Article/Column

On May 20, I convened the House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation to receive a report from the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) called “United States Coast Guard’s Management of the Marine Casualty Investigation Program” (OIG-08-51, May 2008). 

 

The Subcommittee also considered the request of the National Transportation Safety Board to be given the legal authority to assert primacy over the investigation of those marine casualties the Board chooses to examine.

 

The Subcommittee has been looking closely at the multiple facets of the Coast Guard’s marine safety program throughout much of the 110^th Congress. 

 

However, the casualty investigation program – whose specific mission includes examining marine accidents to determine cause and formulating recommendations to prevent future accidents – is the cornerstone of that program. 

 

Unfortunately, the OIG has found that this cornerstone has serious faults. 

 

In a clear and disturbing conclusion, the OIG has stated that the Coast Guard’s marine casualty investigation program is “hindered by unqualified personnel,” by “investigations conducted at inappropriate levels,” and by “ineffective management of a substantial backlog of investigations needing review and closure.”

 

Specifically, the OIG found that many investigations are not being conducted at the level of thoroughness recommended by the Coast Guard’s own policies. 

 

The Coast Guard has four levels of investigation: formal, informal, data collection, and preliminary investigation. 

 

Under Coast Guard policy, the specific characteristics of an accident (such as the number of lives lost and the value of property damaged) should trigger the different types of investigations. 

 

However, the OIG identified more than 1,200 casualties that were investigated at a level lower than the level the circumstances of the accident should have warranted. 

 

The OIG also found that the Coast Guard has a significant backlog of cases that have not been reviewed and closed. 

 

Further, when the OIG tested a sample of closed cases, 30 percent were found to have data entry errors in the Coast Guard’s Marine Information Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE) database.

 

Finally, when the OIG examined a sample of individuals assigned as casualty investigators, it found that 68 percent of those assigned to these positions did not meet the Coast Guard’s own qualification standards to serve as investigators. 

 

The results of the assignment of unqualified individuals to casualty investigations were very clearly demonstrated when three such individuals in Sector San Francisco were assigned to respond to the allision of the COSCO BUSAN with the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge. 

 

These individuals failed to secure perishable evidence and failed to properly conduct all required alcohol and drug examinations after an accident that resulted in the discharge of some 54,000 gallons of oil into San Francisco Bay.

 

Perhaps one of the most troubling findings of the OIG’s report, however, was the finding that many of the challenges it examined were identified more than 10 years ago by the Coast Guard itself – and even, as I discussed in an earlier column, as far back as the seminal oversight report “Semi-Paratus: The United States Coast Guard, 1981,” issued during the 97^th Congress.

 

In other words, the Coast Guard’s challenges with the marine safety program far pre-date the service’s assumption of expanded responsibilities following 9/11. 

 

While these new responsibilities make finding balance among all missions that much more challenging – they also make it that much more important. 

 

To that end, I believe that as the Coast Guard implements new policies intended to ensure that qualified individuals are assigned as casualty investigators, the service must undertake a workload analysis to determine the exact size of the investigator workforce needed to conduct every casualty investigation at the scope recommended by its own policies.

 

Ultimately, however, I believe that the challenges affecting the Coast Guard’s marine safety program can only be resolved by institutional changes within the organization, and I believe that these can best be made – and be made permanent – through the enactment of legislation.  

 

For that reason, the enactment of the Coast Guard Authorization Act, H.R. 2830, which passed the House of Representatives by a resounding 395 to 7, is absolutely critical.

 

This legislation included extensive provisions to strengthen the marine safety program by ensuring that individuals assigned to the program meet the highest qualification standards and can develop the continuity and expertise necessary to ensure that the program functions at the highest level of effectiveness and efficiency.    

 

During the May 20^th hearing, the Subcommittee also heard from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) regarding their proposal to align their relationship with the Coast Guard in the investigation of major marine causalities.

 

The NTSB proposal would modify the Board’s relationship with the Coast Guard to parallel the modal administrations of the United States Department of Transportation.

 

Specifically, the Board’s proposal would provide NTSB with the legislative authority to take the lead in important marine casualties – an authority that they already have for all other modes. 

 

The Subcommittee will continue to examine this proposal, as well as the existing memorandum of understanding between the NTSB and Coast Guard that currently governs their roles on marine casualty investigations, to identify those policies that constitute best practice and that can best ensure the safety of our nation’s vital maritime industry.

 

Strengthening the marine safety program—including the casualty investigation program—remains a top priority for the Subcommittee.

 

We will continue working to determine the most efficient and effective methods to achieve this goal and allow the marine safety program to function according to the highest possible standards.