Extending the 9/11 Commission
After initially opposing the creation of an independent commission to investigate the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration has consistently hampered the Commission's investigation by failing to fully cooperate and share necessary information. This has forced the Commission to request an additional two months in order to fully complete its investigation.

 

While such a request would seem rather innocuous, President Bush and Speaker Hastert opposed it. Both eventually relented. The Speaker, however, now refuses to allow the Commission the additional 60 days it was originally given after publishing its report to formally wrap up its work and lobby Congress on its recommendations. This extra time is crucial and should not be eliminated.

The Senate has passed legislation that would extend the Commission's report deadline and its eventual termination for an additional two months. The House must follow suit quickly, or the Commission will be forced to curtail its work and begin preparing its final report before its original deadline.

 

Commission's Findings
The 9/11 Commission has made great strides in uncovering the events that allowed the September 11th attacks to occur:

· It has exposed some of the immigration screening flaws that allowed the hijackers to enter the U.S., including the dismal cooperation among federal agencies with security watch lists.

· It has highlighted the air security flaws that allowed the terrorists to board the planes and carry on makeshift weapons.

· It has uncovered evidence that U.S. intelligence agencies were given the first name and phone number of one of the hijackers living in Yemen.

If given sufficient time, the Commission will no doubt compile the most comprehensive and extensive report about the September 11th attacks and provide Congress and the White House with concrete recommendations for improving our security.
 

Stonewalling the Commission
Throughout the Commission's existence, cooperation from the administration has been grudging and delayed. The Commission had to issue a subpoena to the FAA to obtain detailed transcripts and other information about communications on September 11th, because the agency was not fully cooperating. In October 2003, the Commission had to threaten the White House with subpoena because the Commission believed it was not being provided all the necessary materials for its investigation. While interviews have been scheduled with President Clinton and Vice President Gore, similar cooperation has not been forthcoming from President Bush and members of his administration. President Bush and Vice President Cheney refuse to meet with the entire Commission. Instead, they will only agree to separate one-hour meetings with the Chairman and Vice Chairman. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice continues to refuse to testify publicly and the Commission is now considering whether to issue her a subpoena.
 

In addition to studying the causes of September 11th, Congress should be conducting a vigorous examination of the Bush Administration's actions in Iraq. With the exception of limited inquiries by the House Intelligence Committee, the House has failed to exercise its oversight responsibilities with respect to U.S. operations in Iraq.

· House committees should be thoroughly investigating not just our intelligence community's massive failures, but how the president and members of his administration used the intelligence to support their case for war in Iraq. We should also examine all the other reasons President Bush cited to support his war.

· House committees should be thoroughly investigating the Pentagon's post-war plans. The guerrilla war is continuing despite Saddam Hussein's capture. Civil strife is at an all-time high after today's synchronized bombings of Shiite religious gatherings, despite the apparent adoption of an interim constitution. Why did the civilian leadership in the Pentagon ignore Army recommendations for a larger occupation?

· House committees should be thoroughly investigating how the administration secretly awarded billions of dollars in no-bid contracts to companies like Halliburton. It is only thanks to the work of Congress members like Henry Waxman and John Dingell that we have begun to uncover the scope of some of these massive contracts and that the U.S. taxpayer is actually being overcharged for reconstruction work.

· House committees should be thoroughly investigating the administration's plan to hand over power in Iraq. How was the handover date chosen? It seems conveniently selected to take the upcoming presidential election into consideration. Why did it take months to get the U.N. involved?

The Case for War
Now that several months of searching have passed without finding any weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and there remains no evidence of a connection between Saddam Hussein and September 11th, one thing is inarguably clear: President Bush and his surrogates intentionally misled the Congress, the American public and the world about the evidence that such weapons existed in Iraq. Some may say this is a premature accusation because it remains possible that some WMDs will be found. But such a discovery would not change the indisputable fact that the president, the vice president, members of the cabinet and other White House advisors were not truthful about the certainty of the evidence.

 

The president would like us to believe that the discrepancies between what the White House said before the war and what we now know to be the truth resulted from intelligence failures. He has disingenuously appointed another commission to study these failures, but has carefully bounded the commission's scope to prevent scrutiny of his own actions. Gaps in our intelligence gathering represent a gravely serious matter that needs to be examined fully. But it is even more important that we scrutinize the discrepancies between what the intelligence agencies told the White House and what the White House told the world. If we cannot trust the president to tell us the truth about the need to send our troops into harm's way, then we have lost an essential component of our system of government. Whatever power our leaders have derives from the informed consent of the governed. This president failed to properly inform those we govern.

 

There are numerous documented examples of the White House's deception in this matter. Part of the administration's modus operandi was to take the intelligence community's assessment that a threat may exist and transform that possibility into certainty in its public statements. For example, UN inspectors found that Iraq had failed to account for a quantity of bacterial growth media. Had this been used, the inspectors reported, it "could have produced about three times as much" anthrax as Iraq admitted to. This report was fed into the White House propaganda machine and came out in President Bush's October 7th address in this form: "The inspectors, however, concluded that Iraq had likely produced two to four times that amount. This is a massive stockpile of biological weapons that has never been accounted for, and is capable of killing millions."

 

A report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace described this act of trickery this way: "In two sentences, possibility becomes likelihood, likelihood then subtly becomes fact, and a huge stockpile is created. Finally, biological agent is transformed into weapons, and not just any weapons but extremely sophisticated delivery systems --the only way such weapons could kill 'millions.' Small changes like these can easily transform a threat from minor to dire."

 

The Carnegie report has identified forty distinct caveats or conditions included in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that White House officials usually left out of their public statements. The Bush Administration regularly omitted terms like, "probably," "we suspect," or "we cannot exclude" when telling the world what our intelligence agencies had reported. Sometimes, the White House was less subtle. Secretary of State Colin Powell told the United Nations, "[E]very statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we are giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid evidence." We know now that what the Bush Administration gave us was indeed nothing more than speculation presented as fact.

 

Another trick the president and his advisors employed was the lumping of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons under the single rubric, "Weapons of Mass Destruction." In so doing, the White House could combine the likelihood that Saddam had chemical weapons --a relatively minor threat-- with the potentially catastrophic scenario of an Iraqi nuclear program, for which there was no evidence at all.

 

The administration further inflated the threat to the United States by insisting with absolutely no supporting evidence that Saddam would give WMD to terrorists. The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate concluded that this was unlikely except under imminent threat of a U.S. attack. Establishing this nightmare scenario was essential to securing public and congressional support for war. Only through terrorists, did Saddam pose a threat on American soil. Without that threat, enthusiasm for an attack on Iraq would have been greatly diminished.

 

Using these methods, the Bush White House presented us with the image of a "mushroom cloud," without which they could not wage the war they had been wanting for years.

 

Post-war Planning
Today's synchronized bombings of Shiite Muslim religious ceremonies in Baghdad and Karbala are tragic reminders that Iraq remains an extremely dangerous place. At least 143 people were killed and thousands more were likely injured.

 

These bombings are just the latest in a series of attacks against Iraqi civilians and U.S. soldiers. Five hundred fifty U.S. soldiers have died in Iraq and over 2700 have been injured. While there is no accurate figure available for Iraqi casualties, it is reasonable to assume that number is in the thousands. The vast majority of these deaths occurred after the end of major combat operations was announced by President Bush on May 1 of last year.

 

It is now conventional wisdom that the president and his administration failed abysmally to plan for post-war Iraq. Vice President Cheney's predictions of a rosy welcome were shattered long ago. Our troops remain engaged in a guerilla war and Iraq's civilian population lives under constant threat of attack by the same adversary.

 

Why is the House ignoring this reality? The CIA, the State Department, the Army, the Marine Corps, the Army War College, and various NGOs have produced thousands of pages of recommendations that were ignored. These predictions have proved extremely accurate after the fall of Baghdad. Outside experts are saying the ongoing financial, diplomatic, and human cost of the Iraq occupation are far worse than expected because the administration did not take its own agencies' suggestions.

 

This is an extremely serious charge, yet no House Committee is currently investigating what went wrong with our post-war plans.

 

Tonight is an opportunity to outline some of the advice ignored by the administration.

 

U.S. Military Recommendations
War games run by the Army and the Pentagon's joint staff in preparation for war with Iraq led to very high troop levels. The Army's recommendation for an invasion force was 400,000 troops. Secretary Rumsfeld envisioned a force level of 75,000.

 

The Army's recommendation took into account the invasion AND subsequent occupation. It argued a larger force would actually be more useful after Baghdad fell, as opposed to the initial invasion. A large force would allow the Army to restore order quickly and perhaps allow for a much smaller occupation force six months later.

 

In Bosnia, the Army stationed 200,000 troops to watch over 5 million people. In Iraq, with a population of 25 million, the Army dispatched fewer than 200,000 troops for postwar action. The heart of the army's argument was that the U.S. would win the war but could be trapped in an untenable occupation if there were too few soldiers.

 

Marine General Anthony Zinni, who preceded Tommy Franks as CENTCOM commander, agreed with the Army's recommendation for higher troop levels.

 

The Army had also worked out cost projections prior to the war, despite claims by Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz that it was impossible to produce such numbers.

 

State Department's "Future of Iraq" Project
Starting in late 2001, the State Department began contemplating post-war plans and created the Future of Iraq Project. It brought in outside experts and teams of exiles and created seventeen working groups designed to systematically cover what would be needed to rebuild Iraq's political and economic infrastructure. Congress authorized $5 million to fund the project's studies in May 2002. The final report consisted of thirteen volumes of recommendations on specific topics. Among the list of recommendations were:

· Restore electricity and water supplies as soon as possible after regime change by employing Iraqis, thereby creating jobs and engendering good will toward the coalition;

· DO NOT disband the entire Iraqi army. The Project suggested purging the Iraqi army of its Baathist elements but retaining most members to help restore public order and provide for the country's defense when the U.S. departs. It also stressed, however, that "all combatants who are included in the demobilization process must be assured by their leaders and the new government of their legal rights and that new prospects for work and education will be provided by the new system." The report laid out detailed steps on how this could be accomplished.

· The Project stressed how disorderly Iraq would be soon after liberation, despite Vice President Cheney's rosy predictions. It predicted the power vacuum and the crime and looting that followed Saddam's removal.

· It also suggested that despite the need for a long U.S. postwar commitment, instituting a long-term military government would alienate Iraqis.

· It warned against the ill will that would result from Iraqi's being seen as working for foreign contractors instead of having foreign contractors be seen as assisting Iraqis.

 

CIA Suggestions
The common theme among all CIA predictions was that disorder would follow the fall of Baghdad. The CIA believed that rivalries in Iraq were so deep that quick transfer of sovereignty would invite chaos.

 

The CIA began running war games to plan for postwar Iraq. These included representatives from the Defense Department, but when the Secretary of Defense's office heard of these in the early summer of 2002, it reprimanded the DOD employees who participated and ordered them to stop cooperating with the CIA.

 

These war games were intended to make cost predictions and simulate potential problems. Because of that they were seen as weakening the case for launching a "war of choice."

 

NGOs and USAID
In the fall of 2002, USAID began planning for postwar Iraq, since it was the natural contact for Non-Governmental Organizations. These NGOs were concerned with relief operations in Iraq.

At the time, most high-ranking officials in the Bush Administration were comparing the eventual fall of Iraq to the fall of Germany and Japan. The NGOs strongly disagreed with this assumption and made those views known to USAID.

 

The NGOs believed Iraq would likely fall into chaos following regime change and requested that sanction restrictions be lifted from them so they could prepare for postwar Iraq. This request was denied. The NGOs continued to stress the disorder that would follow war but all they received back from the USAID representatives were broad assurances that everything was taken care of.

War College Report

In January 2003, the Army War College produced a report that addressed Iraq reconstruction challenges. It predicted long-term gratitude towards the U.S. was unlikely and that if the U.S. had to supply the bulk of the occupation force this will lead to many more problems in postwar Iraq. It strongly recommended that a large international force would be ideal for postwar occupation.

It also provided a 135-item checklist of what tasks would have to be done right after the war and by whom.

 

According to those involved with the report, the Pentagon paid little attention to any of its postwar recommendations.
 
 
Unrealistic Assumptions
Exaggerations during the buildup for war were not limited to weapons of mass destruction. Administration officials often made widely ridiculed assumptions about post war Iraq.

· Both President Bush and Vice President Cheney claimed we would be greeted as liberators.

· USAID Administrator Natsios claimed rebuilding would cost U.S. taxpayers $1.7 billion.

· Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz repeatedly claimed it was impossible to guess any costs for the war.

· Rumsfeld called former economic advisor Lawrence Lindsey's claim that the war would cost $200 billion way off.

· Wolfowitz claimed reconstruction would cost U.S. taxpayers very little.

To date the U.S. has spent approximately $150 billion in Iraq.

House Must Investigate
These examples are just the tip of the iceberg. There are literally thousands of pages of postwar planning that were prepared and appear to have been ignored.

Why was the Defense Department and not the State Department initially put in charge of post-war Iraq? Why weren't we more prepared? Why didn't the administration take its own recommendations?  Why were we told there were no cost estimates when there were?

Postwar plans were available and they were ignored. The House must investigate this to ensure that legislative remedies are examined and to put in place mechanisms to prevent another failure of this magnitude.

No-bid Contracts
Halliburton and Bechtel already have contracts worth $3.14 billion from the conflict in Iraq and the reconstruction efforts. Yet, Rep. Waxman and his staff at the government reform committee have found that the cost of many of the reconstruction projects could be reduced by 90 percent if the projects were awarded to local Iraqi companies rather than contractors like Halliburton and Bechtel.
 

Evidence of Overcharging
We have learned that KBR, a Halliburton subsidiary, is overcharging the U.S. for fuel delivered to Baghdad from Kuwait. We have also learned that KBR employees received kickbacks from a Kuwaiti subcontractor in exchange for awarding that subcontractor a reconstruction contract.

Information Delayed

Members of Congress were informed of these sole-source, non-competitive contracts by media reports. Despite repeated requests from Members to federal agencies, the administration has been slow to respond or simply has declined to provide details about why these large private contracts were awarded on a non-competitive basis.

 

Two brief examples:

USAID awarded several contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars to a few companies it handpicked to compete against each other. Yet, repeated inquiries from the minority government reform committee to USAID have been brushed aside and now USAID has refused to provide copies of the contracts or information on how it chose which companies would bid on these initial contracts.

 

The administration has also failed to disclose information about its sole-source oilfield contract with Halliburton's Kellogg Brown & Root. KBR was awarded a no-bid contract on March 8, 2003, but the Defense Department did not disclose until April 8, 2003 that this contract has a potential value of $7 billion. And today, despite a recommendation by the Army Corps of Engineers to open this contract to public scrutiny, the Defense Department continues to keep its content classified for alleged national security reasons.

 

House Committees Must Investigate
It is clear that members of Congress are receiving grudging and delayed cooperation, if they receive any cooperation at all, from the administration regarding reconstruction contracts. Only a formal committee investigation will be able to answer the serious questions and allegations that have arisen from this no-bid process.

Iraq's Political Transition
Ambassador Bremer has set the deadline for transferring power back to the Iraqis as June 30, 2004. This date falls conveniently close to the beginning of the summer presidential campaign. The date was set solely by the United States, despite recent events indicating that Iraq will not peacefully transition without the U.N. leading negotiations.

 

This begs the question, was this date set for political purposes? The House should be asking these questions and demanding clear proof of the reasoning behind this date.

 

Part of the original reasoning was that elections would be held shortly after the transition deadline to ensure the legitimacy of the new government. That is no longer the case. The U.S. plan for such an election was roundly rejected and it was the U.N. that had to step in and negotiate a solution to the election question. Does this Administration still believe the U.N. is a worthless debating society?

Under the U.N. plan, national elections will take place in the late fall of 2004. Shouldn't this new development affect the transfer date? The Congress and the American people deserve answers to these questions that at this late date still remain unanswered.