Issue Brief #21
December 20, 2005
To B(52 SOJ) Or
Not To Be
The future of Air Force AEA is in
question, but it should not be
The year 2012 might seem a long way off to most people, but to the
defense community, it’s already here. We are already planning,
developing and acquiring assets and capabilities that are necessary to
ensure military superiority over future adversaries. That year also
marks an important milestone in electronic warfare as it is the
transition date for the Air Force to assume the electronic attack
expeditionary mission from the Navy, which has managed the mission for
the past decade.
By now, most defense experts will admit that retirement of the EF-111
had a significantly negative impact on an electronic attack mission that
today is highly valued. Furthermore, it is commonly accepted that
stealth technology, which was to replace the need for an electronic
attack capability, especially for the Air Force, has not been and will
not be capable on its own to defeat advanced threats already being
fielded by future adversaries.
With this in mind, our electronic attack mission is going to change
dramatically, but whether or not it’s for the better remains to be
seen. The Navy is already beginning to field EA-6B Prowlers with the
new ICAP III jamming suite, which is a critically important upgrade to
our electronic attack mission. The system also provides a baseline
capability for future electronic attack assets. In 2009 the Navy will
introduce EA-18 Growlers into its fleet with this new capability and
subsequently retire the Prowlers. The Air Force, which currently relies
on Navy Prowlers, will reclaim its stake in the electronic attack
mission in 2012 with what is commonly called a “B-52 Plus Family of
Systems,” the core of which is the B-52 Stand-Off Jammer (SOJ).
There are only two questions: Will the Air Force actually develop and
field the B-52 SOJ? And, if so, will the B-52 SOJ be operational by the
time we need it?
The evolving integrated air defense systems (IADS) of future
adversaries, including Iran and China, are more mobile, more lethal at
longer ranges and more difficult to overwhelm with current jamming
capabilities. The Air Force’s Family of Systems responds by employing
stand-off components, such as the B-52 SOJ to deny long range radar and
the EC-130 Compass Call to target enemy communications, and stand-in
components, such as the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV), the
Miniature Air-launched Decoy (MALD) and MALD-J, which provides a jamming
capability. The MALD and MALD-J will be carried aboard the B-52 SOJ, as
well. The Stand-off and Stand-in components will allow the Air Force to
disrupt the connectivity and integration of advanced IADS, allowing for
penetrating aircraft, such as the F-15, F-22, or Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
to defeat the IADS and obtain air superiority.
This sounds like a good operational concept, except that the future of
the B-52 SOJ (let alone some of the other assets) is anything but
guaranteed. There is little debate that stand-off jamming is vitally
important in defeating advanced IADS. Without disrupting IADS from
outside their range, you place the lives of warfighters at much greater
risk. We learned this in 1999 during Operation Allied Force. While the
IADS were much less sophisticated, the tactics employed by the IADS
highlighted the need for stand-off jamming to conduct suppression of
enemy air defenses (SEAD) operations. Unfortunately, we only had Navy
Prowlers and not enough of them. We are in much better shape today, but
the clock is ticking on these aging aircraft and we will certainly face
more advanced threats in years to come than today in Iraq or
Afghanistan. Therefore, we need a next generation electronic attack
capability. The decision the Air Force made regarding the retirement of
the EF-111 is in the past. What should concern decision-makers in the
defense community today, especially Congress, is that the Air Force may
be repeating history. Only this time, instead of deciding to get out of
the jamming mission, they may decide not to get back in – a decision
that would be equally if not more detrimental.
The Air Force, like the Department of Defense (DoD) in general, is
facing mounting budget constraints. However, given the clear need for a
robust airborne electronic attack capability, it’s alarming to hear that
the B-52 SOJ may be given the ax in the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR), especially without a clear alternative to substitute the
capability that the B-52 SOJ would bring to the table. If the B-52 SOJ
does not survive, what is the Air Force proposing to take its place?
Will the Air Force be committed to this alternative program and provide
the necessary funding? Or, is this decision going to further delay the
development and delivery of a stand-off jamming capability for the Air
Force? These questions must be asked because what the Air Force decides
to do will have an effect on Joint Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA)
capabilities. The Marine Corps, also currently using Navy Prowlers, is
already lagging behind in deciding a follow-on platform. The Navy,
which does have a plan, is basing its acquisition strategy on the
assumption that the other Services are going to take care of their
roles. If the Air Force decides to cancel the B-52 SOJ, without a
viable alternative ready to go, the Services will be faced with too few
electronic attack assets to effectively counter future adversaries.
Such a decision would be a major setback, not only for Air Force AEA,
but Joint AEA.
If the Air Force continues the B-52 SOJ program, or aggressively pursues
a viable alternative, the next question is when will this system be
operational? Current plans indicate that the SOJ variant will be
deployed as “early” as 2014, but current plans are already faced with
significant delays and it is highly unlikely to be ready before 2015.
It is hard to imagine an alternative program being introduced at this
stage and being fielded earlier. The problem, of course, is that the
advanced IADS referenced above will be operational by 2010. Thus, the
Air Force should dedicate funding and resources to it to ensure that its
“Family of Systems” is ready by no later than 2012. This is the
transition point at which time the Navy solely will have EA-18 Growlers,
the USMC will assume ICAP III Prowlers, and the Air Force assumes its
expeditionary mission. Our military cannot afford to face a significant
capability shortfall in countering future threats. The cost in lives
would be too great.
DoD and Congress cannot wait until 2010 to address the problems we know
will arise in 2010. We have to start addressing them today or we will
regret it. And, the next time, our adversaries will be much more
advanced than those we encountered in Operations Allied Force, Enduring
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. There is no question of what we need. The
question is, will we have it when we need it?
Joseph R. Pitts
Members of Congress
Co-Chairman, Electronic Warfare Working Group
Electronic Warfare Working Group
Congressman Joe Pitts, Founder and Co-Chairman
420 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
202 225-2411 phone 
202 225-2013 fax