Issue Brief #19
July 29, 2005

ICAP III: The Numbers Just Don’t Add Up

 One of the many success stories from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is the effectiveness and expanded role of the EA-6B Prowler.  Far from “going the way of the buggy whip industry,” which many in the defense community predicted a decade ago, electronic warfare (EW), and specifically the electronic attack mission of the Prowler, is seen as a core capability necessary for military superiority across the spectrum of conflict.  Warfighters, in the air or on the ground, want the protection and the offensive capability afforded by the Prowler.

 While the Prowler is flying in the face of its past critics, the reality is that it is reaching the end of its service life.  Further, the Prowler’s jamming suite, while sufficient to confront the current threat, is out-dated and insufficient against emerging air defense threats.  Enter the ICAP III upgrade for the Prowler, currently set for deployment in 2006, and the Navy’s plan for the next generation platform, the EA-18G, on schedule for 2009.  The ICAP III is a tremendous leap forward in capability over the existing ICAP II architecture.  It will improve the receiver system to provide for expanded frequency coverage, improved geo-location, increased interoperability and integrated communications jamming capability.  The EA-18G will provide a more flexible, agile and efficient platform to continue the Navy’s electronic attack mission for the next 20 years.

Unfortunately, there is a glaring problem: when you step back and look at the joint Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) requirement and the Services’ transition plans to meet that requirement, the Navy ICAP III buy is woefully inadequate and, like in a race, if you get off to a bad start, it’s all the more difficult cross the finish line first.

 The current plan for the Navy is to buy only 21 ICAP III systems, but only 14 of which are funded.  This is a low-water mark in a rapidly evaporating buy to meet a requirement that was as high as 62 systems only a little more than a year ago.  The ICAP III buy will begin to replace ICAP II Prowlers and provide the Navy just enough to bridge the gap until the EA-18G fleet is fully operational by 2012.  But the buy will dangerously limit, and consequently overtask, the number of ICAP III squadrons available.  Additionally, it will shortchange training, which will have a residual effect on EA-18G readiness.  Even if Congress finds the additional funding to cover one-third of the total ICAP III buy, that would cover, at most, five ICAP III squadrons.  Assuming the Navy needs one training squadron, that leaves only four squadrons to divide between workups and deployments – no doubt a logistical nightmare given current threat scenarios.  Clearly, there will have to be a continued heavy reliance on ICAP II Prowlers to meet global commitments for several more years.  But this is just the beginning of the problem. 

 The Navy currently supports Prowler expeditionary squadrons for the Air Force and the Marine Corps.  The Air Force will assume the AEA expeditionary mission in 2012 as it begins to implement its current plans for a B-52 Plus Family of Systems.  The B-52 variant, however, is not scheduled for deployment until 2014, which means that the Air Force will probably have to rely on the Prowler in some capacity until at least 2015.  The Marine Corps, however, has yet to endorse a plan for its follow-on support jamming platform, but will inherit Prowlers from the Navy as the EA-18G comes on line.  Unfortunately, the Marine Corps Prowler requirement will be about 31 aircraft, meaning that there will not be enough ICAP III Prowlers to meet even the Marine Corps requirement, let alone that of the Air Force.  Due to a number of factors, not the least of which is funding, the Expeditionary mission will need to rely on EA-6B Prowlers through 2015.

 In the end, it is likely that the Services will be operating EA-18Gs, ICAP III Prowlers, ICAP II Prowlers, a B-52 variant, and other manned and unmanned aircraft to meet the joint AEA requirement.  Furthermore, ICAP II is 1980’s technology that the Services will still be relying upon in 2015.  And, it is very likely that future adversaries will have advanced weapons that can easily overwhelm such outdated technology.  This is not what the Services have in mind when they talk about a “System of Systems.”

 What is the remedy?  The Department of Defense (DoD) and Congress must work together to significantly increase the buy of ICAP III .  Assuming that the Marine Corps will rely on the Prowler more heavily and for a longer time than the other Services, there should at least be enough ICAP III Prowlers to meet the Marine Corps requirement, once the Navy fully transitions to the EA-18G.  While this does not address the Air Force requirement, the Air Force has time and is in a position to speed up its plans for deploying a B-52 Plus Family of Systems that can mitigate the problem.  In short, if the Prowler must be in service beyond 2012, the fleet should comprise solely of ICAP III .

 This, of course, raises the issue of limited funding, let alone who pays, and some in Congress remain skeptical about the developmental progress of ICAP III , as referenced by H.R. 2863, FY 2006 Defense Appropriations Act, which passed the House or Representatives in May.  However, the delays are relatively minor and can be overcome with the right level of investment.  Cutting funding and the overall buy of the ICAP III only increases the per unit cost of the aircraft and interrupts production.  It is also important to remember that the fewer ICAP III Prowlers we have means the more ICAP II Prowlers remain in service, which will be much more expensive to operate and maintain.  Thus, cutting ICAP III funding does not necessarily save money and only degrades the capability with which we equip our warfighters.

Everyone agrees upon the importance of ICAP III and the centrality of AEA to military superiority.  That being said, it’s time for leadership from the top down to invest in the ICAP III program equal to its realized importance.  ICAP III in sufficient numbers will buy back battlespace, save lives, and improve our ability to combat any threat anywhere in the world.  It’s an equation that needs an answer greater than 14.

Joseph R. Pitts and Rick Larsen
Members of Congress
Co-Chairmen, Electronic Warfare Working Group

Electronic Warfare Working Group

Congressman Joe Pitts, Founder and Co-Chairman

420 Cannon House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515

202 225-2411 phone    202 225-2013 fax