Statement
of Congressman Joseph R. Pitts
Lexington
Institute Forum on Electronic Warfare
October
5, 2001
Good morning.
I want to thank the Lexington Institute for sponsoring this
important forum on electronic warfare, or EW.
The Lexington Institute is a leader in public policy, especially defense,
and they have been an invaluable partner in the Electronic Warfare Working Group
that I founded and co-chair.
The timing for this forum could not be more appropriate.
We all watched with horror the terrorist attacks that took place on
September 11. This tragedy changed
America; it changed the world; and I believe it will change history.
As we carry out the war on terrorism, as we draw battle
plans and form alliances, we realize we face an elusive enemy and a complex
network of terrorist organizations and resources. And, we really do not know how this war will look six months,
a year, five years from now. In
other words, we have to be ready for anything, anywhere.
So, what does this have to do with EW?
It is my firm belief that our military must have a robust EW capability
to ensure that it has access to and control of any battle space in which it must
operate. We need EW to win
effectively and efficiently this war on terrorism.
As most of you know, the definition of EW is broad and
vague. But essentially, it is the
control and manipulation of the electromagnetic spectrum and the ability to deny
its use by the enemy. One of our
most recognizable EW assets is the EA-6B Prowler, our only dedicated
support-jamming platform, but EW is much more than that.
It encompasses jamming, stealth, self-protection, electronic intelligence
(ELINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT).
EW is invaluable for air superiority and for the suppression and/or
destruction of enemy air defenses.
History has taught us that dominance in electronic warfare
leads to success in military operations. Unfortunately,
it has also taught us that we tend to forget about EW in peacetime and
unnecessarily place the lives of our service men and women in harm’s way.
As an Air Force Captain and EW officer, I served three tours of duty in
Vietnam where I flew 116 combat missions onboard B-52s.
I know first-hand the value of EW, the protection it provides our armed
forces, and the edge it gives us over our adversaries.
During the Vietnam War, our forces were forced to play a game of catch up
-- a game we cannot afford to play again.
Today, our military is at a critical juncture.
After a decade of careless and shortsighted cuts in our defense, we now
face the transformation policy of a new administration, a new – and
unanticipated – war on terrorism, a reevaluation of our current military
commitments around the world, and the need to continue our global presence.
With this in mind, I want to briefly touch on some key
issues I believe are essential in achieving the goal of ensuring a robust and
dominant EW capability. This will
not be an exhaustive list, but I hope that it will spur on further discussion.
I also want to touch on what role I believe EW will play on the war on
terrorism.
First, we need to do a better job of balancing our
investment in the major areas of EW: support jamming, self-protection, and EW
support. Balance means providing
the necessary resources to ensure that each layer of EW adequately meets
operational goals and requirements, both for today and the future.
Each time America has fought an air campaign adversaries learned new ways
of coping with our EW methods, forcing the Pentagon to come up with more clever
electronic countermeasures. We must
be prepared for whatever tactics and technology our adversaries throw at us.
Properly balancing investment in a multi-layered EW strategy will offer
our forces greater protection and save lives.
Second, we need to dedicate ourselves to the research,
development, and production of advanced EW technology.
As you know, technology is rapidly advancing and to ensure a robust EW
capability, we must keep up with the curve.
It concerns me when I hear discussion of upgrades that would replace
1970s technology with late 1980s/early 1990s technology.
We must replace it with 2001 technology.
Technology advances rapidly, but development, testing, and production in
the DoD moves, often times, at a snails pace.
Congress and DoD share the burden for this.
For too long EW has lived off of congressional plus-ups through the
appropriations process. This makes
it extremely difficult to map out the future of EW when you don’t know from
year to year whether the money will be there – and too often it isn’t.
While DoD must improve its effort to fund critical EW programs in its
initial budget request, Congress must do a better job at understanding the
importance of EW and working with DoD to develop an EW roadmap to which we in
the defense community are committed.
Third, we need to streamline our EW programs and
management. I have mentioned this
before and stand committed to the idea of establishing a joint EW office to
coordinate and fund critical EW programs. EW
is not simply the responsibility of one service.
It is not about access to the battle space for only the Navy or the Air
Force, but rather our entire military. The services need to work together to
identify cross-service EW priorities that will unite each of their strengths and
address each of their weaknesses. The
joint EW office would provide a single “belly-button” stream for funding EW
programs.
Finally, we need to improve joint training in EW.
We should not pursue Navy EW, Air Force EW, and Army EW separately.
We should look at EW as a joint requirement and train that way –
allowing the services to work and train together for the common goal of access
to and control of any battle space. Trust
me, as an Air Force veteran, this is not always easy to swallow, but it is what
we need to do today. Further, in
our joint training we must improve what we train against.
In other words, we need to provide the opportunity for our forces to
train against more advanced foreign military equipment.
We must train together against the best out there to ensure that we are
ready for anything.
These are simply a few key issues, but there are many more
areas that need to be addressed. We
need to expand and improve our EW capabilities. We need to be prepared to fight wherever, whenever, and
against whomever.
This is the case as we begin the war on terrorism.
I want to make a few brief observations on what role I believe EW will
play in any military action in South Asia.
It appears that the U.S. and allied forces will face a
minimal air-to-air threat. The
primary threat will come from air defense systems.
The Taliban’s air defense systems are not as advanced as those we faced
in Iraq or Serbia; however, we must be prepared for IR guided, man-portable SAMs.
Therefore, we need to ramp up self-protection countermeasures, such as RF
towed decoys, IR countermeasures, and covert materials decoys.
This is especially important in protecting our large aircraft, such as
C-130s. The Large Aircraft
Infra-Red Counter-Measure (LAIRCM) program and the next generation system that
will provide the aircraft with a closed-loop infrared countermeasures capability
are extremely important. I commend
to your attention a recent EW Working Group issue brief on these programs
provided by my colleague Rep. Tom Sawyer.
Further, our air forces do not have adequate missile
warning systems. This needs to be
address immediately. Communications
jamming will also play an important role. While
the Taliban may not have an advanced integrated air defense system, they do have
a communications network that we will need to disrupt.
Finally, I would be remised if I did not mention that,
again, the Prowler will be heavily tasked.
Recent reports indicate that the Prowler still faces significant
shortfalls in maintenance. It also
needs various upgrades to its jamming suite, its radar, it needs an automatic
flight control system, and the list goes. Unfortunately,
this has been the same list for several years.
This is why I have established the Electronic Warfare
Working Group. I want to provide a
resource to Members of Congress and the defense community at-large, so that EW
is properly understood and priorities and shortfalls are addressed.
The Working Group is here to help relay the message about
the importance of EW in maintaining military superiority.
We do not seek to advocate one program over another, but inform the
defense community about the options before them and push EW into the center of
the debate.
I am pleased to be working with so many in the defense
community who are dedicated to EW and Members of Congress who are interested in
learning more about the need to advance EW priorities.
In fact, another co-chair of the Working Group, Congressman Mark Kirk,
will be addressing you shortly. His
expertise in EW has been invaluable and his leadership is needed.
Again, I want to again thank the Lexington Institute for convening this forum. And I look forward to continuing our effort rebuilding of America’s EW capabilities.
Electronic Warfare Working Group
Congressman Joe Pitts, Founder and Chairman
420 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
202 225-2411 phone 
202 225-2013 fax