Written
Statement of Congressman Joseph R. Pitts
Prepared
for the
October
28-31, 2001
Omni
Shoreham Hotel, Washington, DC
Good afternoon.
I want to thank the Association of Old
Crows for sponsoring this important event on electronic warfare.
Over the past two years, it has been a pleasure to work with AOC to raise
awareness of and support for EW on Capitol Hill.
The timing for this symposium could not
be more appropriate. With the war
on terrorism currently underway in South Asia, the need for EW to enable and
protect our armed forces is once again on the front burner – as it has been
with any military conflict since the invention of the radar.
This afternoon I want to talk about what
the EW Working Group is, what we are doing to raise awareness of EW on Capitol
Hill, and briefly mention a few priorities that I believe Congress and the
defense community should embrace to ensure that our military has a robust EW
capability that will enable it to have access to and control of any battle space
in which it must operate.
About two years ago, I decided to form
the EW Working Group following a series of hearings on Kosovo Lessons Learned
before the House Armed Services Committee.
The topics that all the witnesses kept coming back to was the heavy
tasking of the Prowler, the need for EW, especially support jamming, and the
need for suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD).
Since that time, we have worked to build a coalition between Members of
Congress, the defense industry, DoD, and organizations like the AOC and the
Lexington Institute, to raise awareness and understanding of EW, and both
identify and address EW shortfalls.
The Working Group is not just another House caucus or task force. To fulfill our number one goal in raising awareness of EW, the Working Group is more or less a forum where we allow members to voice their concerns about or support for EW programs and policies.
We currently have about 25 members in
the Working Group. To measure our
success, though, you have to look beyond the raw number of members. When we first began, we had four members who were interested
in EW, each of them co-chairs: John Spratt, Duke Cunningham, Norm Dicks, and
myself. Today, we have about 15
Members who are active in the Working Group in various capacities. We have an ongoing education effort that reaches out to
Members who are interested in EW. This
is an effort that builds year upon year. To
those in the defense industries, we rely on you to help us identify Members who
have EW programs in their district. We
need your help to bring them in and help them be an active part of the Working
Group. I am confident that if we
stay on course, the Working Group will continue to grow and be a respected,
clear, and undeniable voice for EW.
How do we do this?
There are a number of ways. This
past year we have been circulating issue briefs on various EW topics.
Some of which have raised a few eyebrows.
That is our goal: you don’t have to agree with everything we circulate,
but you have to pay attention to it and be willing to engage us on it.
This is how we raise awareness – by encouraging dialogue and debating
ideas. We also hold a number of
briefings by both the defense industries and DoD.
If there is a subject that you want us to know about, contact me, and
we’ll try to set up of a briefing. Further,
we have circulated letters in support of funding for various defense programs.
And, we have had several staff delegation trips to see DoD and industry
at work in EW. EW, without a doubt,
is something you need to see to believe. You
can read all the manuals you want, but until you see it at work, it is hard to
grasp.
Why is the Working Group so important?
EW suffers from a major public relations problem.
First, it is not a glamorous topic.
It doesn’t have a real tangible quality to it that other defense
programs have. We are talking about the control and manipulation of the
electromagnetic spectrum – not something that can be seen with the naked eye
or touched with the hand. Therefore,
we have to break it down and make it easily understandable.
There is nothing that will make a Member of Congress lose interest
quicker than an explanation that takes too long.
The Working Group takes the concepts and terminologies and breaks them
down to something that can be quickly grasped.
We make EW less intimidating.
Second, EW is often a highly classified
subject. This makes access
difficult. I’ve often said that a
top-secret briefing is no different from unclassified briefing, except that you
have the opportunity to ask the right questions.
The Working Group helps ensure the right questions are asked.
And, we will pursue the answers.
Third, EW programs are spread throughout
and buried within other defense programs. Therefore,
it is not easily identifiable when reviewing defense programs, and it is often
overlooked or simply ignored. We
want to help identify EW and help Members know where to look.
In my remaining time, I want briefly
touch on some key issues that I believe are essential in achieving the goal of
ensuring a robust and dominant EW capability.
This will not be an exhaustive list, but I hope that it will spur on
further discussion.
First, we need to do a better job of
balancing our investment in the major areas of EW: support jamming,
self-protection, and EW support. Balance
means providing the necessary resources to ensure that each layer of EW
adequately meets operational goals and requirements, both for today and the
future. Each time America has
fought an air campaign adversaries learned new ways of coping with our EW
methods, forcing the Pentagon to come up with more clever electronic
countermeasures. We must be
prepared for whatever tactics and technology our adversaries throw at us.
Properly balancing investment in a multi-layered EW strategy will offer
our forces greater protection and save lives.
Second, we need to dedicate ourselves to
the research, development, and production of advanced EW technology.
Not only must we identify EW shortfalls, but we must also look into the
future, know what capabilities we may need, and dedicate ourselves to meeting
those needs in a timely manner that keeps pace with technology.
We must keep up the technology curve.
It concerns me when I hear discussion of upgrades that would replace
1970s technology with late 1980s/early 1990s technology in 2001.
We must replace it with 2001 technology. Unfortunately, while technology advances rapidly,
development, testing, and production in the DoD moves, often times, at a snails
pace. Congress and DoD share the
burden for this. Further, for too
long EW has lived off of congressional plus-ups through the appropriations
process. This makes it extremely
difficult to map out the future of EW when you don’t know from year to year
whether the money will be there – and too often it isn’t.
While DoD must improve its effort to fund critical EW programs in its
initial budget request, Congress must do a better job at understanding the
importance of EW and working with DoD to develop an EW roadmap to which we in
the defense community are committed.
Third, we need to streamline our EW
programs and management. Congressman
Pitts has mentioned this before and stands committed to the idea of establishing
a joint EW office to coordinate and fund critical EW programs.
EW is not simply the responsibility of one service.
It is not about access to the battle space for only the Navy or the Air
Force, but rather our entire military. The services need to work together to
identify cross-service EW priorities that will unite each of their strengths and
address each of their weaknesses. The
joint EW office would also provide a single “belly-button” stream for
funding EW programs.
Fourth, we need to improve joint
training in EW. We should not
pursue Navy EW, Air Force EW, and Army EW separately.
We should look at EW as a joint requirement and train that way –
allowing the services to work and train together for the common goal of access
to and control of any battle space. Further,
in our joint training we must improve what we train against.
In other words, we need to provide the opportunity for our forces to
train against more advanced foreign military equipment.
We must train together against the best out there to ensure that we are
ready for anything.
Fifth, I would be remised if I did not
mention that, again, the Prowler is being heavily tasked.
Recent reports indicate that the Prowler still faces significant
shortfalls in maintenance, including its center wing section.
It also needs various upgrades to its jamming suite, its radar, it needs
an automatic flight control system, and the list goes.
Unfortunately, this has been the same list for several years.
It is about time that the Navy, DoD, and Congress get on the same page
and address these needs this year. We
continually hear about the importance of the Prowler, how it is “go-no-go”
criterion for our air forces, yet each year the budget comes out, we ignore it.
This is unacceptable.
Finally,
last week, the preliminary report of the Analysis of Alternatives was completed.
While I have not seen it, the word on the street is that the Growler
option is the front-runner. This is
no surprise to me. The Growler has
many strong points, including the fact that we already have the platform in the
F-18. But, I’ve often felt that
the AoA was in many ways a ceremonial gesture to crown the Growler as the next
follow-on support jammer. Now, I do
not want sound critical of those who are conducting the AoA. I know they are working hard and I know they are studying the
options presented to them. But,
there are other factors at work that complicate the decision-making process.
If the Growler is the best, most viable option, I can support it, but
I don't think we should rush to judgment that the Growler is the right choice.
We must decide on an option that is cost-effective, able to incorporate
advanced EW technologies, is versatile, able to be delivered quickly, and is
available to both the AF and the Navy.
These are simply a few key issues, but
there are many more areas that need to be addressed.
We need to continue to expand and improve our EW capabilities.
We need to be prepared to fight wherever, whenever, and against whomever.
History has taught us that dominance in electronic warfare leads to
success in military operations. Unfortunately,
it has also taught us that we tend to forget about EW in peacetime and
unnecessarily place the lives of our service men and women in harm’s way.
This is why the EW Working Group was
established: to provide a resource to Members of Congress and the defense
community at-large, so that EW is properly understood and priorities and
shortfalls are addressed. The Working Group is here to help relay the message
about the importance of EW in maintaining military superiority.
Again, I want to thank the AOC for sponsoring this symposium.
Electronic Warfare Working Group
Congressman Joe Pitts, Founder and Chairman
420 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
202 225-2411 phone 
202 225-2013 fax