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Issue Brief #11
September 4, 2001
Neglecting
Surface EW Will Not Sail
Since the introduction of the SS-N-2 Styx anti-ship missile, which was first
deployed in 1958, maritime forces have faced a growing threat that is low in
cost and dramatic in payoff to the forces deploying anti-ship missiles.
The 1967 sinking of the Israeli Destroyer Eilat north of Port Siad in the
Mediterranean Sea by two Egyptian missile boats, the 1982 destruction of the HMS
Sheffield in the Falklands by an Exocet missile fired from an Argentinean Super
Etendard aircraft, and the damage to the USS Stark in 1987 by two Exocets fired
by Iraqi Mirage aircraft have highlighted the vulnerability of high value ships
and crews to low cost and widely deployed anti-ship missiles.
The anti-ship missile has proven to be the best weapon for enhancing a nation's
naval firepower at a minimal cost. With many countries actively seeking
next-generation anti-ship missiles, our maritime forces continue to sail daily
into increasing danger. Those ships suitably equipped with electronic warfare (EW) have a unique capability for an early and effective non-lethal self defense
response to potential, developing and actual hostile action in an uncertain
threat environment, such as is particularly prevalent today. Electronic warfare
also provides an additional layer of defense working in conjunction with other
self-defense weapons systems.
With the advent of radar to conduct surveillance, targeting and missile terminal
homing, there has been a continuing response-counterresponse interaction between
the RF sensors designed for attack and the shipboard countermeasures designed to
deny or degrade them. Broadly these
countermeasures fall into four categories of EW: (1) detection, identification
and location of the radar source; (2) warning and situational awareness of the
threat’s intent to the self-defense combat system and decision makers; (3)
denial (through countermeasures) of the position of the potential targeted
platform; and (4), in the end game, deception of the missile itself through the
countermeasures’ repertoire of techniques.
The US Navy over the years has been
actively engaged in shipboard EW endeavors and has better equipped their ships
for self-defense. But since the early 1990s, the ability of ships to
detect/identify or to employ suitable countermeasures has significantly degraded
as a result of advanced threats, changes in fleet missions and operating
environments.
Dramatic gains in ship self defense weapons systems have been made, but
equivalent advances to existing shipboard countermeasures systems have not. Too
often, the capabilities have been left to erode. According to a July 2000,
General Accounting Office (GAO) report on ship self-defense, "Individual
ships must have an autonomous capability to defend themselves. In peacetime
presence or interdiction operations, individual ships are often required to
operate independently, without the protection of the layered defenses provided
by a battle group. Consequently, they must be able to rely on their own self-defense
capabilities.” While the GAO report correctly points out the importance of
EW in a self-protective role, even the layered role of a battle group demands a
significant and reliable EW capability. The FY 2001 Defense Appropriations
Conference Report also pointed out concern for the sustainment of shipboard EW
capability.
For a variety of reasons, investments in maintaining the prior proven
capabilities of EW systems have not kept pace with the changing threats to and
missions of the US Navy. Funding for modernization of existing systems has
suffered to the demands for new platforms and potential promises of next
generation systems. Yet, even the most ambitious notions for developing and
deploying new replacement systems will show that existing installed systems will
be the predominant protection system beyond 2015 and in the fleet beyond 2020.
Therefore, EW systems currently installed on surface combatants and critical
support ships will be the backbone for the Navy ’s force protection for the
near to mid term. Unfortunately, except for the introduction of a new off board
decoy on selected ships, virtually nothing has been done to improve shipboard EW
since the early 1990s.
While we have maintained the existing hardware through innovative depot
activities, sustainment of mission capability has seriously lagged. This
situation concerns me greatly. We are facing serious problems today with
obsolete parts and maintenance challenges that threaten the ability of the
systems to provide the self-defense required.
Since its earliest days, EW has been conducted with an ever-changing
response-counterresponse
environment due to the dynamic nature of changing missions, threats and the
environments in which they operate. In the past, we have kept pace with this
environment, but, sadly, this has not been the case for the last several years.
Currently deployed forces suffer with legacy EW systems that are in serious need
of upgrade to address these shortfalls against evolving threats and missions.
Unfortunately, the lack of modernization funding in prior year budgets will
soon, if not already, lead to unsupportable and inadequate systems to protect
our forces in current operations. I believe this situation has now reached a
critical stage and requires immediate attention.
The environment in which we operate
today is complex and uncertain. The escalation from peaceful operations to self-protection
is now measured in seconds. Although we are developing and deploying advanced
self-protection weapons, the critical role of EW in the weapons system
employment decision process cannot be overlooked. Electronic Warfare is vital in
providing the decisive edge in maritime self-defense, and its ability to
establish real time situational awareness, threat detection and classification
and early soft kill defensive response is the key to meeting the challenge of
the new generation of anti-ship cruise.
John N. Hostettler
Member of Congress
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202 225-2013 fax