Congressional EW Working Group Questions AF Approach to the Future

By K. Chaisson,
Washington Editor, Forecast International
December 29, 2005
 

In a December Issue Brief, Congressman Joe Pitts (R-Pa.), Co-Chair of the House Electronic Warfare Working Group, raised serious questions about the USAF's motivation to truly prepare for the future of electronic warfare. Pitts noted that 2012 is the year when the Air Force is to assume the electronic attack expeditionary mission from the Navy, which has managed the mission for the past decade. The paper questioned whether or not the Air Force is truly motivated and ready to support this change, given the increasingly tight budget climate faced by everyone in the Department of Defense. It is now well accepted the Air Force assumed that stealth technology would make electronic attack unnecessary, or at least secondary. This promoted Air Force decision-makers to retire the EF-111A, the service's only electronic attack aircraft, in 1996. But, the paper points out, "Retirement of the EF-111 had a significantly negative impact on an electronic attack mission that today is highly valued. Furthermore, it is commonly accepted that stealth technology, which was to replace the need for an electronic attack capability, especially for the Air Force, has not been and will not be capable on its own of defeating advanced threats already being fielded by future adversaries." Experts agree that the electronic attack mission is going to change dramatically. The Navy is beginning to field EA-6B Prowlers with the new ICAP III jamming suite, a critically important upgrade to the electronic attack mission. The ICAP III system also provides a baseline capability for future electronic attack assets, such as the EA-18 Growlers the Navy plans to introduce into its fleet in 2009. With this new capability fielded, the Navy will begin to retire its long-in-the-tooth Prowlers. The Air Force, which currently relies on Navy Prowlers, will reclaim its stake in the electronic attack mission in 2012 with what is commonly called a "B-52 Plus Family of Systems." The core of this is the B-52 Stand-Off Jammer (SOJ), recently identified as an Air Force requirement. Congressman Pitts raises two questions: "Will the Air Force actually develop and field the B-52 SOJ? And, if so, will the B-52 SOJ be operational by the time we need it?" The evolving integrated air defense systems (IADS) of future adversaries have become more mobile, more lethal at longer ranges, and more difficult to overwhelm with current jamming capabilities. The Air Force's Family of Systems plan is to respond by employing stand-off components, such as the B-52 SOJ, to deny long-range radars the ability to detect attackers, and the EC-130 Compass Call to target enemy communications. The plan, as described during the recent AOC 2005 International EW Conference, also includes stand-in components, such as the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV), the Miniature Air-Launched Decoy (MALD), and MALD-J, which provides a jamming capability. The MALD and MALD-J will be carried aboard the B-52 SOJ. The Stand-off and Stand-in components will theoretically allow the Air Force to disrupt the connectivity and integration of advanced IADS, allowing for penetrating aircraft, such as the F-15, F-22A, or Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), to defeat the IADS and obtain air superiority. Pitts, a former B-52 Electronic Warfare Officer, notes that "this sounds like a good operational concept, except that the future of the B-52 SOJ (let alone some of the other assets) is anything but guaranteed. There is little debate that stand-off jamming is vitally important in defeating advanced IADS. Without disrupting IADS from outside their range, you place the lives of warfighters at much greater risk. We learned this in 1999 during Operation Allied Force. While the IADS were much less sophisticated, the tactics employed by the IADS highlighted the need for stand-off jamming to conduct suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) operations. Unfortunately, we only had Navy Prowlers and not enough of them. We are in much better shape today, but the clock is ticking on these aging aircraft and we will certainly face more advanced threats in years to come than today in Iraq or Afghanistan. Therefore, we need a next-generation electronic attack capability. The decision the Air Force made regarding the retirement of the EF-111 is in the past. What should concern decision-makers in the defense community today, especially Congress, is that the Air Force may be repeating history. Only this time, instead of deciding to get out of the jamming mission, they may decide not to get back in - a decision that would be equally if not more detrimental." The Air Force, like the DoD in general, is facing mounting budget constraints. The Issue Brief expressed concern that the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) or the FY07 budget request would kill the program without a clear alternative to substitute the capability that the B-52 SOJ would bring to the table. "If the B-52 SOJ does not survive, what is the Air Force proposing to take its place?" Pitts asked. "Will the Air Force be committed to an alternative program and provide the necessary funding? Or, is this decision going to further delay the development and delivery of a stand-off jamming capability for the Air Force? These questions must be asked because what the Air Force decides to do will have an effect on Joint Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) capabilities." The paper notes that the Marine Corps, currently using Navy Prowlers, is already lagging behind in deciding a follow-on platform. The Navy, which does have a plan, is basing its acquisition strategy on the assumption that the other services are going to take care of their roles. If the Air Force decides to cancel the B-52 SOJ without a viable alternative ready to go, the services will again be faced with too few electronic attack assets to effectively counter future adversaries. Such a decision would be a major setback, not only for Air Force AEA, but Joint AEA. If the Air Force continues the B-52 SOJ program, or aggressively pursues a viable alternative, the next question is, when will this system be operational? Current plans indicate that the SOJ variant will be deployed as early as 2014, but current plans are already facing significant delays and it is highly unlikely to be ready before 2015. Having to develop an alternative program will delay fielding even more. This is a problem because the advanced IADS being developed by potential adversaries will be operational by 2010. "Thus, the Air Force should dedicate funding and resources to ensure that its 'Family of Systems' is ready by no later than 2012," Pitts recommended. "This is the transition point at which time the Navy solely will have EA-18 Growlers, the USMC will assume ICAP III Prowlers, and the Air Force assumes its expeditionary mission. Our military cannot afford to face a significant capability shortfall in countering future threats. The cost in lives would be too great. "DoD and Congress cannot wait until 2010 to address the problems we know will arise in 2010. We have to start addressing them today or we will regret it. And the next time, our adversaries will be much more advanced than those we encountered in Operations Allied Force, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. There is no question of what we need. The question is, will we have it when we need it?" The Electronic Warfare Working Group was founded by Congressman Pitts as a way of raising electronic warfare issues for members, educating them on the technology and tactics involved, and advocating for progress in an often misunderstood and ignored area.

Electronic Warfare Working Group

Congressman Joe Pitts, Founder and Chairman

420 Cannon House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515

202 225-2411 phone    202 225-2013 fax