Before The
Joint Economic Committee
October 21, 1997
In May 1967, Egypt broke its signed engagement to preserve demilitarization of Sinai and allow free Israeli shipping to the Red Sea. The U.N. troops stationed in Sinai left at Nasser's request, and the U.S. reneged on its obligation to guarantee the demilitarization and passage. Terror increased in proportion to Israel's deterrence discreditation. Facing an overwhelmingly superior enemy at close quarters, Israel's very survival depended upon a total risk preemption with a "no margin for error" air strike followed by a spectacular victory.
The insistence of the U.N. that Israel withdraws to its pre-1967 lines "with minor modifications" raises the question of Israel's survivability within the U.N. requested lines, given the proven Arab and international disrespect for contracted obligations, the lessons of later wars, and especially, the qualitative and quantitative escalation in the Arab Order of Battle. This paper attempts to provide an answer.
Yoash Tsiddon - Chatto, Col. (res), member of the 12th Knesset and of the Peace Mission, Madrid 1991. Chief of planning & operational requirements, Israeli air force, prior to the Six Day War. Member, Raphael (armament develop. Authority) advisory board 1992-1995. Mr. Tsiddon publishes extensively on security issues in Israel and abroad, and is a founding member of Ariel Center for Policy Research.
Whether the Six Day War of June 1967, when Israel's brilliant victory relieved it from the strangling clutch of the Arab countries, was Nasser's brinkmanship that missed the brink, or his deliberate act to annihilate Israel when he felt, wrongly as it turned out, that he is capable of doing so, is a matter for historians' research. The fact is that he created a situation that forced Israel to either capitulate or open fire. Israel chose to preempt.
Living on a jumpy "Qui vive?" was possible for Israel at that particular time on three conditions:
- That the Sinai be demilitarized, and the southbound Israeli shipping through the Red Sea unhindered, as was agreed in 1957 at the end of the Sinai Campaign, in a U.S. brokered Cease Fire agreement.
- That the U.S. will honor the obligation it undertook to guarantee the said passage and demilitarization, backed by U.N. troops stationed in the Sinai for as long as Israel deemed necessary.
- That the neighboring Arab countries will accept Israel's existence and refrain from warlike acts like terror, shelling, incursions, etc.
As it turned out, in May 1967 the Sinai was re-militarized and Israel's southbound shipping blockaded. The U.N. troops left when asked by Nasser to do so, and the U.S. reneged on its guarantees while warlike acts continued. During the trying weeks of end May and beginning of June 1967, the whole Western world sympathized with Israel and denounced the Egyptian-Syrian threats that were actively encouraged by the Soviets. However, nobody did anything to help the Jews in a situation that threatened to become a second holocaust.
The one act that prevented Israel's downfall was its preemption, led by the Air Force's successful surprise attack which destroyed the main body of the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian Air Forces and opened the Arab ground forces to relentless air attacks and unhindered Israel ground forces pursuit.
Disregarding the circumstances that led to that war as well as the pre-war sympathy, the world community demands to this day that Israel withdraw to its pre-June 1967 demarcation lines with "minor modifications".
Given, on one hand, the international and Arab pressure to withdraw and, on the other, the fact that Israel barely, though victoriously, extricated itself in June 1967 from mortal danger by preempting against heavy odds, the question is how secure can Israel be within the pre-June 1967 borders, considering today's volume of forces and potent weapon systems as well as yesterday's lessons?
This paper will attempt to provide an answer.
On February 22, 1967, that is about three months before the Six Day War, Yigal Allon1 made a presentation, surveying Israel's security situation. Following are some quotes from there2:
"In my coming speech I want to prove that Israel is entitled, nay, obligated - and therefore also capable of opening preemptive hostilities whenever war is imposed upon it, this being the most important and, in certain circumstances, the only means of securing its survival"."There are six possible scenarios that entitle or, rather, compel Israel to go to war:
- In case of offensive troops concentrations that endanger Israel.
- When it becomes certain that the enemy is preparing a surprise air strike against Israel air bases.
- If our nuclear facilities and research centers will be subjected to a pinpoint air strike.
- If the guerrilla, mining and terror shelling will reach such proportions that will render our passive defense and retaliatory raids inadequate.
- If Jordan will conclude a military pact with another
- Arab country and will permit the concentration of foreign forces within its borders, and especially west of the Jordan River.3
- If Egypt will blockade the Tiran (Sharm-el-Sheikh) Red Sea passage".
"...the method that may be used by the enemy in a surprise, Blitz-Krieg type war, taking the following actions:
- A surprise air strike against the Israeli Air Force, catching it on the ground4.
- A simultaneous ground offensive on a number of fronts, covered and supported by an Air
- Force which enjoys full air superiority (see a. above).
- Seaborne landings, be it with limited objectives like harassment, disruption or diversion of forces or even a large scale invasion or large scale guerrilla operations or even the use of parachutists or seaborne infiltration in the rear, whose objectives will be to spread confusion and harass transportation5.
- Air and sea bombardment of urban and industrial concentrations.
Such a Blitz-Krieg war or anything similar will aim to accomplish facts before a full (Israel) general mobilization and before an international intervention will, if it will, materialize to achieve a cease fire".
Important Note
The reader should bear in mind that the much criticized Israeli obsessive preoccupation with defense, is unfortunately, well founded: Guided by their respective declared Aims of War, Arab-Israeli wars unfold by a unique set of rules:
- An Israeli victory means demands for peace and cooperation and meant, in the past, the consolidation of defensive positions to answer further threats.
- An Arab victory means, as blunt as it sounds, national and even personal extermination.6
The Middle East is an almost ideal arena for air warfare. Mostly desert or arid, with hardly any vegetation, where targets are hard to conceal and tactical intelligence reads from an open book. The movement of ground forces which relies on wheeled vehicles for logistics is, or rather was supposed to be, limited to the few roads existent. The climate is, mostly, clear weather with good visibility.
Not having any territorial depth to maneuver or to trade for time, Russian or French fashion, Israel developed its Air Force as far as its modest means and limited access to suppliers permitted, so as to achieve an outreach in depth and shift the war to enemy territory as soon as possible.
The 1956 Sinai Campaign was fought jointly with the British and French forces that (although their ground forces' achievements were far from brilliant) carried much of the burden of air superiority. When air superiority was secure, air-to-ground warfare proved to be a merciless, deadly weapon in the desert, especially when the anti-aircraft weapons were relatively primitive.7
The political fiasco of the Sinai Campaign/Suez Affair, taught those ready to learn a most crucial lesson which was later applied to the contingency planning that became the Six Day War:
When a number of days into the war, the Soviets threatened the British, French and Israelis with a nuclear strike unless fire ceases immediately and the angry Eisenhower Administration did not par the threat8, the fire had to cease. Having achieved all its objectives in four days, Israel was ready, even content, to oblige and negotiate. As against it, the Anglo-French, whose cumbersome moves prevented them from occupying the length of the Suez Canal, their objective, before the Soviet ultimatum matured, had to capitulate, not being in a position to negotiate. They lost the battle.
The conclusion, applied when planning the coming contingency, was that when fighting a conventional war in a theater of super-power active interest, a military decision had to be reached as close to the opening moves as possible, within a maximum of 10-14 days before a super-power nuclear threat, unchecked by another side, could become real, having run its warning, weighing, decision-making, readiness and ultimatum course.9
- In the existing circumstances, Ygal Allon was proven right. Israel had no choice but to preempt when threatened, or risk its very existence.
- If a decisive victory had to be achieved within the shortest possible span of time (see above Prevailing Circumstances), the choice of arena was crucial: nothing would do but going simultaneously for the "jugulars" of the 25 top priority targets, when the fate of the war would be decided. The "jugulars" were the runways whose cratering would prevent the main body of the enemy Air Force from taking off (special armaments, among others, the French Matra Durandal, were conceived and forged to Israeli Air Force definition).10
- The bomb load of the Israeli attacking force would be critically limited because of fuel loads required by ranges to targets, especially when flying low under radar coverage (which is most wasteful on fuel) and when requiring a reserve for possible air-to-air engagement and breakaway upon returning. Intensive training, superb intelligence data, runs on models and personal target allocation, with photos and procedures memorized, helped overcome the scarcity of armament.11
- Targets were to be hit simultaneously, by order of priority, in a way that mutual support, i.e., one air base's aircraft defending the (other) one attacked, was rendered impossible as far as conditions would allow, through meticulous timing. Back up formations sent to ascertain kill, had secondary and tertiary targets allocated if/when their back-up missions became redundant due to successful first runs.
- Where/when runways were put out of commission, strafing runs were to be made by the attacking fighters to destroy anti-aircraft artillery and as many enemy aircraft on the ground as possible.
- SIGINT and post-strike photo reconnaissance (including the strafing aircraft's gun camera) were to be put to efficient use to prevent escape of unhurt targets or duplication of attacks.
- Electronic warfare, in its infancy, was to be used as a supplement to special missile suppression/diversion sorties allocated.
- Upon inflicting mortal damage to the enemy air forces, which was assumed to require about two days, a significant percentage of missions were to be diverted to ground forces support. Until then, the ground forces would enjoy the theater air superiority, i.e., freedom of movement achieved by the air bases attack, and receive occasional support when acutely required, or when free missions were available. 44 Fouga Magister, light jet trainers, were earmarked for ground support. They fought valiantly with insufficient armaments and suffered heavy losses.
- Spread so thin, the only home air defense detail were four Mirage aircraft.
- Losses were calculated to be 3 percent per sortie. The calculations were unfortunately, accurate.
- When the war did break out and the stunning news of the total collapse of the Egyptian Air Force reached the Egyptian GHQ in a quick sequence of disastrous reports, Marshall Hakim Amer, Nasser's deputy and Minister of Defense, ordered a general ground forces withdrawal from the Sinai,12 be it in order to prevent their eventual total annihilation or in order to achieve a political stalemate. The story of the Israeli outnumbered ground forces' valiant and successful combats in hot pursuit that crushed the Egyptian forces sent to reoccupy Sinai, as that of the battles for the Golan, Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem do not belong to this review, having taken place in the aftermath of decision, that is after a barely cliff-hanging Israel turned the tables by one masterly air strike.
- The elaborated description of the Israeli Air Force's conditions and deeds, is hereby presented for two reasons:
-To emphasize how dependent Israel's very existence was upon the success of its outnumbered, thinly spread (no reserves) Air Force carrying out a complex, decisive move at a risk as high as to be justified only by mortal danger. -To be able to examine, on the basis of this feat, what are the prospects of repeating a similar performance in present day's circumstances.
Following the June 1967 debacle, Egypt and Syria did draw the right conclusions:
- The new Soviet re-supplied aircraft were dispersed in hardened, well separated shelters. Additional runways were built.
- Radar coverage gaps were, as a rule, closed also at low altitude.
- Anti-aircraft defense made a quantum jump:
-In accordance with the Soviet doctrine, Air Defense gained an equal standing to that of the Army, the Air Force or the Navy, enjoying top priority. -By the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, in October 1973, a very dense web of then ultra modern SAM-6, SAM-3 and improved SAM-2 anti-aircraft missiles, as well as the efficient Flatdish, radar guided quadruple 37mm anti-aircraft cannon was in place, well coordinated by a Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) system and complemented by interceptor-fighters and the ground units' shoulder fired SAM-7 "Strella" anti-aircraft missiles.
-If the writer's findings were correct 13, the Egyptian Air Defense Command consisted, at the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War of an equivalent of about 10 divisions, that is about the same size as the total Egyptian ground forces, to which the Egyptian Air Force interceptors force should be added.
The SAM missiles defenses became the Israeli Air Force's main and most dangerous enemy, whose defeat was the key to achieving an air superiority over an area so as to assure the safe, free maneuvering of Israeli ground forces and to provide the support (fire or assault transport) they were entitled to. When, at the end of the "War of Attrition", Israel and Egypt signed, on August 7, 1970, a U.S. brokered cease fire agreement, the most important article was the one stipulating that Egyptian SAM missiles should be kept out of the reach of the Suez Canal Zone. Unfortunately, the Egyptians moved their SAM's close to the Suez Canal the very night the cease fire had been signed, in flagrant breach of the agreement. Israel, under firm U.S. pressure (again), did not react on time, which it could and should have done before they were reactivated.
"Cleaning" a SAM missile defended area requires an intense one or two days' effort which means a one or two days delay in air superiority and support for the protection of the ground forces at the most critical time, which is that of the outbreak of hostilities, before the Israeli mobilization is carried out. Tolerating the August 7, 1970 arrogant infringement of the cease fire agreement, i.e. allowing the shifting of SAM's to cover the Canal Zone, was tantamount to Israel offering the key for the crossing of the Suez Canal to Egypt, a key used by them three years later. To conclude this paragraph, it may be said that the Arab reaction to the terrible defeat of June 1967 was most intelligent, rapid and efficient, rendering a copied repeat performance of the air victory of June 1967 absolutely impossible. From now on, a relatively slow grinding will become the rule, with the defeat of the SAM cover to precede further operations, if unacceptable losses are to be avoided.14
Although enough raw intelligence data was available, Golda Meir, the then Prime Minister of Israel, decided to accept on October 3 and 4, and even October 5, 1973 in the morning, the Israel Defense Forces' Chief of Intelligence assessment that "there is no danger of war in the near future", an assessment shared by Defense Minister Dayan and Chief of General Staff Elazar yet challenged by the "Mossad".
By Friday, October 5, in the evening, there were doubts. By Saturday (Yom Kippur), October 6 in the morning it became certain that war was to start that very evening. It started early in the afternoon.15 When the certainty of war was unanimous by Saturday, October 6 in the morning, Elazar asked the permission of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense to preempt that very day at noon with a full scale air strike. That operation required an immediate "green light". Golda's words were (quote):
"Dado, I am aware of all the reasons in favor of a preemptive war, but I am against it. None of us knows now what the future has in store for us, but there is always a possibility that we'll need someone's help and if we'll strike first, no one is going to help. I wish I could say yes because I know the meaning of it, but, with a heavy heart, I say no".16
The combination of the Israeli government's error of August 1970, i.e., of tolerating the deployment of Egyptian SAM missiles on the Suez Canal, which was a blatant breach of the cease fire signed by the Egyptians that same day, with the error of misreading existing intelligence data, especially on October 3,4, and 5, 1973 and the error of not permitting a preemptive strike on October 6, 1973 at noon (out of fear of the U.S.) when the outbreak of war was certain, cost Israel about 3,000 lives.17
The obvious conclusions to be drawn from the above paragraph are:
- Even a war wise government like Israel's can err at a crucial moment. Errors are human. The country's defense/deterrence establishment should prevent such a mistake from becoming a death warrant (see para. 2.4).
- Israel has to conduct a sincere, aggressive enlightenment campaign,18 especially in the U.S., to reduce diplomatic "friendly fire" in crucial moments. Israel has a case. It has never been pleaded with vehemence and vigor.
- Israeli leaders have to learn to live with U.S. pressure when necessary and bear the consequences rather than lose lives or endanger the country's existence. As Allon said, given the circumstances in the Middle East and the danger of extermination if it is going to lose a war, democratic, peace seeking Israel should be free to preempt when war with a neighboring dictatorship is about to break at the dictator's initiative.
- All defense planning in the Middle East19 has to cater to the "worst case" scenario unless absolutely certain that this is not the case. The Yom Kippur evaluation of the situation did the opposite.
- The improvement in the balance of power between Israel and the Arabs could not compensate for the loss of initiative to the Arabs.
How is it that, in spite of everything, Israel scored a world class military victory (not so in the political field) during the Yom Kippur War?
It takes a long stretch of imagination to believe that an Israel within the pre-June 1967 borders would have committed the errors mentioned above. Possession of buffer zones and the crushing 1967 victory brought complacency. However, were the aforementioned errors to have been committed within the pre-June 1967 borders, it is fairly certain that the State of Israel would have ceased to exist. The facts are that the Golan Heights and the Sinai (where the depth of Egyptian penetration was, in some places, deeper than the whole width of Israel in many places), provided the depth required for the Israeli IDF to "buy" the time necessary for regrouping, reinforcing and re-supplying in view of the coming counterattack. If there was ever a case that proved the vitality to Israel of a buffer, a protection belt, this was the Yom Kippur War, when the "territories" saved Israel from its own government's errors.
- Types upgraded from T.34 and Stalin of WWII vintage, to T.55 and T.62 in 1973 and then, at present, to upgraded T.55, T.62, T.72 and T.72M or the U.S. M1A1.
- Tank cannons grew in caliber from 75mm to high speed 120mm using highly sophisticated ammunition.
- Tank turrets became gyrostabilized to enable firing in movement.
- GPS is being introduced for totally independent navigation and positioning.
- Most important: Passive infrared night vision equipment has converted armor into a 24 hours/day fighting force, thus adding about 30 percent to its war making capability.
- More powerful engines, better armor, better human engineering, more reliability and faster maintenance are to be counted among the added features.
- Types upgraded from MiG-15, 17, 19, 21 or Su-7 of the Six Day War (June 1967) to later types MiG-21, Su-20, etc. in 1973 and MiG-23, MiG-25, MiG-29 or Su-24, etc. that improved the quality of later platforms of Russian manufacture. F-16 A,B,C,D as well as F-15 of U.S. manufacture are top of the line platforms. The top speed bracket remained the same, i.e., around Mach 2 at altitude, clean aircraft, to sonic speed when flying low or subsonic when carrying underslung stores such as bombs or auxiliary fuel tanks.
- One of the revolutionary improvements in air combat technology has been the introduction of the WDNS (Weapons Delivery and Navigation Systems) whose readings are presented on a pilot's HUD, i.e. Head-up Display. An illustration of one of the improvements in aiming achieved through the use of WDNS cum HUD is the accuracy of ("dumb") iron bombs release. While in training, a pilot may achieve, flying over a known firing range, by a fix set of rules, an accuracy of 30 mR C.E.P. 21 when aiming "the old way". In combat, where ranges, speeds, altitudes, dive angles and speeds are played havoc with by anti-aircraft fire or other distractions and the target has to be identified, the 30 mR look more like 300, especially to non-veteran pilots. Equipped with WDNS + HUD, any pilot who operates the system properly, will hit with an accuracy of 6.5-7.0 mR (mili-Radian angular precision). This system alone, is a force multiplier of between 4 and 8 or more, depending on the pilot's experience.
- The second revolutionary improvement is that of passive night, infra-red vision, FLIR (Forward Looking Infra Red). Although some night attacks were carried out by combat aircraft before FLIR, using parachuted flares, this was a complicated procedure, used mostly (if not only) by the Israelis, with the illumination being unsteady, incomplete and uni-directional.
-FLIR turns a combat aircraft, an attack or an assault helicopter into a 24 hr/day fighting machine which, in order to avoid being in full view of too many preying eyes, will prefer now the relative cover of night. Being a passive system, i.e., that receives and interprets the surrounding I/R radiation but does not radiate itself, the FLIR is discrete. -Considering the hours of darkness each day and the edge that FLIR offers at night, this system may be considered to be a further force multiplier of about 2.
- Stand off guided weapons of a multitude of varieties of sizes and ranges and Cluster Bomb Units (C.B.U.) are a quantum jump in armament technology, as are the multitude of short, medium and long range air-to-air missiles.
- The end result of the changes enumerated in above (i) to (iv) is that:
(1) Payload/range capabilities of modern combat aircraft is in the order of 6 to 10 times that of 1967 combat aircraft (ton-miles). (2) Where bombing and other weapons' release are concerned, the payload/range capability is further multiplied by a factor of, say, 4 due to the WDNS +HUD and further, by a factor of 2 due to the FLIR.
- Without going into further technical details, it may be safely concluded that one 1997 combat aircraft is, in terms of its strike capability, more than a match to a whole squadron of 1967 or even 1973 vintage combat aircraft - this in a region almost ideal in its geography and climate for the conduct of aerial warfare. 22
- The "lonely" SAM-2 of 1967 was joined in 1973 by the SAM-3 high performance medium altitude, by the lethally efficient SAM-6 low and medium altitude, mobile missile and by the "Strella", SAM-7 shoulder fired, infra-red homing infantry missile.
- Later, apart from the improved technology, density, proper positioning and C3I of the above mentioned veterans, the Middle East has received the SAM-5, for extreme range and altitude, the SAM-10, SAM-12 to SAM-17, etc.
- Israel is presently surrounded by the densest most sophisticated and most efficient missile air defense system in existence anywhere.0;
- The by far most dramatic addition to the Middle East arsenal surrounding Israel are the ballistic missiles that "came of age" in grand style, especially since the Gulf War of 1991. During the Six Day War of 1967 there were no ballistic missiles launched. The Egyptian effort of 1962-64 to develop a German V-2 derivative (as is the SCUD) with the help of German rocket scientists withered when thwarted by Israel (which took measures against the scientists) and by other interventions.
- Throughout the Yom Kippur War of 1973, some Frog missiles were launched by Syria and some Frog and Kelt (cruise) missiles were launched by Egypt. Ballistic missiles were hardly mentioned, if at all in IISS 1973 documentation. The scarcity of Western, including Israeli, intelligence on the ballistic missiles development status, quantities and operational readiness in Arab countries was displayed during the Gulf War. Not much is known of about what happened before 1991.
- For instance, IISS data on Syria, 1973, makes no mention of Syrian Frog-2 or Frog-7, although some were launched at Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. It also lacks all information on Egyptian cruise Kelt missiles that were fired at Israel.
- However, the Jaffe Center report of 1994-95, based on 1992-93 data, mentions under the "Defense Production" heading (p. 196), the existence of a SCUD B SSM manufacturing facility in Egypt, operating with North Korean assistance.23 That same report discloses an intensive manufacturing and inventory build-up effort of ballistic missiles as well as the existence of a conventional, chemical and bacteriological warheads production facility in Syria.
- The present day ground-to-ground ballistic missiles inventory ready to be launched at Israel from Egypt (Iraq?), Syria and Saudi Arabia seems to be about 1,000 to 1,500 SCUDs (or others).
- The TBM (Theater Ballistic Missiles) are, as of 1995 or 1996, considered Main Battle Weapons by Syria and Egypt.
The writer hopes that the qualitative trends roughly surveyed in this paragraph convey the message that today's main weapons are by a few orders of magnitude more potent than those of twenty or thirty years ago, even when no weapons of mass destruction have been considered. This fact should be well comprehended when the quantitative evolution is enumerated.
Egypt
b. Air Force-combat aircraft, operational (including bombers)
c. Army - Tanks
d. Ballistic Missiles
Syria
b. Air Force-combat aircraft, operational
c. Army - Tanks, all types
d. Ballistic Missiles
Other Arab Countries
a. Iraq - still recovering from Gulf War. Data unreliable.
b. Saudi Arabia - the largest arms buyer in the world.
Generally, the trend in the Middle East is that of an "immanent war" arms race. The Middle East, including Iran, imports between 42 percent of the world's arms exports.
Special Remark on Egypt
Egypt is the second largest arms buyer in the Middle East, within the process of westernizing its equipment. Its army is, by now, 65 percent western and its Air Force 85 percent. Its real defense expenditure is estimated to be about 5 times the one openly specified in its budget. 24 It cooperates in defense matters with two "Terror Harboring" countries, in flagrant breach of its defense agreement with the U.S. and the U.S. turns its head the other way. With a GNP stagnant for the last decade, in the order of $50 billion, the Egyptian GNP per capita has not grown in real terms, due to a population growth of about one million a year and the U.S. dollar devaluation.
The obvious questions to be asked are why does Egypt, with no real Sudanese and Lybian threats and having signed a peace agreement with Israel that Israel will certainly be happy to maintain and improve on, need such a rapid build-up of a world class Order of Battle, if it does not harbor any aggressive ideas? If it does - against whom?
How long will it keep on spending at the present rate with the meager GNP per capita (1/20th that of Israel) decreasing? Why? What is the U.S. opinion about it?
The Arab Armed Forces around Israel have recently grown at an unparalleled rate, especially since the Six Day War of 1967. Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Iraq and other Arab countries, as well as Iran, all poor economic performers, all dictatorships of one kind or another, live for the last 30 years on a frantic war footing, with the outside world seeming to be only too happy to oblige and supply. With mass destruction weapons about to be coming of age and a desperate economic situation stirring the masses to move toward Islamic Fundamentalism, or Ba'ath, which is a mirror image of fundamentalism, or any other "ism", 66 percent of this planet's oil reserves are tied to one of the mightiest time bombs ever, yet no one cares... but Israel, which faces at present the highest concentration of military power ever deployed per mile of frontier or square mile of territory.
- The Palestinian Authority is to include the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, i.e. all the Palestinian Arabs that are neither Israeli nor Jordanian citizens.
- Were Israel to shrink to its 1967 borders, with or without any minor modifications, they will become an (extremist) entity bordering with Jordan and, if one remembers 1958, 1968 or 1970, will most probably be out to "unify the country" again.
- If before 1967, the Hashemite throne held the Judea and Samaria Palestinians on a tight rein, unarmed, with no universities and a rudimentary economy to prevent them from overwhelming Jordan, the Palestinian Authority emerging at the end of this century will be well armed, with ten universities or colleges and an economic start-up.
- Were any Arab-Israeli war situation to develop, the Palestinian Authority will certainly pitch in to exact additional concessions from Israel.
- This will complicate matters enormously, like for instance, if Jordan will be occupied by Syrian, Iraqi or Saudi troops, or the three of them, 25 with the Palestinian Authority's help, creating an untenable situation for Israel.
- It may be stated that, while during the 1967 war, the Arabs of Judea and Samaria (and Gaza) were passive onlookers, during a possible war from the 90's on, they should be reckoned with as an active, armed enemy element.
During October 30 and 31, 1994, a symposium was held at the Dayan Center of the Tel-Aviv University26, its subject being the political line of the Israeli Arabs in view of the pending implementation of the Oslo agreements. About a dozen Arab speakers, covering practically the whole Israeli Arab spectrum, spoke, each one in a manner befitting his political position and temperament. All of them, without exception, declared that with the most probable establishment of a (third) Palestinian State in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, the Arabs of Israel remain the only Arabs under foreign occupation. The demand is, so they said, that Israel sheds its "Jewish State" character27, agree to a law of return of the Arabs as well as that of the Jews and...please change the anthem, the flag and (as one suggested), the name. "Only then will a Jewish community live in peace in the Arab Middle East". Vox Populi.
The mid-August 1997 Israeli-Arab Assad worshiping dignitaries' visit to Syria (including some Arab members of Knesset), confirms and underlines the symposium's context. It is a surprise why so many were surprised in Israel. The mission's participants spoke their truth in Damascus.
To conclude, one should consider that a fairly sizeable segment of the Israeli Arabs will, once Israel will find itself in a precarious situation in the case of war, side with its enemies.
As King Abdullah said and repeated during his reign and as King Hussein often stated until about ten years ago, all Jordanians are Palestinians, be they Bedouin or townsfolk, the way all Israelis are Palestinians, be they Jews or Arabs. It is a simple geographic description. However, a large percentage of Jordanians, especially those opposed, for one reason or another, to the Hashemite throne, identify themselves with the Arab Palestinians of Judea and Samaria. Moving cleverly, Arafat adopted (highjacked?) the name of Palestine for his movement (entity in being) which drove King Hussein to denounce the "Jordan is Palestine" slogan that he so proudly proclaimed a decade earlier, and annul, in July 1988, the Jordanian citizenship of the Arab Palestinians of Judea and Samaria. 28
Not much reading of the Arab mind is necessary to understand that the ruling elites of both Jordan and the emergent Palestinian Authority are on a collision course. How the situation will develop if Israel will withdraw from the buffer it provides in the Jordan Valley is anybody's guess.
Concluding this paragraph, it is evident that Jordan's basic strategic interest, which it certainly cannot proclaim in the circumstances, is to have a strong Israel by its side, which will protect its territorial integrity from neighborly designs and drive a wedge between it and the Palestinian Authority if/when it will emerge as an autonomous pseudo-state. An Israel shrinking to the pre-June 1967 borders will open Jordan to a pincer movement of say, a P.A.-Syrian alliance aimed, for the short term, at usurping the Jordanian throne and, for the long term Syrian design, to take one step further toward the "Fertile Crescent".29
b. A state of no war.
These are two distinct, unbridgeable situations that go by the same name.
The prerequisites of a peace of harmony are:
When examined realistically, the Middle Eastern circumstances of totalitarianism, internal instability, intra-Arab strifes, deep cultural, economic and emotional fissures, as well as, of course, the inherent conflict of interests (as seen by the Arabs) and the viciously aggressive anti-Israeli motivation, etc. point to a "peace
of no war" as the only peace achievable in the Middle East in the foreseeable future, a peace nevertheless, as anticipated at the First Peace Conference at Madrid in November 1991.
Deterrence emerges as the single, vital and sufficient mechanism to prevent war in a "peace of no war" situation. The "components" of deterrence are:
The strength of an armed force is measured by the sum total of its capability of exercising a controlled, informed, supplied and otherwise supported manipulation of a triad of:
- Firepower;
- Mobility;
- Terrain. 31
For the sake of illustration, it may be said that Force = f (Firepower x Mobility x Terrain), since there is a certain measure of cross-compensation among the three. However, if one of the three pillars of strength, Terrain in Israel's case, is reduced ad absurdum, the sum total that makes Force may become insignificant, irrelevant of how great the other two factors are.
Reverted to its 1967 demarcation lines, Israel will have to back any peace agreements that it might have signed with the deterrence of the threats of:
- The mightiest concentration of forces per mile of frontier or per (its own) square mile the world has ever seen, numerically and even qualitatively superior to the Allied Forces that invaded Normandy in June 1944, as strange as this statement sounds. 32
- The emergence of a de facto independent Palestinian Authority that, apart from anti-Israeli irrident activities, will most probably be engaged, in alliance/collusion with Iraq or Syria, in the dismembering of Jordan, i.e. the deployment of Iraqi or Syrian (or Iraqi, Syrian, Saudi) forces along the Jordan and then, to be expected, along the Palestinian Authority's demarcation lines with Israel (whose width will be, at critical places, some 9-10 miles in all).
- Egypt reneging on its peace agreement with Israel and joining a Syrian, Iraqi (Iranian) anti-Israeli coalition.
- A degradation of the Middle East political situation toward Islamic fundamentalism or other outcome of an ever-increasing gap between the West's (including Israel's) constantly improving standard and quality of life and the standard and quality of life in the Arab countries, overburdened as they are by defense outlays.
- A degradation of the (conventional) military existing balance with the overtaking of the Israeli technological advantage, as is the case with FLIR, WDNS + HUD or GPS.
- A degradation of the non-conventional military situation brought about by the "nuclearization" of the surrounding dictatorships in addition to the standard inclusion of chemical and/or biological weapons in Arab arsenals.
- A terror situation33 whose intensity will increase with the deterrence deficiency created by enhancing the Arab forces and by the grossly diminished Israeli force through loss of vital strategic ground.
The deterrence, whose main component is the capacity to win the war if it (deterrence) misfires, has to be powerful enough to cater to the teachings of Israel's own (expensive) past experience, which are:
b. Israel cannot and should not rely on foreign guarantees as components of its deterrence. Foreign guarantees are of very short duration.
c. Israel cannot rely on the presence of U.N. or any other troops to bolster its peacekeeping capability. They are there as long as both parties agree to their being.
d. Israel cannot rely on demilitarization for its deterrence. Like the Rhineland in 1920-1936 or the Sinai 1957-1967, demilitarization is not valid, unless both parties are profiting from it.
e. In view of the above point a), Israel should keep its preemption options open by conducting a continuous, aggressive and powerful enlightenment campaign where it counts, in time of tranquillity as in time of tension (see Golda Meir's deliberations previously mentioned).
f. Israel's defense establishment has to be able to cover for its own government's errors, preventing them from turning into a national disaster.
g. Israel is forbidden to sign any agreements that affect its deterrence/war winning capability without tangible quid-pro-quo collaterals offered by the antagonist, first and foremost being quasi-total disarmament, genuine and under constant surveillance.
h. In the circumstances, Israel is obligated to always plan for "worst scenarios".
A "map in hand" and "feet on the ground", in situ evaluation of Israel's residual deterrence potential, given the enormous Order of Battle facing it and following its withdrawal from the protective high ground of the Golan, Samaria and Judea as well as from the maneuvering area of the Jordan Valley, all of which will subsequently be surrendered to potential enemy forces which will thus gain decisive topographical advantage against Israel and will bring about the dismemberment of Jordan, will confirm that:
Facing a Middle East that is not a "new one", that is arming faster and better than any other part of this world, making no bones about its non-acceptance of Israel in its midst, that is skidding toward political-ideological-economic chaos, deeply rooted in its hatred of the West and the Jews (who may destabilize the totalitarian ruling elites), the Israeli level of conventional deterrence, within the confinement of the pre-June 1967 war demarcation lines, will be far below that required by the situation in order to maintain a "peace of non-war". That spells war, from a totally inferior position. Given the time/distance considerations within pre-1967 borders, there is a very high probability that the only response Israel may produce to an imminent war situation, will not be a repeat preemption, 1967 style or other, which may be rendered impossible by existent circumstances, but the one desperate option remaining, an eventual "Samson's option".
1 Yigal Allon - the most prominent and successful general of the War of Independence, Commander of the Palmakh, the (pre-I.D.F.) Hagannah elite corps. Itzhak Rabin's mentor. In 1967, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Labor Party's Eshkol government.
2 "War and Victory" Album, Mizrachi Publishers, 1967.
3 i.e., Judea and Samaria which were in Jordanian hands at the time.
4 Allon was privy to the Israeli Air Force and other plans.
5 The presence, in Israel, of a large Arab minority, part of which would actively side with their kin, was and is to be considered in case of an Arab-Israeli war, especially when the chips are down.
6 As clearly indicated by all Arab declarations, whether written or verbal, made since the establishment of Israel to this very day. Judging by past experience, the Arab statements should be taken seriously, as should or should have been, Hitler's "Mein Kampf", Nasser's "Philosophy of the Revolution", "The Palestinian Covenant", Arafat's and others "Jihad" (Holy War), inflammatory rhetoric (in Arabic) or Islamic Fundamentalist dictums.
7 During the War of Independence, both sides' air forces were not significant enough to reach firm conclusions.
8 One may assume that, angry or not, the U.S. would not have tolerated a U.S.S.R. nuclear strike against its NATO allies or even Israel. It would have been too dangerous a precedent, however, given the magnitude of the threat, not openly countered by the U.S. at the time, the Anglo-French-Israelis could not but comply.
9 See this writer's, "The Case of the Forgotten War", Society of Experimental Test Pilots - "Technical Review" and "Cockpit", first 1971. (Paper written in 1965 but held back for five years by Israeli Security.)
10 The general runway attack concept, prioritizing and operational requirements deliberations are discussed in "Attacks of Air Bases - 1964/65" (Top secret - now declassified), a paper by Israeli Air Force Planning Dept., May 11, 1964, signed by the writer. Also elaborated on in more general terms in the writer's book "By Day, By Night, Through Haze and Fog (both in Hebrew).
12 See "Nativ", July 1997, "The Six Day War: Why is Israel Abandoning its Gains? (Hebrew), by Dr. Uri Milstein, quoting (pp.75) from a still classified research of the Six Day War made by Brig. Gen. (res.) Abraham Ayalon of the I.D.F. History Dept.
13 As in charge of the Israeli Air Force's post Yom Kippur War study team of air/ground warfare (1973-1974).
14 As Israel learned the hard way, during the first three days of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, when Dayan, the then Defense Minister, personally insisted that Air Force support be given at all cost to the surprised and beleaguered few Israeli troops present in the Canal Zone. The losses were ghastly.
15 "My Life", Golda Meir autobiography (Hebrew), Ma'ariv Publishing, 1975. pp. 306-309. qq.
16 Ibid, pp. 309-310.
17 Equivalent to about 300,000 lives in the U.S. or almost five times the total, eight years' U.S. losses in Viet Nam. The number of Israel's inhabitants in June 1967 was about 2.5 million.
18 The presentation of Israel's case before the Administration, Congress, media, academia, public opinion, etc., as if it were before a jury in a Court of Justice, as against propaganda, P.R. or just information.
19 See the "Dhimmi, Jews and Christians under Islam", by Bat Yeor, Cranbury, 1985. See "The Closed Circle - An Interpretation of the Arabs" by David Pryce-Jones, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, Gt. Britain, 1989. See "The Hidden Hand - Middle East Fears of Conspiracy" by Daniel Pipes, St. Martin's Press, U.S., 1996. The Middle East is an unstable area, politically, culturally, emotionally and defense-wise. An explosive mixture of medieval myths, fears and ethics with oil money and state-of-the-art weaponry, with unfortunately, very few exceptions. An inbred hatred of the foreign, especially of the Jews and the West (and Israel represents both).
20 Based on:
21 C.E.P. = Circular Error Probability, i.e. the circle around the aiming point where 50 percent of the bombs will hit.
22 The relatively detailed description of the aviation part of "Qualitative Trends" is not due to "professional aberration". It is rather, that aircraft are, by now, the decisive weapon in the Middle East, and they have undergone the most decisive modernization in spite of the less apparent changes in their platforms' performance. The ground forces improvements, too many to enumerate, have an enormous impact of their own.
23 A blatant infringement of the U.S. military assistance agreement providing Egypt with a US$ 2.3 billion yearly aid on condition that it stays clear of terror harboring countries.
24 See "Nativ", July 1997 - "How Much Does Egypt Spend on Weapons of War?" by Sean Pine (pp. 70 - Hebrew).
Endnotes
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