Colloquy and Floor Speech - July 22, 2004

U.S. - Morocco Free Trade Agreement

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Pitts) for the purpose of engaging in a colloquy.

Mr. PITTS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the gentleman from California (Chairman Thomas) as well for his leadership on the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement. I am a free trader and believe that free trade helps our Nation and the nations of the world. However, I am deeply concerned about the issue of Western Sahara, and I have had concerns that the U.S. needed to make clear that this free trade agreement covers only the internationally- and the U.S.-recognized borders of Morocco and does not include the disputed territory of Western Sahara. It is my understanding that the language in the conference report makes clear that the free trade agreement does not cover resources, goods, services, or any other entity related to trade that originates in Western Sahara.

I would ask the gentleman, does the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement cover trade with the disputed territory of Western Sahara?

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PITTS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. CRANE. The Committee on Ways and Means' report states the clear coverage of the free trade agreement. ``The committee notes that the FTA will cover trade with and investment in the territory of Morocco as recognized by the United States, which does not include the Western Sahara.''

Mr. PITTS. I thank the chairman for that clarification.

The following is a letter from USTR making clear that we do not support Morocco's claim over the Western Sahara and the FTA does not recognize or include the Western Sahara. (click here to read in .pdf)

Executive Office of the President, the United States Trade Representative,

Washington, DC, July 20, 2004.
Hon. JOSEPH R. PITTS,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN PITTS: Thank you for your letter of July 19, 2004, concerning our Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Morocco and the status of Western Sahara.

The Administration's position on Western Sahara is clear: sovereignty of Western Sahara is in dispute, and the United States fully supports the United Nations' effort to resolve this issue. The United States and many other countries do not recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and have consistently urged the parties to work with the United Nations to resolve the conflict by peaceful means.

The FTA will cover trade and investment in the territory of Morocco as recognized internationally, and will not include Western Sahara. As our Harmonized Tariff Schedule makes clear, for U.S. Customs purposes, the United States treats imports from Western Sahara and Morocco differently. Nothing in the FTA will require us to change this practice. The Administration will draft the proclamation authorized in the legislation implementing the FTA (H.R. 4842) to provide preferential tariff treatment for goods from the territory of Morocco. Preferential tariff treatment will not be provided to goods from Western Sahara.

I hope this letter addresses your question regarding the FTA and the status of Western Sahara. I encourage you to support the FTA. It will create economic opportunities for U.S. manufacturing and service firms, workers, and farmers, and will support economic reforms and foreign investment in Morocco.

Thank you again for your letter. Please feel free to contact me should you have further questions.

Sincerely,
ROBERT B. ZOELLICK.

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Pitts).

Mr. PITTS. Mr. Speaker, thank you for your leadership.

While trade is a vital component to strengthening with the greater Middle East, promoting the spread of democracy is even more so. The Sahrawi are a peaceful pro-Western, pro-democracy people. They want the international community, including the U.N. Security Council and the United States, to uphold its commitment to a free and transparent referendum for self-determination, and it is unacceptable that Morocco has been allowed to prevent that vote from taking place.

During his tenure the former Secretary of State Baker proposed a plan that both parties accepted at first, and the Moroccans accepted the plan, but as soon as the people of Western Sahara accepted they withdrew their support, and I am deeply concerned that the Moroccan government, as patterned, will use this agreement with help from friends in France and others to attempt to increase its exploitation of the resources.

I just want to clarify the statement about the people of Western Sahara. Earlier today someone said that the Sahrawis are terrorists. I take exception to this remark, as the people of Western Sahara, and like many others in North Africa and the Middle East, have actually tried to peacefully solve the conflict. The State Department does not consider the people of Western Sahara to be terrorists. It is a misstatement. It is wrong. It is unproductive in our fight against terrorism to suggest that they are, and our own State Department does not believe the people of Western Sahara are terrorists.

Secondly, I visited there. I visited the refugee camps. I know the people. They are not terrorists. Members of this House should go to the refugee camps. They should see the terrible malnutrition of the people, the lack of health care, the refugee camps. If they would visit the refugee camps they would know that the information fed to them by supporters is inaccurate.

Mr. Chairman, I am voting for the FTA because there is protection for the people and resources of Western Sahara and because I believe the free trade will help the people of Morocco and those of surrounding countries.

The following is a series of items that would make clear that this agreement should not be abused by Morocco to profit off of land that it has no legitimate claim to.

   Western Sahara--Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975

    INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

   In its Advisory Opinion which the General Assembly of the United Nations had requested on two questions concerning Western Sahara, the Court,

   With regard to Question I, ``Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?'',

   --decided by 13 votes to 3 to comply with the request for an advisory opinion;

   --was unanimously of opinion that Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain was not a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius).

   With regard to Question II, ``What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?'', the Court

   --decided by 14 votes to 2 to comply with the request for an advisory opinion;

   --was of opinion, by 14 votes to 2, that there were legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco of the kinds indicated in the penultimate paragraph of the Advisory Opinion;

   --was of opinion, by 15 votes to 1, that there were legal ties between this territory and the Mauritanian entity of the kinds indicated in the penultimate paragraph of the Advisory Opinion.

   The penultimate paragraph of the Advisory Opinion was to the effect that:

   The materials and information presented to the Court show the existence, at the time of Spanish colonization, of legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the territory of Western Sahara. They equally show the existence of rights, including some rights relating to the land, which constituted legal ties between the Mauritanian entity, as understood by the Court, and the territory of Western Sahara. On the other hand, the Court's conclusion is that the materials and information presented to it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the Court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory.

   For these proceedings the Court was composed as follows: President Lachs; Vice-President Ammoun; Judges Forster, Gros, Bengzon, Petrén, Onyeama, Dillard, Ignacio-Pinto, de Castro, Morozov, Jiménez de Aréchaga, Sir Humphrey Waldock, Nagendra Singh and Ruda; Judge ad hoc Boni.

   Judges Gros, Ignacio-Pinto and Nagendra Singh appended declarations to the Advisory Opinion; Vice-President Ammoun and Judges Forster, Petrén, Dillard, de Castro and Boni appended separate opinions, and Judge Ruda a dissenting opinion.

   In these declarations and opinions the judges concerned make clear and explain their positions.

    Course of the Proceedings

   (paras. 1-13 of Advisory Opinion)

   The Court first recalls that the General Assembly of the United Nations decided to submit two questions for the Court's advisory opinion by resolution 3292 (XXIX) adopted on 13 December 1974 and received in the Registry on 21 December. It retraces the subsequent steps in the proceedings, including the transmission of a dossier of documents by the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Statute, Art. 65, para. 2) and the presentation of written statements or letters and/or oral statements by 14 States, including Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, Spain and Zaire (Statute, Art. 66).

   Mauritania and Morocco each asked to be authorized to choose a judge ad hoc to sit in the proceedings. By an Order of 22 May 1975 (1.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 6), the Court found that Morocco was entitled under Articles 31 and 68 of the Statute and Article 89 of the Rules of Court to choose a person to sit as judge ad hoc, but that, in the case of Mauritania, the conditions for the application of those Articles had not been satisfied. At the same time the Court stated that those conclusions in no way prejudged its views with regard to the questions referred to it or any other question which might fall to be decided, including those of its competence to give an advisory opinion and the propriety of exercising that competence.

   Competence of the Court

   (paras. 14-22 of Advisory Opinion)

   Under Article 65, paragraph 1, of the Statute, the Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of any duly authorized body. The Court notes that the General Assembly of the United Nations is suitably authorized by Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter and that the two questions submitted are framed in terms of law and raise problems of international law. They are in principle questions of a legal character, even if they also embody questions of fact, and even if they do not call upon the Court to pronounce on existing rights and obligations. The Court is accordingly competent to entertain the request.

   Propriety of Giving an Advisory Opinion

   (paras. 23-74 of Advisory Opinion)

   Spain put forward objections which in its view would render the giving of an opinion incompatible with the Court's judicial character. It referred in the first place to the fact that it had not given its consent to the Court's adjudicating upon the questions submitted. It maintained (a) that the subject of the questions was substantially identical to that of a dispute concerning Western Sahara which Morocco, in September 1974, had invited it to submit jointly to the Court, a proposal which it had refused: the advisory jurisdiction was therefore being used to circumvent the principle that the Court has no jurisdiction to settle a dispute without the consent of the parties; (b) that the case involved a dispute concerning the attribution of territorial sovereignty over Western Sahara and that the consent of States was always necessary for the adjudication of such disputes; (c) that in the circumstances of the case the Court could not fulfill the requirements of good administration of justice with regard to the determination of the facts. The Court considers (a) that the General Assembly, while noting that a legal controversy over the status of Western Sahara had arisen during its discussions, did not have the object of bringing before the Court a dispute or legal controversy with a view to its subsequent peaceful settlement, but sought an advisory opinion which would be of assistance in the exercise of its functions concerning the decolonization of the territory, hence the legal position of Spain could not be compromised by the Court's answers to the questions submitted; (b) that those questions do not call upon the Court to adjudicate on existing territorial rights; (c) that it has been placed in possession of sufficient information and evidence.

   Spain suggested in the second place that the questions submitted to the Court were academic and devoid of purpose or practical effect, in that the United Nations had already settled the method to be followed for the decolonization of Western Sahara, namely a consultation of the indigenous population by means of a referendum to be conducted by Spain under United Nations auspices. The Court examines the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the subject, from resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, to resolution 3292 (XXIX) on Western Sahara, embodying the request for advisory opinion. It concludes that the decolonization process envisaged by the General Assembly is one which will respect the right of the population of Western Sahara to determine their future political status by their own freely expressed will. This right to self-determination, which is not affected by the request for advisory opinion and constitutes a basic assumption of the questions put to the Court, leaves the General Assembly a measure of discretion with respect to the forms and procedures by which it is to be realized. The Advisory Opinion will thus furnish the Assembly with elements of a legal character relevant to that further discussion of the problem to which resolution 3292 (XXIX) alludes.

   Consequently the Court finds no compelling reason for refusing to give a reply to the two questions submitted to it in the request for advisory opinion.

   Question I: ``Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the Time of Colonization by Spain a Territory Belonging to No One (terra nullius)?''

   (paras. 75-83 of Advisory Opinion)

   For the purposes of the Advisory Opinion, the ``time of colonization by Spain'' may be considered as the period beginning in 1884, when Spain proclaimed its protectorate over the Rio de Oro. It is therefore by reference to the law in force at that period that the legal concept of terra nullius must be interpreted. In law, ``occupation'' was a means of peaceably acquiring sovereignty over territory otherwise than by cession or succession; it was a cardinal condition of a valid ``occupation'' that the territory should be terra nullius. According to the State practice of that period, territories inhabited by tribes or peoples having a social and political organization were not regarded as terrae nullius: in their case sovereignty was not generally considered as effected through occupation, but through agreements concluded with local rulers. The information furnished to the Court shows (a) that at the time of colonization Western Sahara was inhabited by peoples which, if nomadic, were socially and politically organized in tribes and under chiefs competent to represent them; (b) that Spain did not proceed upon the basis that it was establishing its sovereignty over terrae nullius: thus in his Order of 26 December 1884 the King of Spain proclaimed that he was taking the Rio de Oro under his protection on the basis of agreements entered into with the chiefs of local tribes.

   The Court therefore gives a negative answer to Question I. In accordance with the terms of the request for advisory opinion, ``if the answer to the first question is in the negative'', the Court is to reply to Question II.

   Question II: ``What Were the Legal Ties of This Territory with the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian Entity?''

   (paras. 84-161 of Advisory Opinion)

   The meaning of the words ``legal ties'' has to be sought in the object and purpose of resolution 3292 (XXIX) of the United Nations General Assembly. It appears to the Court that they must be understood as referring to such legal ties as may affect the policy to be followed in the decolonization of Western Sahara. The Court cannot accept the view that the ties in question could be limited to ties established directly with the territory and without reference to the people who may be found in it. At the time of its colonization the territory had a sparse population that for the most part consisted of nomadic tribes the members of which traversed the desert on more or less regular routes, sometimes reaching as far as southern Morocco or regions of present-day Mauritania Algeria or other States. These tribes were of the Islamic faith.

   Morocco (paragraphs 90-129 of the Advisory Opinion) presented its claim to legal ties with Western Sahara as a claim to ties of sovereignty on the ground of an alleged immemorial possession of the territory and an uninterrupted exercise of authority. In the view of the Court, however, what must be of decisive importance in determining its answer to Question II must be evidence directly relating to effective display of authority in Western Sahara at the time of its colonization by Spain and in the period immediately preceding. Morocco requests that the Court should take account of the special structure of the Moroccan State. That State was founded on the common religious bond of Islam and on the allegiance of various tribes to the Sultan, through their caids or sheiks, rather than on the notion of territory. It consisted partly of what was called the Bled Makhzen, areas actually subject to the Sultan, and partly of what was called the Bled Siba, areas in which the tribes were not submissive to him; at the relevant period, the areas immediately to the north of Western Sahara lay within the Bled Siba.

   As evidence of its display of sovereignty in Western Sahara, Morocco invoked alleged acts of internal display of Moroccan authority, consisting principally of evidence said to show the allegiance of Saharan caids to the Sultan, including dahirs and other documents concerning the appointment of caids, the alleged imposition of Koranic and other taxes, and acts of military resistance to foreign penetration of the territory. Morocco also relied on certain international acts said to constitute recognition by other States of its sovereignty over the whole or part of Western Sahara, including (a) certain treaties concluded with Spain, the United States and Great Britain and Spain between 1767 and 1861, provisions of which dealt inter alia with the safety of persons shipwrecked on the coast of Wad Noun or its vicinity, (b) certain bilateral treaties of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries whereby Great Britain, Spain, France and Germany were said to have recognized that Moroccan sovereignty extended as far south as Cape Bojador or the boundary of the Rio de Oro.

   Having considered this evidence and the observations of the other States which took part in the proceedings, the Court finds that neither the internal nor the international acts relied upon by Morocco indicate the existence at the relevant period of either the existence or the international recognition of legal ties of territorial sovereignty between Western Sahara and the Moroccan State. Even taking account of the specific structure of that State, they do not show that Morocco displayed any effective and exclusive State activity in Western Sahara. They do, however, provide indications that a legal tie of allegiance existed at the relevant period between the Sultan and some, but only some, of the nomadic peoples of the territory, through Tekna caids of the Noun region, and they show that the Sultan displayed, and was recognized by other States to possess, some authority or influence with respect to those tribes.

   The term ``Mauritanian entity'' (paragraphs 139-152 of the Advisory Opinion) was first employed during the session of the General Assembly in 1974 at which resolution 3292 (XXIX), requesting an advisory opinion of the Court, was adopted. It denotes the cultural, geographical and social entity within which the Islamic Republic of Mauritania was to be created. According to Mauritania, that entity, at the relevant period, was the Bilad Shinguitti or Shinguitti country, a distinct human unit, characterized by a common language, way of life, religion and system of laws, featuring two types of political authority: emirates and tribal groups.

   Expressly recognizing that these emirates and tribes did not constitute a State, Mauritania suggested that the concepts of ``nation'' and of ``people'' would be the most appropriate to explain the position of the Shinguitti people at the time of colonization. At that period, according to Mauritania, the Mauritanian entity extended from the Senegal river to the Wad Sakiet El Hamra. The territory at present under Spanish administration and the present territory of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania thus together constituted indissociable parts of a single entity and had legal ties with one another.

   The information before the Court discloses that, while there existed among them many ties of a racial, linguistic, religious, cultural and economic nature, the emirates and many of the tribes in the entity were independent in relation to one another; they had no common institutions or organs. The Mauritanian entity therefore did not have the character of a personality or corporate entity distinct from the several emirates or tribes which comprised it. The Court concludes that at the time of colonization by Spain there did not exist between the territory of Western Sahara and the Mauritanian entity any tie of sovereignty, or of allegiance of tribes, or of simple inclusion in the same legal entity. Nevertheless, the General Assembly does not appear to have so framed Question II as to confine the question exclusively to those legal ties which imply territorial sovereignty, which would be to disregard the possible relevance of other legal ties to the decolonization process. The Court considers that, in the relevant period, the nomadic peoples of the Shinguitti country possessed rights, including some rights relating to the lands through which they migrated. These rights constituted legal ties between Western Sahara and the Mauritanian entity. They were ties which knew no frontier between the territories and were vital to the very maintenance of life in the region.

   Morocco and Mauritania both laid stress on the overlapping character of the respective legal ties which they claimed Western Sahara to have had with them at the time of colonization (paragraphs 153-160 of the Advisory Opinion). Although their views appeared to have evolved considerably in that respect, the two States both stated at the end of the proceedings that there was a north appertaining to Morocco and a south appertaining to Mauritania without any geographical void in between, but with some overlapping as a result of the intersection of nomadic routes. The Court confines itself to noting that this geographical overlapping indicates the difficulty of disentangling the various relationships existing in the Western Sahara region at the time of colonization.

   For these reasons, the Court (paragraphs 162 and 163 of the Advisory Opinion) gives the replies indicated on pages 1 and 2 above.

   Sardines and Sovereignty in Western Sahara

   LAAYOUNE, WESTERN SAHARA.--On trawlers at the quayside near Laayoune, the main city in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, the crew unload sardines in wicker baskets thrown from hand to hand.

   The traditional baskets are misleading, because the yield of sardines, octopus and squid from the Western Saharan ports of Laayoune, Boujdour and Dakhla has come to represent more than 60 percent of Morocco's total annual fisheries yield of almost one million tons. With sovereignty over the Western Sahara still in dispute, this is a politically significant catch.

   The uncertainty about the future of this vast, mainly desert territory in the northwest corner of Africa puts a dampener, for now, on investment in tourism for winter sun-seekers, officials in Laayoune admit.

   But against the backdrop of diplomatic stalemate, as the United Nations strives for a solution to the dispute between Morocco and the Polisario separatist movement, Morocco is keen to show that the regional economy is developing apace.

   The fishing sector is one area where the authorities can point to significant growth, always under the firm guiding hand of the central government.

   SOUTHERN-MOST SUBJECTS

   Claiming Western Sahara as its historic ``southern provinces,'' Morocco controls most of the territory.

   The Polisario movement, based across the border in Algeria, sees the future of the area as an independent state, governed by its Saharan Arab inhabitants, known as Sahrawis.

   Since a 1991 cease-fire, successive U.N. initiatives aimed at ending a dispute which dates from 1975, and asserting the Sahrawis' right to ``self-determination,'' have failed.

   Advocates of independence for Western Sahara stress the territory's mineral wealth, with the phosphate mine at Boukra near Laayoune, and possible offshore oil reserves.

   But the Boukra mine is loss-making and subsidized by the Office Cherifien des Phosphates' more important phosphate production near Khouribga, according to officials. It is fishing that generates new jobs and export earnings. Western Sahara fish products now account for up to seven percent of Morocco's total export earnings of 85.6 billion dirhams ($9.80 billion).

   Morocco declined to renew a fishing accord with the European Union which until the late 1990s had allowed foreign boats into Moroccan waters. It has instead spent heavily since then on port infrastructure in Western Sahara, as though consolidating its hold on the territory.

   Like all other businesses in Western Sahara, the sardine canning businesses, and plants processing octopus for Japanese dinner tables, pay no taxes except for payroll contributions.

   They also benefit from the subsidies in the prices of fuel, power and water with which Morocco woos its southern-most subjects, who account for less than two percent of the kingdom's 29.6 million population.

   Local investors are often Sahrawi notables who see the territory's future with Rabat rather than the Polisario and who play a prominent role in the local economy. A little over a generation ago, the Sahrawis' lifestyle revolved around camel and goat rearing. Fish did not figure at all in the Sahrawi diet and even today few Sahrawis work directly with fish.

   But among new investors, the favorable conditions for businesses can sometimes encourage over-hasty decisions.

   OCTOPUS FOR THE JAPANESE

   Lining the walls of the conference room in the Laayoune governor's headquarters, photos showed a visit to Western Sahara by Morocco's King Mohammed.

   Some 40 men, and one woman wrapped in the colored veil worn in Western Sahara, listened to Morocco's Fisheries Minister Taieb Rhafes. He had flown down from Rabat to explain why he was extending a ban on octopus fishing.

   With him were representatives of Moroccan banks whose loans to local investors had encouraged a proliferation of octopus-freezing plants around Dakhla, from a handful in 1997 to 90 in 2003. The octopuses have been almost wiped out by over-fishing, the minister explained. It takes only three months to have an octopus-freezing plant up and running, said an official.

   At Laayoune port, the fishermen are not Sahrawis, but come from Moroccan ports further north--Agadir, Essaouira and Safi. A spontaneous movement of sardines southwards, traced by Morocco's fisheries research institute, the INRH, coincided with the development of infrastructure in the Western Sahara. The fishermen followed the fish southwards, bringing their expertise with them.

   Moroccan officials have no separate figures for employment among Sahrawis and non-Sahrawis. ``There are no two communities here,'' only Moroccan citizens, Laayoune Governor Mohamed Rharrabi told Reuters.

   With the sea-faring culture far-removed from the traditional Sahrawi lifestyle, it seems fishing will provide only some of the jobs needed in the Laayoune region, where unemployment at the last census was 40 percent among 20 to 24 year-olds.

   Denmark Does Not Recognise Moroccan Sovereignty on Western Sahara

   COPENHAGEN--Danish Government, does not ``recognise Moroccan sovereignty on Western Sahara'', declared Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Per Stig M fller, in response to a question he answered before of his Parliament, according to close sources to the Saharawi representation to Denmark.

   Answering a question asked by Danish Member of the Parliamentary group Enhedslisten (Union list, in English), Mr. Soern Soendergaard, the Minister for Foreign Affairs asserted that his Government ``does not recognise Moroccan sovereignty on Western Sahara'', considering Moroccan presence on the territory as illegal and unacceptable.

   Regarding the peace plan, elaborated by UN Secretary General's former Personal Envoy, James Baker, Mr. M fller affirmed that this plan remains applicable, recalling that it ``is accepted by Polisario Front and the neighbouring countries and is unanimously adopted by Security Council in its resolution 1495''.

   Finally, the Head of Danish diplomacy reiterated ``the support of Denmark of the efforts paid by UN's Secretary General and his former Personal Envoy aimed at reaching a just and lasting solution to the conflict'', in Western Sahara conforming to international legality and by implementing UN's resolutions.

   German PDC/CSU Calls to Immediate Settlement of Western Sahara Conflict

   BERLIN.--The parliamentary group of German Christian Democrat Party (PDC/CSU) in Bundestag (Parliament), called on Thursday to an immediate settlement of Western Sahara's conflict, exhorting international community to pay more efforts in defending Saharawi people's ``right to self-determination''.

   In a communiqué publicised on Thursday, of which SPS received a copy, PDC/CSU parliamentary Group's spokesperson, Dr. Christian Ruck, asserted that ``Western Sahara conflict's settlement tolerates no more delays'', calling international community to pay more efforts in defending Saharawi people's ``right to self-determination''.

   UN Secretary General's former Personal Envoy, James Baker's resignation ``may push to failure'' the peace plan for self-determination of Saharawi people, though this plan constitutes ``a reasonable compromise to realise peace in this region'', deplored the spokesperson.

   Thus, the international community is called to ``prove to the people of this region, who is still suffering this old aging conflict, that its right to self-determination remains a priority for the international community'', which should also defend UN's principles and international law, so as to reach a peaceful settlement to this problem, concluded the communiqué.

   Svitzer Feels Heat in Western Sahara

   Fugro affiliate Svitzer has just completed a marine survey on Kerr-McGee's Boujdour acreage off the disputed territory of Western Sahara.

   Based in Norfolk in the UK, Svitzer is the latest company to attract brickbats from activists determined to persuade industry players not to sign deals with Morocco, which occupies the territory and claims its resources.

   Following a one-year extension, KMG's reconnaissance permit will expire on 29 October. However, its tenure is contested by the Sahrawi independence militia, which has long fought for sovereign control, stirring international controversy over the licencing regime imposed by Rabat.

   Fellow UK consultancy Robertson Research International (RRI) is also poised to complete survey work in Western Sahara, despite question marks over the legitimacy of UK corporate involvement in what the UK government calls a ``non-self governing territory'' where it says sovereignty remains to be determined under UN auspices. For its part, RRI said it is not directly contracted to Rabat.

   Confirmation of RRI's involvement comes hard on the heels of a campaign launched by Western Sahara support groups across Europe against exploration and production companies doing business at the behest of Rabat.

   Kerr-McGee, Total and TGS-Nopec were blasted for jumping the gun on a fragile peace process in which the UN has sought diplomatic consensus ahead of a referendum on self-determination for the Sahrawi people.

   Activists' primary target of late has been UK-registered Wessex Exploration, which was recently invited to Rabat to finalise a preliminary but open-ended deal to analyse onshore data ahead of an exploration push outlined by Moroccan state oil company managing director Amina Benkhadra.

   Wessex has been warned that ``its reputation would suffer'' if it did not back off or negotiate with the Sahrawi authorities.

   In the meantime, several UK parliamentarians have moved to seek clarification of the UK government's position on British companies doing business in Western Sahara. Concerned MPs led by the Labour Party's David Drew, want to pin down Whitehall on its attitude.

   Drew will shortly table a parliamentary question seeking greater clarity. Drew now speaks for the Western Sahara Support Group and two Conservative MPs are expected to join existing members before they resurface as a parliamentary force.

   The UK Foreign Office insists sovereignty in Western Sahara remains undetermined as long as UN calls to resolve the crisis via the so-called Baker Peace Plan remain unheeded. ``We want to push the UK to promote the Plan so that Morocco withdraws. It should also tell British companies that they should not get involved in Western Sahara at this time while the UN mandate remains unimplemented,'' said Drew.

   The Foreign Office currently has no problem with companies winning reconnaissance or E&P licences from Rabat, so long as the practical effect complies with constraints laid down by the UN Legal Office on ``disregarding the rights'' of the Sahrawi people.

   This means Kerr-McGee and Total can use TGS-Nopec and Fugro to shoot seismic as long as rigs are not deployed to confirm or produce oil finds.

   Meanwhile, the acquisition of strategically important seismic data for Rabat as the licensor remains legal under the ``look but don't touch'' interpretation of both UK and US governments. However, a UK official said that ``we'd have to revisit this opinion if activity got this far. There is no official endorsement''.

   ``Right now, our view is that UK companies going into Western Sahara are on their own and we cannot link them to the Department of Trade & Industry or offer the support of any other government mechanisms,'' the source added.

   Two UK-registered companies presently stand on both sides of the fence. Sterling Resources has inherited an exclusive offshore PSC from AIM-listed Fusion Oil & Gas following a recent take-over, while Wessex is under increasing pressure after retaining its exclusive study licence from Rabat.

   After expending $600 million on peace-keeping efforts, the UN system is tiring of the Western Sahara crisis, with UN Special Envoy James Baker resigning in frustration last month.

   The UN's new representative, Alvaro de Soto, said this week that he would pursue the same policy as Baker, suggesting no new ideas to break the deadlock were on the table.

   Norwegian Industry To Exploit Sahrawi Fish Resources

   Norwegian officials are in the process of promoting Norwegian investments in the booming fisheries industry in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, despite protests by Sahrawi officials. The fisheries industry is the dominant economic sector in the territory, promoting new Moroccan settlements here. Norwegian capital and knowledge is to help this development.

   According to information made available to afrol News, the Norwegian Ambassador in Morocco, Arne Aasheim last week was on a three-day visit to El Aaiun, the capital of the Western Sahara territory. Here, he had meetings with the Moroccan authorities governing the occupied territory and representatives of the fisheries sector.

   Sources wanting to remain anonymous told afrol News that the primary focus in these meetings was on how Norwegian companies could strengthen their foothold in the booming Moroccan fisheries industry, which mainly is based in the occupied territory. Morocco has been singled out as a golden opportunity for Norway's many companies operating in the fisheries sector.

   Norway is one of Europe's leading fisheries nations, also regarding the larger definition of the industry, including the construction of fisheries vessels, fishing technology and fish processing and distribution technology.

   Morocco, on the other hand, during the last years has singled out the fisheries industry as one of its most promising sectors for economic development. After refusing to renew a fisheries agreement with the European Union in 1999, Moroccan authorities are now promoting the establishment of a large national fleet of fishing vessels, fish processing plants and an export infrastructure. Since 2001, approximately euro 150 million have been invested into the sector annually.

   The controversial bit of Morocco's booming fisheries industry is that it is mostly based on the rich fisheries resources off the cost of occupied Western Sahara. According to international law, an occupying state is obliged to manage the renewable resources of the territory it occupies. However, revenues from these resources are to be channelled into the development of the people of the territory.

   In the case of Western Sahara, the revenues of the exploitation of the territory's resources however do not go to the internationally recognised representatives of the Sahrawis--the exiled Polisario government--but instead to the strengthening of Morocco's occupation of the territory. Almost the entire work force of the fisheries sector in Western Sahara is of Moroccan origin and the sector's growth is promoting more Moroccan settlements in the occupied territory.

   While the Norwegian government generally has defended the case of the Sahrawis in their conflict with Morocco, this has not been the case in the important fisheries sector. Mr Aasheim's predecessor at Norway's Rabat Embassy, Ole Kristian Holthe, since 2000 has been an active and passionate promoter of Norwegian investments in Morocco's booming fisheries sector, non-regarding the location of these investments.

   In February 2002, Ambassador Holthe met with the society for Norwegian Maritime Exporters (NME) in Haugesund, informing about that access to ``the Moroccan market is something that is happening now.'' He especially emphasised on the large number of fishing vessels that Moroccan authorities were ordering in an international tender.

   Explaining that Morocco is ``the most stable Arab country oriented towards the West,'' Mr Holthe added that the problems surrounding Western Sahara should not endanger Norwegian investments. ``Norwegian authorities may consider that [official] Norwegian trade promotion devices should not be involved in investments [in Western Sahara], but my opinion is that, as long as one enters as a partner in the fisheries industry--and looks at this geographically--then it should be safe.''

   According to research done by the Norway-based international fisheries media `IntraFish', Norwegian authorities already in 2002 were financially aiding exporters to get a foothold in Morocco; including the occupied territories. This included aid by the Norwegian government's agency guaranteeing export financing and the Scandinavian Investment Bank. At least kroner 30 million (euro 4 million) were available to finance Norwegian exports to Morocco's fisheries sector.

   These government efforts have already produced several Norwegian investments in Western Sahara. In October 2002, the Norwegian company Finsam announced it was constructing an ice producing plant in ``Laayoune, Morocco''--which translates into El Aaiun in Western Sahara. This ice plant is mainly producing ice for fish landed in El Aaiun.

   Other Norwegian investments in the occupied territory's fishery sector include the company Selfa Arctic, which is ``constructing modern coastal fisheries in Morocco;'' Simrad, which delivers marine electronics to Morocco, including to its ``Moroccan retailer in Laayoune;'' Astia Holdings, which exports fishing vessels and equipment to Morocco; and Furuno, which sells electronic navigation equipment in Morocco.

   Ambassador Holthe's indiscrete promotion of Norwegian export opportunities in Western Sahara however became too much for Norwegian authorities. Already in November 2002, Foreign Minister Jan Petersen instructed his Rabat Ambassador to write an official letter to companies investing in Western Sahara and inform them about the political risk and ethical problems.

   According to information given to afrol News, however, Ambassador Holthe smoothened the wording in the letter he sent out to Norwegian companies, saying that the Embassy could see no limits in international law regarding investments in Western Sahara. In 2003, Mr Holthe was replaced and sent to the Norwegian Embassy in Iran for reasons unknown to afrol News.

   Since that, Ambassador Aasheim has inherited the complex question of Norwegian investments in Western Sahara. As far as afrol News has been able to establish, the Norwegian Embassy in Rabat has not lowered its profile regarding this promotion since Mr Aasheim's appointment. Last week's official promotion trip by the Ambassador to El Aaiun is probably the first ever investment promotion trip to the occupied territories by any Norwegian government official.

   It therefore came as a shock to the Polisario exile government. Mouloud Said, the Polisario Representative in Washington told afrol News today that his government considers ``any transaction between the occupying power with any other entity or government as completely illegal at the eyes of international law, and we do condemn any attempt to strengthen the Moroccan occupation.''

   We are disappointed because traditionally, the Norwegians government has been in support of the peoples' right to self-determination all over Africa and in particular in Western Sahara, added Mr Said. ``This is uncharacteristic coming from the representative from a government known for its defence of human rights and the right of self-determination.''

   Mr Said further said that the Polisario considered a UN legal opinion issued in 2001, regarding oil exploration in Western Sahara to be of relevance in this case. The legal opinion concluded that Morocco had no right to act on behalf of Western Sahara and market its resources, according to Mr Said.

   Unfortunately, afrol News was not able to gather reactions from Norwegian authorities. The Norwegian Embassy in Rabat did not answer phone calls from afrol News neither on Friday nor today, while spokesperson Cathrine Andersen at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to supply afrol News with a direct phone number to Ambassador Aasheim, claiming the Ministry had ``no other information'' on how to get in contact with its Rabat Embassy.

   Framework Agreement on the Status of Western Sahara (Baker Plan I)

   ANNEX I OF SG REPORT S/2001/613 OF 20 JUN 01

   The authority in Western Sahara shall be as follows:

   1. The population of Western Sahara, through their executive, legislative and judicial bodies shall have exclusive competence over local governmental administration, territorial budget and taxation, law enforcement, internal security, social welfare, culture, education, commerce, transportation, agriculture, mining, fisheries and industry, environmental policy, housing and urban development, water and electricity, roads and other basic infrastructure.

   2. The Kingdom of Morocco will have exclusive competence over foreign relations (including international agreements and conventions) national security and external defence (including determination of borders, maritime, aerial or terrestrial and their protection by all appropriate means) all matters relating to the production, sale, ownership or use of weapons or explosives and the preservation of the territorial integrity against secessionist attempts whether from within or without the territory. In addition, the flag, currency, customs, postal and telecommunication systems of the Kingdom shall be the same for Western Sahara. With respect to all functions described in this paragraph (2) the Kingdom may appoint representatives to serve it in Western Sahara.

   3. In Western Sahara the executive authority shall be vested in an Executive, who shall be elected by a vote of those individuals who have been identified as qualified to vote by the Identification Commission of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, and whose names are on the United Nations provisional voter lists (completed as of 30 December 1999) without giving effect to any appeals or other objections. To qualify as a candidate for Executive, one must be an individual who has been identified as qualified to vote as aforesaid and whose name is on said provisional voter lists. The Executive shall be elected for a term of four years. Thereafter, the Executive shall be elected by majority vote of the Assembly. The Executive shall appoint administrators in charge of executive departments for terms of four years. The legislative authority shall be vested in an Assembly, the members of which shall be directly elected by voters for terms of four years. The judicial authority shall be vested in such courts as may be necessary, the judges of which shall be selected from the National Institute for Judicial Studies but shall be from Western Sahara. Such courts shall be the authority on territorial law. To be qualified to vote for members of the Assembly, a person must be 18 years or older and either (i) a continuous resident of the territory since 31 October 1998, or (ii) a person listed on the repatriation list as of 31 October 2000.

   4. All laws passed by the Assembly and all decisions of the courts referred to in paragraph 3 above must respect and comply with the constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco, particularly with respect to the protection of public liberties. All elections or referenda referred to in this agreement shall be conducted with all appropriate guarantees and in keeping with the Code of Conduct agreed to by the parties in 1997, except where to do so would be inconsistent with the terms hereof.

   5. Neither the Kingdom nor the executive, legislative, or judicial bodies of the Authority of Western Sahara referred to above may unilaterally change or abolish the status of Western Sahara. Any changes or modifications of this agreement has to be approved by the Executive and the Assembly of Western Sahara. The status of Western Sahara will be submitted to a referendum of qualified voters on such date as the parties hereto shall agree, within the five year period following the initial actions to implement this agreement. To be qualified to vote in such a referendum a voter must have been a full time resident of Western Sahara for the preceding one year.

   6. The Secretary-General of the United Nations will offer his mediation and good offices to assist the two parties hereto in the implementation or interpretation of this agreement.

   7. The parties agree to implement this agreement promptly and request the assistance of the United Nations to this end.

   Sahara Refugees Form a Progressive Society

   LITERACY AND DEMOCRACY ARE THRIVING IN AN UNLIKELY PLACE

   TINDOUF, ALGERIA.--A dozen women recline on the steps of the main girls' school in the Saharawi refugee camps, their pastel robes like blots of water-color on the whitewashed cement. When the door opens and the headmistress emerges, the women suddenly leap up and crowd around her, clamoring. They are mothers seeking places for their daughters in the already-crowded school.

   The Saharawi women are among the most liberated of the Muslim world, and their status is characteristic of the well-organized, egalitarian society that has developed in the refugee camps over the past three decades. For all their bleakness, the Saharawi camps boast a representative government, a 95 percent literacy rate, and a constitution that enshrines religious tolerance and gender equality.

   The Saharawis are the Arab nomads of Western Sahara, bound together by their Yemeni ancestry and their dialect, Hassaniya, which remains close to classical Arabic. For centuries, they roamed the territory with their camels and goats, sometimes trading with Spanish colonizers, and became known as ``blue men'' for the indigo robes they wear.

When Spain abandoned Western Sahara in 1975, Morocco invaded and drove the Saharawis into neighboring Algeria. Trading their camels for Land Rovers, they fought a guerrilla war under the leadership of the Polisario Front, an independence movement, until the UN brokered a ceasefire in 1991. Since then, the promised vote on independence has been stalled by disagreement over who should be allowed to participate.

   EQUALITY

   Meanwhile the Saharawi refugees, numbering some 160,000, have clung on in camps amid the flat, stony wastes near the town of Tindouf, in southwest Algeria. Subsisting on foreign aid--chiefly rice, bread, and a few root vegetables--most suffer from chronic malnutrition. Their settlements consist almost wholly of adobe huts and dusty canvas tents, appearing from afar as brown smudges on the slightly lighter brown desert.

   ``Women built these camps,'' says Menana Mohammed, deputy secretary-general of the Union of Saharawi Women. When the Saharawis arrived at Tindouf, most of the men had stayed behind as soldiers. ``You'll still find women doing all kinds of work, including leading,'' Ms. Mohammed adds.

   While most of the top brass are men, the minister of culture is a woman. Women hold one fourth of the seats in the Saharawi parliament, and they make up most of the civil service, including teachers, nurses, and doctors.

   ``These days our chief concern is education,'' says Mohammed. All young Saharawis learn Spanish as well as Arabic, and some attend universities in Spain, Cuba, and Algeria through the sponsorship of those countries' governments.

   ``In the camps, we had to be both sexes, because the men were all away fighting,'' says Mohammed. There is an old Saharawi saying, she says, that rings especially true today: ``A tent is raised on two poles: a man and a woman.'' The Saharawis' traditionally tough, wandering lifestyle has always made them regard husband and wife as equal leaders of the household.

   INDIVIDUALISM

   It has also begotten an individualistic approach to Islam. While most Muslims tend to stress the importance of the Islamic community, ``the Saharawis believe that religion is a very personal issue,'' says Mouloud Said, the Polisario's representative in the United States. ``It's a personal relationship between the human being and his Creator. This is the mentality of the nomadic society.''

   Mosques are conspicuously absent from the camps, in large part because the Saharawis ``don't believe that to speak to God, you need a fancy place,'' explains Mr. Said.

   Saharawis seldom pray in groups save on important Muslim holidays, and view even these ceremonies as purely optional. For some, this is a welcome escape-hatch from the religion's bloodier rituals.

   ``Each person has his own Islam,'' says Zorgan Laroussi, a translator in the camps who chose not to attend the mass slaughter of camels for the feast of al-Eid al-Fitr, which marks the end of Ramadan. His brother-in-law Salek did go, and relishes explaining the ritual's finer points while the two men and their families share a dish of grilled hindquarters.

   Saharawis are equally welcoming of other religions. ``There is an almost continuous presence of church groups from all over the world--in particular the U.S.--in the camps,'' says Said. ``Every year for the last four years, there has been a joint prayer at Easter.''

   ``Tolerance is not something new, but it's something [Saharawi leaders] encourage,'' he says. ``In a tolerant society, the center prevails, not the extremes. That means respect for others, whether for the faith or their ideas.''

   This credo finds ample use in the Saharawis' recent conversion to a united democratic government. Following their flight from Western Sahara, they quickly saw that overcoming the desert and the Moroccan Army meant forsaking old tribal loyalties. ``What's most important is that we Saharawis hang together, so we highlight stories that promote unity among us,'' says Minister of Culture Miriam Salek, who works with the Ministry of Education and the Saharawi Youth Organization to keep alive Saharawi folklore and history.

   DEMOCRACY

   In 1976, the Polisario proclaimed, and more or less became, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. Although a government-in-exile, it is recognized by 75 countries, and the UN formally considers Western Sahara an occupied territory.

   Tier upon tier of elected officials make up the camp government, from the national parliament down to neighborhood councils. Saharawis are avid voters, and many participate in local civil service--even if it's merely taking a twice-weekly shift on the trash detail, or helping dole out rations.

   This could be the blueprint for an independent Western Sahara, and there is a general sense of pride and excitement among the Saharawis for their new society. ``This has worked so far, what we have here,'' says one young daira (district) councilman, ``and it should still work in Western Sahara. We built this on the hope of the people, and I don't think they'll want to change.''

   But as the years drag on, many fear they will never have the chance to find out. Their smoothly running camps and refusal to resort to terrorism keep them out of the public consciousness, relieving pressure on the UN to push for a quick settlement to the 29-year-old conflict. ``We have been landless for so long,'' laments Tellib Helli Embarik, an old tribal leader. ``I don't know if the UN is just waiting for us to disappear or what!''

   Deserting the Baker Plan

    President Bush likes to talk about nurturing democracy within the Muslim world, but he's doing little for the pro-Western Muslims of the Western Sahara whose future rests in his hands.

    If you don't know much about the plight of these people, you aren't alone. They have been languishing in refugee camps in western Algeria for nearly 30 years and will remain there until the United States stops playing chief enabler to Moroccan government that invaded and seized their country when it was freed from colonial rule by Spain in the '70s. I've visited the camps, and to suggest that the people who inhabit them live under harsh conditions is to speak euphemistically.

    The Western Saharan or Saharawi peoples tried to resist the Moroccans, but hundreds of thousands of them were forced to flee to Algeria before a U.S.-equipped Moroccan army determined to seize their land. Today more than 300,000 of them survive as best they can, unable to see their relatives or visit their homeland.

    Realizing they didn't have the capability to defeat Morocco on the battlefield, the Saharawi faced a choice. They could fall on the asymmetric warfare of the terrorist, surrender or turn to the international community. They perhaps rather naively chose the latter course and went to the United Nations and the World Court seeking justice.

    Meanwhile, they've built a functioning democracy that guarantees equal rights to men and women alike, educated their children and let it be known that all they want to do is live in peace with those around them. Their congressional friends in the United States include people such as Sens. Jim Inhofe (R-Okla.) and Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Reps Joe Pitts (R-Pa.), Mark Green (R-Wis.) and Donald Payne (D-N.J.), but so far few of their colleagues and virtually no one in the Bush administration or the media seem to share their concerns.

    This is in spite of the fact that virtually everyone agrees the Saharawi are right. The International Court of Justice in 1975 ruled Morocco had no right to the land seized, but the king of Morocco ignored the ruling and the United Nations sought a referendum in which the people of the region could vote on whether they wanted to be ruled by their colonial masters or by leaders of their own choosing.

    Meanwhile, the United States stood by silent as our Moroccan ally consolidated control over the region to become the last colonial power on the African continent.

    Publicly, of course, the Moroccans declared that they too believed in self-determination, but marched hundreds of thousands of Moroccans into the region and declared that if there was to be a vote, these folks should be allowed to vote too. The Saharawi and the United Nations balked at this baldfaced attempt to stuff the ballot boxes, but finally appointed former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker as a special envoy to work something out. Baker eventually came up with a ``compromise'' plan that would grant the vote to enough Moroccans to give them a majority if they stuck together and suggested a period of autonomy within Morocco followed by a vote to decide whether the region would go its own way.

    To everyone's surprise, the Sahrawi accepted the ``Baker Plan.'' They know they can't survive in the camps forever and suspect that more than a few of the Moroccans who will vote might welcome the chance to escape the tender mercies of their king. The Moroccans immediately rejected the plan announcing that they will never accept any scheme that includes the possible loss of the territory they have grabbed.

    The United Nations doesn't know what to do, and Baker has thrown up his arms and resigned. The king's only real ally in the United Nations is France, but it's our silent acceptance of whatever he wants do to that has allowed him to thumb his nose at the world. Everyone knows that as long as King Mohammed VI can keep the United States in line, he will remain intransigent.

    During the king's visit to Washington last week, President Bush supposedly brought up the Baker Plan, but one wonders if he pressed very hard. He has, after all, said nothing about the Saharawi in public and done everything from declaring Morocco a ``major non-NATO ally'' to leading the charge for a U.S.-Moroccan Free Trade Agreement to give the King the impression that we aren't about to do anything at all about the way he acts in his own neighborhood.

    Meanwhile, the Saharawi hang on, praying for the day when an American president who talks about democracy and justice will come to their aid.

   Beyond Diplomatic Niceties

   This week, His Majesty, King Mohammed of Morocco is in Washington to tout the newly signed US.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement and to bask in his nation's newly christened status as a ``major non-NATO ally''.

   While we do not oppose free trade or establishing stronger allies, we would do well to look past the diplomatic niceties that surround such trips. His Majesty's country illegally occupies a swath of land in West Africa known as Western Sahara. His government has promised the people of Western Sahara, the Sahrawi, a vote to determine their own future. More than a decade later, that vote has yet to occur.

   Powerful friends in Europe and here in Washington have helped His Majesty's government postpone this vote and consolidate control over the country The Moroccan government says its colonial rule over Western Sahara ensures its ``territorial integrity'' and preserves stability in the region. But this idea is simply divorced from reality on the ground.

   During trips to the country, we have learned the Sahrawis are peaceful, pro-Western and pro-democracy. In short, despite living under an illegitimate colonial power, they have established a deep-rooted culture of democracy, capable of supporting a viable state. They have their own elected leaders, many of them women. They have provided education and equal rights to all their citizens--men and women.

   The only stability a sovereign, democratic Western Sahara disrupts is a status quo defined by tyranny. The King will deny this. Official Washington will ignore it. But it is the truth.

   From 1884 until 1975, Western Sahara was a Spanish colony. Upon Spain's withdrawal, Morocco invaded. The Sahrawis have fought a lonely battle for liberation ever since, many suffering in the refugee camps that dot Algerian sand dunes. The U.N. International Court of Justice ruled Morocco's claim to Western Sahara was illegitimate. Morocco ignored the ruling.

   In 1991, Morocco accepted the U.N.-brokered cease-fire promising the Sahrawis a referendum for national self-determination. Moroccan officials moved tens of thousands of their own citizens to Western Sahara, attempting to stack the vote in its favor. In 1997, the United Nations asked former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker to help implement the referendum. Morocco continued to balk.

   The U.N.'s voter identification commission, using agreed-upon criteria, set out to identify the eligible voters. After years of interviews with each, the U.N. in January 2000 published the provisional list of voters, rejecting the majority of Moroccan applicants. Morocco--fearing it would lose the upper hand--reneged on its commitment to the referendum.

   To break the impasse, Mr. Baker submitted a compromise plan to the Security Council in July 2003. The plan included a referendum for the Sahrawis and gave Moroccans who settled in Western Sahara through 1999 the right to vote, making them the majority of the electorate. Convinced a peaceful solution was possible, the leading Sahrawi political group--the POLISARIO Front--reluctantly accepted the terms of Mr. Baker's plan. Its gesture was never reciprocated. Morocco, supported by France, rejected the Baker Plan from the outset.

   As this battle rages, Sahrawis suffer. The Moroccan government continues to imprison Sahrawi activists, exploit the natural resources of Western Sahara, and prohibit foreign journalists from transmitting the truth to the outside world, as evidenced by the recent expulsion of several Danish reporters.

   The U.N. has spent more than $600 million to maintain this dreadful status quo. Successive U.S. administrations, Republican and Democrat, have walked a fine line on this issue. Morocco is a longstanding ally. However, alliance with powerful nations should not provide the cover to ignore international commitments and deny the basic human right of self-determination to a peaceful, democratic people.

   When the president meets with King Mohammed this week, he should not ignore His Majesty's opposition to democracy in the Western Sahara. The spread of freedom is central to our mission as a nation. This is ever more important as the administration works to spread democracy in Islamic nations.

   Unlike many others in the Middle East and North Africa, the Sahrawis have chosen a peaceful path to democracy. We owe the democratic people of Western Sahara no less than the support we have given others in their fight for independence--the right to have a say in their own future.

   When Congress considers the US.-Morocco free trade agreement, it should seriously consider how it will aid His Majesty's attempt to exploit an area to which he has no legitimate claim. Ignoring Western Sahara will put a vote for Sahrawis further out of reach.

   The time has come to abandon empty promises and hollow rhetoric in favor of a free, fair, and transparent referendum for the Sahrawis. This is the only way to build a peaceful, democratic future for Western Sahara and the entire region.

    Letter dated 29 January 2002 From the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel, addressed to the President of the Security Council

    1. In a letter addressed to me on 13 November 2001, the President of the Security Council requested, on behalf of the members of the Security Council, my opinion on ``the legality in the context of international law, including relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, and agreements concerning Western Sahara of actions allegedly taken by the Moroccan authorities consisting in the offering and signing of contracts with foreign companies for the exploration of mineral resources in Western Sahara''.

   2. At my request, the Government of Morocco provided information with respect to two contracts, concluded in October 2001, for oil-reconnaissance and evaluation activities in areas off-shore Western Sahara, one between the Moroccan ``Office National de Recherches et d'Exploitations Petrolieres'' (ONAREP) and the United States oil-company Kerr Mc-Gee du Maroc Ltd., and the other between ONAREP and the French oil company TotalFinaElf E&P Maroc. Concluded for an initial period of 12 months, both contracts contain standard options for the relinquishment of the rights under the contract or its continuation, including an option for future oil contracts in the respective areas or parts thereof.

   3. The question of the legality of the contracts concluded by Morocco off-shore Western Sahara requires an analysis of the status of the territory of Western Sahara, and the status of Morocco in relation to the Territory. As will be seen, it also requires an analysis of the principles of international law governing mineral resource activities in Non-Self-Governing Territories.

   4. The law applicable to the determination of these questions is contained in the United Nations Charter, in General Assembly resolutions, pertaining to decolonization, in general, and economic activities in Non-Self-Governing Territories, in particular, and in agreements concerning the status of Western Sahara. The analysis of the applicable law must also reflect the changes and developments which have occurred as international law has been progressively codified and developed, as well as the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and the practice of States in matters of natural resource activities in Non-Self-Governing Territories.

    A. THE STATUS OF WESTERN SAHARA UNDER MOROCCAN ADMINISTRATION

   5. A Spanish protectorate since 1884, Spanish Sahara was included in 1963 in the list of NonSelf-Governing Territories under Chapter XI of the Charter (A/5514, Annex III). Beginning in 1962, Spain as administering Power transmitted technical and statistical information on the territory under Article 73 (e) of the Charter of the United Nations. This information was examined by the Special Committee with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (``Special Committee''). In a series of General Assembly resolutions on the Question of Spanish/Western Sahara, the applicability to the territory of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), was reaffirmed.

   6. On 14 November 1975, a Declaration of Principles on Western Sahara was concluded in Madrid between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania (the Madrid Agreement), whereby the powers and responsibilities of Spain, as the administering Power of the territory, were transferred to a temporary tripartite administration. The Madrid Agreement did not transfer sovereignty over the territory, nor did it confer upon any of the signatories the status of an administering Power--a status which Spain alone could not have unilaterally transferred. The transfer of administrative authority over the territory to Morocco and Mauritania in 1975, did not affect the international status of Western Sahara as Non-Self-Governing Territory.

   7. On 26 February 1976, Spain informed the Secretary-General that as of that it had terminated its presence in Western Sahara and relinquished its responsibilities over the Territory, thus leaving it in fact under the administration of both Morocco and Mauritania in their respective controlled areas. following the withdrawal of Mauritania from the Territory in 1979, upon the conclusion of the Mauritano-Sahraoui agreement of 19 August 1979 (S/13504, Annex I), Morocco has administrated the territory of Western Sahara alone. Morocco however, is not listed as the administering Power of the territory in the United Nations list of Non-Self-Governing Territories, and has, therefore, not transmitted information on the territory in accordance with Articles 73 (e) of the United Nations Charter.

   8. Notwithstanding the foregoing, and given the status of Western Sahara as a Non-Self-Governing Territory, it would be appropriate for purposes of the present analysis to have regard to the principles applicable to the powers and responsibilities of an administering Power in matters of mineral resource activities in such a Territory.

   B. THE LAW APPLICABLE TO MINERAL RESOURCE ACTIVITIES IN NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES

   9. Article 73 of the United Nations Charter lays down the fundamental principles applicable to Non-Self-Governing Territories. Members of the United Nations who assumed responsibilities for the administration of these territories have whereby recognized the principle that the interest of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and have accepted as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories. Under Article 73 (e) of the Charter, they are required to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories under their administration.

   10. The legal regime applicable to Non-Self-Governing Territories was further developed in the practice of the United Nations and, more specifically, in the Special Committee and the General Assembly. Resolutions of the General Assembly adopted under the agenda item ``implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples'', called upon the administering Powers to ensure that all economic activities in the Non-Self-Governing Territories under their administration do not adversely affect the interests of the peoples of such territories, but are instead directed to assist them in the exercise of their right to self-determination. The Assembly also consistently urged the administering Powers to safeguard and guarantee the inalienable rights of the peoples of these territories to their natural resources, and to establish and maintain control over the future development of those resources (GA res 35/118 of 11 December 1980; 52/78 of 10 December 1997; 54/91 of 6 December 1999; 55/147 of 8 December 2000; and 56/74 of 10 December 2001).

   11. In the resolutions adopted under the item ``Activities of foreign economic and other interests which impede the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in territories under Colonial Domination'', the General Assembly reiterated that ``the exploitation and plundering of the marine and other natural resources of colonial and Non-Self-Governing Territories by foreign economic interests, in violation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, is a threat to the integrity and prosperity of these Territories'' and that ``any administering Power that deprives the colonial people of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the exercise of their legitimate rights over their natural resources ..... violates the solemn obligations it has assumed under the Charter of the United Nations'' (GA res. 48/46 of 10 December 1992 and 49/40 of 9 December 1994).

   12. In an important evolution of this doctrine, the General Assembly in resolution 50/33 of 6 December 1995, drew a distinction between economic activities that are detrimental to the peoples of these territories and those directed to benefit them. In paragraph 2 of that resolution, the General Assembly affirmed ``the value of foreign economic investment undertaken in collaboration with the peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories and in accordance with their wishes in order to make a valid contribution to the socio-economic development of the Territories''. This position has been affirmed by the General Assembly in later resolutions (GA res. 52/72 of 10 December 1997; 53/61 of 3 December 1998; 54/84 of 5 December 1999; 55/38 of 8 December 2000; and 56/66 of 10 December 2001).

   13. The question of Western Sahara has been dealt with by both the General Assembly, as a question of decolonization, and by the Security Council as a question of peace and security. The Council was first seized of the matter in 1975, and in resolutions 377 (1975) of 22 October 1975 and 379 (1975) of 2 November 1975 it requested the Secretary-General to enter into consultations with the parties. Since 1988, in particular, when Morocco and the Frente Polisaro agreed, in principle, to the settlement proposals of the Secretary-General and the Chairman of the OAU, the political process aiming at a peaceful settlement of the question of Western Sahara has been under the purview of the Council. For the purposes of the present analysis, however, the body of Security Council resolutions pertaining to the political process is not relevant to the legal regime applicable to mineral resource activities in Non-Self-Governing Territories and for this reason is not dealt with in detail in the present letter.

   14. The principle of ``permanent sovereignty over natural resources'' as the right of peoples and nations to use and dispose of the natural resources in their territories in the interest of their national development and well-being, was established in General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962. It has since been reaffirmed in the 1966 International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights, as well as in subsequent General Assembly resolutions, most notably, resolution 3201 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, ``Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order'', and Resolution 3281 (XXIX) containing the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. While the legal nature of the core principle of ``permanent sovereignty over natural resources'', as a corollary to the principle of territorial sovereignty or the right of self-determination, is indisputably part of customary international law, its exact legal scope and implications are still debatable. In the present context, the question is whether the principle of ``permanent sovereignty'' prohibits any activities related to natural resources undertaken by an administering Power (cf. para. 8 above) in a Non-Self-Governing Territory, or only those which are undertaken in disregard of the needs, interests and benefits of the people of that territory.

   C. THE CASE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

   15. The question of natural resource exploitation by administering Powers in Non-Self-Governing Territories was brought before the International Court of Justice in the Case of East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) and the Case Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia). In neither case, however, was the question of the legality of resource exploitation activities in Non-Self-Governing Territories conclusively determined.

   16. In the Case of East Timor, Portugal argued that in negotiating with Indonesia an agreement on the exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf area of the Timor Gap, Australia had failed to respect the right of the people of East Timor to permanent sovereignty over its natural wealth and resources, and the powers and rights of Portugal as administering Power of East Timor. In the absence of Indonesia's participation in the proceedings, the International Court of Justice concluded that it lacked jurisdiction.

   17. In the Nauru Phosphate Case, Nauru claimed the rehabilitation of certain phosphate lands worked out before independence in the period of the Trusteeship administration by Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Nauru argued that the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources was breached in circumstances in which a major resource was depleted on grossly inequitable terms and its extraction involved the physical reduction of the land. Following the Judgment on the Preliminary Objections, the parties reached a settlement and a Judgment on the merits was no longer required.

   D. THE PRACTICE OF STATES

   18. In the recent practice of States, cases of resource exploitation in Non-Self-Governing Territories have, for obvious reasons, been few and far apart. In 1975, the United Nations Visiting Mission to Spanish Sahara reported that at the time of the visit, four companies held prospecting concessions in off-shore Spanish Sahara. In discussing the exploitation of phosphate deposits in the region of Bu Craa with Spanish officials, the Mission was told that the revenues expected to accrue would be used for the benefit of the Territory, that Spain recognized the sovereignty of the Saharan population over the Territory's natural resources and that, apart from the return of its investment, Spain laid no claim to benefit from the proceeds (A/10023/Rev.1, p. 52)

   19. The exploitation of uranium and other natural resources in Namibia by South Africa and a number of Western multinational corporations was considered illegal under Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia, enacted in 1974 by the United Nations Council for Namibia, and was condemned by the General Assembly (GA res. 36/51 of 24 November 1981, and 39/42 of 5 December 1984). The case of Namibia, however, must be seen in the light of Security Council resolution 276 (1979) of 30 January 1970, which declared that the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal and that consequently all acts taken by the Government of South Africa were illegal and invalid.

   20. The case of East Timor under the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) is unique in that, while UNTAET is not an administering Power within the meaning of Article 73 of the United Nations Charter, East Timor is still technically listed as a Non-Self-Governing Territory. By the time UNTAET was established in October 1999, the Timor Gap Treaty was fully operational and concessions had been granted in the Zone of Cooperation by Indonesia and Australia, respectively. In order to ensure the continuity of the practical arrangements under the Timor Gap Treaty, UNTAET, acting on behalf of East Timor, concluded on 10 February 2000, an Exchange of Letters with Australia for the continued operation of the terms of the Treaty. Two years later, in anticipation of independence, UNTAET, acting on behalf of East Timor, negotiated with Australia a draft ``Timor Sea Arrangement'' which will replace the Timor Gap Treaty upon the independence of East Timor. In concluding the agreement for the exploration and exploitation of oil and natural gas deposits in the continental shelf of East Timor, UNTAET, on both occasions, consulted fully with representatives of the East Timorese people, who participated actively in the negotiations.

   E. CONCLUSIONS

   21. The question addressed to me by the Security Council namely, ``the legality ..... of actions allegedly taken by the Moroccan authorities consisting in the offering and signing of contracts with foreign companies for the exploration of mineral resources in Western Sahara,'' has been analysed by analogy as part of the more general question of whether mineral resource activities in a Non-Self-Governing Territory by an administering Power is illegal, as such, or only if conducted in disregard of the needs and interests of the people of that territory. An analysis of the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter, General Assembly resolutions, the case law of the International Court of Justice and the practice of States, supports the latter conclusion.

   22. The principle that the interests of the peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories are paramount, and their well-being and development is the ``sacred trust'' of their respective administering Powers, was established in the Charter of the United Nations and further developed in General Assembly by resolutions on the question of decolonization and economic activities in Non-Self-Governing Territories. In recognizing the inalienable rights of the peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories to the natural resources in their territories, the General Assembly has consistently condemned the exploitation and plundering of natural resources and any economic activities which are detrimental to the interests of the peoples of these territories and deprive them of their legitimate rights over their natural resource. It recognized, however, the value of economic activities which are undertaken in accordance with the wishes of the peoples of those territories, and their contribution to the development of such territories.

   23. In the Cases of East Timor and Nauru, the International Court of Justice did not pronounce itself on the question of the legality of economic activities in Non-Self-Governing Territories. It should be noted, however, that in neither case was it alleged that mineral resource exploitation in such territories was illegal per se. In the Case of East Timor, the conclusion of an oil exploitation agreement was allegedly illegal because it was not concluded with the administering Power (Portugal); in the Nauru Case, the illegality allegedly arose because the mineral resource exploitation depleted unnecessarily or inequitably the overlaying lands.

   24. The recent State practice, though limited, is illustrative of an opinio juris on the part of both administering Powers and third States: where resource exploitation activities are concluded in Non-Self-Governing Territories for the benefit of the peoples of these territories, on their behalf, or in consultation with their representatives, they are considered compatible with the Charter obligations of the administering Power, and in conformity with the General Assembly resolutions and the principle of ``permanent sovereignty over natural resources'' enshrined therein.

   25. The foregoing legal principles established in the practice of States and the United Nations pertain to economic activities in Non-Self-Governing Territories, in general, and mineral resource exploitation, in particular. It must be recognized, however, that in the present case, the contracts for oil reconnaissance and evaluation do not entail exploitation or the physical removal of the mineral resources, and no benefits have as of yet accrued. The conclusion is, therefore, that, while the specific contracts which are the subject of the Security Council's request are not in themselves illegal, if further exploration and exploitation activities were to proceed in disregard of the interests and wishes of the people of Western Sahara, they would be in violation of the international law principles applicable to mineral resource activities in Non-Self-Governing Territories.
Hans Corell,

   Under-Secretary for legal Affairs,
The Legal Counsel.

   KINGDOM OF MOROCCO,

   MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, SECRETARIATE,

   Rabat, January 22, 1998.
From: The Minister of State for the Interior.
To: All Walis and Governors of the Kingdom's Prefectures and Provinces.
Object: Training workshops for applicants for identification for the referendum to confirm the Moroccanness of the Sahara.

   This circular results from examination of the daily activity reports on the ethnic workshops, forwarded by yourselves, and from remarks, suggestions and proposals made by the Moroccan party's Observers in the light of seven weeks of identification, some twenty weeks from the end of this operation.

   The results of identification having so far fallen short of the necessary level, owing in part, certainly, to evidence from the Chyoukh representing the other party which is often negative, but also owing to the manifestly insufficient preparation of our applicants, you are invited to pay the closest attention to this briefing and supervise personally, in accordance with my earlier instructions, the strict application of the following measures:

   1. Exhaustive pre-identification of the applicants and their sub-fractions:

   It emerges from the daily activity reports from the ethnic workshops forwarded by yourself that, unfortunately, only a small number of Walis and Governors (see list attached to this circular) have an exact knowledge of the tribes and sub-fractions relevant to their respective commands, and have consequently been able to provide the Ministry of the Interior with statistical data on the applicants that conforms to the information in the central index.

   The others are invited immediately to produce their data on the tribes and sub-fractions and on the number of applicants present in their respective commands and held ready to be summoned at any time to MINURSO's Identification Centres.

   It goes without saying that an incomplete knowledge of the sub-fractions and their numbers in a prefecture or province results in underestimation of the real population of applicants, so that an insufficient number of these is being trained and taken to the Identification Centres, contrary to the objective of my earlier instructions.

   The Walis and Governors concerned will therefore, on receipt of this circular, require their information technology units to contact the central information technology service to arrange immediate presentation of the province's or prefecture's data on the sub-fractions and their numbers.

   2. Preparation of applicants for identification:

   As specified in my previous circulars, the basis for the summoning and identification of applicants by MINURSO is the form filled out by them in 1994, on which the computerised data-banks used by this mission and by the Ministry of the Interior itself are both based.

   Each applicant is registered and can be sought through his form number. The form contains the applicant's main details and those of his father and mother, in addition to all the elements that specify which identification criterion, out of the five criteria defined by the United Nations Peace Plan, is likely to be fulfilled by the applicant.

   The applicant must also have perfect knowledge at least of the contents of the said form. However, when this document does not reflect the applicant's real situation, he should not be imprisoned by it but should seek to make it easy for the Identification Commission to recognise key elements, such as:

   the birthplaces of the applicant and his immediate family (father, mother, children).

   the seasonal pasture zones frequented in the Sahara by the applicant or his family.

   landmark dates in relation to the birth of the applicant and his immediate family (father, mother, children) in the Sahara.

   the lineage of the applicant and his immediate family and kinship with a known Sahrawi family.

   the history of the applicant's tribe and family.

   geography of the region in which they lived and travelled.

   Lastly, there is a need to inculcate the applicant with a psychological stance enabling him to:

   demystify the identification operation and the MINURSO commission.

   be motivated and aware of the stakes in the referendum.

   have confidence in himself and be self-assured.

   overcome shyness and diffidence and speak loudly and clearly.

   learn in advance, from applicants already identified as belonging to the same subfraction, what questions the Identification Commission is asking.

   be able to cite one or more family members already counted or identified, and give their numbers.

   convince the Moroccan Cheikh who will then convince the Identification Commission.

   Full mastery of these elements implies preliminary training of the applicant in his prefecture or province of origin and 2 or 3 days of fine tuning with the Moroccan Cheikh before the identification session.

   3. Responsibilities of the Cheikh and the Observer:

   As specified in the document attached to this circular, concerning ``verification of eligibility'' of applicants, the Cheikh's main mission with MINURSO is to testify that the applicant fulfils one of the five identification criteria defined by the United Nations Peace Plan.

   To this end, it is necessary for the Cheikh to meet at least once with the Observer and the applicants from each sub-fraction to become amply acquainted with the latter in preparation for the identification session. A list, in Arabic, of the applicants from his sub-fraction should be supplied to the Cheikh.

   To facilitate contact between the applicants and the Cheikh of their fraction, the Observer teams will be tripled to enable them to follow the identification operation at the same time as preparing the applicants.

   In the identification session the Cheikh should appear credible and convincing and should not restrict himself to recognizing the applicant, but seek to support and defend him as well. He should listen closely to the applicant's declaration and give active, reasoned and coherent testimony in support of the applicant's answers.

   He should have perfect knowledge of the applicant, his lineage and his links with the sub-fraction and region.

   He should relate this in a clear and convincing manner to the Identification Commission to elicit a positive verdict from it.

    4. Role of the Instructors

   Close contact between the Instructor, the Cheikh and the Observer is essential to train the Cheikh, teach him the identification process and the five eligibility criteria, raise his awareness, motivate him and remove any complexes he may have about the MINURSO Commission.

   At least one full-day session involving the Observer, the Instructor, the Cheikh and the applicants from the sub-fraction is necessary to coordinate, evaluate and plan their common action.

   For each ethnic sub-fraction, it is proposed that a group of applicants from the Southern Provinces who have already been identified, along with qualified cadres from these provinces, should be formed to help with the training programme of applicants from the Northern Provinces.

   These applicants should identify the best-known and most widely distributed parts of their lineage and make them known to the Identification Commission.

   In the same context, applicants from the Northern Provinces who are of Sahrawi origin should be integrated with their respective tribes to familiarize themselves with certain details that may help facilitate their identification.

   Nevertheless, in cases where applicants in this category are certain of their Sahrawi origin but have acquired the culture of Northern Morocco, those concerned should defend their Moroccan personality while providing convincing proofs of their Sahrawi origin.

   Lastly, agents of the authorities, notables, young people and women should be mobilized in support of this operation.

   A special unit is to be established for preparing the Chyoukh, and a system set up to train the Instructors and the Chyoukh in, for example:

   the identification process.

   the five criteria.

   the role of the Chyoukh.

   the technical arrangements.

   Finally, deserving Chyoukh are to be encouraged and treated with respect.

   In conclusion, the next twenty weeks are of determining importance for the outcome of the referendum to confirm the Moroccanness of the Sahara, whose result depends on your immediate action to apply integrally all the instructions you have been given on this subject, which I invite you once again to execute rigorously in liaison with the central Governors concerned, who are required to keep me regularly informed.

   Driss Basri,
The Minister of State for the Interior.