Issue Brief #6
May 18, 2001

Protecting Self-Protection

From Vietnam to the Gulf War and, most recently, over the skies of Serbia and Kosovo, electronic warfare has played a key role in deceiving the enemy and, thus, protecting American aircraft and aircrews.  Electronic warfare can be most easily defined as the control and manipulation of the electro-magnetic spectrum (i.e. radar, radio, and infrared) during military operations.

Since the earliest introduction of radar into the air defense equation, there has been continuing interaction between electronic detection of combat aircraft and countermeasures designed to avoid being detected, tracked and targeted. Broadly, these countermeasures fall into three categories of electronic deception: standing off from the air battle and creating clutter on enemy radar screens to degrade detection and tracking of penetrating aircraft (stand-off jamming); deceiving an individual radar with a variety of countermeasure techniques utilized by a single penetrating combat aircraft (self-protection); and reducing the radar cross section of a penetrating airborne platform and combining that low observability with evasive tactics (stealth).

The United States has been actively engaged in each of these electronic warfare endeavors over the years, and has been suitably rewarded with increased combat effectiveness and reduced attrition.  But there is a cloud on the horizon.  Ironically, the success of these techniques and tactics has not led to the sustained investment needed to keep these systems on the cutting edge in the deadly game of measure and countermeasure.  This standoff jamming shortfall has led to an ongoing Analysis of Alternatives to determine cost-effective ways to maintain and enhance this needed capability in the future.

For a variety of reasons, our commitment to stealth technology has also been less than adequate.  Despite investing billions of dollars in R&D in aircraft low observability, the U.S. has only a few stealthy airframes to show for it. 

Because investments in standoff and stealth have not kept pace with our military requirements and operations tempo around the globe, it is more important than ever to maintain and improve the third leg of the EW triad: self-protection.  Even if proposals to expand the nation’s stealthy strike force take root, we are more than a decade away from bringing on line a robust fleet of long-range B-2s complemented by some stealthy air superiority and ground attack fighters. Therefore, self-protection jamming systems on our legacy fleet of fighter/attack aircraft, including the F-16, F-18, A-10 and F-15E, are likely to be critical in carrying out U.S. force projection in the near to mid-term.  I wish I could report that our effort on self-protection jammers was being managed more effectively than standoff and stealth.  Sadly, this is not the case.

We are facing serious problems with obsolete parts and maintenance challenges that threaten our aircraft’s ability to protect themselves in a hostile anti-air environment.  Electronic warfare is conducted within an ever-changing and increasingly challenging battlespace. As currently deployed air defense systems are upgraded and proliferated, an urgent need exists to sustain and improve these ECM pods. Unfortunately, the lack of funding to sustain, modernize and upgrade the U.S. inventory of self-protection pods will soon result in unsupportable systems and the inability of our air forces to conduct operations.  I believe this situation is critical and requires our immediate attention.  Therefore, I am encouraging my fellow members of the EW Working Group and the Congress at large to support these upgrades in the Fiscal Year 2002 budget and thus avert a pending operational shortfall in the self-protection systems of our most plentiful and valuable fighter aircraft.

Ask any bomber or fighter pilot and those who send them into combat -- suppressing enemy air defenses is critical to mission success and, although attention is now being directed toward long-term improvements in standoff and stealth, we are not investing adequately in the self-protection systems required by our legacy force to meet near-term power projection requirements. If those vital resources are not adequately and appropriately addressed within the next few budget cycles, our nation will lose the flexibility of sending F-16s and A-10s into combat.  If they are sent, they will do so without the protection of critical self-protection pods.

I hope the Defense Department’s “top-to-bottom” review currently underway in the Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment, the subsequent Quadrennial Defense Review and the ensuing congressional deliberation on the defense budget will restore Electronic Warfare programs in general, and self-protection jammers, in particular, to a rightful position of national priority.

Wayne T. Gilchrest
Member of Congress

Congressman Wayne T. Gilchrest is a member of the Congressional Electronic Warfare Working group, which serves as a resource for Members of Congress and the defense community to raise awareness of the importance of Electronic Warfare (EW) in our national defense and to ensure that critical shortfalls in US EW capabilities are adequately and appropriately addressed. He represents the Eastern Shore of Maryland, the Chesapeake Bay, Annapolis, and a portion of Baltimore City, Maryland.

Electronic Warfare Working Group

Congressman Joe Pitts, Founder and Co-Chairman

420 Cannon House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515

202 225-2411 phone    202 225-2013 fax