Issue Brief #18
July 13, 2004

Protecting Commercial Aircraft:
No Silver Bullet to Defeat a Missile

It has been said that the goal of terrorists is to “kill a few, hurt many, and scare everyone.” Certainly, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 changed that theory slightly with the number of deaths, but the underlying principal is still true: terrorists want to scare us – to intimidate us.

It is no secret that terrorists hate America.  They hate freedom and they hate democracy.  We are their enemy and they want to defeat us.  They want to destroy our society, our economy, and our symbols.  This was the goal of 9/11.  But America responded and recovered.  The attack was devastating, but the terrorists’ goal was not accomplished.  So, they will try again.  Fortunately, since 9/11, America has been one step ahead and we must stay that way.  This means that we must readily respond to emerging threats and remedy existing vulnerabilities.

Facing us today is the threat of a man-portable, shoulder-fired missile (MANPAD) attack against our commercial aircraft.  It is a threat that we need to respond to because there is no margin for error.  A single attack against our commercial aircraft would have dire consequences.

To begin to tackle this pressing issue, we must first ask, why is there a MANPAD threat?  First, there is widespread proliferation of MANPAD systems.  There are 700,000 MANPADs produced worldwide and too many are in the hands of militia and terrorist groups.  They are readily bought and sold in the black market and depending upon the model can be purchased for as little as $1000.

Second, MANPADs are easy to use and easy to conceal. It takes very little time to teach a person to use one.  And, they can be easily assembled, taken apart, and transported, so that once it is fired, the terrorist can run and blend into society.  Already, approximately 30 civil aircraft have been attacked with MANPADS.  MANPAD attacks are easy to plan and execute. 

But why are the potential targets commercial aircraft?  True, there are many targets, but as the opening statement about the goal of terrorists implies, they want to attack on multiple levels.  Commercial aircraft are a primary target for this reason: they are an engine for our thriving economy and a symbol of our freedom.  Yet, commercial aircraft are vulnerable.  Their size, lack of maneuverability, and flight procedures, present many challenges to countering the MANPAD threat.  Further, airports are “soft targets:” typically located in urban settings, they have large geographical footprints, and are densely populated.

What should be our response to the MANPAD threat?  Above all, our response must be comprehensive.  There is no silver bullet, no single solution to this problem.  There are a number of mitigation options that must be considered and incorporated in our response.

The Department of Homeland Security is currently studying three leading proposals to equip our commercial aircraft fleet with a countermeasure system.  They are looking at both flare and laser-based options.  I believe there is room for both in our response.  Both have strengths and counter each other’s weaknesses.

In deciding how to move forward with such a system we must be sure to take into account a number of questions: What are the life-cycle costs for each option?  How many flight hours can a system go before maintenance is required? What is the process for equipping aircraft with countermeasures?  We must also identify and prioritize those aircraft that are more susceptible to attack and equip them first.  Further, can the countermeasure system be readily upgraded to meet emerging advanced MANPADs, such as laser-beam riders?  These systems are the next generation of MANPADs, and it is only a matter of time before they are in the hands of terrorists, unless we stop their proliferation.

But, even if we employ an effective, cost-efficient solution, we are still at risk.

Even if a terrorist launches a missile at an aircraft and the countermeasure system effectively defeats the threat, significant damage is still done.  Such an attempt would have a chilling effect on air travel and the toll on our economy, not just our commercial airline industry, could be devastating.  The terrorists will have succeeded in scaring.  We must make sure they don’t even have the opportunity to launch.  The countermeasure system should be the last line of defense, not the first.

There are other mitigation options that warrant consideration and incorporation into our response: reducing the infrared (IR) signature of commercial aircraft so that a missile has nothing on which to lock; improving arms control efforts to end the proliferation of the most threatening MANPAD systems; changing flight procedures to avoid predictable flight patterns; implementing neighborhood watch programs around vulnerable airports; and improving security in and around airports. 

In closing, the MANPAD threat is real and we must respond.  But we must be careful.  If we go for the quick solution and throw money at the problem, we play into the enemy’s hand.  In the coming weeks, the EW Working Group will take a closer look at our response – the countermeasure options that DHS is studying, as well as the other mitigation options mentioned above.  It is vitally important that we understand the scope of the threat and our response.

Joseph R. Pitts
Member of Congress

Electronic Warfare Working Group

Congressman Joe Pitts, Founder and Co-Chairman

420 Cannon House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515

202 225-2411 phone    202 225-2013 fax