On August 25, 2004, Rep. Mica chaired a hearing of the Aviation Subcommittee on the aviation security aspects of the 9/11 Commission Report. The purpose of this hearing was to report and discuss ways in which Congress can work to improve aviation security in the future.
Background:
In November 2002, Congress and the President created the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) to investigate “facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.” The bi-partisan commission consisted of ten commissioners.
In its report issued August 2004, the 9/11 Commission reviewed and analyzed issues “relating to intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, diplomacy, immigration issues and border control, the flow of assets to terrorist organizations, commercial aviation, the role of Congressional oversight and resource allocation, and other areas determined relevant by the Commission.” The Commission closely scrutinized the aviation security system in place on September 11th, reviewed aviation security enhancements since 9/11, and made specific aviation security recommendations.
U.S. AVIATION SECURITY SYSTEM DEFEATED ON SEPTEMBER 11TH
The 19 hijackers involved in the September 11th attacks boarded four transcontinental flights from three international airports. Each of the airports had security screening checkpoints owned by two U.S. commercial airlines and operated by three private screening companies under contract with the airlines. The hijackers successfully defeated the “layers” of aviation security in place at that time.
The 9/11 Commission Report set forth, in great detail, how the hijackers were able to successfully defeat the pre-9/11 aviation security system. This included:
Getting through the aviation security checkpoint system:
The hijackers had researched, analyzed, observed and tested how to go about defeating the existing airport security screening requirements. For instance, they knew what size knife blade was permissible. There is also evidence that they were able to carry mace onto their flights. By 8:00 a.m. on September 11th, all 19 hijackers were able to clear the security screening checkpoints and were waiting at the gates to board their flights.
In passing through the checkpoints, each of the hijackers would have been screened by a walk-through metal detector calibrated to detect items with at least the metal content of a .22-caliber handgun. Anyone who might have set off that detector would have been screened with a hand wand—a procedure requiring the screener to identify the metal item or items that caused the alarm. In addition, an X-ray machine would have screened the hijackers’ carry-on belongings. The screening was in place to identify and confiscate weapons and other items prohibited from being carried onto a commercial flight.
On September 11th, only Washington Dulles International Airport had close-circuit television that recorded which alarms were triggered and what screening procedures were applied. What occurred at Dulles is very telling about the level of security in place on 9/11. Of the 5 hijackers who boarded American Flight 77 at Dulles, three set off the first metal detector and were directed to a second metal detector. Of those three, two set off the second metal detector and were hand-wanded and then cleared. The carry-on bag of one of the two hijackers hand-wanded, was swiped for explosive trace detection and cleared.
Beating the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS):
Half of the 9/11 hijackers were “selected” by CAPPS for special security measures. An airline customer service representative “flagged” two additional hijackers, not “selected” by CAPPS, for extra-scrutiny when they presented themselves at the check-in counter. Therefore, more than half, or 10 of the 19 hijackers, were selected for “special screening” on September 11th. Unfortunately, this meant only that their checked bags were not loaded on the aircraft until they had boarded the aircraft. It did not impact the level of screening received by the hijackers or their carry-on bags.
Exploiting the pre-9/11 flight crew training:
Prior to September 11th, flight crews were trained to cooperate and not resist in the event of a hijacking. The FAA security training guidance for airlines and flight crews, referred to as the “Common Strategy,” did not contemplate suicide hijackings where the aircraft would be used as a guided missile. Therefore, the flight crews were not forewarned and were not properly prepared for this new threat. The hijackers took advantage of this. They killed some of the crewmembers and passengers, and warned the remaining crew and passengers that they had a bomb on board and to remain in their seats. The crew stuck with their training, they cooperated with the hijackers and calmly reported the events in the belief that the plane would be returned to an airport. With the exception of Flight 93, the crew and passengers acted in accordance with known security procedures and did as the hijackers demanded.
Hiding the location of the hijacked planes:
On September 11th, the terrorists discontinued radio contact. They also turned off the transponders on three of the four hijacked aircraft. The FAA could still track the aircraft, with some difficulty, by their primary radar returns. However, unlike with the transponders, the identification and altitude information were not displayed on the FAA air traffic controllers’ screens. Controllers “lost” at least three of the aircraft for varying periods of time on 9/11. In one instance, Flight 77, the aircraft flew “undetected” for 36 minutes on a course heading due east toward Washington, D.C.
Taking advantage of poor planning and communication:
On 9/11, as the realization that one hijacking and then multiple hijackings had occurred, the FAA and the Department of Defense both attempted to respond to the threat. Unfortunately, their joint hijacking protocol did not contemplate a suicide hijacking. The FAA controllers followed normal operational procedures for the loss of radio contact with an aircraft and its transponder displays. They tried to contact first the aircraft, then the airlines, and finally other aircraft in the area. These actions, while in accordance with their procedures, resulted in the loss of precious time.
Once it was determined that the aircraft had not crashed, but rather were hijacked, the FAA sought the assistance of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). This required multiple levels of notification and approval. On September 11th, during all the confusion, the command structure was never clearly defined. Even once fighters were scrambled, they did not know where the aircraft were located. Moreover, the hijacking protocol in place at the time called for the military to provide “a fighter escort” five miles behind the hijacked aircraft. As the 9/11 Commission Report states, “NORAD and the FAA were unprepared for the type of attacks launched against the United States on September 11, 2001. They struggled, under difficult circumstances, to improvise a homeland defense against an unprecedented challenge they had never before encountered and had never trained to meet.”
Communication was confused and information was not shared across the Government. Even within the FAA, the four air traffic control centers and FAA Headquarters did not have the same information. Communication between the FAA and the military, the White House and other Government agencies was equally poor. The 9/11 Commission Report states, “As one witness recalled, “[It] was almost like there were parallel decision-making processes going on;…[In] my mind they were competing venues for command and control and decision-making.”
|
