficult job of securing these stockpiles has not been given the priority that current threats demand. To address this threat, America should lead a global alliance to secure all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons materials in the former Soviet Union and beyond to prevent the catastrophic event that could occur if al-Qaeda operatives or their compatriots obtain access to them.

We also need a robust, aggressive strategy to close the security gaps we face at home. Our best scientists must be dedicated to developing vaccines and medicines to counteract a bioterror attack. We need new technologies and research methods to reduce from years to weeks the time it takes to develop drugs to treat new or bioengineered pathogens. And we need detailed, well rehearsed plans for distributing vaccines in the event of an attack. Radiation portals should be positioned at every port of entry, right away, so no cargo container enters the United States without being screened for nuclear or radiological materials. All cargo that is shipped on passenger airlines should also be screened. Airliners must be equipped with anti-missile technology as soon as reasonable systems are available. Forces on our borders should be doubled and all our borders should be monitored 24/7. The Coast Guard needs modernized equipment this decade, not over 20 years from now as currently proposed. First responders must have modern communications equipment so they can talk to each other during emergencies. Our subways, commuter rails, and other transportation facilities need security cameras, communications equipment, chemical and biological sensors, and better emergency response plans. The thousands of chemical plants that threaten the safety of surrounding

communities must undergo risk assessments and security improvements must be mandated. First responders across America need to have the equipment and training they need to respond to likely terrorist incidents in their communities.

The Administration has initiated partial or weak programs in many of these areas. But the terrorists will not wait for the implementation of a five-year, phased-in, gradual homeland security effort. Our enemies are plotting attacks against America now. We need to move much faster and much more aggressively in light of the imminent threats we face. The cost of these investments in security is small in comparison to the human and financial cost of failure.

Preventing the Rise of Future Terrorists

To defeat the terrorist organizations that threaten us, we must take bold steps to reverse the current dynamic where more terrorists are recruited every day than are detained or killed through our other efforts. Our troops can prevail on the battlefield, our intelligence agencies can identify terrorist cells, and our defensive measures can foil plots, but the long term key to our national security is isolating the radical Islamic extremists by presenting a competing and more powerful and positive vision of the future of the Middle East and the Muslim world. It must be a vision built in partnership with the people of the Middle East and supported by a global coalition with American leadership at the helm.

The population of the Arab world is now at 280 million, approximately equal to that of the United States. Over half of the entire Arab world is under 24 years of age. While a whole generation forms its worldview, opinion of the United States across the Muslim world is at an all-time low. A study by former Ambassador Edward Djerejian concluded that “hostility toward the United States has reached shocking levels.” The Pew Research Center recently issued a survey showing that Osama bin Laden is supported by 65 percent of Pakistanis and 55 percent of Jordanians. Shockingly, even in Turkey, a NATO ally and recent victim of terrorist violence, 31 percent say that “suicide attacks against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq are justifiable.”

One critical factor in world opinion about the United States is that large majorities in Muslim nations believe that we act internationally without taking into account the interests of other nations. According to the Pew Center, 79 percent of Turks and 77 percent of Jordanians believe that the United States “pays little or no attention to their country’s interests in making foreign policy decisions.”

If we are to win the war on terror in our lifetimes, this perception of the United States has to change. To win the war, we must convince the world, especially Arabs and Muslims, that our fight is their fight too.

The problem is, we are not doing this now. As the world’s sole superpower, we must be cognizant of the resentment our status engenders. Phrases like “shock and awe,” and “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” contribute to this resentment and work counter to our

interests. A foreign policy based on these terms will not bring us much success in the effort to halt the rise of future terrorists.

While we are encouraging other nations to take strong action against terrorist organizations, at the same time we also need to be taking proactive efforts to demonstrate to people across the globe that we are a force for positive change in their lives. We need to show them that we care about the same things they care about – better jobs, better schools for their children, better health care, and better roads, housing, and water. Freedom to pursue a better life is the most universal of human values and spreading this freedom is in our nation’s long term security interest.

To change the tide in our long term war against terror, the United States, together with our allies should make a dramatic and massive commitment, on the scale of the Marshall Plan, to the future of Arab and Muslim children and to the economic prosperity of all people in the Middle East. The original Marshall Plan led to the longest period of peace and prosperity in European history and the creation of a united Europe, whole and free. Americans were never again sent to die on the battlefields of Europe, but instead have expanded the community of free nations and strengthened our own security.

The challenges we face today require a vision just as grand. We should lead a global effort that will help revolutionize educational opportunities and economic development in the Arab and Muslim world. To get children out of *madrasas* that preach hate and venom against the West and modern values, we should create a global alliance to build high quality schools in Arab countries that agree to double their own investment in public education. We should create a “Renaissance Partnership” to create free-market economies in the Middle East. Under this plan, countries that accept open trade standards, agree to form a Middle East Common Market, and develop transparent financial institutions would qualify for billions in assistance to create technology infrastructure, small businesses, and other entrepreneurial enterprises. And we should triple support for the National Endowment for Democracy to support moderate voices throughout the Islamic world such as independent media, small business federations, democratic political movements, and civic organizations.

These initiatives should be big, so people can feel their impact and understand that the United States cares about improving their lives. And while expensive, these programs are small investments compared to the cost of military actions and their aftermath, or further terrorist attacks on our homeland.

No matter how bold these initiatives are, they must be accompanied by success in our mission to stabilize and reconstruct Iraq. The stakes could not be higher. The Arab world was hostile to the Administration’s argument for war even when it relied on claims that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and harbored terrorists. Now that those claims have been undermined, the credibility and standing of the United States in the Middle East is on the line as never before. Failure is not an option. Iraq must be stabilized. Its economy must be restored. Political institutions must be developed. And the Iraqi people must be provided hope for a better future. If this political and economic development does not occur, then the perception within the Muslim world will be that the United States pursued an illegitimate war of aggression against an Arab country and left it in a worse condition than it was found. Not only would Iraq become a haven for the enemy terrorists, an ironic

and tragic result, but the war will continue to be a rallying cry and recruitment tool for the radical fundamentalist movement that we are trying to defeat. If we succeed, Iraq can be the beginning of an effort to reshape the Middle East in line with our long-term strategic interests.

Prior to its invasion, Iraq was not a battleground in the war on terror. It is now. We must succeed.

Leading the Country and the World in the War on Terror

Implementing an effective strategy to win the war on terror will require strong and visionary leadership. We must take decisive, forceful actions, but must do so in a way that sustains the partnerships with other countries that are necessary for success. And we must have the courage to advocate for domestic and international financial support to the very parts of the world from which our deepest enemies have arisen.

It takes strong leadership to build international support for our actions rather than “going at it alone.” It takes strong leadership to convince other countries to work with us in combating the terrorists rather than labeling them as either with us or against us. It takes strong leadership to tell the American people that we are not as safe as we need to be.

Finally, it takes strong leadership to ask Americans to make sacrifices for their country. This is the first war in our history in which our soldiers are fighting, but those at home are not being asked to make sacrifices in their own lives. During World War II, every American was called upon to sacrifice: from the troops who served, to the housewives who rationed, to the citizens whose taxes were raised to pay for the war. Today, our young people should be encouraged to give a year of their lives to public service, either in the Armed Forces, National Guard, AmeriCorps, or the Peace Corps. Our leaders should also be telling the American people, candidly and frankly, that winning the war on terror will cost a great deal of money, and that all Americans are going to have to make sacrifices to achieve victory. Right now, we are failing to make the investments needed to win this war and its costs are being passed on to future generations.

To win the war on terror, we need bold, principled, and enlightened leadership to execute a well conceived and comprehensive strategy. Our great nation has always risen to the challenges that history has presented, and we will do so once again.

Representative Jim Turner, (D-TX)

Ranking Member

U.S. House Select Committee on Homeland Security

ATTACKING THE TERRORISTS

The first mission in winning the war on terror is to take the fight to the enemy.

The horrific nature of attacks by al-Qaeda and its collaborators is constrained only by the capability of the terrorists weapons and the limits of their dark imaginations. For the first time in history, we face an adversary whose main goal is the killing as many American and other Western civilians as possible.

To prevent future terrorist attacks against the United States and our allies, to restore a sense of stability to world affairs, and deliver justice to the victims of terrorist attacks – the United States must marshal all the assets of national power for the long fight ahead.

To win this war, we must find the enemy and strike him at times and places of our choosing. To fight this type of war requires the production of new capabilities in the Intelligence Community and a revolution in military affairs. We will need the ability to deploy small and stealthy forces that can pinpoint the enemy and deploy instantly around the globe to disrupt and destroy its terrorist network. We must transform the Federal Bureau of Investigation to meet the threats of this new age and require all agencies to share information so we can receive sufficient warning to prevent future attacks. We must disrupt the enemy's line of supply, which is his network of financiers.

And finally, we need to take dramatic steps to strengthen our alliances and form strong relationships with others countries to form an effective global coalition to defeat terrorism.

IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE

Winning the war on terror will require an unprecedented level of cooperation and coordination between every intelligence agency in the United States government and between the intelligence services of our allies. More than two and a half years after the attacks of September 11th, it is clear by all accounts that to accomplish our goal of protecting the homeland and destroying al-Qaeda and like minded groups, great change must take place in the Intelligence Community.

The Congressional Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (Joint Inquiry) stated the gravity of the situation with great clarity in its final report:

FINDING: Prior to September 11th, the Intelligence Community was neither well organized nor equipped, and did not adequately adapt, to meet the challenge posed by global terrorists focused on targets within the domestic United States.

Serious gaps existed between the collection coverage provided by U.S. foreign and U.S. domestic capabilities. The CIA's failure to watch list suspected terrorists reflected a lack of emphasis on a process designed to protect the homeland from terrorist threat. At home, the counterterrorism effort suffered from the lack of an effective domestic intelligence capability.¹

Despite this unambiguous finding, the structure and organization of the Intelligence Community is essentially the same as it was before September 11. The same problems with intelligence sharing, watchlisting, intelligence collection, and intelligence analysis that were present before September 11 still exist today. We must move faster and stronger to improve the most essential weapon we have in fighting the War on terror: intelligence.

Create a Fully Unified Terrorist Watch List

More than two years after September 11, our government still does not have a single database of suspected terrorists for the worldwide use of intelligence officers, federal, state, and local law enforcement, border inspectors, and immigration officials.² After shifting responsibility four times over two years, the Administration created the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), within the FBI, on December 1, 2003,³ but promptly announced that the Center was only in a "test phase" at that time,⁴ and that "initial capabilities of the TSC will be limited."⁵ According to the FBI, the TSC will have a database that will contain all the government's terrorist watchlist information by December 2004, but even then, that system will not have the capability to provide real time screening capability to all the homeland security officials who need it.

This means that today, and in the future, people are boarding planes or entering our borders without being checked against the government's entire list of known terrorists. Each additional day of delay endangers the lives of Americans.

The Administration should ensure that the government, by no later than the end of this year, creates a fully unified terrorist watch list that is electronically accessible by law enforcement, border agents, and consular officers so they can be advised in real time whether individuals are known or suspected terrorists.

Coordinate the Agencies of the Intelligence Community by Creating the Post of Director for National Intelligence

Since the national security re-organization of 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has been responsible for coordinating the Intelligence Community. The DCI has also always been simultaneously head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In reality though, the DCI exerts little control over other intelligence agencies.

For example, in December 1998, the DCI raised the status of the al-Qaeda threat when he announced in writing, “We are at war (with Bin Laden). I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside the CIA or the Intelligence Community.” The Joint Inquiry found however that, “the Intelligence Community as a whole had only a limited awareness of this declaration.” The Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division at the time testified to the Joint Inquiry that he “was not specifically aware of that declaration of war.”

To ensure that the Intelligence Community receives clear and consistent direction, Congress should create the post of “Director of National Intelligence” (DNI),⁶ as envisioned in legislation introduced on April 1, 2004 by all Democratic members of the House Intelligence Committee.⁷ The DNI would integrate the full spectrum of intelligence-related functions both at home and abroad with respect to counterterrorism. This would include the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the military services’ intelligence agencies, the FBI, and intelligence components of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).⁸

The Director of National Intelligence should be the President’s principal advisor on intelligence and have the full range of management, budgetary and personnel responsibilities needed to make the entire U.S. Intelligence Community operate as a coherent whole. No person should be permitted to serve as both the DNI and head of any other agency at the same time.

Improve Human Intelligence Capabilities

Acquiring information about the composition, location, capabilities, plans, and intentions of terrorist organizations is an enormous challenge for intelligence agencies.

Effective counterterrorism operations depend, in part, on effective human intelligence (HUMINT), acquired through the use of spies and informers.⁹ The lack of human intelligence assets has been a serious deficiency in the war against al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups.

The Joint Inquiry found that “Prior to September 11th, 2001, the Intelligence Community did not effectively develop and use human sources to penetrate al-Qaeda. This lack of reliable and knowledgeable human sources significantly limited the Community’s ability to acquire intelligence that could be acted upon before the September 11 attacks.”¹⁰ The U.S. Commission for National Security in the 21st Century said, “The intelligence community should emphasize the recruitment of human intelligence sources on terrorism as one of its highest priorities.”¹¹

A renewed commitment to HUMINT will involve a willingness to accept the risks of dangerous missions, and likely ties to disreputable individuals who may be in positions to provide valuable information. These are risks we must take to infiltrate and defeat al-Qaeda. This commitment to human intelligence will also require a move toward greater reliance on non-traditional

methods and techniques. This would include, in part, the expanded use of non-official cover personnel who are removed from the protection of American embassies that would be available if the agents had cover as a U.S. government official.¹²

All agencies involved in collecting HUMINT against al-Qaeda and other counterterrorism targets should be provided with sufficient incentives and large increases in resources to improve HUMINT collection in order to carry out more effective surveillance, infiltration, and disruption of terrorist networks.

Integrate Intelligence

The Intelligence Community collects a vast amount of information from a variety of sources using methods that run the gamut from low-tech clandestine meetings to high-tech satellites. Gathering, integrating, and analyzing intelligence in an effective manner is critical to maintaining a close watch on suspected terrorists at home and abroad. Too often, however, intelligence collected from different sources is not merged together to allow collectors and analysts to build a comprehensive picture of how our enemies intend to strike us. The Intelligence Community needs to find a way to leverage all of its resources to help fight the war on terror.

Congress attempted to address this problem by creating a specialized intelligence fusion and analysis section within the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) called the Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP). But the President clouded the mission of IAIP by announcing during the 2003 State of the Union address that he was creating, under the auspices of the CIA, a new Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC).

Public testimony by Administration officials confirms the continuing difficulties of inter-agency coordination of intelligence. Testifying before the House Select Committee on Homeland Security Committee in February 2004, TTIC Director John Brennan admitted that integrating information from fourteen different agencies' information systems across the government is presenting "a series of challenges." The confusing reality of overlapping jurisdiction among multiple governmental organizations involved in protecting the homeland – TTIC, the CIA's Counter Terrorism Center, DHS's Directorate of IAIP, the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center, and the FBI's Counterterrorism Division – reduces our faith that a workable system for assessing and identifying threats is being developed and refined.

In addition, serious staffing shortages are reducing the important new intelligence role of the Department of Homeland Security. While Congress has approved 692 employees for IAIP for fiscal year 2004, fewer than 300 had been hired as of February 11, 2004. As of late 2003, DHS had assigned only five full time analysts to TTIC of the 35 projected to be necessary.

Within a year, the Intelligence Community should present a plan to the Director of National Intelligence that provides solutions to overcome current technological and organizational challenges that hinder the full integration of all forms of intelligence. In particular, the Administration should take action to hire the personnel necessary to fully staff IAIP and TTIC and fulfill their diverse duties.

Promote “Jointness” Within the Intelligence Community

The attacks of September 11th painfully exposed the lack of communication and coordination between the major agencies of the Intelligence Community. Congress should enact legislation modeled on the Goldwater-Nichols Act that would instill the concept of “jointness” in the Intelligence Community.¹³

The Director of National Intelligence should require “joint tours” for intelligence and appropriate law enforcement personnel to broaden their experience and bridge organizational and cultural divides through service in other agencies. Joint tours would include service at Intelligence Agencies and in those agencies that are consumers of intelligence products.

The DNI should also require Intelligence Community agencies to participate in joint exercises. Personnel should be rewarded for joint service with career advancement credit, such as incentive pay and fast track promotion potential, especially for officers agreeing to serve at TTIC. TTIC needs to be highlighted as a premier posting, not an assignment likely to delay career advancement.

Increase the Language Skills of Intelligence Analysts and Case Officers

One of the greatest national security assets that the United States has is technology. Our ability to intercept communication at every level is limited only by the speed of our technological innovations. There is, however, a huge gap between our ability to collect information and our ability to process and understand it.

The National Security Agency (NSA) has stated that only 30 percent of its language personnel working in counterterrorism have a working knowledge of “campaign languages” such as Arabic.¹⁴ According to the Chief of the FBI’s Language Services Division, prior to September 11th, 35 percent of the Arabic language materials collected were not reviewed or translated as a result of the translation backlog at the FBI. That backlog was projected to increase to 41 percent by 2003. The Director of the CIA Language School testified that the CIA’s Directorate of Operations is not fully prepared to fight a world wide war on terror and at the same time carry out its traditional agent recruitment and intelligence collection mission.¹⁵

Intelligence agencies must increase the number of employees who are fluent in the “campaign languages” to the point where 100 percent of all information collected can be processed on a real-time basis.

Promote International Intelligence Cooperation

International cooperation between intelligence agencies is essential to winning the war on terror. Regardless of how strong and capable a military we have, or how effective our own intelligence services are, we will always require on the ground cooperation of local intelligence services.

The Director of National Intelligence should place as one of the highest priorities of the Intelligence Community the establishment of new and strengthening of ex-

isting relationships between U.S. intelligence agencies and those of other nations. Joint training and exchanges should be encouraged to solidify and expand these critical relationships.

TRANSFORMING THE MILITARY: GLOBAL REACH, GLOBAL STRIKE

The United States has the most efficient and lethal fighting force in the history of the world. Yet the bulk of our armed forces have been designed for the conflicts of the 20th century— large set piece actions involving state-to-state conflict in which one nation’s military confronts that of an adversary.

At the dawn of the 21st century, the United States faces a new kind of threat to our national security – non-state actors who stealthily cross borders, find refuge and support from civilian populations, and target civilians in hit-and-run and suicide missions. In an age when the likes of al-Qaeda can inflict more casualties on the United States in one strike than the Imperial Japanese military did at Pearl Harbor, and is constantly looking to acquire even greater destructive power in the form of powerful weapons of mass destruction, it is imperative that the capabilities of our military forces match the main threat to our national security.

No longer are nation states the sole participants in, or originators of, military conflict and no longer is the destruction of traditional military forces the sole object of our adversaries’ effort. Some military scholars call this emerging threat “fourth generation warfare.” On these battlefields of the future, large, technologically-advanced, “heavy” military formations may play a supporting role to smaller, more agile, and sometimes covert special operations forces working in conjunction with a host of interagency actors, including intelligence and law enforcement personnel. Future wars are likely to be extremely complex, low intensity conflicts transcending national borders whose effects will expand beyond the range of “traditional” military targets into large parts of civil society. With the rise of al-Qaeda and affiliated groups and the continued insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, we can see that a new generation of warfare has arrived.

The capabilities required to prevail in these conflicts require joint forces that are able to deploy rapidly, be employed immediately and prevail decisively in expeditionary roles.¹⁶ We must therefore design major elements of our military forces to be prepared for the conflicts of the 21st century by adopting a structure that allows for global reach and global strike.

Global reach, global strike is an approach to force structure that advocates agile and precise new weaponry, based primarily on U.S. soil and other secure garrisons, able to deploy and then employ firepower decisively within days anywhere in the world.¹⁷ Restructuring the U.S. military to achieve the goals of global reach, global strike means a major increase in our airlift capability and adopting the latest technology of “military transformation.”

Accelerate the Pace of Military Transformation

The process of transformation entails new technologies (war fighting systems), new operational concepts (network centric warfare) and new organizational structures, such as Special Forces and joint operations. The broad aim of transformation is to develop joint, network centric, distributed forces capable of rapid decision superiority with overwhelming firepower across the battlefield.¹⁸

The Quadrennial Defense Review issued by the Secretary of Defense in 2001 issued a list of the key characteristics of a security environment that require military transformation, which included:

- diminished protection of geographic distance
- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- increasing challenges from weak/failing states
- more operations in urban areas

This is our strategic environment today- and so the U.S. military must embrace military transformation to meet these new challenges.

The process of transformation entails the development of new technologies, such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, new operational concepts, such as network centric warfare, and new organizational structures, such as Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters. The fielding of new technologies is partially a function of funding levels, but even after funding is established, it is still dependent on the pace of scientific research and development.

Operational concepts and organizational changes, however, are the product of leadership and, as such, can be started today to help bring transformational capabilities to U.S. forces. The quintessential example is the Special Operations soldier on horseback calling for precision effects delivered by stealth aircraft launched from half a world away.

Currently, the Defense Department spends 17% of its procurement budget on transformational programs. We must move faster.

The United States should double its commitment to military transformation by providing incentives to those who are part of joint operations and ensure that within the next ten years- up to of 35 percent of the Defense Department's acquisitions are for transformational programs.

Support the Transformation of Land Forces

After assessing the changing threat environment, the Chief of Staff of the Army stated that the Army had to transform to meet the challenge of the rise of transnational terrorist groups and subnational groups in failed states.¹⁹ The current ten division format is a legacy of the Cold War strategic environment. The Army wants to create a rapidly deployable, early-entry combat force that is lethal, survivable, and capable of operating in all types of military operations from small scale contingencies to a major theater of war. As an early entry force, these smaller brigade sized units are expected to have built-in combat power to conduct immediate combat operations upon arrival in theater. This new emphasis on smaller, faster and stronger forces should be supported.

The Secretary of Defense should improve the readiness, training and deployment ability of Army forces by supporting, consistent with the U.S. Army's goals- a new force structure of 48 brigades. By upgrading airlift capability with new C-17's and C-5's, U.S. Army forces should be fully operational and able to project American power anywhere in the world within ten days.

Boost Naval Transformation

New concepts for the use of naval power have already been used successfully in the Kosovo conflict and, in particular, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. For Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. Navy provided close-in launch platforms for delivering ordnance to targets using real-time information and serving as jumping-off points for Marine units to drop onto al-Qaeda and Taliban targets at times and places of our choosing. Further transformation of the Navy will strengthen the ability of the United States to project power anywhere in the world and launch joint military operations in a timely fashion and hit targets of opportunity. The Littoral Support Craft-Experimental, or the “X-Craft” – a fast, small aluminum catamaran that can serve as a weapons or SEAL platoon-launching platform – is an example of a new weapons system that can bring U.S. forces closer to shore-based terrorist sanctuaries.

The Navy should also accelerate its transformation with its “Sea Power 21” concept that consists of three main elements- Sea Strike, Sea Shield and Sea Basing:

- *Sea Strike- projecting offensive power from the sea in support of joint operations. This involves time sensitive strikes carried out using real-time intelligence linked to precision weapons. Sea Strike allows Marines to strike over the horizon at deep inland objectives without having to establish a beachhead;*
- *Sea Shield- using naval assets to provide a defensive umbrella to assure allies and protect the homeland with systems like updated Aegis cruisers; and*
- *Sea Basing- creating at sea accessible cargo on pre-positioning ships that greatly reduces the need for foreign seaports. It explores the idea of flying crews home for their rotations to keep combat power in the field.*

Promote Air Force Transformation

For over fifty years, the United States Air Force has maintained unquestioned air supremacy and provided direct support for our troops in every conflict from the Korean War to Gulf War II. When transforming the armed forces, our goal in regard to the Air Force should be to maintain a force structure that can achieve air supremacy in any potential theater in the world while enhancing their ability to provide real time surveillance and close in support to covert and special forces units that can be expected to lead operations in the war on terror. The Air Force has taken steps to transform its approach to future air warfare, to include experimentation with unmanned aerial vehicles and a greater reliance on precision strike methods and ordnance.

The Air Force should be encouraged to continue its transformation by acquiring more unmanned aerial vehicles for combat such as the Predator and Predator B, improving GPS precision guided munitions, more rapidly deploying stealth technology on aircraft, supporting and improving the Multi-Mission Command and Control Aircraft (M2C2A), and increasing airlift capacity to meet the needs of a global reach, global strike military.

Create a Joint Defense National Training Center

In the 1983 conflict in Grenada, coordination between the services was so irregular that Army units had to use pay phones to communicate with the Navy and Marines. Great progress has been made since then in moving the U.S. military toward conducting “joint” operations in which the services integrate their war fighting capabilities for maximum advantage on the battlefield. In an age where Navy Seals operate in the mountains of Afghanistan supported by Army mountain units and can call in air strikes from the Air Force- “joint operations” are more important than ever.

The Secretary of Defense should strengthen and expand the efforts of the Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, VA and create a permanent “Joint Defense-wide National Training Center” at which the development of doctrine will evolve out of continuous exercises and information sharing.

Increase the U.S. Army Endstrength by 60,000

America is fortunate that so many men and women have dedicated their lives to providing for our security. Their sacrifices are inspiring, but their ability to continue to sacrifice is finite. All the Services are stretched, but the nature of the war on terror has shown that the Army is particularly burdened. The Army has recognized that current authorized force levels are insufficient to meet the demands of the war on terror and other operations and has instituted emergency measures to man the force at an elevated level. While the war on terror is a fairly recent phenomenon, the operations tempo has been accelerated for some time and is unlikely to recede in the future.

The United States Army should increase its manpower by 60,000 in order to create new units for the demands of the war on terror and to meet existing, more conventional threats. Particular emphasis should be placed on strengthening the Special Forces and stability operations units. Stability Operations troops include soldiers specially trained for the aftermath of war such as military police, civil affairs and engineers.

ENHANCING SPECIAL FORCES

The war on terror is a different kind of war requiring a different kind of military. U.S. forces must be characterized by stealth, speed, range, accuracy, sustainability, reliability, and be supported by superior intelligence to deal effectively with the spectrum of threats we face beginning with al-Qaeda.²⁰

For generations, the U.S. military has defended the interests of America and our allies by employing large land based armies, squadrons of bombers and fleets of ships. While maintaining security around the globe still requires traditional military force mixes, winning the war on terror requires a new force mix.

Special Operations Forces are small, elite military units with special training and equipment that can infiltrate hostile territory through land, sea and air to conduct a variety of operations, many of them classified. Special Forces personnel undergo rigorous selection and lengthy specialized training. U.S. Special Forces units currently total roughly 47,000 active and reserve personnel in the Army, Navy, and Air Force, or about 2 percent of all U.S. active and reserve forces.²¹

In the past, Special Operations Forces have been largely seen as an adjunct to traditional large-scale military operations or as a tool for small-scale operations in exceptional circumstances. In the war on terror, they will be required to operate on their own, on a continuing basis, in small groups and even as individual soldiers.²²

Al-Qaeda is actually a loose network of terrorist cells made up of what could at best be called "irregular" forces. They hide in caves and caverns, and work in corners of crowded neighborhoods from Morocco to Munich.

Finding and destroying al-Qaeda's thousands of fighters is difficult work for the U.S. military's traditional forces, which are not ideally suited for ferreting out the terrorists. In addition, we must be careful in employing our vast firepower to avoid projecting an overbearing and destructive presence in areas of the world already alienated from the United States.

The forces we use to hunt and destroy terrorist cells and individuals must be small, light forces who have received years of special training in counterterrorism operations and are accustomed to fighting and prevailing in all environments, in all corners of the globe. The men and women of the U.S. Special Forces must lead the charge in the war on terror. The U.S. Government must do all it can to strengthen and support the Special Forces in this mission.

Currently, large elements of the U.S. Special Forces are necessarily in Iraq, and others are on training missions across the globe. A strengthened Special Forces will allow for a greater effort to find and apprehend or destroy Osama Bin Laden and his chief lieutenants. The message to terrorists must be clear: "You can run, but you can't hide."

Double U.S. Special Forces to 100,000 Troops

The Administration proposed increasing the total number of U.S. Special Operations Forces personnel by 2,653 in fiscal year 2004. Most of the new personnel are to be used as planners.²³ This increase is insufficient at a time when terrorists continue to threaten America and Special Operations Forces are being called on to take on new missions in every part of the globe.

The United States should commit to doubling the number of special operations and special operations-capable forces and increase the total to 100,000 troops over the next ten years.

This goal can be reached by increasing core Special Operations Forces by 25,000 troops and intensifying the training and strengthening the capabilities of 25,000 U.S. Marines to make them special forces-capable. Elements of this strengthened force could include:

- *Five new SEAL teams and associated support elements*
- *Six new Army Special Forces Battalion equivalents*
- *Increased Dedicated Aircraft Capability to Deploy SOF*
- *Deployment of the "Next Generation Gunship" to replace AC-130's*
- *Increase civil affairs, psychological operations and instructor personnel*
- *Shift to four-month, instead of six-month, deployment schedule*
- *Increase Military-to-Military Training Exercises with U.S. Allies*

Create NATO Special Forces Units

After the September 11 attacks, the 19 nations that made up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invoked Article V of the NATO charter. This put into action the NATO collective security pledge of "one for all and all for one." By invoking Article V, NATO committed itself to the fight against al-Qaeda. The United States can use this as an opportunity to rebuild our alliances with our European allies and Turkey, while increasing our fire power against al-Qaeda and preparing ourselves for future such threats.

The United States should take the lead in proposing "NATO Special Forces Units," which would consist of upwards of five Battalions (units made up of 800 troops), comprised of forces from all NATO states. NATO Special Forces Units would receive the best training and equipment in the Alliance and be ready for instant deployment worldwide.

Form Joint Commando Forces with Arab and Muslim Nations

The United States should seek to form joint commando forces with key partners to pursue al-Qaeda and search for Osama Bin Laden. Ideally, partners would include countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt to the extent that host governments permit such activities. High level military-to-military exchanges, training, and joint exercises should also be pursued to solidify key alliances in the war on terror.

Strengthen CIA Special Activities

During the run up to the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, there were some who warned of a protracted conflict that would bog down tens of thousands of U.S. troops. Instead, the CIA took the lead in planning a different kind of conflict that utilized a mix of U.S. Special Forces and CIA personnel, supported by air power, working with local militias. The Special Activities Division of the CIA demonstrated the kind of flexibility, imagination, and speed that will be necessary in the long-term fight against terrorist networks.

The Special Activities Division of the CIA should be strengthened and given the resources necessary to develop special "terrorist hunter" teams. These teams would integrate Special Operations Forces and host nation intelligence officers and CIA operatives. These units would be created and deployed wherever key terrorist groups and cells are located.

TRANSFORMING THE FBI TO HANDLE COUNTERTERRORISM MISSION

The FBI has traditionally been tasked with the dual missions of law enforcement operations and domestic intelligence collection. The FBI's law enforcement culture, which centers on building a case that can stand up under the rules of criminal procedure, has disadvantages when it comes to collecting and analyzing intelligence that can be used to prevent a terrorist attack. As stated in a report by the Markle Foundation Task Force, "the types of crimes the United States faces from terrorists are too lethal to be treated as a traditional law enforcement issue."²⁴

The FBI's traditional reliance on an aggressive, case-oriented law enforcement approach did not encourage the broader collection and analysis efforts that are critical to the intelligence mission."²⁵ As the Joint Inquiry concluded, "[t]he FBI was unable to identify and monitor effectively the extent of activity by al-Qaeda operating in the United States."²⁶ Moreover, this embedded law enforcement culture prevented the FBI from sharing domestic law enforcement information with other federal agencies – a requirement for an effective domestic counterterrorism program. As National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice stated before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "9/11 Commission"), "if anything might have helped stop 9/11 it would have been better information about threats inside the United States, something made very difficult by structural and legal impediments that prevented the collection and sharing of information by our law enforcement and intelligence agencies."²⁷

Finding and destroying terrorist operatives and cells within the United States is going to require a talented and targeted domestic intelligence capability, a strong federal law enforcement agency, and a new level of knowledge and information sharing at the local law enforcement level to ensure that we are doing everything possible to accomplish this mission.

Speed Pace of FBI Reforms

Instead of maintaining a case-oriented law enforcement approach toward major crime figures, the FBI must adopt an entirely new mindset aimed at successfully penetrating stealthy domestic terrorist groups to prevent terrorist attacks. This sea change in operational tactics, strategy and attitude is slow in developing.

One former senior official summarizes the point, "It's one thing to recruit Tony Soprano, yet quite another to recruit an al-Qaeda operative."²⁸ Already, it is apparent that the FBI will have to overcome delays in implementing new intelligence programs and cost overruns before real progress is made against U.S.-based terrorist cells.

Intelligence functions aimed at reducing the threat of domestic terrorism must be paramount in driving the FBI's mission. However, the means for accomplishing this task – focusing on collection and analysis efforts against the greatest potential threats instead of relying on methods of "disseminating interesting items from a river of intelligence" – are lacking at the Bureau.²⁹

The vast majority of FBI confidential intelligence sources have not been appropriately vetted in order to assess their validity and credibility and serious doubts exist about the ability to disseminate relevant intelligence information to state and local officials in a timely manner.³⁰ The

fact that few Special Agents in Charge of field offices have extensive national security experience also undermines efforts to institute the comprehensive reforms required. To his credit, FBI Director Robert Mueller has tried to centralize FBI Headquarters control over counterterrorism and counterintelligence cases, but results from this new approach are mixed to date.

The problem is the existence of an ingrained cultural bias at the FBI that relies on reactive law enforcement practices instead of implementing preemptive actions to thwart terrorist actions. The FBI's lack of expertise in understanding how to drive intelligence collection based on focused, directed, analytically-based requirements will raise doubts that the FBI is capable of transforming itself, either in the near or long-term.³¹

Special Agents in Charge (SACs) of Bureau field offices should be required to have experience in intelligence gathering and sufficient knowledge of intelligence matters to precisely focus analysis and collection against the terrorist target. In addition, a system for properly vetting intelligence sources must be initiated without delay.

Improve Information Sharing

The inability of the FBI's Counterterrorism Division and CIA's Counter Terrorism Center to work effectively together was a critical pre-9/11 failure. Two terrorists who were on the airplane that struck the Pentagon, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, were the focus of the FBI, CIA, and the National Security Agency beginning in 1999, but the lack of regular communications among these agencies about the threat posed by these two confirms the bureaucratic inertia that contributed to the September 11 attacks. Many of the legal barriers to information sharing have been removed by the USA Patriot Act, but the cultural practices of agencies, as well as technological restraints, continue to inhibit effective information sharing. In addition, numerous new organizations have been created or re-structured since September 11: the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, the Terrorist Screening Center, the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Information Analysis, the Joint Intelligence Coordinating Council, the FBI's Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence, and the FBI's Office of Intelligence, to name a few. Defining the roles of these organizations and ensuring coordination among them continues to present a challenge.

Provisions of the USA Patriot Act that removed barriers to information sharing among federal agencies should be extended after careful review by the Congress. Strong oversight over homeland security intelligence must be conducted to ensure that new bureaucratic structures are resulting in genuine improvements in intelligence sharing. The respective missions of organizations with responsibilities for counterterrorism intelligence collection, analysis, and operations must be clearly defined and carefully coordinated.

Share Information with Local Law Enforcement

Two major missions must be undertaken simultaneously to ensure that we are taking advantage of our tens of thousands of local law enforcement officials to prevent terrorist attacks in the homeland. Information must flow down from the federal government to the local level and information must flow up from the local level. Today, state and local law enforcement officials have not been granted the security clearances they need, receive scattered and sometimes conflict-

ing information from the federal government, and lack the best information technology and inter-operable communication equipment available.

The Department of Homeland Security and the FBI, which are both currently responsible for communicating with state and local law enforcement officials, must establish a mechanism and delineate responsibilities for sharing information.

Hire Additional Agents for Counterterrorism

At this point in our history, the FBI needs to be more focused than ever on the massive responsibilities of both counterterrorism and federal law enforcement. The FBI's traditional responsibilities should not be shortchanged, not only because they are important in their own right, but because actions such as investigating money laundering schemes, identification fraud, smuggling, and wire fraud will contribute to the counterterrorism mission. The Bureau will need a dramatic increase in its resources to carry out these important missions.

The FBI should increase the number of its field agents by 50% over the next ten years and receive the resources to effectively deploy them in the field. This means approximately 550 new agents each year.

CUTTING OFF TERRORIST FINANCING

Unlike other terrorist leaders, Osama Bin Laden did not begin his career as a military leader, a religious authority, or an obvious representative of the downtrodden. He is a rich financier who built al-Qaeda's financial network from the foundation of a system originally designed to channel resources to the *mujahadeen* fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan.³² He secured significant funding for al-Qaeda and put in place a complex structure to provide funding to regional and local groups aligned with the terrorist network.

Al-Qaeda's global fundraising network is built upon a foundation of charities, non-governmental organizations, mosques, websites, intermediaries, banks, and other financial institutions. It runs businesses operating under the cloak of legitimacy, as well as criminal conspiracies ranging from petty theft to diamond smuggling.³³ It also draws funds and support from a number of wealthy sympathizers in the Middle East and elsewhere.

In addition to its criminal conspiracies, al-Qaeda cynically manipulates traditional Muslim institutions for their own financial benefit. A religious obligation of Muslims to donate 2.5 percent of their income to charities (called *zakat*) has been twisted by some local leaders into an outlet of contributions to al-Qaeda. In many communities, the *zakat* is often provided in cash to prominent, trusted community leaders who then donate the funds to individuals they deem worthy.³⁴

Al-Qaeda also makes use of the ancient *hawala*, or underground money transfer system, widely used in the Middle East. It operates on countless street corners and is a cash business that leaves behind few, if any, records for use by investigators following money trails.³⁵

For years, authorities in the Middle East, and elsewhere, have turned a blind eye to the construction of the al-Qaeda fundraising network. Individuals and charities based in Saudi Arabia have been the most important source of funds for Al-Qaeda, which has also taken advantage of the regional banking centers of the Middle East (UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain) that have over the years generally ignored the repeated calls of the international community to build anti-money laundering regimes consistent with international standards.³⁶ It has used these banks to mask transactions and gain access to the international banking community. From this base, it has extended its reach into South and Southeast Asia, and into some of the major banking capitals of the world.

After the September 11 attacks, the U.S. government took a series of actions to disrupt terrorist financing networks. The USA Patriot Act contains sections on international money laundering that were designed to prevent terrorists and their supporters from using the U.S. financial system anonymously to move funds obtained from, or destined for, illegal activity.³⁷

The President issued Executive Order 13224, which froze "all property and interests in property" of certain designated terrorists and individuals supporting them. International action was taken through a series of United Nations Security Council Resolutions that directed all countries to freeze without delay any funds or other financial assets and economic resources belonging to these individuals and groups, and to cut off all transactions to, or for, their benefit.

Within weeks of the attack, the United States and our allies around the world located and froze the accounts of some 300 individuals and entities linked to al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, and the Taliban. Over \$120 million of al-Qaeda funds had been reported frozen as of late last year, with experts concluding that al-Qaeda's financial network had been "disrupted."³⁸

Al-Qaeda, however, still has access to ample funding from its own hidden investments and from an extensive worldwide network of non-governmental organizations and charity front operations. There is a great need for increased pressure on al-Qaeda's financial network, for the funds continue to flow. While al-Qaeda's total budget is a mystery, a United Nations Monitoring Group report estimates that wealthy individual donors contribute up to \$16 million annually. The vast bulk of Al-Qaeda assets that were frozen were seized in the first three months after September 11. Asset seizures have been slow since then. Reinvigorating the effort will require broader and much better coordinated international efforts. It is time for a renewed effort to disrupt terrorist financing networks around the globe.

Create an International Financial Anti-Terrorism Center (IFAC)

Stopping the flow of funds to terrorists is a classic example of the importance of building alliances to win the war on terror. Although almost 170 nations have blocking orders in force, only four countries, including the United States, account for about two-thirds of the blocked \$121 million of al-Qaeda funds.³⁹

The United States should lead an effort by the nations of the Organisation of Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) to establish a specialized international organization dedicated solely to combating terrorist financing in a renewed effort to disrupt international terrorist financing networks.

This organization's activities should include intelligence, information sharing, and forensic banking investigations. An International Financial Anti-Terrorism Center (IFAC) should establish and maintain a database to which suspicious transaction reports could be referred or verified by the international banking community.

Establish Financial Standards for Charities and NGOs

The IFAC should establish strong international standards on how governments regulate charitable organizations and their fundraising. The IFAC would also develop a "white list" of international charities and financial institutions that commit to the highest due diligence and anti-money laundering procedures.

Requirements should be imposed to assure that, to the greatest extent possible, charities route their transactions through established banking systems. In such cases, the recipient organization should be required to maintain a bank account and to transact business through verifiable means, such as checks and electronic transfers.

Forge International Partnerships

While most countries have responded positively to the United Nations resolutions and the measures they imposed against al-Qaeda, several have been lax in implementing them.

The United States should reach bilateral agreements with the critical countries where al-Qaeda has established sources of funding, or which serve as key transit points for movement of such funds. Special attention should be paid to Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and other Persian Gulf States. This support should include U.S. investigative assistance, particularly in the areas of financial investigations and forensic banking. The U.S. should seek the support of the World Bank and United Nations in this effort.

Register Hawala Brokers

Hawala, and similar informal financial transfer mechanisms, play an important role in the transfer of money from developed countries to lesser developed countries. In 2001, *hawala*-like international transfers amounted to an estimated \$80 billion. It is important that the international community attempt to control this process in order to prevent al-Qaeda and other criminal and terrorist groups from using these systems to circumvent anti-terrorism and money laundering rules. This will require a broad international effort to develop appropriate rules and standards to regularize this activity.

According to one report, as of mid-2002, only about 10,000 of an estimated 250,000 money service businesses in the United States were registered under post-9/11 regulations. U.S. enforcement measures have been extremely modest.⁴⁰ There is currently no plan to coordinate federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts to identify, monitor and prosecute unregistered *hawaladars*.⁴¹

The Treasury Department, working with the Department of Homeland Security's Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, should take the lead in developing a national plan to ensure the registration and lawful operation of hawaladars in the United States. A force of at least 100 new agents should be assigned solely to this mission.

The United States should press the World Bank and other international agencies to establish working groups to develop international standards for registering and regulating hawala operations.

Increase U.S. Assistance For International Action

With the tightening of banking controls in Europe, North America and several banking centers in Asia and the Middle East, al-Qaeda has sought to move its financial activities and assets to other jurisdictions that lack the ability to deal with them. We must assure that all countries willing to participate in programs that track terrorist financing have the means to do so.

Tracking down the sources of terrorist financing, to be effective, requires the cooperation of informed and dedicated financial and law enforcement personnel across the globe. Technical assistance programs in problem countries assist in the creation of effective regulatory, enforcement, and control regimes for financial institutions and charitable organizations. The President's fiscal year 2005 budget included only \$8.5 million for the Treasury Department's Office of Technical Assistance.⁴²

The Secretary of the Treasury should receive at least \$25 million to strengthen the capacities of our international partners in stopping the flow of funds to terrorist organizations.

Link International Aid to Financial Accountability

The United States should encourage international organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank, and appropriate U.N. Agencies to develop and consult a “white list” of financial institutions that value accountability and transparency before making decisions on international aid.

STRENGTHENING ALLIANCES

Fighting and winning a global war against the international terrorist threat requires a global anti-terrorist coalition of the kind that came to our side after September 11. Extensive cooperation is needed in the areas of intelligence gathering, law enforcement, international finance and military affairs. Unfortunately, over the past two years the consensus that created this alliance was shattered. Relations with our traditional allies have fallen into a dangerous state of disrepair.

The United States cannot defeat al-Qaeda and like minded groups alone. Bombings from Bali to Istanbul and the rise of al-Qaeda affiliated or independent cells in Europe and Central Asia are proof positive that the threat is pervasive and widespread. To defeat an enemy with a global presence, you need a global alliance. We must isolate al-Qaeda, not ourselves.

Building and strengthening alliances is central to successfully waging and winning the war on terror. The United States must take bold steps to revitalize existing alliances and forge new relationships to build a global alliance to win the war on terror and establish a democratic peace.

NATO Expansion

For over fifty years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been a cornerstone of American security. The United States founded NATO during the darkest days of the Cold War, to bind together the destinies of democratic peoples in a “one for all and all for one” security pledge. In recent years, NATO has used military force to end the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo and bring peace and stability to the Balkans. Today, NATO stands as an alliance of 26 democracies from Washington to Warsaw, united in preserving the peace.

In the wake of September 11th, NATO for the first time invoked “Article 5” of the Treaty, which meant that the attack against the United States was considered an attack against all members. The United States must take the lead in accepting this assistance and work to transform what was a creation of the Cold War into the foundation of our global coalition against Al-Qaeda.

To secure the gains of the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe and extend the zone of peace and collective security that comes with NATO membership, the United States should support the expansion of NATO to secure the southeastern flank of the Alliance. Assuming they meet NATO membership criteria, Croatia, Macedonia, and Albania should be brought into the Alliance in 2007. Bosnia, Moldova, and the Ukraine could follow in 2010.

If Russia demonstrates a renewed commitment to democratic governance and cooperates in all efforts to inventory, secure and destroy loose nuclear, chemical and biological materials, the United States should consider starting the sponsorship process for Russian membership in NATO in 2014.

Support a United Europe

Development of the European Union has been encouraged by the United States as a way to bind together the nations of Europe whose conflicts twice in the 20th century unleashed war upon the world. It has been, and still remains, in America's strategic interest to support European integration. The United States will ultimately be better off if the European Union emerges as a responsible center of power, shouldering its fair share of responsibility for security and stability in an uncertain world.⁴³

The United States should support and encourage the integration of Turkey and the Balkans into the European Union. This would send a powerful message to the world, that the seventy million Muslim citizens of Turkey, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Albania will be welcomed into the zone of peace and prosperity that is the European Union.

Maintain Support for Kosovo and Bosnia

Twice in the 1990's, the United States led an international coalition to save two Muslim peoples from the scourge of war and genocide. Today, there are some who would end the US commitment to these two lands.

The United States should maintain its military presence and increase its level of material support for the people and governments of Kosovo and Bosnia.

PROTECTING THE HOMELAND

In the wake of the September 11 attacks, our government acted with unprecedented unity and speed. The Administration was authorized to take a variety of actions to protect us from terrorists, including the use of military force against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In the months following September 11, legislation was enacted to bolster security at our seaports and airports, fortify our borders, and provide our intelligence and law enforcement communities with the tools needed to root out terrorists here and abroad. The following year we worked together to create the Department of Homeland Security.

These efforts, the implementation of many new programs, and increased funding for many established programs, have made us safer today than we were before the attacks of September 11. But the critical question is – are we as safe as we need to be?

It remains an uncomfortable but unassailable fact: America is not as safe as it needs to be in the face of the threat we face from those that seek to do us harm. Critical gaps in our homeland security continue to exist while, as the Madrid train bombing confirms, al-Qaeda and like-minded groups continue to seek ways to kill our citizens, destroy property and infrastructure, disrupt our economy, and demoralize our nation. Our enemies are opportunistic and will remain fixated on identifying and exploiting our weaknesses. We must be proactive in taking steps to prevent attacks in America and remain vigilant in bolstering our homeland defenses as rapidly and effectively as we can. As we move forward to strengthen our security we must be mindful that properly made, homeland security-related investments also offer substantial benefits in such critical areas as public health, crime prevention, technology development, the free flow of commerce, and all-hazards preparedness.

We also need to acknowledge the somewhat counterintuitive reality that our homeland security efforts start on foreign shores. The greatest threat to our security and the future of the globe, is the possibility that terrorist groups obtain and use a nuclear weapon. One of the fundamental measures we must take to protect our homeland is to secure stockpiles of nuclear materials around the globe, as well as other materials that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction. We must also take aggressive measures to deal with the threat of bioterrorism, ranging from developing the capacity to develop countermeasures to bioengineered pathogens to planning mass vaccination campaigns in the event of an attack.

Stronger measures also need to be taken to protect our borders and harden targets inside America. The entry of 20 million cargo containers into America by ship, rail, and truck presents a tremendous vulnerability and our efforts to close this security gap have thus far been inadequate. And we still do not have in place effective measures to screen foreign visitors coming to the United States and reduce the flow of illegal immigration as well. While massive investments have been made in aviation, unscreened air cargo and shoulder fired missiles present serious threats to security. Inside

the United States, little has been done since September 11 to better secure our food supply, our computer networks, our rail and transit systems, and other critical infrastructures.

If our defenses fail, our first responders need to be better prepared than they are now to deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack. Homeland security spending can no longer be treated as another source of port barrel spending – we must target funds where they are needed most and ensure they are dedicated toward building the essential capabilities of our first responder communities to respond to terrorist attacks. At a minimum, strong federal efforts need to be taken to solve the communications interoperability problem that tragically plagued the response efforts at the World Trade Center.

Providing for the common defense is the first duty of government. To win the war on terror, we must dedicate ourselves to making the changes necessary and committing sufficient resources to protecting the country against the serious threats we still face every day.

PREVENTING TERRORISTS FROM OBTAINING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

The chilling reality is that terrorists have been working for a decade to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, DCI George Tenet recently testified that “acquiring these [weapons] remains a religious obligation in Bin Ladin’s eyes.”⁴⁴ Yet, tons of WMD material is strewn across the globe at insecure locations, ripe for their picking. The International Atomic Energy Agency reports that there have already been 16 thefts involving highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium.⁴⁵ In one case, the theft of about two kilograms of HEU from a research facility in the nation of Georgia, the whereabouts of the material remain unknown.⁴⁶

We can take important steps toward preventing terrorist’s acquisition of weapons of mass destruction if we take bold and decisive action and build a global coalition to halt the spread of WMD.

Unfortunately, this critical mission is not being accomplished. For example, the United States has increased spending for programs focused on improving controls over nuclear and chemical warheads, materials, and expertise outside the U.S. by only 8% since September 11, 2001.⁴⁷ We must act with the speed and commitment of a nation trying to protect our people from the horrific fate of nuclear devastation or the plagues that could be unleashed from bio-terrorism.

In the words of former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, “Terrorist groups are racing to get weapons of mass destruction. We should be racing to stop them.”⁴⁸

Secure All Unprotected Nuclear Material

Ten years ago, the Soviet Union broke apart and left as its legacy enough highly enriched uranium and plutonium to make 60,000 nuclear warheads. Much of this material is unguarded and unaccounted for.⁴⁹ The largest stock of unsecured nuclear material is in Russia and some of its former Republics. This threat, however, extends far beyond Russia and the former Soviet Union. Some twenty tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) exist at 130 civilian research facilities in 40 countries, many of which have no more security than a night watchman and a chain link fence.⁵⁰ Furthermore, we haven’t fully accounted for sealed sources of nuclear material on loan to foreign countries.⁵¹ The solution to the problem is clear, as Senator Nunn stated, “The most effective, least expensive way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to secure weapons and materials at the source.”⁵² If terrorists could get hold of the HEU or plutonium that are essential ingredients of a nuclear bomb, making a bomb might be within the capabilities of al-Qaeda.⁵³

While the United States and Russia have been working together to secure these materials in Russia for over ten years, to date even initial “rapid upgrades” such a bricking over windows or piling heavy blocks on top of material, have been accomplished for only 40% of the potential bomb material in Russia. Less than one-seventh of Russia’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium has been destroyed.⁵⁴

In June 2002, the leaders of the Group of Eight (G-8) industrialized democracies agreed to launch a new “Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” The purpose of the Global Partnership is “to prevent terrorists, or those that harbor them, from acquiring, or developing, nuclear, chemical, biological, missile, and related technology.” The G-8

committed \$20 billion over the next ten years to threat reduction projects.⁵⁵ Unfortunately, many Nunn-Lugar programs are on hold because of access and liability issues that have been problems for years. Russia is denying the U.S. access to the most significant sites that need robust security, and we have not resolved the Russian concerns about the liability requirements for U.S. contract personnel performing the security upgrades.

It is time for the United States to lead the Global Partnership toward decisive action aimed at preventing nuclear terrorism with initiatives such as:

Secure Nuclear Material Across the Globe

During the Cold War, the United States and Russia built dozens of nuclear energy research labs in other nations across the globe. Twenty tons of HEU were distributed around the world in the last fifty years by the U.S. and the Soviet Union into research reactors and other facilities.⁵⁶ Most of this material is poorly guarded.

The United States should lead an effort through the International Atomic Energy Agency, to secure all nuclear material locations outside the U.S. and Russia in the next two years. Armed guards, electronic surveillance, and layered barriers and defenses would be employed.

Remove All Nuclear Material from the World's Most Vulnerable Sites

The surest way to ensure that nuclear material will not be stolen from one of the 130 vulnerable sites around the world is to remove it so there is nothing left to steal. A successful joint U.S.-Russian operation did precisely this at the Vinca reactor in Belgrade, Serbia just last year. One hundred pounds of highly vulnerable nuclear fuel was removed and secured.

The United States should lead an effort with our G-8 partners to remove all nuclear material from vulnerable sites outside Russia within the next five years. Such an effort could be accomplished for under \$50 million a year.⁵⁷

Secure Nuclear Materials From Russia and the Former Soviet Union by 2008

Hundreds of tons of weapons grade nuclear material in Russia remains at locations that are not secure and are vulnerable to theft and terrorist attack.

The United States, along with its Global Partners, should secure all weapons grade nuclear material in Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union within the next five years. This requires a committed, aggressive effort to eliminate the access and liability barriers to securing this material.

Triple U.S. Commitment to Nuclear Security

Funding for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs "Nunn-Lugar" has remained flat over the last several years at about \$1 billion annually. A bipartisan Commission under Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler proposed last year that U.S. efforts for nuclear security be increased to \$30 billion over ten years.⁵⁸

The United States should meet the goals of the Baker-Cutler Commission and triple the resources spent to improve nuclear security.

Strengthen Counterproliferation Efforts

The unraveling of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan's nuclear smuggling network has revealed that the spread of nuclear weapons expertise and development equipment is a problem of global proportions. The absence of an international legal regime to constrain such activities badly complicates efforts to penalize proliferators such as A.Q. Khan and his partners. Under an international legal regime requiring transparency, Khan's network and recipient states would have put themselves in jeopardy of capture and prosecution by any state in the world when they failed to disclose their activities. To deter, protect against, and punish proliferators, the United States must work with the rest of the international community to develop laws with universal jurisdiction that enable enforcers to reach anywhere that dangers arise.

Criminalize Nuclear Smuggling

The United States should take the lead in proposing a new international convention that will facilitate the detection, interdiction, and enforcement against individuals, corporations and states that might engage in illicit acquisition, possession, development, and trafficking of nuclear weapons related materials, equipment, and know-how. Such a Convention would criminalize transfer or trade in nuclear weapons components and require a declaration system for legitimate trade across state borders while rendering undeclared trade illegal.

Develop an International Strike Force to Hunt Nuclear Traffickers

Currently the IAEA has three full time personnel who work on preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear material.

The United States should support the creation of a 50 person international law enforcement unit to track nuclear smugglers.

Expand Proliferation Security Initiative

In the spring of 2003 the Bush Administration brought together a coalition of ten other nations who were willing to "enter into partnerships to employ their national capabilities to develop a broad range of legal, diplomatic, economic, military and other tools to interdict threatening shipments of WMD and missile related technology."⁵⁹ The PSI envisions being able, if necessary, to interdict WMD transfers on the high seas or in the territory of partner states. Though PSI has expanded to include additional supporters, to date, China and Russia have refused to participate in this initiative citing a number of concerns related to the legality of interdiction. Russian and Chinese participation is important to the success of this initiative.

The 26 nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have a long established network of intelligence sharing, shared military practices built through exercises, interoperable equipment and joint planning structures. PSI can be made operationally more effective by using the existing structure of NATO.

The United States should encourage every NATO state to sign on to the Proliferation Security Initiative and use NATO's training, exercise and planning structure to enhance PSI's operational capability. Further, PSI membership should be open to non-NATO countries and China and Russia should be encouraged to participate.

Secure Sources For “Dirty Bomb” Materials

Al-Qaeda has expressed interest in unleashing radiological terrorism by building and using radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) that are also known as “dirty bombs.” In April, 2002, a captured Al-Qaeda leader, Abu Zubaydah, told American interrogators that the organization had been working aggressively to build a so-called “dirty bomb.”⁶⁰ In February 2004, George Tenet, the CIA Director, stated that Al-Qaeda remains interested in dirty bombs and terrorist documents contain accurate views of how such weapons would be used.⁶¹

Common radioactive materials that are used in medicine, industry and scientific research, could fuel RDDs.⁶² Though only a small fraction of the millions of radioactive sources used worldwide pose inherently high security risks, this category in absolute numbers encompasses hundreds of thousands of sources all over the world.⁶³ With so many potential sources, we should focus our defensive measures on those elements that are most hazardous, such as strontium, cesium, and plutonium. Important next steps include:

Strengthen Domestic Inspection

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission should increase the inspections of users of the most radioactive materials.

Secure Disused Sources

The Department of Energy’s Off-Site Recovery Project has secured more than three thousand disused sources of radioactivity, but faces substantial funding shortfalls.⁶⁴

The Department of Energy should secure ten thousand disused radioactive sources of cesium, strontium and plutonium in the next two years.

Encourage International Action

Dozens of nations across the globe are home to thousands of pounds of source material for potential use in radiological devices. The United States should help lead an international effort to identify and secure these source materials.

The United States should strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency to offer regulatory and security assistance to the 50 non-members states that lack security and regulatory infrastructure for radioactive sources.⁶⁵

Destroy Chemical Weapons Stockpiles

The deadly effects of chemical weapons have been known since the First World War. We were reminded of their horrible capability during the Iran-Iraq war and after learning of how Saddam Hussein in Iraq used them to exterminate whole villages of civilians.

Today, chemical weapons are of particular interest to international terrorists as a poor man's weapon of mass destruction. Terrorists have used chemical weapons in the subways of Tokyo, and toxins have been used in suicide bombings in Israel and have been tested by al-Qaeda terrorists working in Afghanistan.⁶⁶

At the Shchuchye chemical weapons facility in Russia, there are today nearly 2 million rounds of nerve agents – enough to kill every man, woman, and child on earth. One artillery shell is small enough to fit in a briefcase and kill one hundred thousand people.⁶⁷ The weapons sit in decaying buildings, largely unsupervised. The threat of unsecured chemical weapons falling into the hands of terrorist is a real threat and wholly preventable.

The United States and Russia have agreed to destroy their stockpiles of chemical weapons, which account for 90% of existing global stockpiles.⁶⁸ Yet, most of Russia's 40,000 tons of chemical weapons ... have yet to be destroyed.⁶⁹ In 1998, the United States Senate ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which bans the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons, requires the destruction of existing weapons and related material, establishes an international verification regime, and requires export controls and punishment for violators of the Convention.⁷⁰

Current law calls for the destruction of chemical weapons by 2012, but the United States has a poor record of destroying its own stockpile. According to the Department of Defense, management, organizational, and strategic planning weaknesses are causing the U.S. to miss the CWC's 2004 deadline for eliminating 45 percent of our chemical stockpile. Addressing its own program will help the U.S. make the case that other countries should follow its lead.

The United States should lead by example by improving its efforts to eliminate its own chemical weapons stockpiles on time. It should also promote an international effort to destroy all chemical weapons worldwide in the next six years. The U.S. should offer all technical and financial assistance necessary to locate, secure and destroy stockpiles of chemical weapons globally. As part of this assistance package, nations receiving aid will be asked to support a sanctions regime against any and all nations refusing to join the Chemical Weapons Convention.

PROTECTING AGAINST THE THREAT OF BIOTERRORISM

Biological weapons are one of the most frightening of all weapons of mass destruction and are a growing threat. History shows us the threat of contagion is real. In the 20th century alone, more than 300 million people died from smallpox.⁷¹ Today, infectious diseases remain the third leading cause of death in the U.S.⁷² The anthrax attacks of October-November 2001 demonstrated that the capability and the will to murder with pathogens are now a reality.

Compared to nuclear or chemical weapons, weapons for bioterrorism are easy to obtain and produce, inexpensive, and capable of inflicting significant damage even in the absence of large quantities of material or delivery mechanisms.⁷³ Pathogens suitable for attacks can be concealed and transported with little difficulty. Information about how to obtain and prepare dangerous pathogens is increasingly available through the Internet and other open sources. Furthermore, bioweapons facilities can be easily concealed within legitimate research laboratories or pharmaceutical sites.⁷⁴

During the Second World War, it was learned that Nazi Germany was attempting to develop a super weapon that could inflict millions of casualties and lead to our defeat. In response, the United States mobilized the federal government on a massive scale and the “Manhattan Project” produced the atomic bomb first and helped to win the war. The threat of bioterrorism to our national security is so great that the United States should embark on a “Bioterrorism Prevention Initiative” of such scale and ambition that it will rival the Manhattan Project. Such an initiative would be comprised of the following elements:

Prevent Terrorists From Obtaining Biological Weapons

The dangerous legacy of the massive Soviet biological weapons program remains at dozens of former research and production sites across former Soviet states.⁷⁵ Planning, funding, and diplomatic pressure to secure and track activities at these locations has languished. Currently there are 140 nations that have ratified the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 that prohibits the possession, stockpiling and use of biological weapons. But the Convention, violated by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, has never had provisions for monitoring, inspection, and enforcement.⁷⁶ Meanwhile, a thriving “germ commerce,” including the exchange and storage of dangerous pathogens, continues throughout the world, with too few effective controls.⁷⁷

The United States must lead an effort to put enforcement provisions in the Biological Weapons Convention and develop international controls on pathogen research and trade. Technology to help detect and prevent weaponization should be developed and distributed to support enforcement. The U.S. should work with nations who agree to these enhanced protections to provide comprehensive vaccine stockpiles for their populations and improve their infectious disease surveillance capacity. The United States should work to strengthen the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to secure foreign stockpiles of bioweapons, and champion standardized, international controls on the storage, sale and transport of dangerous pathogens.

Protect Against Bioterrorism By Developing New Cures and Technologies

“Manhattan Project” for New Cures

Even with effective preparedness, we lack most of the diagnostics, drugs, and vaccines we would need to find those exposed, treat potentially life-threatening infection, and prevent disease from spreading. According to a 2000 study by the Defense Science Board, we have only one of the 57 different countermeasures needed to defend against 19 of the major bioterrorist agents.⁷⁸ Currently, the government lacks the capability to develop new medicines, while the private sector has little incentive to enter the biodefense market.⁷⁹ Project Bioshield, the Administration’s attempt to solve this dilemma, does not go far enough in harnessing private sector capabilities or enhancing the federal capability to develop essential medical tools. An effective government effort to produce new medicines may finally address many of the serious national and international health problems that are neglected by traditional market forces and private pharmaceutical firms.

The United States should harness the innovation of the private sector and the power of the federal government in an effort akin to the “Manhattan Project” to develop effective treatments for the most dangerous diseases in the world. The federal government should develop the capacity to produce new, safe, and effective diagnostics, vaccines, and drugs against the most virulent pathogens to protect our citizens against bioterrorism and other serious infectious disease threats. Federally-funded venture capital and “virtual” drug development firms should be established to develop and utilize the best public, private, and academic scientific and technological capabilities to counter microbial threats.

Creating Rapid “Bug to Drug” Capability

The advancement of biotechnology is making possible the bioengineering of new weapons that can evade current detection and treatment strategies.⁸⁰ The emergence of SARS and novel virulent flu strains demonstrate how rapidly pathogens can naturally mutate to subvert our medical defenses. The danger of a thinking enemy manipulating pathogens in a similar way could be devastating. Under such circumstances we would have few options but to try to find existing or new medicines effective against the new disease. However, our response capabilities today are remarkably slow. Currently, it usually takes over ten years to develop a treatment for a new infectious disease.⁸¹ However, the Defense Science Board has suggested that a sustained research effort over 20 years could reduce the time from pathogen identification to effective countermeasure, or “bug to drug,” from ten years to 24 hours.⁸² Opportunities here are rich. In a recent report, the Food and Drug Administration stated that technology in drug and vaccine development has long been neglected, noting that “in many cases, developers have no choice but to use the tools and concepts of the last century to assess this century’s candidates.”⁸³ The agency suggested a new research agenda is required to “turn the process of bringing these technologies to patients from a costly and time-consuming art form to a well-understood science” in order to cut drug and vaccine timeframes and costs. This research agenda could be the foundation of a strong public-private partnership effort to fight novel or bioengineered infectious diseases with the rapid delivery of drug and vaccine countermeasures.

The U.S. should embark on a long term research program aimed at dramatically shortening the time between the detection and identification of a new pathogen and the production of effective countermeasures to protect health. The “bug to drug” cycle should be shortened from years to a matter of weeks. The resulting

advances should be applied to a working capability to deliver cures to a novel or bioengineered pathogen as quickly as possible. Notably, the fruits of such an endeavor could provide many important benefits in addition to strengthening our biodefenses, including reduced drug costs and faster delivery of new medicines for all types of illnesses.

Prepare for Bioterror Attack by Building a Strong Biodefense System

Even with the strongest prevention efforts, the risk of terrorists deploying bioweapons cannot be completely eliminated. A strong biodefense system must be developed that prepares America for a bioterror attack and demonstrates to our enemies our ability to protect ourselves. Governments, first responders, and the healthcare sector must be given clear roles and responsibilities, and furnished with the capabilities to detect pathogens in the environment, identify exposed victims, and treat these individuals.

Develop a National Biodefense Plan

While one of the greatest threats to our health and safety remains the potential of a terror attack with biological agents, no comprehensive national plan has been developed to prevent, prepare for and respond to a bioterror attack.

A comprehensive National Biodefense Plan should be developed and implemented that defines roles and responsibilities for relevant federal, state, local, and private institutions and identifies and provides crucial capabilities required for effective preparedness.

Establish an Early Warning System

A National Health Tracking Initiative should be launched that establishes regional and national centers for the integration of laboratory, clinical, pharmacy, and other data relevant to monitoring population health. Connected to the Centers for Disease Control's Health Alert Network, these centers would provide an early-warning system for signs of infectious disease outbreaks.

Promote International Disease Surveillance

AIDS, SARS, and the West Nile virus demonstrate that pathogens can cross oceans and do not respect borders. Today, the world's cities are all reachable within 36 hours by air. A bioterror attack or naturally occurring outbreaks in other countries can spread quickly, making the ability to detect these incidents before they reach the U.S. a crucial defense.

The U.S. should lead international cooperative efforts in infectious disease surveillance, detection, and containment. The United States should also work through the World Health Organization to support units that can deploy any-

where in the world within 24 hours for emergency response to infectious diseases.

Build Public Health “Surge Capacity”

America’s health care system and public health infrastructure are already stretched to capacity and would be unable to effectively respond to, or care for the mass casualties that could be expected from, a biological or other WMD attack on American soil.⁸⁴ While more attention and resources have been belatedly given to our health infrastructure since September 11, the system remains underprepared, with insufficient workers to distribute medicines, lack of hospital and laboratory surge capacity, and a chronic gaps in planning.⁸⁵ Disease surveillance, the essential first step in detecting an outbreak, is hampered by too few epidemiologists in the field and incomplete collection and integration of available health information at the regional and national level.⁸⁶ Stronger, better targeted, and sustained investment in our public health capacities is clearly necessary. Ultimately, a strong biodefense through public health preparedness will not only serve to deter a potential adversary from using biological weapons, but also prove invaluable for dealing with naturally occurring disease outbreaks, and many other public health concerns.

Strengthening the public health infrastructure must be a primary focus of our biodefense strategy and the National Biodefense Plan should help define where to target significantly increased and sustained new investments. Every hospital in the United States should receive the specialized tools necessary to diagnose and respond to biological attacks. Regional planning efforts for surge capacity should be initiated. Additionally, the federal government should consider mothballing Veterans Administration hospitals that are scheduled for closure and prepare them for use as mass casualty facilities during an emergency.

PROTECTING OUR BORDERS AND PORTS OF ENTRY

Our borders and ports of entry are one of the last lines of defense protecting the American people. It is essential that we dedicate the resources necessary to strengthen our defenses on land, sea, and air. While doing so, we must ensure that America remains a welcoming nation to visitors, students, and commerce. To both secure our borders, and ensure that they facilitate, rather than hinder, travel and trade, we must make investments in technology, personnel, and technology to modernize our borders and the surrounding communities for the 21st century.

Strengthen Land Borders

Increase Patrols and Inspectors on Our Borders

The United States must meet the need to screen cargo and visitors at the border and control the spaces between our ports of entry, while maintaining a free flow of commerce and an open door to visitors. Over 2000 new inspectors must be hired along the northern border just to meet the mandates set forth in the USA Patriot Act. The federal government has not even developed a new staffing strategy to deal with the security and immigration control issues on the southern border. Massive illegal immigration problems along the Arizona border have required the launching of a new federal initiative, but it is being staffed by transferring agents from other southern border sites. Genuine border security cannot be achieved by plugging one hole only to open up another.

The United States should increase the number of border inspectors and border patrol agents by at least 3,000 over the next four years. Staff should be allocated based on a national threat and vulnerability assessment to prioritize the threats facing our land borders and areas between our ports of entry.

Monitor Every Mile of the Border 24/7

Hundreds of miles of our border go unmonitored by personnel or technology every day. Yet technology currently exists – such as unmanned aerial vehicles, remote sensors, and long range cameras – to monitor every mile of the northern and southern border for the passage of terrorists and illicit cargo.⁸⁷

The Department of Homeland Security must deploy innovative technologies to ensure that every mile of our land border is monitored.

Develop a Border Management System that Enhances Homeland Security and Facilitates Legitimate Travel and Trade

The US-VISIT entry-exit system proposes to improve border integrity by recording the entry and exit of foreign visitors to the United States and validating their identities. The program, which has been partially implemented at our air and sea ports, is in its infancy.

Full implementation of US-VISIT will prove immensely challenging, especially if current inadequacies in infrastructure, personnel, and technology are not addressed. Sixty-four land ports of entry have less than 25 percent of the required space in the federal inspections area.⁸⁸ Public highways and roads leading to ports of entry on both sides of the northern and southern border are insufficient.⁸⁹ Insufficient staffing at and between land border ports of entry, airports, and seaports has been an ongoing problem.⁹⁰ Enhancements in technology, without commensurate improvements in infrastructure and staffing may actually reduce the effectiveness of border security programs and substantially increase wait times at our borders. It is critical to understand that technology is an aid, not a replacement, for law enforcement personnel at our borders. Prior to full implementation of US-VISIT, the Administration must lay a solid foundation to create a vibrant and secure border through investments in infrastructure that will enable security to be enhanced while expanding economic opportunities and growth.

As an anti-terrorism tool, US-VISIT has potential, but must address glaring deficiencies. To be effective, the system must be capable of electronically screening individuals against a comprehensive integrated terrorist watch list. Right now, it cannot. Additionally, security could be enhanced by screening and inspecting as many foreign visitors as possible before they arrive in the United States. Lastly, while the security US-VISIT offers is limited to our ports of entry, border regions between ports of entry remain extremely porous.

The Administration should invest in adequate highways and access roads to the border, expanded inspection areas where possible, and additional inspections personnel and technology. The Administration should also move quickly to push out our border through the expansion of pre-clearance programs at our land borders and at our airports overseas. Lastly, the thousands of miles between our ports remain vulnerable unless we make necessary investments in law enforcement personnel and technology.

Protect Seaports

Strengthen the Coast Guard

Since September 11th, the U.S. Coast Guard has been asked to lead the nation's efforts to secure 95,000 miles of coastline and 361 ports while ensuring the flow of commerce. They are, however, short on personnel and the Coast Guard cutter fleet is older than 39 of the world's 41 major naval fleets.⁹¹ Administration plans to upgrade ships and air patrol will not be complete until 2022.⁹²

We should turn the Coast Guard into a 21st century force by increasing its manpower and firepower to match its mission. Congress should increase the Coast Guard's strength by 15 percent to turn it into a maritime force that is 50,000 strong. We should also accelerate the upgrading of frontline ships and planes (Project Deepwater) so that the new force is ready in the next ten years rather than the current pace of twenty years.

Check Cargo for Weapons of Mass Destruction

Millions of cargo containers enter the United States and travel through our communities every year. Currently, less than 5 percent of the cargo containers entering American ports are physically inspected to determine their contents. This Administration has not deployed the personnel or equipment necessary to ensure that these containers are free of weapons of mass destruction.⁹³

Technology should be deployed to each sea and land port of entry to enable 100 percent of all cargo containers entering the United States to be screened for nuclear and radiological materials without engaging in cumbersome physical inspections that will slow commerce.

Implement Port Security Plans

Prior to September 11, the security at many American seaports ranged from poor to fair.⁹⁴ Many ports are developing plans to provide the security necessary in the post-September 11th world, such as installing cameras, building fences, and posting guards. Yet, the Administration has provided virtually no support for these efforts in its post-September 11 budgets. Due to the lack of funding and commitment, many ports are struggling to get these changes in place, leaving them extremely vulnerable.

Ports must receive the resources they need to improve their security.

Improve Aviation Security

Protect Passenger Planes from Missile Attack

Passenger planes are totally undefended against attack by surface to air missiles. Tens of thousands of these missiles are scattered across the globe and readily available for purchase on the black market. They are of known interest to terrorists and have been used against civilian aircraft in Kenya and most recently Baghdad.⁹⁵ Technology is being developed to help defend vulnerable civilian aircraft from surface to air missile attack.

The Department of Homeland Security must accelerate research for on board anti-missile technology for passenger aircraft, improve perimeter security, and deploy missile defenses as warranted by the threat as soon as technically feasible. Additionally, the Administration should pursue international programs to counter the proliferation of these missile systems and train border inspectors to prevent their entry into the United States.

Screen All Cargo on Passenger Planes

Today, 22 percent of all air cargo moves on passenger flights without a security check, despite a law that says the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) will screen all cargo.⁹⁶

TSA instead relies on “known shippers” despite evidence of numerous security violations.⁹⁷ Screening passengers without screening the cargo carried beneath their feet invites disaster.

The Department of Homeland Security should establish a physical screening process for all cargo placed on passenger planes.

Screen All Baggage on Passenger Planes

Despite multiple requirements and missed deadlines, the (TSA) is still not electronically screening 100 percent of checked baggage. In some cases, TSA only ensures that a passenger is on board before a bag is loaded, a policy providing no security from suicide attacks.

The Department of Homeland should comply with the legal mandate for 100 percent electronic screening of baggage.

PROVIDING SECURITY INSIDE AMERICA

Terrorists have made it clear that attacking critical infrastructures achieves their dual aims of taking American lives and disrupting our economy.⁹⁸ For example, there are over 7,000 U.S. chemical facilities where a toxic release could kill or injure over 10,000 people; an accident at any one of over 120 of those facilities could threaten over 1 million people. As the deadly Madrid train bombing demonstrated, rail and other public transit are extremely vulnerable to attack. The millions of rail and truck cars carrying toxic and combustible chemicals around the country daily are potential bombs on wheels. Intelligence officials have warned against threats to water supplies, dams, and airplane attacks against nuclear facilities. Every day, millions of citizens are potential targets at concentrated travel points like bridges, tunnels, and subway stations and at concentrated settings like large buildings and public entertainment venues. We often make the mistake of defending against only the most recent attack. But it is likely that next time the terrorist will exploit a far different vulnerability than they did on September 11. We must harden as many of our infrastructures as possible to try and prevent, or at least mitigate the damage from, the next terrorist attack.

Passenger Rail and Transit Security

Worldwide, roughly one-third of terrorist attacks target transportation systems; the most frequently targeted transportation mode is public transit.⁹⁹ The attacks in Madrid are the most recent example of 195 terrorist attacks from 1997-2000.¹⁰⁰ Although terrorist attacks similar to the Madrid attacks or the frequent bus bombings in Israel have yet to occur in the United States, the threat is real and hard to protect against.

Some ten million train and subway trips are taken every day in the U.S., of which 66,000 travel on Amtrak on the one of the busiest corridors in the world, between Washington and Boston. Five times as many Americans travel on trains and transit each day then those that travel on planes.¹⁰¹ Yet, the resources dedicated to rail and transit security are woefully inadequate.

Invest In Security Measures

DHS's 2004 fiscal year budget has \$4.3 billion for aviation security, but less than 2 percent of this amount - \$85 million - for ground transportation security, which includes not only trucking, but also rail and mass transit.¹⁰² In the fiscal year 2005 budget request, spending on maritime and land transportation fell below three percent of TSA's budget.¹⁰³

The cost in terms of security is real. According to a GAO survey and interviews with transit officials nationwide, "insufficient funding is the most significant challenge in making their transit systems as safe and secure as possible." In fact, survey respondents were more than 2.5 times more likely to cite insufficient funding as the main impediment to security relative to any other factors.¹⁰⁴

The total estimated cost of security improvements at eight large transit agencies totaled \$711 million. Extrapolating this estimate suggests that providing a baseline of security to the 50 largest metropolitan areas would cost roughly \$2 billion.

The Administration should increase grant funding for passenger rail and transit by fivefold to \$250 million in fiscal year 2004 to provide a down payment on enhancing security for passenger rail and transit throughout the United States.

Clarify Responsibilities on Rail/ Transit Security

According to the GAO, “The roles and responsibilities of TSA and [the Department of Transportation] in transportation security have yet to be clearly delineated, which creates the potential for duplicating and/or conflicting efforts as both entities move forward with their security efforts...DOT and TSA have not yet formally defined their roles and responsibilities in securing all modes of transportation.”¹⁰⁵ In 2003, GAO recommended that the DHS Secretary work with the Secretary of Transportation to “develop a risk-based plan that specifically addresses the security of the nation’s rail infrastructure” and “establish time frames for implementing specific security actions.”¹⁰⁶ The GAO and DOT disagreed with the recommendation, and clear definition of roles and responsibilities remains absent.

DHS should develop a national transportation security strategy to help stakeholders set priorities, leverage resources, establish performance expectations, and create incentives for stakeholder to improve security.

The DHS Secretary should work with Secretary of Transportation to develop a risk-based plan that specifically addresses the security of the nation’s rail and transit infrastructure and establish time frames for implementing specific security actions.

Chemical Facility Security

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has identified 123 facilities in the U.S. that could threaten over one million people in the event of a massive breach of chemical containment, and over 7,000 U.S. chemical facilities where a toxic release could kill or injure over 10,000 people.¹⁰⁷ A 2002 Brookings Institution report ranks an attack on a chemical facility behind only biological and nuclear attacks in terms of possible fatalities.¹⁰⁸

While chemical facilities and materials are essential components of our economy, they are also attractive targets to terrorists: capable of causing large loss of life and poorly defended. As recently as this holiday season, DHS officials warned of possible targeting of chemical plants by terrorists.¹⁰⁹ The Justice Department has described the threat to chemical plants as “both real and credible” and potentially more dangerous than an attack on a nuclear power plant.¹¹⁰

Recent reports suggest that the security surrounding industrial chemicals is weak. In November 2003, the television magazine *60 Minutes* reported unlocked gates, absent guards, dilapidated fences, and unprotected tanks filled with deadly chemicals at dozens of facilities in several major metropolitan areas.¹¹¹ In the Pittsburgh area, one reporter found easy access to over 200 tons of corrosive chlorine gas at four different sites.¹¹²

The seriousness and immediacy of the threat to our chemical infrastructure requires immediate steps:

Require Chemical Facilities to Assess and Address Security Vulnerabilities

Following September 11, many chemical facilities took voluntary actions to improve security. While laudable, these efforts have not been sufficient. Not all companies have taken voluntary steps, and there is little oversight for those that have. According to the General Accounting Office, “no federal oversight or third-party verification ensures that voluntary industry assessments are adequate and that necessary corrective actions are taken.”¹¹³ As a result, the extent of security preparedness at U.S. chemical facilities is unknown, and facility operators, law enforcement, and emergency responders may not be prepared to respond appropriately to security threats.

The Administration itself has advocated action. Over a year ago, DHS Secretary Tom Ridge and former EPA Administrator Whitman publicly stated that “voluntary efforts alone are not sufficient to provide the level of assurance Americans deserve” and chemical facilities “must be required to take steps” to improve security.¹¹⁴ In the 30 months since September 11, however, the Administration has taken only “preliminary steps” towards ensuring the security of these vulnerable facilities.¹¹⁵ DHS officials have visited only 17 plants and must rely wholly on industry supplied information and voluntary action.¹¹⁶

Congress should require all facilities that may pose a substantial danger to conduct vulnerability assessments, develop security plans to address vulnerabilities, and implement them. Federal standards setting, oversight, inspection, and strong enforcement authority by DHS and EPA would ensure compliance. Vulnerability assessments and security plans should be reviewed by government officials to ensure compliance and provide oversight. The pooling and sharing of information about security practices will assist government, industry, and first responders in constantly improving security and emergency response strategies.

Improve Security by Promoting Inherently Safer Technologies

According to President Bush’s science advisor, Dr. John Marburger, technologies that reduce the toxicity, flammability, or other hazardous characteristics of chemicals and their processes “help improve the environment, public health, and competitiveness,” and also “inherently reduce the threat of terrorism.”¹¹⁷ Replacing dangerous chemical products and processes with “inherently safer technologies” (IST) will fundamentally reduce and possibly eliminate the danger posed by a chemical facility. Taking these steps is the only way to remove these targets from terrorists’ lists.¹¹⁸ But the Administration has opposed legislation requiring facilities to consider adopting IST where practicable¹¹⁹ and has systematically undermined the chemical security activities of the only federal agency with expertise in IST, the EPA.¹²⁰

Chemical producers and users should be required to consider using IST or other “alternative approaches” that can make a chemical or chemical process less hazardous. Information regarding the economic and technological barriers to its adoption to improve security should be collected and, with the leadership of EPA, an analysis undertaken that will identify opportunities across the industry where IST can improve security and suggest areas for research that will enhance IST and its adoption in the future.

Agro-Terrorism And Food Safety

A strong, vibrant agricultural sector is an essential part of the U.S. economy, making up 13% of our GDP, and our safe, secure food supply is enjoyed by every single American. However, these crucial assets are highly vulnerable to willful and targeted disruption.

Past, unintentional introductions of pathogens demonstrate the danger. The discovery of a single case of mad cow disease in the U.S. has seriously damaged international trade in U.S. beef. In 2001, an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the United Kingdom, caused by a highly contagious and easily introduced virus, cost that country over \$10 billion in economic losses.¹²¹ The Department of Agriculture conducted a simulation of an intentional release of this same virus in the U.S. and found that a single truckload of contaminated hogs could spread disease to 25 states within five days before detection.¹²²

Unintentional food-borne illnesses remain a serious health threat, sending over 300,000 people to the hospital each year.¹²³ The recent outbreak of hepatitis A that harmed consumers of a shipment of Mexican green onions has demonstrated to observing terrorists the ease with this method of reaching a widespread range of victims with little risk of capture.¹²⁴ The terror alone from a real or suspected contamination of the food supply could be substantial. In 1989, Chilean grapes were widely rumored to be laced with cyanide poison. Although no evidence was found, public fears cost at least \$210 million in damages.¹²⁵

Terrorists have recognized these vulnerabilities. In a 1984 incident in Oregon, domestic bioterrorists sickened 750 people by contaminating a restaurant salad bar with salmonella bacteria.¹²⁶ In Afghanistan, U.S. agricultural documents and training manuals that included extensive sections on agricultural terrorism were discovered in al-Qaeda safe houses.¹²⁷

These threats to our agricultural base and food supply must be addressed.

Strengthen Border and Facility Inspections

Defense against agricultural terrorism begins at the border, where the introduction of pathogens and contaminants can be stopped. But inspection at U.S. borders remains weak, with the FDA inspecting only 2 percent of food imports under its jurisdiction. Meanwhile, serious concerns exist about the adequacy of DHS inspectors' training and workforce.¹²⁸ DHS has not filled all available agriculture specialist positions¹²⁹ and between 50 to 75 percent of the current staff may transfer to alternative positions when permitted.¹³⁰ This will create a gap in our ability to inspect agriculture shipments coming across our borders.

Within the U.S., the highly integrated nature of our food distribution system means numerous access points for the terrorist as food travels from "farm-to-fork," moving thousands of miles and changing hands repeatedly.¹³¹ The flow of livestock and crop shipments is often not traced.¹³² At thousands of food processing and packing plants across the country, basic security is poor, personnel are rarely screened, and inaccurate or nonexistent recordkeeping practices make tracing contaminated food complicated and time-consuming.¹³³ While federal agencies have issued security guidelines and new registration requirements, they lack the authority or the manpower to enforce their adoption.¹³⁴

Well-trained inspectors at airports, seaports, and land crossings are essential, and DHS should seek full and stable staffing of these positions. The inspection workforce of the USDA and FDA needs to be boosted to increase inspections to

ensure compliance, but these resources cannot be increased indefinitely. The federal government should develop a program to train state and local inspectors to recognize exotic animal and crop diseases, the signs of terrorism, and understand biosecurity best practices. The job of all inspectors will be made much easier with rapid, sensitive diagnostic techniques for pathogens. The development of such devices and techniques must be a priority. A nationwide electronic livestock identification system should be deployed that is capable of tracing, within 48 hours, an individual animal from birth to slaughter.

Enhance Detection of Agro-Terrorism

The ability to rapidly detect an outbreak is vital to minimizing harm to people and the economy and reducing terror. But disease surveillance is hampered by farmers reluctant to report disease, underdeveloped communication channels between officials, poorly trained veterinarians, and inadequate diagnostic tools and laboratory capacity.¹³⁵ As a result, an outbreak of certain diseases might go unnoticed for long periods. In other instances, widespread outbreaks would quickly overwhelm laboratories or lead to misjudgments about the true extent of the spread of disease.

Surveillance is the most important tool for detecting contamination of the food supply. CDC's only active surveillance program for food-borne illnesses, FoodNet, covers less than 15% of the U.S. population.¹³⁶ In addition, the microbial monitoring of food, done at processing plants and ports of entry, is fragmented and is not sufficiently integrated with surveillance to detect pathogens in the food system.¹³⁷

Active surveillance of food-borne illnesses, particularly those caused by pathogens likely to be intentionally introduced, must be expanded more quickly. Ultimately, a nationwide program should be employed. Rapid, clinical diagnostic tools for major food supply threat agents should be developed and supplied to practitioners. Results from food sampling and inspection data need to be further integrated into food-borne surveillance systems. This effort, combined with targeted research, will enhance already widely practiced safety assurance methods to detect intentional food contamination.

Prepare a National Agro-terror Response Plan

Preparedness for agricultural terrorism is also weak. The current food safety system remains a patchwork of up to 200 different agencies functioning under different regulatory approaches, operating in an uncoordinated fashion.¹³⁸ There is no comprehensive plan or strategy to prepare and defend the nation against terrorist attacks on our agriculture and food supply¹³⁹ and numerous gaps remain in our ability to rapidly and effectively respond.¹⁴⁰

The Department of Homeland Security should lead in developing a comprehensive national strategy to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism against the nation's food supply and thwart the entry of harmful agents into the U.S. that would threaten our agricultural sector. Plans must include a strategic stockpile of animal vaccines, antibiotics, and insecticides, as well a rapid-reaction reserve of veterinary and plant pathologists who can respond to combat a serious outbreak. The sequencing of likely pathogen genomes should take on a high priority

and these data should be applied to a vigorous program in animal vaccine and drug development and genetically resistant crop science.

Cybersecurity & Information Warfare

According to a survey conducted last year by the Pew Internet and American Life Project, almost half of Americans fear terrorists will launch cyberattacks on our critical infrastructures, disrupting major services and crippling economic activity.¹⁴¹ This fear is not unwarranted. Our power systems, telecommunications networks, financial sector, emergency, and national defense services all depend on computer networks – networks that are interconnected and reliant upon one another.

Our nation is only as strong as the security on the weakest link on these networks. A weak link on any computer can allow a hacker to open a dam, close down an air traffic control system, or create financial ruin for our banking industry. It was only a few years ago that a computer hacker gained control of a telephone system and disabled the Worcester, Massachusetts airport, shutting down the airport for more than six hours.¹⁴² Others have penetrated the computer systems of the California Independent System Operator, the nonprofit corporation that controls the distribution of 75 percent of the state's power, and the Roosevelt Dam in Arizona.¹⁴³ In 2000, someone gained access to a utility company computer in Australia, releasing millions of gallons of raw sewage into a community's waterways.¹⁴⁴ In 2003, the Sobig computer virus temporarily shut down the 23,000-mile-long CSX rail system.¹⁴⁵

These are only a few examples of the physical havoc that can be caused by cyberterrorists. The potential economic damage to our economy is also devastating and could be in the hundreds of billions of dollars. During the summer of 2003, three viruses, Sobig, Blaster, and Welchia, caused more than \$32.8 billion in economic damages.¹⁴⁶

We know that terrorists, as well as their supporters, are technologically-savvy. Soon after September 11th, hacker gangs such as "GForce Pakistan" declared a "cyber jihad" on the United States and called on all Muslim hackers to participate.¹⁴⁷ In October 2001, GForce defaced a government website posting a message stating, "Osama Bin Laden is a holy fighter...whatever he says makes sense." It also said that it planned to hit major U.S. military and British web sites and proclaimed an "Al-Qaeda Alliance online."

According to the Institute for Security Technology Studies at Dartmouth College, "terrorists are known to be extensively using information technology and the Internet to formulate plans, raise funds, spread propaganda, and communicate securely."¹⁴⁸ In addition to terrorist groups, several nation-states are known to be involved in developing cyberweapons.¹⁴⁹ Among those nations developing cyberwarfare capabilities are North Korea, Cuba, China, and Russia.¹⁵⁰

Unfortunately, terrorists will only continue to expand on their technology capabilities. According to Dorothy Denning, author of one of the first books on cybersecurity and information warfare, our country must realize that "the next generation of terrorists will grow up in a digital world." Their skill and experience will be greater than today's terrorists. Indeed, cyberterrorism "could also become more attractive as the real and virtual worlds become more closely coupled, with automobiles, appliances, and other devices attached to the Internet."

Securing our networks must be a priority in the war against terror. We cannot wait for a disaster to happen before we devote our full energies to preparing for and being able to respond to this threat.

Create Cybersecurity Crisis Center

If an electronic 9-11 were to happen tomorrow, who in the government could coordinate the efforts of dozens of agencies and effectively reach out to the private sector, which owns 85 percent of our critical infrastructures? It is not clear who has the authority and capability within the federal government to bring together the various federal and state agencies, as well as the relevant private sector entities, in the event of a cyber-catastrophe.

The challenges of protecting our critical networks and infrastructures require a new paradigm of government and industry leadership for addressing a crisis as it emerges. What is needed is a National Crisis Coordination Center that could house within a single physical facility critical infrastructure sector representatives, and federal, state, and local government agencies. This center would be multi-agency and include all agencies tasked with responsibilities relating to responding to attacks on our critical networks. At the same time, the center would house private sector representatives so that those who own and operate 85% of the infrastructures would be available in the event of a cyber "9-11." Such a center could bring together the best of the federal government and private sector.

Make Cybersecurity A Priority

In February 2003, the Administration released a "National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace," setting forth five cybersecurity priority areas, including the development of a cybersecurity response system, a threat and vulnerability reduction program, and awareness and training programs, as well as plans for securing government computers and developing national security and international cooperation. Implementation of the plan has been delayed for over a year and three presidential advisors on cybersecurity have left the government, one after only two months. Indeed, the latest individual responsible for reporting to the President on critical infrastructure protection, including cybersecurity, left the White House's Homeland Security Council in February and has yet to be replaced.

We cannot continue to wait to protect our computer networks. We should move forward to meet the challenges presented by modern technology and eliminate the weakest links in our networks. We should develop a culture of security within our computer networks and among our citizens to ensure our national security. We need leadership within the government to assure that the United States is ready for attacks on our computer systems, especially in a time of crisis. If we do not take action, we leave our nation at risk.

Prepare for Information Warfare

Information warfare "consists of those actions intended to protect, exploit, corrupt, deny, or destroy information resources in order to achieve a significant advantage, objective, or victory over an adversary."¹⁵¹ For example, during the Gulf War, it was reported that a group of Dutch hackers indicated to Saddam Hussein that they would disrupt the U.S. military's deployment to

the Gulf for \$1 million. Fortunately, Saddam declined the offer. Infowarfare can also try to disrupt or damage what we think or know about the world and about our country. Infowarriors use propaganda, media interference, computer hacking, and other efforts to promote “dissident or opposition movements across computer networks.”¹⁵²

The emergence of technology has made information warfare a viable threat. Not only must the United States protect its infrastructures, it must assure the availability and integrity of the information contained on them.

Critical Infrastructure

Besides protective measures specific to individual sectors, the government needs to develop a comprehensive approach to infrastructure protection that increases security and hardens targets across all sectors. The following steps need to be taken to begin the difficult process of identifying and addressing the many vulnerabilities in U.S. critical infrastructure:

Complete National Critical Infrastructure Risk Assessment in One Year

According to the Homeland Security Act, the DHS is required to comprehensively assess critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, prioritize protective measures, and develop a comprehensive national plan for securing critical infrastructures. Although the need for a national critical infrastructure risk assessment to prioritize protective efforts is widely accepted,¹⁵³ little has been done to perform the assessments. According to James Gilmore, Chairman of the Gilmore Commission, none of the Administration’s various homeland security strategies were based on an adequate risk assessment,¹⁵⁴ the lack of which “hampers defensive measures and preparedness activities.”¹⁵⁵

In September, 2003, DHS’ Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection Robert Liscouski testified to the House Select Committee on Homeland Security¹⁵⁶ that he “would be surprised, frankly, if we had [a comprehensive risk assessment] done in the next five years.” Five years is too long to wait when the threats exist now.

*The DHS should, in coordination with other public and private partners, assemble within one year an initial/draft national critical-infrastructure risk assessment. Such an assessment should include a full assessment of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, and leverage, to the fullest extent possible, already existing risk assessments that have been performed by many states, infrastructure sectors, and federal agencies. The study should be updated and improved on an annual basis. In addition, the Congress should establish an Independent Commission to assess critical-infrastructure security and suggest strategies for the protection of the nation’s critical infrastructures.*¹⁵⁷

Provide Incentives to Promote Investments in Infrastructure Security

The Administration has failed to provide leadership to improve critical-infrastructure security, 85 percent of which is owned by the private sector. According to the Brookings Institution, the Bush Administration “largely ignores” major critical infrastructure in the private sector.¹⁵⁸ In testimony before the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, homeland security experts gave the DHS “not a passing grade” on critical infrastructure protection.¹⁵⁹ The extent of the

Bush Administration policy to date is a nearly singular reliance on voluntary private action. Unfortunately, “private markets by themselves do not provide adequate incentives to invest in homeland security.”¹⁶⁰

*The Administration should promote smart investments in critical infrastructures to improve both security and overall reliability, making critical infrastructures less vulnerable to potential disruption, whether terrorism-related or not. The Administration should use all the policy tools at its disposal to change the structure of incentives to increase the security of critical infrastructure in the United States, including tax incentives, promotion of terrorism insurance and other commercial products, and work with owners of critical infrastructure, as necessary, to ensure a minimum regulatory framework that helps promote security in each of the critical infrastructure sectors without placing unreasonable burdens on business owners.*¹⁶¹

Improve Information Sharing between Government and Owners of Critical Infrastructure

The Administration has made little progress on achieving effective information sharing between all levels of government and private owners of critical infrastructure protection. Information sharing is largely *ad hoc* and the Administration needs to make these relationships more explicit, more trusted, and more institutionalized. According to the GAO,¹⁶² the Gilmore Commission,¹⁶³ and the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security,¹⁶⁴ the Administration has done little to delineate the functions, relationships, and mechanisms for information sharing in coordination with the critical sectors. Among problems cited by the GAO,¹⁶⁵ “none of the [levels] of government perceived the current information sharing process with the federal government to be effective... and the information that was shared was not perceived as timely, accurate, or relevant.” Finally, the Markle Foundation has concluded the Administration has not taken advantage of America’s technology expertise to enhance information sharing to combat terrorism.¹⁶⁶

The DHS must dramatically improve information sharing by clearly defining roles and responsibilities, improving outreach and coordination, building robust institutions, better leveraging available technology, and strengthening accountability.

Develop a Comprehensive National CIP Protection Plan

*This plan would facilitate critical-infrastructure-protection information sharing that clearly defines roles and responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security, other federal agencies, state and local governments, and private owners of critical infrastructure before, during, and after an attack on critical infrastructures. Establish comprehensive procedures for information sharing.*¹⁶⁷

Create Metrics for Measuring Progress in Infrastructure Protection

The Administration should follow the recommendation of the Gilmore Commission that DHS “develop metrics for describing infrastructure security in meaningful terms, and to determine the adequacy of preparedness.” The DHS should prepare an annual report card which assesses the state of preparedness of each of the critical infrastructure sectors against specific performance metrics. In addition, DHS should grant annual awards recognizing significant improvements or achievements in critical-infrastructure protection. Such programs can be a powerful tool for government to motivate private sector actors to enhance infrastructure security, as the public-relations impact of such assessments can be significant.

RESPONDING TO TERRORIST ATTACKS

According to a prominent bipartisan commission, America is “dangerously unprepared” to respond to a catastrophic terrorist attack. The September 11 attacks were a wake-up call to the nation that we must prepare, plan and be able to quickly mobilize to respond to any terrorist attack on our soil. Preparing America to meet this challenge means arming our first responders with the tools they need to respond to any situation and save lives, mobilizing second responders to strengthen preparedness and support first responders, and preparing the National Guard to assume a leading role in case of catastrophic attack.

Arm First Responders with the Tools They Need

Over two years after September 11th, there has been no systematic review of the true planning, equipment, training, and personnel needs of America’s first responders in order to protect our communities from terrorist attacks. Although funding for some programs has increased, we have not defined the goals and objectives of this spending; we have not advanced the implementation of interoperable communications systems; nor have we identified the priority threats and vulnerabilities that limited homeland security funds should address.^{168 169 170}

Determine the preparedness needs of our communities—including equipment, personnel, training, planning, and exercises—for firefighting, law enforcement, emergency medical services, public health, medical capabilities, and emergency management, that are flexible enough to be utilized for a wide range of threats and vulnerabilities. Create a Terrorism Preparedness Grant Program that will fund these needs, and get needed equipment and training in the hands of the police, firefighters and emergency personnel who will be the first on the scene of an attack.

Enable First Responders to Communicate

America’s first responders still cannot talk with one another at a disaster scene. Communications equipment still is not interoperable and that means that too often at a disaster site, firefighters, police, and emergency personnel cannot communicate. There are at least six Federal departments and a number of interagency and independent organizations that are involved in developing standards for communication systems and equipment. Over two years after September 11, and over eight years after a federal advisory committee stated that immediate measures needed to be taken to promote interoperability, the situation remains as disconnected as ever.¹⁷¹

¹⁷² The technology exists today to overcome these barriers.

Enhance interoperable communications and allow first responders to take effective and coordinated action by deploying nationwide more cost-effective and efficient solutions to achieve radio system interoperability in the near future, utilizing available solutions that take advantage of the existing communications infrastructures within our states and localities. Centralize the administration of interoperable communications research, standards development, and grant management within DHS.

Expand Urban Search and Rescue Teams

The National Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Response System is managed by Federal Emergency Management Agency to provide a highly-specialized and technical response capability in order to rescue victims of structural collapse to save lives, treat injuries and minimize secondary damage to structures. Each of the 28 current US&R Task Forces draws upon a base of local expertise, and has up to hundreds of members on-call for deployment in order to provide built-in redundancy for each Task Force. Last year, the Department of Homeland Security provided assistance to train and equip all 28 of the US&R Task Forces to address a situation involving weapons of mass destruction. Previously, only six (6) Task Forces were fully prepared to respond to WMD incidents.¹⁷³

The Department of Homeland Security should set a response standard that mandates the ability to provide US&R Task Force assistance to every community in the nation within six hours of a terrorist incident or natural disaster.

Deploy Defenses for a Chemical Attack

The history of use of chemical weapons by terrorists proves that we must be prepared. We must not send our first responders into the chemical equivalent of the World Trade Towers.

Firefighters, police officers, and EMTs must be equipped with appropriate and effective protective gear to respond to a contaminated area. Where effective antidotes exist, every ambulance crew in the nation should be equipped with the supplies and training to treat victims at the scene. When new tools are needed, the development and licensing of antidotes for potential chemical agents and toxins should be vigorously pursued.

Support Second Responders

Since September 11, many Americans have been searching for a way to join the fight against terrorism. The federal government should facilitate and work in coordination with the private sector and small businesses to actively involve citizens in preparedness efforts. Public-private partnerships, such as the partnership between the Business Executives for National Security and the State of New Jersey and Georgia, have proven to be useful in identifying and coordinating private sector support for state and local first responders.

The Department of Homeland Security should support the development of "Second Responder" initiatives in all fifty states.

Strengthen National Guard Capabilities For Homeland Security

At present, the Army National Guard is primarily organized and equipped to conduct sustained combat overseas, with a very small percentage eventually dedicated to homeland security functions in the United States. Adjusting to the new strategic threats faced by the United States, the National Guard should devote more resources to provide greater support to civil authorities in preparing for and responding to homeland security responsibilities, and in particular, potential catastrophic terrorist attacks.¹⁷⁴ Homeland security should be made a top priority mission for a more significant portion of the National Guard. Geographically dispersed, with deep ties to local communities and well-established relationships with state governments, the National Guard is ideally suited—along with United States Northern Command—to be the military's primary contribution to homeland security. Aspects include:

Enhance National Guard's Homeland Security Mission

All Army and Air National Guard personnel should be trained and equipped with an enhanced focus on consequence management in the event of a major terrorist attack. The Guard should specifically prepare for assuming the lead military role in consequence management in case of a terrorist attack using nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological weapons in the United States. This will ensure that Guard personnel, who are not deployed overseas, will be able to respond in the event of a terrorist attack.

Provide the United States with Regional National Guard WMD Response Units

The Department of Defense has received congressional approval to deploy Civil Support Teams (CST), specialized National Guard units that are trained to respond in the case of a WMD terrorist event against U.S. population centers in each state and several territories. Their function is primarily diagnostic in nature and they do not perform a consequence management role. They determine the nature of an attack, provide medical and technical advice, and provide guidance as to which follow-on response capabilities will be necessary. With additional training, they could play a more vital role in assisting local first responders such as firefighters and policemen in responding to attacks involving hazardous materials or weapons of mass destruction.

Currently, there are 32 full-time, 22-member teams. The fiscal year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act required a full-time WMD-CST in each state or territory, and the fiscal year 2004 Defense Appropriations Act provided funding for 12 additional CSTs. Rather than individual state teams, each with a small number of personnel having a limited function, these teams should be combined into larger regional teams whose members have greater initial response capability and can be deployed within a short period of time. The home-base of the regional teams would be based on an assessment of risk, desired response time, and the location of other WMD-response assets.

The United States should have eight to ten Rapid Response Regional Civil Support Teams capable of responding to a WMD terrorist attack within 4 hours. The teams should have both diagnostic expertise and the ability to support the efforts of first responders following a WMD incident.

Conduct Annual Homeland Security Training and Exercises for Guard Units

Every National Guard unit should conduct annual full-scale exercises centering on its homeland security mission. The Guard units should coordinate their training, activities and planning with state and local first responders.

REINFORCING SECURITY, PRIVACY, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

Scrutinize Emerging Technologies

The protection of our citizens' civil liberties and privacy is fundamental to the American way of life. Our security efforts are, after all, designed to preserve the "unalienable rights that are essential to the strength and security of our nation: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."¹⁷⁵ At the same time, emerging technologies continue to become more sophisticated. In recent years, communications, surveillance, and database technologies, as well as biometrics and interconnected networks, have changed our terrorist-fighting capabilities. As we evaluate how to use these powerful tools, we must consider the implications for our "individual privacy and personal liberties."¹⁷⁶

Benjamin Franklin said, "They that would give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." Our nation will lose the war against terrorist groups if they succeed in having us sacrifice our liberties at the altar of security. As Peter Swire and Jeffrey Eisenach, officials in the Clinton and Reagan Administrations, respectively, noted "We organize government not only to defeat terrorism and protect our nation, but also to maintain the heritage of freedom that gives those efforts meaning."

The federal government should convene a Privacy Commission to develop and issue clear, public guidelines governing the use of emerging technologies that have privacy and civil liberties implications. The Commission should also recommend rules to govern the collection, retention, and dissemination of information, including information provided by the private sector.

Review USA Patriot Act

To effectively fight the war on terror, our law enforcement and intelligence agencies must be equipped with the necessary legal authorities to find terrorists and prevent attacks. Six weeks after the September 11 attacks, Congress passed the USA Patriot Act. The Act increased the ability of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to more effectively share information about terrorists and their activities, broadened federal authority to track and intercept communications for both law enforcement and foreign intelligence gathering purposes, authorized the detention and deportation of alien terrorists, and added resources to fight terrorism financing.

Many parts of the USA Patriot Act provide important counterterrorism tools that have improved our capability to investigate and pursue terrorists. Concerns have been expressed, however, that some provisions of the legislation extend overly intrusive authorities to the government. Congress wisely provided that parts of the Act would expire in December 2005 so the efficacy of these provisions and their impact on personal liberty could be carefully assessed. Our country should have this important debate, as the Gilmore Commission put it, "in the quiet of the day," so that provisions of the law that make a positive contribution to the war on terror can be extended, and if necessary clarified and strengthened, while those that do not, or are overly broad, can be modified or repealed.

A thorough review of the USA Patriot Act should be undertaken in the next session of Congress. Agencies should be required to explain how they use the powers granted to them and how these authorities contribute to the war on terror. Provisions that Congress determines have made a positive contribution to the government's counterterrorism efforts should be extended. Provisions that are rarely, if ever, used, and have had the effect of undermining public confidence in our law enforcement agencies, should be considered for repeal.

PREVENTING THE RISE OF FUTURE TERRORISTS

"It is useless to win a war, only to lose the peace"

- Franklin Delano Roosevelt

Over the long term, fighting the war on terror means not only attacking the enemy or protecting our homeland, but reducing the number of people who want to inflict harm on the United States and popular support for the individuals and groups that makes their operations possible. In an infamous memo written by Secretary Donald Rumsfeld last year, he asked: "Are we capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassahs and the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against us?" He went on to write, "The US is putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan, but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop terrorists. The Cost benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists' cost of millions."

To win the war on terror, our country will have to start putting much more effort into a long range plan to shape public opinion in the Arab and Muslim worlds to help stem the tide of people and funds that flow to terrorist organizations. Our national security ultimately depends on isolating the radical Islamic extremists by presenting a competing and more powerful and positive vision of the future for the people of the Middle East and the Muslim world. It must be a vision built in partnership with the people of the Middle East and supported by a global coalition with American leadership at the helm.

We must begin building bridges by opening dialogue between the United States and the Arab and Muslim world at every level. The United States should make a dramatic and massive commitment, on the scale of the Marshall Plan, to the future of Arab children and to the economic prosperity of people in the entire Middle East.

To accomplish this generational challenge, we will need to inspire a new sense of national service in the American people. We must clearly state the reasons for this commitment and be straight about the costs required to secure the safety and prosperity of the American people. To win this war, we must truly win the peace.

BUILDING BRIDGES TO THE ARAB / MUSLIM WORLD

Public diplomacy is the promotion of the national interest by the United States government to understand, inform, engage and influence the emerging leaders and general population of a nation or region. It is about reaching people, not governments. An essential component in defeating radical Islamic extremism is effectively using public diplomacy to reach and engage the 1.2 billion Muslims across the globe, to convey the values we share and build bridges of understanding between our cultures.

A recent bipartisan Commission led by former Ambassador Edward Djerejian has found that America's public diplomacy efforts are "inadequate, outmoded, and lacking strategic direction and resources." The report calls for a "transformation" of public diplomacy which requires "an end to the absurd and dangerous under funding of public diplomacy in a time of peril, when our enemies have succeeded in spreading viciously inaccurate claims about our intentions and our actions."¹⁷⁷

The Djerejian Commission concluded that, "the United States lacks the capabilities in public diplomacy to meet the national security threat emanating from political instability, economic deprivation, and extremism, especially in the Arab and Muslim world."¹⁷⁸

There is a struggle of ideas happening in the Muslim world, between the forces of modernity and reaction. One school of thought wants to bring the Muslim world into the 21st century, the other, manifested by al-Qaeda, wants to turn the clock back a thousand years. To win the war on terror, the United States must revitalize its effort to engage with the Arab and Muslim world by finding ways to strengthen the forces of tolerance. We must combat the extremists in the realm of ideas, not just on the battlefield.

This will be an uphill fight. According to the Pew Research Center, attitudes toward the United States in the Arab and Muslim world "have gone from bad to worse."¹⁷⁹ The Djerejian Report found that "hostility toward the United States has reached shocking levels."¹⁸⁰

The task ahead is huge, and so must be our commitment. Currently, funding for public diplomacy outreach programs comes to only \$25 million for the entire Arab and Muslim world.¹⁸¹ Bold new initiatives are needed now, before an entire generation turns against the United States. These include:

Increase Arab Speaking U.S. Diplomats

Currently, there are only 54 State Department employees who have tested at the bilingual level of competence in Arabic.¹⁸² Even fewer are able to hold their own on Arab language television or radio. This is an intolerable situation.

The State Department should hire and train an additional 500 Arabic speakers over the next three years. These individuals would be deployed to represent the United States and debate issues in the Arab media and in other public forums. Special attention should be focused on recruiting Arab-Americans.

Support the Voices of Moderation

America's current approach to disseminating information to the Arab and Muslim world is to run a large radio station called "Radio Sawa" and a new television station. We should not focus all our communications resources on just one media outlet and instead need to support regional voices of moderation and independent media.

The United States should create a non-profit "Corporation for Public Diplomacy." The organization, supported by both private and U.S. government funds, would make grants to individual producers and independent, indigenous media channels with the goal of creating and disseminating high quality programming to the Arab and Muslim world.

Build American Cultural Centers

The cost cutting brought about by the end of the Cold War and recent security concerns have drastically curtailed the easily accessible facilities that housed public diplomacy efforts such as reference services, libraries, book and art exhibits, film and television screenings, and cultural performances.¹⁸³ A small effort has been made to recreate these centers that are called "American Corners." They are planned to provide a multifaceted programming platform to tell America's story, especially to the young, through books, periodicals, music, film, and the Internet.

The State Department should commit to the creation and operation of 100 American Corners throughout the Arab and Muslim world, easily accessible to the public and staffed by U.S. Arabic-speaking diplomats and local citizens.

Double Exchange Program Visitors from the Muslim World

Since 1940, over 700,000 promising young foreigners have participated in exchange programs, such as the Fulbright Program which directs a range of academic exchange, the Humphrey Program which brings mid level public service professionals to the U.S. for a year of training, and the International Visitors Program which allows U.S. Ambassadors to invite current and emerging leaders to gain first hand knowledge of the U.S., and the U.S. Citizen Exchange, which awards grants to U.S. non-profits for exchanges with foreign counterparts. These programs cost \$245 million in FY 2003.¹⁸⁴

The U.S. Government should double the number of exchange program visitors that come from the Arab-Muslim world.

Create an Alumni Database for Exchange Program Participants

The State Department currently does not maintain a systematic database of foreign nationals who have participated in U.S. government-funded exchange programs.

The State Department should create a database of all foreign national participants in U.S.-funded exchange programs and ensure that the senior public affairs

officer at each post is given the resources necessary to develop monthly programs to keep alumni connected to and informed about the United States.

Open a Center for U.S.- Arab / Muslim Studies

The federal government has supported the creation and maintenance of the Dante Fascell North-South Center at the University of Miami for the study of Western Hemisphere Affairs and the East-West Center at the University of Hawaii, which promotes between relations between the U.S. and Pacific Rim nations. No such Center for the Arab and Muslim countries exists.¹⁸⁵

The United States should create and sustain a "Center for U.S.-Arab / Muslim Studies." The Center would sponsor research that would encompass many subjects including trade, economics, democratic governance, and security issues. The Center would maintain an extensive program of international fellowships and conferences.

Establish a Public Diplomacy Reserve Corps

The Public Diplomacy Reserve Corps would recruit prestigious private sector experts from relevant professions for short-term assignments. The Corps would augment overseas operations by offering individuals the opportunity to serve on short-term projects.¹⁸⁶

Fully Engage In Resolving Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The United States' efforts to prevent the rise of future terrorists by building bridges to the world's 1.2 billion Muslims must begin with full fledged engagement by the Administration to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This conflict has not caused the rise of al-Qaeda, and resolution of the conflict will not end global terrorism targeted against the United States. Nonetheless, rightly or wrongly, continuation of the conflict is a source of aggravation in the Muslim world, and the perceived favoritism of the United States toward Israel, especially since the beginning of the current *intifada* in September 2000, fuels hostility toward the United States among the world's Muslim population. Furthermore, many regimes in the Middle East use the conflict as a pretext to justify poor governance. Without this excuse, ineffective regimes would be held more accountable for their actions, thus creating the conditions for democratic change in the region. Successive American administrations have been able to maintain a strong alliance and close friendship with Israel, while helping to facilitate discussions between Israel and the Palestinians.

While the strategic partnership between the United States and Israel endures and strengthens, it is critical that the United States be fully engaged, at the highest levels of government, on a consistent and constant basis, in the search for a resolution to this tragic conflict. Our experience over the past three years has demonstrated one certainty: in the absence of discussions and diplomacy, violence fills the vacuum, causing power to shift away from voices of moderation and toward our enemies and those affiliated with them.

IMPROVING EDUCATION FOR ARAB CHILDREN

Winning the war on terror requires halting the rise of a new generation of terrorists – right now. Education is the key to preventing a new generation from turning to the teachings of the extremists.

The failing states of the Arab world face a devastating combination of challenges that include dictatorial regimes with little public base of support, lack of economic progress in a generation, political violence, and a growing Islamist opposition.¹⁸⁷ These unstable Arab states also share the phenomenon of a population explosion in which at least 50 percent of their respective populations (about 280 million) are under 24 years of age. This youth cohort places tremendous strain on the entire infrastructure of the state, especially on educational services that are already poor and declining in quality after a generation of underinvestment. The education gap between the people's needs and the Arab states' resources is being filled by Islamist organizations through their informal network of religious schools known as *madrasas*.¹⁸⁸

The statistics tell the story of a generation of Arab youth at risk of being lost to the lure of a free education at radical *madrasas*. According to the UNICEF Report "State of the Arab Child," 22 percent of boys and 31 percent of girls are not enrolled primary education. For children not receiving secondary school education, these figures skyrocket to 42 percent for boys and 52 percent for girls.

Secondary schools have long been key recruiting grounds for Islamist movements and the inculcation of Islamist attitudes and world outlook.¹⁸⁹ The underlying phenomenon in a number of Arab states is budgetary weakness that has led to diminished public services at a time of growing need. A prime example is that *madrasas* went from numbering in the hundreds to the thousands.¹⁹⁰ The educational initiatives to reverse these trends include:

Establish Global Alliance for Arab Children

USAID is currently offering \$100 million over five years to Pakistan to strengthen its public educational system. Instead of this ad hoc approach, the United States should enlist the nations of the European Union and Japan to offer Arab states significant resources if they commit to education reform.

The United States should organize an international donor's conference, and pledge a total of \$10 billion over 10 years – to be matched by the EU, Japan, Canada, and the Gulf States – for an Arab Youth Opportunity Fund. Funds will be spent directly for operation of primary and secondary secular schools in Arab states that commit to doubling their investment in public education over the course of ten years.

University Scholarships for Arab / Muslim Youth

At the height of the Cold War, USAID offered some 20,000 scholarships for university students to study in the United States. Today the number of scholarships available is down to 900 for applicants worldwide.¹⁹¹

The United States should offer 1,000 university scholarships a year for promising students from Arab / Muslim states who commit to returning home upon completion of their studies. We should also challenge the Gulf States to offer an equal number of scholarships for American students to study in the Middle East. The U.S. should work with our Canadian allies to coordinate and expand this effort.

American Knowledge Library Initiative

The Arab world is currently in relative intellectual and cultural isolation from the rest of the world. Arab publishers translate into Arabic only about 330 books a year, or, for comparison, only one-fifth the number that Greeks translate into Greek. During the past 1,000 years, the entire Arab world has translated into Arabic only as many books as Spanish publishers now annually translate into Spanish. Internet usage among Arab countries is the lowest rate in the world and only 1 in 100 Arabs has a personal computer.¹⁹²

The United States should undertake a massive translation program of thousands of the best books in numerous fields into Arabic and other languages of the Middle East. Recommendations would come from boards of academics in a variety of fields including history, business, economics, sociology, and the hard sciences. These books would be distributed to libraries as well as marketed through local partners. They would also be housed in "American Cultural Centers" and made available to all universities and high schools. The cost of translation is roughly \$5000 per book, making this an important investment in building secular education in the Arab / Muslim world.¹⁹³

City to City Exchanges

The State Department should set a goal of facilitating the establishment of 100 "sister city" programs between American communities and those in the Arab/Islamic world. The programs would emphasize links between educators, students, cultural, and professional groups. Efforts would be encouraged to establish formal links and exchanges between universities in the U.S. and the Middle East.

STIMULATING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

In September of 2001, our attention was drawn to a far off corner of the world – Afghanistan. That tragically failed state had become home to tens of thousands of disaffected youth from the Arab world who were gathered under the banner of al-Qaeda. This holds two important lessons for us as we move forward to win the war on terror:

- We cannot allow states to fail and become potential havens for terrorists
- We must work to expand opportunity in the Arab / Muslim world

As President Bush stated in a letter accompanying his National Security Strategy-

“The events of September 11th taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks within their borders.”

The countries of the Muslim world face enormous demographic and economic stresses. None of them is likely to produce the number of jobs necessary for their growing populations. The primary hope for heading off this potentially explosive situation is economic growth.¹⁹⁴ A group of Muslim scholars recently wrote a study that was issued by the United Nations Development Program. The study (The Arab Human Development Report 2002), talked about the dire situation in Arab societies. In short they reported that in the 22 nations of the Arab world:¹⁹⁵

- Economic productivity is declining. The growth in per capita income has stalled for two decades to a level just above sub-Saharan Africa. Forty years ago, Arab productivity was 32 percent of the North American level, by 1990 it had fallen to 19 percent;
- More than one in five Arabs lives on less than \$2 a day;
- Arab nations spend less than one-seventh of the world average annual investment in research. Achievements in science and technology are very limited;
- More than one in four Arabs is illiterate;
- Half of Arab youths say they want to emigrate.

Since 1980, the Middle East’s share of global trade and investment has collapsed, falling by 75 percent even as the region’s population has doubled. Today the entire Muslim world, with its 57 countries and 1.2 billion people, receives barely more foreign investment each year than tiny Sweden.¹⁹⁶

Governments are under pressure from below, by forces of ethnic separatism and violence, and from above, by economic, technological, and cultural forces that no government can control.¹⁹⁷

These trends clearly show the danger of allowing the status quo to continue. For without American action and leadership, we can expect to see more failed states, and more disaffected youth providing recruits for the enemies of freedom. Bold action is required to reverse these trends.

Since September 11, the President has called for, on more than one occasion, a “Marshall Plan” effort to provide development assistance in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is therefore important to remember exactly what made up the Marshall Plan. In his famous 1947 speech unveiling the assistance idea, Secretary of State George Marshall said that money was needed to reconstruct “the entire fabric of the European economy.” Over its four-year life, the Marshall Plan cost the

United States between 2.5 and 5 percent of its national income. Today that would amount to no less than \$200 billion a year.¹⁹⁸

Since the end of the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. has committed about \$2 billion to the Afghan people.¹⁹⁹ The current total budget for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is \$13 billion, far less than 1 percent of the federal budget.²⁰⁰ It is time to get serious about fulfilling this important mission that will help win the war on terror.

In today's world, where terrorists gain strength from disorder, development assistance is a vital investment in America's national security. If we use our power only for self-protection it fuels the fires of resentment. On the other hand, if we use our power, with others, to fight the status quo that mires much of the world in poverty, we earn influence and the respect and authority that power alone can never gain.²⁰¹ The following measures should be carried out:

The Renaissance Partnership

The United States should lead the effort to build a dynamic free market economy for the Middle East that provides economic opportunity for the tens of millions of Arab youth who will be coming of age in the next ten years.

The Renaissance Partnership would be a \$200 billion effort designed to support the development of open and dynamic job creating economies that are integrated into the world economic system. The main principles of the Renaissance Partnership would be:

Work With Our Allies

The United States would lead the effort by pledging up to \$100 billion over 10 years for the Renaissance Partnership. We would call on all the nations of the European Union, the G-8, the OECD, and wealthy Gulf States to join in the effort by matching the American pledge. The level of American support would be conditioned on the Allies matching our challenge.

Set Standards for Performance

One of the keys to success of the Marshall Plan was that the acceptance of funds was tied to developing regional economic cooperation. The United States should expect results from the Partnership that would create the economic growth that leads to long-term stability and peace. Before funds are distributed, partner states in the Middle East must agree, in treaty form, to meet the following standards: transparency of accounts on all projects accepting RP funds; accepting open trade standards by becoming eligible for WTO membership; forming a Middle Eastern Common Market patterned on the early European Community; and open membership for all regional states in the Middle Eastern Common Market.

Set Priorities with the Arab States

One of the central facets of the Marshall Plan was the requirement that European countries work together to devise a plan for economic reconstruction. As Marshall said, "It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe."²⁰²

The RP contributor states would work with recipient states to identify specific projects that should receive funding. Priority would go to projects that develop an entrepreneurial culture and build a middle class. Examples are: developing technology infrastructure, micro-credit financing, small business loans, teaching business skills, women's education, and building anti-corruption units in law enforcement.

Publicize the Work of USAID

When the Administrator of USAID was asked how much of his \$13 billion budget goes to publicizing the agency's work – he replied "almost none of it." There are some statutory restrictions that limit the dissemination of information about their activities.²⁰³

The development assistance provided by the United States to the people of the Arab/ Muslim world should be widely publicized in those nations. Muslims should see American values in action in their daily lives.

REVITALIZING STABILITY OPERATIONS

The most devastating attacks ever delivered against the American homeland emanated from the failed state of Afghanistan. In the 21st century, we now know from painful experience, that terrorists find haven in failed states and therefore we cannot allow states to fail.

Failed states are countries in which the central government does not exert effective control over, or deliver vital services to, significant parts of its territory due to conflict, ineffective governance, or state collapse.²⁰⁴ Terrorist organizations take advantage of failed states' porous borders and their weak law enforcement and security institutions to move money, men and weapons.²⁰⁵ In the case of al-Qaeda, this international terrorist network was able to set up extensive training camps in the failed state of Afghanistan, operate freely in the failing state of Sudan and conduct illicit trade to finance their operations in the failed states of Liberia and Sierra Leone.

To win the war on terror, whether we like it or not, the United States must become more rather than less engaged in the difficult tasks of peacemaking, peacekeeping and nation building in failed states.²⁰⁶ In fighting the war on terror, there is no part of the globe that we can view as unimportant to U.S. national security interests. We must, therefore, adapt our strategies and tactics to meet this new reality.

There is a long way for us to go. Stability operations have been conducted in an ad hoc manner in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and the painful results of poor planning are plain for all to see. In Afghanistan a tiny international security force limited to Kabul has effectively turned the rest of the nation over to warlords and a resurgent Taliban. As for Iraq, while official U.S. policy since 1998 was dedicating \$100 million a year toward the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, it was not until one month before Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched that the Pentagon assembled its team for the reconstruction of Iraq.²⁰⁷ The belated Pentagon Planning Team reportedly excluded Pentagon officials with experience in post war Reconstruction in the Balkans.²⁰⁸ The results of the failure to plan are clear – massive looting and lawlessness in the shadow of U.S troops (who were without an occupation plan) quickly undermined U.S. credibility with the Iraqi people. We must take the following steps to ensure that we do not win the war and lose the peace.

Finish the Job in Afghanistan

The Karzai government in Afghanistan has a zone of effective control that extends only so far as the reach of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which is to say only in the city of Kabul. The ISAF consists of approximately 5,000 troops. The UN has declared one third of the nation off limits to aid workers.²⁰⁹ The Bush Administration attempted Afghan reconstruction on the cheap by forbidding the expansion of ISAF and hoping that a new Afghan Army and Police Force could fill the void. Those Afghan forces, however, will not be strong enough to be a significant presence for three to five years. To prevent further gains by the Taliban and increased lawlessness in Afghanistan, the U.S. must take the lead in providing security while waiting for the rise of the new Afghan security forces.

The United States should support the expansion of a NATO-led ISAF mission to encompass all of Afghanistan. The new ISAF should have at its core 25,000 U.S. troops that would be matched by 25,000 from NATO partners. The United States would also provide air transport for ISAF, making it a highly mobile force. Additionally, the United States should channel its aid assistance through the Karzai

regime, rather than around it (Currently, 84 percent of aid to Afghanistan is delivered through foreign donor agencies.²¹⁰), so that the central government can gain resources and establish local control.

Secure Iraq: Transform U.S Military Mission to a NATO Mission

Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Saddam Hussein maintained control with the hand of a despotic dictator. It now appears that Saddam neither possessed weapons of mass destruction nor harbored terrorists intent upon attacking America. The growing presence of al-Qaeda operatives and other extremists in post-invasion Iraq present the possibility of a future Iraq of increasing danger to our security.

Failure to achieve stability and political reform in Iraq is not an option for the United States. Trading the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein for an unstable state haven for enemy terrorists is unacceptable. The United States must accept the reality of its mistaken assessment of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and move forward to restore our credibility. When the United States worked with our NATO allies in Kosovo, the burden on troop deployment and reconstruction aid was 15 percent for the United States with our allies contributing 85 percent. Today in Iraq, the American troops make up roughly 85 percent of the deployed troops.

We can ask for and expect troop commitments from our Allies if we share daily operational control of Iraqi affairs with them, and turn the occupation into a NATO mission. An American general would remain in charge of the operation, but would report to the NATO Council, the same situation in which U.S. General Wesley Clark led our forces to victory in Kosovo.²¹¹

Secure Loose Iraqi Ammunition

Today, 600,000 tons of ammunition from Saddam's army have yet to be secured, and thousands of shoulder-fired surface to air missiles remain at large.

U.S. forces must destroy that ammunition immediately or else secure it with surveillance technology and armed guards.²¹²

The U.S. Reconstruction Corps

Security is the absolute starting point for reconstruction: with it, almost anything is possible; without it, next to nothing is possible.²¹³ Afghanistan and Iraq are not the first cases of post conflict reconstruction that are vital to U.S. national interests, and they will not be the last. Throughout our history, the United States has assisted the reconstruction of failing or war torn states. However, the U.S. government remains poorly organized for the task.²¹⁴

A new "U.S. Reconstruction Corps," modeled on FEMA, would be responsible for rapidly mobilizing U.S. reconstruction experts from federal, state, and local levels, as well as the private and non-profit sectors. The Office would build and maintain "on call" lists of reconstruction experts, including retired and active duty police, who are able to deploy briefly, but on a moment's notice. The Direc-

tor of the U.S. Reconstruction Corps would be based at, and have a seat on, the National Security Council, and report to the Secretary of State.

Assemble U.N. Reconstruction Corps

The United States should help the United Nations assemble an “on call” list of international experts who can be gathered and quickly deployed into failed states to restore order, head off humanitarian disasters and jump start economic reconstruction. The Corps will include police, judges, correctional officers, health care workers, and civil administrators, many of whom have worked in the U.N.’s other stabilization missions.

Create a U.S. Army Division for Stability Operations

The American military faces difficulty when transitioning from war fighting to the daily tasks of maintaining law and order in the midst of civilian populations. Several nations have corps of lightly armed troops who are expert in crowd control and law enforcement. The Italians have the *Carabinieri* and the Spanish have *La Guardia*.

The United States Army should add new division strength units to its forces especially trained for the duties of stability operations. The new force would number between 25,000 and 35,000 troops and be deployable anywhere in the world on seven days notice.

Open an Interagency U.S. Stability Operations Institute

Earlier this year, the Bush Administration discussed closing the only Peacekeeping Institute, at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, PA.²¹⁵ Our experiences in the Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that stabilizing a post-conflict society requires coordination between a wide range of military and civilian agencies.

The National Defense University and the State Department should work together to open a permanent “Stability Operations Institute,” which would involve all Services and relevant U.S. government agencies involved in reconstruction. The Institute would focus on the full spectrum operations taking place in weak and failed states such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian relief and restoration of law and order. Friendly states would be encouraged to participate.

PROMOTING DEMOCRATIC VALUES

Not one of the Arab states in the Middle East and North Africa (the original center of Islam) have governments that are chosen by their own people.²¹⁶ Divorced from accountability to their own people, every Arab government is also ranked in the bottom group of countries with a high Corruption Perception Index.²¹⁷ A result of this democracy deficit is growing anger amongst Arab populations against the status quo. Frustration is building against regimes that deny participation, stifle dissent and fail to provide the space for civil society to grow.

A dangerous trend is developing of non-democratic Arab states unable to provide any economic opportunity to an emerging youth populations. For the United States to recast its relationship with the Arab and Muslim world, for us not to lose a generation of Muslim youth to the siren call of al-Qaeda and other extremists, we must be on the side of change, not the failing status quo.

We have been down this road before and there is reason for hope. During the Cold War, the ossified communist regimes of Eastern Europe grew more and more distant from reflecting the will or understanding the aspirations of their peoples. The United States worked to promote the growth of civil society and pro-democratic groups in the repressed societies of the Warsaw Pact. The activists who received American support went on to lead a peaceful people power revolution that liberated millions from Vladivostok to the gates of Vienna.

Since 1989, the road to democracy has been marked in Eastern Europe by accomplishments such as:

- the advent of the separation of powers in government;
- the holding of free and fair elections;
- progress toward the creation of an independent judiciary;
- the emergence of a flourishing press;
- the articulation in new constitutions of fundamental human rights such as expression, religion, privacy and property;
- a dedication to the norms of international law through treaties and institutions such as the EU and NATO; and
- economic reform, including the dismantling of command economies and the growth of the private sector.²¹⁸

Promoting political reform in the Middle East and moving toward greater democracy, will help us to win the war on terror. Not only is promoting freedom consistent with our fundamental values, but it will enhance our security. We will reduce the ability of terrorists to strengthen their organizations if the United States is seen as a force for positive change rather than being aligned with governments that are not serving the best interests of their people.

Triple U.S. Support to the National Endowment for Democracy

The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was created by Congress in 1983 as a non-profit corporation designed to build civil society and strengthen democratic institutions across the world. Its four major affiliated institutions, the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, Solidarity Center, and Center for International Private Enterprise, have

worked across the globe with countless civic organizations, political parties and parliamentarians. The goal is always the promotion of the citizen's voice in society, the creation of transparent and accountable structures of governance and the strengthening of democratic institutions.

The NED should now focus its attention on supporting moderate voices throughout the Arab / Muslim world through local NGO's and democracy activists. Additionally, the U.S. Government should triple its support for the National Endowment for Democracy and focus the approximately \$80 million increase on supporting the growth and development of representative institutions in the Arab world. Some examples would include aid to: assist independent media, build small business federations, support local human rights watchdog groups and aid democratic political movements.

NATIONAL SERVICE

After the attacks of September 11, volunteer organizations were overwhelmed by offers of support from the American people. In the face of adversity, Americans responded and were ready to answer the call. Unfortunately, since that time, the President has not taken the American people up on their offer of support. This is the first time in American history, when faced with a national crisis, nothing has been asked of the American people.

Defeating al-Qaeda, securing the homeland and preventing the rise of future terrorists will require the mobilization and commitment of the entire nation. It is time that we issue the call to service that Americans have been ready to answer since September 11.

Call For Service

Whenever our nation's future has been threatened, we have called on our young people to serve their country. In the past, this meant conscription into the military. Winning the war on terror requires many kinds of national service at home and abroad.

Upon graduation from high school, every young American should be encouraged to give at least one year in the service of their country. They would have the opportunity of choosing their preferred form of service from a list that will include: Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Coast Guard, Peace Corps, AmeriCorps, and hometown non-profit organizations. In return for their service, every young American will receive a salary of at least \$12,000 and a \$7,000 scholarship for further education.

Expand the Peace Corps

The best messengers of American values are those who go abroad in service to humanity. The United States should more than double the capacity of the Peace Corps, with particular emphasis on missions to Arab and Muslim nations.

Create a Civilian Reserve for Homeland Security

Every American citizen should have the opportunity to register with the Department of Homeland Security for a newly created "Civilian Reserve" which could be used to mobilize the skills and talents of the American people in a time of crisis. The database would include contact information on the individuals, and their relevant skills.

In time of a crisis, particular Civilian Reservists would be asked to respond to a "call to service" and be available for a deployment of up to three months. Americans of all ages would be encouraged to enlist. They would receive the same benefits during that service as members of the National Guard.

Conclusion

In the 21st century, America faces its greatest responsibility and its greatest challenge – the preservation of liberal democracy, individual liberty, and more fundamentally, the survival of civilization. Those who distort Islamic belief and claim divine reward for suicide missions killing innocent civilians must be met with even greater force and conviction. As we vigorously engage our enemies, we must protect against their efforts by securing the homeland and preparing for response in the event our defenses prove inadequate. And finally, to emerge victorious from this conflict, we must be bold and innovative in our actions to stem the rise of future terrorists.

The thoughts and ideas in this document illustrate the significant commitment that will be required to win the war on terror. The cost is high and there is little room for error, but the cost of failure is incalculable.

May this generation of Americans be united in this great cause and be ever mindful that it is our commitment to freedom, justice, and equality that gives us the strength to prevail. For over 200 years Americans have been on the right side of history. With the proper strategy, enlightened leadership, and the enduring strength of the American people, we will again succeed.

Endnotes

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- ² U.S. intelligence agencies were tracking at least two of the September 11 hijackers, but failed to use watch lists to prevent their entry to the United States. Yet, the Administration has failed to address the problem of multiple, incompatible, and sometimes inaccessible watch lists. According to the GAO, “Nine federal agencies ...develop and maintain 12 watch lists...These lists include overlapping but not identical sets of data, and different policies and procedures govern whether and how these data are shared with others.” *General Accounting Office, “Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should be Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and Sharing,” GAO-03-322*. April 15, 2003.
- ³ The White House. “New Terrorist Screening Center Established.” September 16, 2003. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030916-8.html>
- ⁴ Letter to Congressman Jim Turner from Eleni Kalisch, Assistant Director of Congressional Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation, December 18, 2003. http://www.house.gov/hsc/democrats/pdf/press/040113_letter_kalisch_to_turner_dec_18_03reTSC.pdf.
- ⁵ FBI Counterterrorism Division message on the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System, “Terrorist Screening Center,” November 28, 2003.
- ⁶ *Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence*. December 2002. P2.
- ⁷ H.R. 4104 , 108th Congress, 2d Sess. (2004)..
- ⁸ “Intelligence and National Security Policy.” *9/11 Commission.- Testimony of James Steinberg, V.P. and Director of Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution*. 14 October 2003. P6.
- ⁹ *CRS Report for Congress #RL31292*. 27 May 2003. P1.
- ¹⁰ *Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence*. December 2002. P90.
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