

CODEL LYNCH

PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, USS ENTERPRISE & CHAD

SEPTEMBER 9-16, 2007



FINAL REPORT

CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION (CODEL) LYNCH

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I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this final report is to summarize the successful completion of this fact-finding mission and to share observations and recommendations.

On September 9, 2007, CODEL Lynch embarked on a Congressionally-sanctioned¹ fact-finding mission that included stops in Ireland, Qatar, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bahrain, the USS Enterprise (located in the Persian Gulf), Chad, and Spain.

The following Members of Congress participated in CODEL Lynch:

- **Rep. Stephen F. Lynch**, *Democrat*, (MA-09);
- **Rep. Todd Platts**, *Republican*, (PA-19); and
- **Rep. Brian Higgins**, *Democrat*, (NY-27).²

The following countries were the focus of CODEL Lynch fact-finding efforts:

- The Islamic Republic of Pakistan;
- The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan; and
- The Republic of Chad.

¹ CODEL Lynch was authorized by Chairman Henry Waxman and Ranking Member Tom Davis of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives and supported by components of the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of State under applicable law. *See* Attachment A (8/28/07 Letter from Chairman Waxman to Secretary Robert Gates) & B (8/28/07 Letter from Chairman Waxman to Secretary Condoleezza Rice).

² In addition to the Members, **David M. Turk** (Staff Director, Majority, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform), **Andrew M. Wright** (Professional Staff, Majority, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform), **John Cuaderes** (Senior Investigator and Policy Advisor, Minority, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform), Colonel **Christopher P. Hughes** (Chief, U.S. Army Liaison), and Lieutenant Colonel **James P. Garrison** (U.S. Army Liaison) comprised the remainder of the CODEL.

CODEL Lynch had the following objectives:

- Examine U.S. relations with Pakistan, with special emphasis on assessing the Pakistani government's policies with respect to regional security and international terrorism.
- Examine the political and military situation in Afghanistan, and express Congressional gratitude to service men and women deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
- Examine operations and needs of the Carrier Strike Group Twelve, and express Congressional gratitude to service men and women aboard the USS Enterprise deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
- Examine ongoing humanitarian efforts and the security situation related to the ongoing genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan, as well as its collateral effects on Chad.

II. REPORT ON PAKISTAN

A. COUNTER-TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN

The intelligence community has reached consensus that al Qaeda and the Taliban have regrouped in western Pakistan due to conditions hospitable to *jihadi* extremism, including popular support for Bin Laden and Mullah Omar in the region; ungoverned spaces in areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, most-notably the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP); Pakistani prohibitions on U.S. military actions within its borders; and the Pakistani government's uneven commitment and contradictory policies with respect to bringing security to the FATA and NWFP regions.

Underscoring what is at stake on this front-line against jihadi terrorism, the Delegation participated the U.S. Mission's observance of the sixth anniversary of 9/11 at a solemn ceremony on the Embassy grounds. Ambassador Anne W. Patterson led the service in which the names of U.S. Embassy personnel who have died in the line of duty to the United States while serving in Pakistan were read aloud.



Ambassador **Anne W. Patterson** and Representatives **Stephen F. Lynch**, **Todd Platts**, and **Brian Higgins** at the 9/11 ceremony at the U.S. Embassy Islamabad. (9/11/07)

The Delegation met with U.S. Ambassador Anne W. Patterson and Deputy Chief of Mission Peter Bodde to discuss, among other issues, the Pakistani government's ongoing counter-terrorism efforts and Pakistan's domestic political situation.

Following the 9/11 commemoration service and policy meetings, the Delegation flew to Peshawar, Pakistan in the NWFP for further review of counter-terrorism efforts. The Delegation received a briefing from the Commanding General of the Frontier Corps, Muhammad Alam Khattak, and his staff at its headquarters in the historic Bala Hisar fort on the outskirts of Peshawar.

The Frontier Corps is comprised of troops from ethnic tribes from the NWFP and FATA region. The briefing on the Pashtunwali tribal code and historical background of the FATA region illuminated some of the reasons why there could be cultural support for alliance with the Taliban and protection of foreign jihadis, including al Qaeda senior leaders.

Congressionally-appropriated funds support equipment and training for the Frontier Corps. The Frontier Corps assists with border control and counter-terrorism operations. It seeks increased funding and equipment. The government of Pakistan views the Frontier Corps as a critical element in its counter-terrorism strategy because it believes that ethnic Pashtuns will be more effectively regarded as a legitimate government authority in FATA, NWFP, and portions of the Balochistan Province.

Members of the Delegation had some reservations about the effectiveness of the Frontier Corps in light of reports of observation of its performance by U.S. military sources, both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Delegation has heard that some of the Frontier Corps ranks have been co-opted by their tribal peers and are generally less

prepared than the regular Pakistan Army, which, at times, has been reluctant to fully and forcefully engage with militants in Pakistan's ungoverned spaces.

Just prior to the trip, in late August 2007, some 280 Pakistan Army soldiers and Frontier Corpsmen were ambushed and captured in South Waziristan, one of the subcomponents of the FATA. Several of these soldiers have been executed, and the rest remain as hostages of extremist rebels. In response, the Pakistan Army has shown increased resolve for military operations against Taliban and Al Qaeda groups in the tribal areas.

The Delegation took an aerial tour by helicopter of the FATA and NWFP regions, as well as the Khyber Pass. Observing the terrain renders the difficulty in finding al Qaeda senior leadership self-evident. However, the Pakistani Army needs to fully engage in the restive Tribal Belt.



An aerial view of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas taken by members of the Delegation. (9/11/07)

B. THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN PAKISTAN: UNCERTAINTY AND TURMOIL

Pakistan is going through a substantial period of political turmoil. Latent societal tensions came to the fore when President Pervez Musharraf unsuccessfully attempted to remove Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. President Musharraf's action led to large demonstrations led by members of the legal profession, resulting in a "judicial crisis" that activated civil society groups and ultimately concluded with Justice Chaudhry's reinstatement. Opposition parties, including the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), led by former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N), led by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, used the judicial crisis to renew their calls for a return to democracy.

Meanwhile, throughout the spring and early summer, radically-conservative Islamists were locked in a standoff with Pakistani officials after they illegally occupied the Red Mosque, or Lal Masjid, and its affiliated madrassas. The Red Mosque's adherents sought to impose strict version of Islamic *shariah* law on Pakistan, and during the standoff, these extremists harassed and kidnapped barbers, unveiled women, Chinese masseuses, police officers, and DVD and CD purveyors. The standoff ended in a bloody siege of the Red Mosque that has inflamed jihadis and their sympathizers throughout Pakistan, and there has been a spike in suicide bombings, especially in the NWFP, since that time.

Thus, President Musharraf and his government have seen a significant drop in public support because supporters of more moderate, democratic Pakistan were irritated by the judicial crises and religiously conservative citizens were inflamed by support of U.S. counterterrorism efforts and the Red Mosque siege. Polling bears out these trends. A poll conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) between August 29 and September 13, 2007 concludes that:

IRI's September poll witnessed a drop in all major indicators of public mood. Pakistanis are feeling more insecure, both physically and economically, with the vast majority saying that the country is headed in the wrong direction.³

Pakistan is now in the midst of its election season. During the CODEL, there was question as to whether Pakistan's presidential election would be conducted by the sitting parliament, which is controlled by pro-Musharraf legislators, or by a newly-seated parliament following upcoming parliamentary elections. Since the CODEL's return, on October 6, President Musharraf was reelected by the sitting parliament despite an opposition boycott. There is still a cloud over that election because there is a pending

³ IRI Releases Survey of Pakistan Public Opinion, Press Release (Oct. 11, 2007), at 2.

legal challenge to Musharraf's eligibility to run for President while he continues to wear his uniform as Army Chief.⁴

Political intrigue continues to surround President Musharraf's relations with his own political party, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q), and the two major opposition parties, PML-N and PPP. The day before the CODEL arrived in Islamabad, former Prime Minister Sharif returned to Pakistan but was immediately detained and unceremoniously deported to Saudi Arabia. The PPP, on the other hand, has been locked in negotiations with President Musharraf about a potential power-sharing agreement with former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Bhutto has insisted on amnesty for pending corruption cases against her and her husband, Musharraf's resignation as Army Chief, and legislative action to remove barriers to her reelection as Prime Minister. Negotiations have been marred by premature declarations of agreement and inaccurate reporting, but the two sides appear to be headed toward what DCM Bodde described as a "photo finish" compromise.

C. UNTARNISHING THE U.S. "BRAND" IN PAKISTAN

Notwithstanding over \$10 billion in U.S. aid to Pakistan since 9/11, the U.S. image in Pakistan is toxic. Part of this problem mirrors Musharraf's own political problems. Islamists strongly oppose Musharraf's dealings with the U.S., and the more moderate and secular elements of society have been alienated by U.S. support for an unelected leader they believe lacks legitimacy. However, part of the problem flows from a U.S. aid package that has emphasized big-ticket defense items and direct budgetary support to the Musharraf government rather than development aid – with a U.S. face on it – of consequence to average Pakistanis. This dynamic is borne out by the fact that the effective U.S. response to the earthquake disaster in Kashmir resulted in the only significant spike in U.S. popularity during the post-9/11 period. Over the last fiscal year, the U.S. government has done a better job of using a shared objectives process to influence Pakistan's use of U.S. budgetary support for critical societal needs, like education and health care. However, much more needs to be done.

During a period of unequivocal U.S. support for Musharraf (which seems to be in the process of some modulation since Ambassador Patterson arrived on post), diplomatic outreach to a broader swath of Pakistani society suffered. It remains to be seen whether a Musharraf-Bhutto coalition government and a new aid package might start to have some salutary effects on the U.S. image in Pakistan.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS ON PAKISTAN POLICY

- The U.S. needs to continue to pressure the Pakistan government to engage in counterterrorism operations in its restive Western region, including portions of the NWFP, Balochistan (especially the militant centers within Quetta), and FATA. In addition, the U.S. should bolster counter-insurgency training for Pakistani forces.

⁴ Before the presidential election, President Musharraf committed to remove his uniform if he won the presidency, and has reshuffled the Army leadership, nominally, in preparation for such a move.

- The U.S. must maintain pressure on the Pakistan government to reform – and compete with – the madrassa system, while committing vastly more resources to its failing public education system.
- The U.S. must significantly rethink its aid mix to Pakistan. Military aid should be focused on training and weapons systems for use in counter-terrorism operations rather than for use as a bulwark against India. In addition, the U.S. needs a substantial increase in visible development aid that addresses immediate needs of average Pakistanis.
- USAID needs to build its human capital resources to handle its critical education, health care, and governance missions with less reliance on private contractors.
- The U.S. should broaden diplomatic relations from the government to civil society and opposition leaders.
- As the U.S. prepares to seek \$750 million from Congress for FATA development, the administration needs to prepare a comprehensive and effective oversight plan for that significant expenditure of funds.

III. REPORT ON AFGHANISTAN

A. CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM: COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN THE BORDER REGION

Upon arrival at Kabul International airport, Brigadier General Rodney Anderson escorted the Delegation via Blackhawk helicopters to military operations in the Nuristan Province in Northeast Afghanistan. The Delegation received a counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism briefing from Lieutenant Colonel Christopher D. Kolenda, who commands Task Force Saber operating out of Forward Operating Base (FOB) Naray. Lt. Col. Kolenda outlined ongoing military operations, relative support for the Afghan National Government within the Nuristan Province, and counter-insurgency strategy.

Task Force Saber has determined that a successful mission cannot rely on kinetic military power alone, and must be won by extending the writ and bolstering the legitimacy of the Afghan National Government to a skeptical Nuristani population. As such, the military strategy goes hand-in-hand with reconstruction solutions that matter to the local population. Lt. Col. Kolenda invoked the old adage that “where the road ends, the insurgency begins.” The map designating areas hostility, indifference, or support vis-à-vis the Afghan National Government bears out this observation. Task Force Saber has had concrete successes at bringing local tribal populations into a peaceful dialogue by building roads, establishing other public works projects based on local priorities, and providing free health care to locals. In one stark example, Rep. Higgins and Rep. Platts observed a surgical operation on a young Afghan boy that was separating two fused fingers since birth. Such goodwill gestures are critical to a counter-insurgency strategy with any hope of long-term success.

The Delegation also flew out to one of Task Force Saber's remote outposts, Camp Lybert, situated along the mountainous Pakistan-Afghanistan border at an altitude of over 7,000 feet. Camp Lybert, commanded by Captain Adam S. King, had approximately 70 U.S. soldiers, co-located with a small Marine Corps contingent there to train soldiers in the Afghan National Army (ANA). Supplying Camp Lybert, especially with critical heavy machinery, is a challenge given the terrain, and some of the supplies are delivered by unchaperoned pack mules from a local village below. Captain King indicated that there is significant cross-border movement from Pakistan that is helping to fuel the insurgency, but that standing orders prohibit firing on illegal border crossers unless there are weapons visible. The troops stationed at Camp Lybert appeared to have high morale notwithstanding the harsh conditions.



Congressmen **Brian Higgins, Stephen F. Lynch, and Todd Platts** (from left to right) receive a briefing on artillery operations at Camp Lybert in Eastern Afghanistan. (9/12/07)

Task Force Saber appears to be making incremental gains in its efforts to bring local populations into the ambit of the Afghan National Government's writ. However, Nuristan Province is not representative of challenges in other regions in Afghanistan, especially those with widespread poppy cultivation.

Task Force Saber's counterinsurgency strategy still faces significant challenges. For example, the deployment churn of military personnel has a significant disruptive effect on a counter-insurgency strategy centered on the establishment of trust among local tribal populations. The slow pace of reconstruction (or, in many regions of Afghanistan, "construction" for the first time) and widespread government corruption continue to test the patience of the local populace provide an opening for insurgents to exploit. While there have been some successes in training the ANA, it will take a long time before the ANA is able to operate at a capacity commensurate with security needs.

The Afghan National Police, in contrast, continue to lag far behind benchmark goals. Their training has been slow, their resources and pay low, and ranks are corrupted. Moreover, in certain regions, both the ANA and ANP are being used in ways that are counter-productive to their core missions. For example, the Delegation heard that the British are using the ANA for force protection rather than training them to fight as platoons. Likewise, Task Force Saber is using ANP trainees as counter-insurgency forces rather than performance of police functions. County-wide, there remains a severe shortage of embedded U.S. trainers among ANA and ANP components.

Research obtained by the Delegation upon return bears out this problem. The Department of Defense (DOD) had only filled 719 of 1,633 total personnel required for embedded trainers and logistics support missions for the ANA.⁵ In addition, as of September 2007, DOD has only filled 1,377 of 2,909 required slots for police mentors.⁶ Both in Afghanistan and upon return, the Delegation heard that these personnel requests have not been honored by the Pentagon due to priority of Iraq operations, and this failure is having a demonstrably devastating effect on Operation Enduring Freedom. Much has been made of NATO allies' underperformance in these training missions, but the U.S. has to make sure it is fulfilling its obligations as it seeks further assistance from its allies in the Afghanistan effort.

The Delegation also received a classified intelligence briefing from Colonel John McCracken, who was assigned to NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), on efforts to disrupt insurgent operations and the nature and size of hostile elements.

In all, the Delegation observed cautious optimism among U.S. and allied personnel during their trip to Afghanistan, and remain committed to providing the constructive oversight and resources necessary to ensure the success of this critical mission.

B. CONGRESSIONAL RECOGNITION OF SERVICE AND SACRIFICE

The Delegation was honored to have several opportunities to express Congressional gratitude to the young men and women in uniform who are advancing critical U.S. missions and serving in dangerous and inhospitable conditions. The Delegation ate lunch with soldiers operating out of FOB Naray in the Nuristan Province. Their spirits seemed high and they had some access to the external world, including delayed access to some television programming. At Camp Lybert, the Delegation expressed its gratitude during a water-break in a small deck used during soldiers' downtime. In Kabul, the Delegation had dinner with troops from Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania stationed at Camp Eggers and the Kabul-area.

⁵ See Table, *Number of Embedded Trainers, Logistics Support Personnel, and Police Mentors in Afghanistan as of September 2007* (Attachment C).

⁶ *Id.*

C. THE CHALLENGE OF LEGITIMATE AFGHAN GOVERNANCE

Ambassador Chris Dell, who served as Chargé d’Affairs during the CODEL, repeatedly related his concern that governance issues are the biggest obstacle to the success of U.S. and NATO policy in Afghanistan. The Karzai government is locked in a struggle with the Afghan National Assembly over personnel within his cabinet, and numerous officials in his government are alleged to be corrupt, especially with respect to narcotics trafficking. The Afghan National Government is frustrated with the international community’s imposition of reconstruction priorities and failure to program development assistance through the Afghan budget. However, international donors remain hesitant to fund money through the Afghan National Government due to the magnitude of reported corruption.

The Delegation also received a briefing on efforts to combat terrorist financing from the Treasury Attaché, Gretchen M. Biery, and her team. This was a follow-up briefing to a briefing Representatives Lynch and Platts received on a CODEL to Afghanistan in April 2007. According to Ms. Biery, the Afghan National Government is cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism efforts as it establishes its nascent banking system. There is marginal progress being made on reporting controls in the Afghan banking system, but that there remain significant obstacles. There have been widespread reports of banks being repeatedly robbed in outlying provinces where there remain security vacuums. In addition, the legal system in Afghanistan is still dysfunctional, and the government is still working on extradition laws and treaties.

D. AFGHANISTAN’S LONG-TERM STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES

Thirty years of war have decimated Afghan human capital and national infrastructure. After the Taliban’s utter exclusion of women from public Afghan society, the literacy rate among women is an abysmal 9%. The literacy rate for men is only marginally better at 29%. The depletion of human capital inhibits development of basic societal institutions like a teacher corps, health care system, legal and law enforcement systems, and engineering capability. Education also implicates a security dimension. Greater access to education will reduce the attraction of radical Islamic madrassas which, in many areas, now provide the only educational opportunities for Afghan children.

Afghanistan’s lack of infrastructure is equally alarming. Currently, only 6% of the Afghan population has access to electricity. (1879 was the last year that few Americans had access to electricity). The import of that fact is enormous when considering the effort to improve the quality of life of the people outside of Kabul and the influence of the Karzai government. Likewise, many of the roads and bridges of Afghanistan are impassable, which isolates local populations, frustrates economic growth, and denies the expansion of Afghan government legitimacy. As discussed elsewhere in this report, the influence of the government is directly related to the paved road system.

As set forth in the recommendations below, the U.S. needs to reassess its aid mix to Afghanistan.

E. RECOMMENDATIONS ON AFGHANISTAN POLICY

- DOD needs to fill, immediately, all requests for embedded trainers for the ANA and ANP because these vacancies contribute to the deterioration of the security environment as the Afghan National Government competes with the Taliban and other insurgents for legitimacy.
- USDA needs to recruit and deploy, immediately, agricultural advisors for all unfilled positions among Provincial Reconstruction Teams because, at current staffing levels, the alternative livelihoods program is failing to turn the tide against narco-traffickers and the Taliban.
- The U.S. needs to reevaluate its counter-narcotics policy with respect to poppy eradication. While there is a role for poppy eradication down the line, it is at cross purposes with the overriding need to succeed in counterinsurgency strategy. In addition, the U.S. needs to increase pressure on the Karzai government to root out government corruption related to the poppy trade.
- The U.S. needs to lead the international community in substantial increase in aid for basic education, electricity capacity, and transportation infrastructure.

IV. REPORT ON CARRIER STRIKE GROUP TWELVE

On September 13, the Delegation took a carrier onboard delivery (COD) flight from Bahrain to the USS Enterprise situated in the Persian Gulf. On the Enterprise, the Delegation observed day and night flight operations in support of combat operations in Iraq.



The Delegation on the flight deck of the USS Enterprise as an F-18 returning from Iraq lands (9/13/07)

In addition, it received classified and unclassified briefings on the Enterprise's and Strike Group's operations and mission from Rear Admiral Daniel P. Holloway (Commander, Carrier Strike Group Twelve), Captain Ronald Horton (Commanding Officer, USS Enterprise), and their staffs, and observed a mass casualty exercise during its tour to the ship.

As with Afghanistan, the Delegation expressed its deep gratitude to the men and women serving in uniform in the Persian Gulf. As part of that effort, the Delegation attended a ceremony for a number of newly-promoted Chief Petty Officers.

V. REPORT ON CHAD AND ITS RESIDENT DARFURI REFUGEES

A. INSTABILITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM IN CHAD

In Chad, the Delegation received troubling reports of destabilizing forces. President Idriss Deby Itno is engaged in a medium-grade proxy war with Sudan. Deby

supports Sudanese rebels against the regime of President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, while Bashir renders support for Chadian rebels seeking to destabilize the Deby government. According to sources in the U.S. mission and United Nations

Both Mme. Catherine Huck, the joint operations representative for United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Abéché, Chad and Mme. Loum Ndoadoumngue Neloumseï Elise, the Vice-President of the Chad National Assembly, analogized the current security environment of Chad to that of the Darfur region of Sudan “about five years ago.”

Chad’s rampant poverty, concentrated Arab and Muslim population, and weak government control of wide swaths of the country, present conditions ripe for the gathering of dangerous international terrorist threats. According to the U.S. mission, the government of Chad has provided “excellent” cooperation on counterterrorism, including U.S. military to Chadian military assistance provided under the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership.

B. AVOIDING THE “OIL CURSE”: MANAGING CHAD’S NEW ECONOMY

On the economic front, the new Exxon-Mobile oil project in Chad will produce over \$1 billion in royalties and indirect revenues to the Chad. Following a rebel attack on the capital in April 2006, Deby reneged on an agreement with the World Bank – which helped finance Chad’s oil production infrastructure – to spend the vast majority of the new oil wealth to build roads, hospitals, schools, and other projects to help the nation’s poor. A burgeoning crisis was headed off after some emergency diplomacy by the U.S., and Chad and the World Bank reached a new understanding. Still, Chad’s retreat from this commitment is an alarming sign that Chad may fall prey to the scourge of the “oil curse.” It remains to be seen whether these new resources will be used to improve living standards for average Chadians.

Given the volatility of the Chadian security situation and dire poverty, coupled with the opportunities and challenges presented by new oil revenue streams, the nature of the U.S. footprint in Chad is alarming. The country team at the U.S. mission has no permanent commercial or economic officer, the USAID mission is closed, and – despite reports of terrorist activity in Chad – there is no U.S. Treasury attaché on post. While the U.S. mission in Chad boasts of “limited development assistance to counter the conditions which can foster extremism,” it was apparent to the Delegation that such efforts are vastly under-resourced in light of the magnitude of Chad’s economic challenges and political volatility.

C. CHAD’S ONGOING REFUGEE AND INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT CRISES

On the way to the Gaga refugee camp, the Delegation met with Général Touka Ramadane, the Governor of the Ouaddaï region of Chad (which includes Abéché and Gaga). Abéché bustles with activity, and has apparently experienced tremendous growth due to international relief efforts for Darfuri refugees that are coordinated and staged

there. The Delegation arrived at the end of the rainy season, and the roads in Abéché and from Abéché to the Gaga camp were in various states of disrepair. In an ominous sign, flatbeds filled with armed men roam freely throughout Abéché, which our Chadian drivers could not identify as either Chadian regular army or one of the various rebel or militia groups. The powder keg atmosphere was unmistakable.

The refugee crisis in Chad continues. The Gaga camp holds approximately 12,500 registered Darfuri refugees, with more arriving daily.⁷ UNHCR reports that, as of December 2006, eastern Chad contains approximately 270,000 registered refugees.⁸ Meanwhile, resource competition and cultural incompatibility between the residents of eastern Chad and incoming Darfuris has led to nearly 200,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) among the Chadian population.

At the camp, aside from small security and administrative contingents, there were virtually no adult males present. In contrast, the camp teemed with mothers and children.



Congressmen **Todd Platts** (left) and **Stephen F. Lynch** (right) interact with Darfuri children at the Gaga refugee camp in Eastern Chad. (9/15/07)

The U.S. continues to be the major contributor to humanitarian relief efforts in eastern Chad. To date, the U.S. has contributed over \$86 million in humanitarian assistance to Chad, which amounts to approximately 42% of the total assistance provided

⁷ See Register Camp Refugees Population Eastern Chad As of 31 December 2006, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (Attachment D).

⁸ *Id.*

by the international community.⁹ The UN, in part supported by U.S. funds, has contributed another \$9.9 million.¹⁰ Unfortunately, the European Commission (ECHO) has outstanding but unfulfilled humanitarian assistance pledges totaling over \$16 million.¹¹

D. RECOMMENDATIONS OF CHAD AND DARFUR POLICIES

- The U.S. should engage ECHO through diplomatic channels in an effort to ensure that the \$16 million ECHO has pledged but not provided is forthcoming in a timely manner.
- The U.S. should develop a comprehensive strategy to boost the U.S. image among Chadians and avoid the manifestation of extremist jihadism in Chad.
- The U.S. should reopen its USAID mission in Chad, provide sufficient diplomatic human resources (e.g., deployment of a Treasury attaché and commercial/economic officers), and significantly boost development aid in support of that strategy. Such efforts should emphasize water resource management and enhanced energy access.
- The U.S. should continue to insist that a sufficient U.N. peacekeeping force be deployed in the Darfur region of Sudan to protect the vulnerable refugee population.

VI. CONCLUSION

The participants of CODEL Lynch were honored to represent the U.S. House of Representatives, and further the people's business, on this important trip. Participants would also like to express their appreciation to all those who supported this trip – from logistics to security to substantive consultation – and to those in host governments who welcomed us into their countries.

The signatories of this final report welcome the opportunity to discuss the Delegation's observations, conclusions, and recommendations with the Committee, other components of the U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, the White House, and other components of the Executive Branch.

For further information regarding this Final Report, please contact Andrew M. Wright at (202) 225-2548.

Attachments

⁹ See Total Humanitarian Assistance per Donor, OCHA (Sept. 14, 2007) (Attachment E).

¹⁰ *Id.*

¹¹ *Id.*