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Security Challenges Posed by LNG |
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by Congressman Elijah E. Cummings |
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The United States Coast Guard confronts a range of new threats and hazards in the Post-9/11 world. One among these threats is the need to secure liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals and the tankers that bring gas supplies to these terminals. LNG is transported in tankers in a super-cooled form, so the temperature of everything surrounding it is extremely hot in relation to the temperature of the LNG. It becomes a vapor heavier than air if exposed to air or water. If this vapor finds a source of ignition, the resulting fire can burn so hot that it can emit thermal radiation that could burn even those who are not directly in the fire.
I agree with those who state that LNG is not the most dangerous cargo on our nation’s waterways. I also agree that LNG tankers are generally solid and safe vessels. However, LNG does present risks to the communities through which it passes and does require special attention from our Coast Guard.
Further, discussion of the challenges that securing LNG presents to the Coast Guard creates a window into our nation’s urgent need to create rational policies for all hazardous cargoes to ensure that they are placed in the most strategic possible locations and to ensure that the Coast Guard is not stretched too thin to be effective.
During the past year, the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, which it is my honor to chair, held field hearings on two proposed LNG terminal projects, including one in Baltimore, Maryland, to examine the proposed Sparrow’s Point project, and one on Long Island, New York, to examine the proposed Broadwater project.
I have also had the opportunity to observe the impact that LNG operations at the proposed Weaver’s Cove terminal may have on Narragansett Bay during a trip I took with Congressman Patrick Kennedy (D-RI) earlier this year.
There are now some 40 new projects that are in various stages of the process of applying for construction and operating permits. The Energy Information Administration estimates that by the year 2030, imported LNG could account for as much as 20 percent of all the natural gas consumed in the United States.
While there is no question that our nation requires new supplies of LNG, we also need a national policy on the siting of LNG facilities.
Right now, we have a situation in which incentives have been created to promote both off-shore and on-shore sites – and to pursue a host of different objectives through these incentives. The result is a jumble of policies that do not support what should be our national objectives and that are creating unacceptable strains on our Coast Guard.
For example, legislative changes made to the Deepwater Port Act in past years give priority status during the consideration of applications for deepwater LNG permits to those entities that agree to use the U.S. flag and U.S. crew members for the vessels that bring gas supplies to their terminals.
These changes were meant to create an incentive for the use of U.S. crew members – who have undergone the security and background checks that foreign mariners have not – and the use of the U.S. flag in LNG operations by giving an edge in the permitting process to those firms that agreed to these conditions.
The Deepwater Port Act also requires that federal officials work with governors and state officials when assessing applications.
However, more recently, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 altered the approval process for on-shore LNG terminals to give the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) exclusive jurisdiction over the approval of those terminals.
With this move, the state governments in whose waters the on-shore terminals would be located were pre-empted from exercising virtually any role in the process of approving applications for on-shore terminals. Consequently, on-shore placements have also become very attractive to many firms.
Expanded on-shore placements bring the risks associated with LNG into our nation’s communities while placing significant new strains on the Coast Guard, which must ensure security and safety in the ports in which the terminals are located and provide security escorts to LNG tanker ships.
This situation is unacceptable because we know the Coast Guard does not have the resources it needs in all of the areas where new on-shore terminals are proposed to ensure that it can provide the level of waterside security it considers adequate.
For example, in the waterway suitability assessment for the Broadwater terminal, the Coast Guard reported it would need up to 11 new boats to provide adequate security. Despite the obvious red flags that this situation raises, FERC was unable to explain at our Subcommittee’s hearing what impact the lack of such Coast Guard resources would have on a pending terminal application.
Because of the lack of resources, the Coast Guard is also moving to involve local law enforcement authorities – such as the county sheriff’s office in Maryland where the Cove Point LNG terminal is located – in the provision of waterside security around some terminals, even when the local law enforcement personnel have no experience conducting waterside patrols and no experience guarding LNG.
I believe that we need a national policy for the siting of terminals that offers incentives for off-shore placements that move these facilities away from the U.S. population and that encourages the use of U.S. mariners on LNG ships.
I also believe the policies in place in the Deepwater Port Act should form the basis of that national policy by requiring federal and state authorities to work together to assess the placement of facilities.
Until such policies guide the process of deciding where to place LNG terminals, I believe it is essential that no new on-shore facilities be approved until the Coast Guard certifies that the sector in which the terminal is to be located has all of the assets it needs to provide waterside security around the terminal and around the tankers serving the terminals – as required by Section 328 of the Coast Guard Reauthorization of 2008, which passed the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure earlier this year. It is simply unacceptable that we would approve any new LNG terminals if such conditions are not met.
- The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings represents the 7th Congressional District of Maryland in the United States House of Representatives. He is the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation. |

