Issue Brief #15
October 22, 2003

 ELINT/SIGINT  
Understanding the Foundation of Electronic Warfare

Over the past several years, a renewed emphasis has been placed on the value and necessity of electronic warfare (EW).  Yet, recent conflicts, including Operation Allied Force (OAF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), have highlighted U.S. deficiencies in EW capabilities that continue to go unaddressed.  This begs the question: if EW is so important, why doesn’t it receive the necessary attention from Capitol Hill and the Department of Defense when it comes time to prioritize and fund military programs?

There are a number of reasons, but foremost among them is the lack of understanding as to the comprehensive makeup of EW.  Too often, EW is narrowly defined to make it synonymous with electronic attack – blinding the enemy, including the use of radar or communications jamming.  This lends itself to a platform-centric definition of EW centered on aircraft, such as the EA-6B Prowler.  The Prowler is our military’s only dedicated radar jamming aircraft.  Its mission has been essential in recent conflicts as it has been “go-no-go” criterion for air strikes.  However, EW is much more than electronic attack.  There are two other elements of EW: electronic protection and EW support.  Electronic protection employs systems, countermeasures, decoys and stealth to defeat an enemy’s attack.  Electronic support, however, is the foundation of and the starting point for all EW

If electronic warfare is the control and manipulation of the electromagnetic spectrum, and the spectrum is the environment in which information, data, and energy lives, then the collection, interpretation and communication of this information enables the other elements of EW.  Central to the EW support mission are the military’s electronic intelligence (ELINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities.

While there is still much to learn as to how well our military completed the first phase of its mission, we do know that sending and receiving signals and communications continues to take major leaps forward.  We are only beginning to realize the revolutionary implications of the advances made in ELINT/SIGINT.  These advances include the ability to: (1) send and receive signals and communication real time; (2) listen and jam enemy communications; and (3) process and manipulate data through the use of sophisticated algorithms.  Advances in ELINT/SIGINT have raised the profile of vital assets, such as the RC 135 Rivet Joint, EP-3, RC-12 (Guardrail Common Senor), U-2, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and has positioned DoD to be a leader in ELINT/SIGINT operations.  Further, ELINT and SIGINT capabilities are enhanced by advances made in the networking our services.  This allows the military to leverage the strengths of each branch of the service to accomplish a mission while shielding the weaknesses from the enemy.

Unfortunately, ELINT/ SIGINT is generally overlooked when discussing the merits of EW.  Discussions of EW typically focus on the other two elements: electronic protection and electronic attack.  Without the value and necessity of EW support being articulated as the foundation of EW, it is difficult to effectively promote the other elements and understand the enormous value they have in accomplishing supremacy of a battlespace.

While ELINT/SIGINT is not solely EW, it must be seen, understood and communicated as part of the foundation of EW.  Until the services and Congress understand the comprehensive makeup of EW, it will always be subject to being overlooked, under funded, and underprovided.

Joseph R. Pitts
Member of Congress     

Electronic Warfare Working Group

Congressman Joe Pitts, Founder and Co-Chairman

420 Cannon House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515

202 225-2411 phone    202 225-2013 fax