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Remarks by Congressman Mark Kirk With
the War on Terror, we are going to see how important Electronic Warfare (EW) is
in making sure that our American military wins. After
so many conflicts and so many victories, I am beginning to wonder why other
countries have not figured out the "EW factor" in making sure that
they, like us, have such an unbelievable ability to protect uniformed men and
women who are flying over the beach and into harm’s way. As the squadron Air
Intelligence Officer for VAQ-209 and as someone who has flown in EA-6B Prowlers,
let me just mention a couple of things that I wish we would have next time we go
into battle. As a new Member of the
House Armed Services Committee, I am getting my "sea legs in Congress"
and beginning to push for more EW upgrades. I
think probably the most critical thing that we really were missing while flying
against Serbia and Iraq was the ability to update aircrews inbound to their
targets on the changing threat. The
mission from Aviano Air Base in Italy to Kosovo or from Incirlik Air Base in
Turkey into Iraq took two hours or more. The
situation could change fairly radically given the presence of mobile
Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs). In
the Iraqi situation, Saddam's SAMs did not move around much but in Kosovo enemy
SAMs moved constantly. My favorite
opponent was the Serbian SA-6 operator located outside of Ponikve, Serbia. I
called him "Slavko the Destroyer" as he was extremely mobile. He was
moving about every two days and that was making our tactical situation very
difficult. On
one mission, Woody (our best pilot) had been told that the Ponikve SA-6 was far
to his east. It wasn’t. Woody
flew right through the middle of the SA-6 threat ring and ate two four packs of
SA-6 missiles. He dodged eight SA-6 missiles in just one engagement.
It was a fine piece of flying but I wish I had been able to alert him on
Slavko's updated location -- preventing the whole engagement.
I learned of the change as Woody was inbound to his target.
Slavo had broadcast a short burst at a new location to calibrate his
equipment. Our theater sensors delivered the new location to me through our MAT
antenna back at the squadron. It
showed Slavko's new position but there was no way to tell Woody once his mission
began. I could not give him the
updated threat picture. I hope that
we can update the Prowler to give threat updates to the crew who are already
inbound to their targets. This
would make us more effective and would help save lives.
I
must say the national EW sensor systems missed a lot, especially outside of
Pristina. There was one battery that the national systems never saw. As you
know, the Prowler’s ability to collect intelligence is limited.
But we were the only ones who were able to sniff out that SAM battery.
It was dangerous right up until an allied AGM-130 television-guided bomb
went through the door of the radar van. I
would hope that as we upgrade the national collection systems and make sure
updates go into the cockpit that we also make sure that things the aircrew sees
will feed back into the theater threat picture.
This is a priority and when we do this, we will have a much higher chance
to locate newer low-wattage threat emissions. On
situational awareness in the cockpit, I flew one EC-130 "Compass Call"
mission and drooled all over their display panels and their ability to
dynamically respond to what was happening.
For those not familiar with the Prowler cockpit, it is the old, late
1970’s flat monochrome green screen as opposed to the festival of colors that
you see on Compass Call. Compass Call's threat display and sensors give the
operator the ability to dynamically respond to the threat and I know that the
Prowler ICAP-III program will help provide that to tactical aircrews in the
future. This, too, is a priority
especially if you are going up against more capable systems like the SA-10 SAM.
SA-20s now in production in Russia are even more capable. The
last big need is to upgrade the High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM).
The HARM turned out to be a weapon that was designed especially for the
Serbs and somewhat for the Iraqis. The
moment HARM was fired, the enemy "respected it" -- they turned off
their radars and gave us a good "soft kill."
We all like "hard kills" i.e. colorful explosions destroying
the target but a "soft kill" i.e., rendering the enemy ineffective
just as you approach him is almost as good. We obviously we would like the enemy
air defense batteries to "eat" a HARM missile but the whole point of
our mission was to get the enemy to turn off their radars as the strike package
aircrews approached the threat envelope. We
certainly got that. Nevertheless,
one of the things that you like to have after a mission -- the "Aviano
Electronic Attack Wing" flew 770 missions - is the ability to tell
commanders how many threat radars we killed.
Our answer was always, “Don’t know, probably none.”
Each mission resulted in a soft kill.
Upgrading HARM to zero in on a radar even after it is turned off may give
us both soft and hard kills next time.
For
those looking at the current campaign, I have seen the SAM threat picture for
Afghanistan. It is not very
daunting and we may let our guard down on EW because of that. Only lower-grade SAM systems are there. But when you look at
the SA-10s and SA-20s in countries the War on Terror may take us to, aircrews
face a fearsome threat. We must
maintain the ability to master new enemy air defense systems. We
learned on September 11th that the intelligence picture we saw -- of a dangerous
world -- was accurate. Unfortunately,
we ignored it. If we are to
continue the War on Terror, allied aircrews will face very robust, advanced
surface-to-air missile systems. U.S.
and allied forces need to be able to handle them.
One of my deputies in Kosovo was killed in the Pentagon.
My other deputy luckily was not. One
of the things we were planning before the hit on the Pentagon was a brief on
these new advanced SAM systems. I
think Members of Congress need to see the capability of these new threats to
allied aircrews and especially their real ability to burn through our current
jamming. I
am very worried about these new systems. I
know that the Kosovo campaign would have shifted radically had advanced SA-10
SAMs ever shown up in theater. As the squadron's Intelligence Officer, I was
asked one question each morning: where are the SA-10s and have the Russians
delivered them to Serbia or not? That
would have radically changed the situation.
For the future, we have got to plan on facing such fearsome SAM batteries
in the next conflict. Over
the long term, we have to replace the Prowler.
An Analysis of Alternatives is underway at the Pentagon.
I have a pretty model of a F-18G “Growler” on the desk.
I am not pre-judging anything but a successor is needed.
The only thing I will pre-judge is that we have got to upgrade.
Just because other militaries are not investing in EW does not mean that
we should not continue to advance. Among
American aircrews from Aviano to Incirlik, tactical EW support aircraft are
critical “go/no-go” items. In
short -- no Prowler, no mission.
In
Operation Allied Force, the assumption was aerial tanking aircraft availability
was the key factor limiting allied sorties against Serbia.
It turned out not to be. It was available tactical EW aircraft.
After we lost an initial aircraft in Allied Force, we got a memo which my
squadron framed. On it, LT General
Short -- the aerial commander of Allied Force -- basically said “Thou shalt
not enter my theater of war without thy Prowler attached.”
That was a key sign of how valuable these assets are. As
we look to the future, information upgrades in the cockpit, better situational
awareness, and better HARM missiles are the priorities.
We will need a whole new advanced generation of EW assets because the
United States is clearly ahead and we need to stay there.
EW is one of the key reasons why we do not lose people or planes. When
you talk to British aircrews, they will tell you they are so happy that American
Prowlers were there. They know that
American EW aircraft make the difference between getting hit and not, between
losing brave pilots or bringing them home. |
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Electronic Warfare Working Group Congressman Joe Pitts, Founder and Chairman 420 Cannon House Office Building Washington, DC 20515 202 225-2411 phone |