H.R. 550 : The Voter Confidence & Increased Accessibility Act

Answers to Frequently Asked Questions

Q: What audit trail protections does the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) already require?

A: HAVA requires voting machines to produce a "permanent paper record with a manual audit capacity," but this provision fails to mandate anything beyond a print-out of whatever the machine records electronically. H.R. 550 does not change HAVA's audit technology – "a permanent paper record;" it makes the audit record more meaningful by requiring that the voters, rather than the voting machines, verify the accuracy of what is printed on it. In other words, while HAVA requires a paper record, the contents of the paper record are not required to be voter-verified. As a result, voters would never know – and election officials could never determine – whether a faulty voting machine erroneously recorded the voter’s intent and that erroneous data was printed on the "permanent paper record." H.R. 550 would require that voters be able to verify the accuracy of a paper record of their vote, which will mirror the electronic copy of their vote if nothing is amiss with the software, and neither voters nor election officials would be left to rely exclusively on an unauditable electronic tally.

Q: Why don't "ballot images," protective counters and other electronic records sufficiently protect the accuracy, integrity, and security of the results?

A: A "ballot image" is, assuming it is accurate, an electronic recording of a voter's vote recorded and stored inside the voting machine that may be (but generally is not with the voter present) printed out as an individual record. A protective counter is a data receptacle inside a voting machine that records, in a "duplicate location", the same set of data recorded in the "primary location" inside the machine. However, ballot images, data stored on protective counters and other electronic records are all recorded inside the voting machine, beyond the voter’s view and through the use of the same software that received and processed the incoming information. Anything that is electronic and internal to the voting system is subject to the same software glitches, bugs, irregularities and other security risks as the voting system itself. If the computer's software processed the incoming data (votes cast) incorrectly in the first instance, the fact that it then stores that incorrect data in more than one place or in more than one format provides no security benefit, and no auditability benefit -- that incorrect data would simply be repeated in all of the "ballot images," in the protective counter, and elsewhere in the system The only way to know whether the data was received, processed and recorded in accordance with the voter's intention is if a comparison can be made between paper records verified by the voters themselves and the electronically recorded "ballot images" or other data. Without a complete set of voter verified records, that comparison to the electronic tally cannot be made, and errors and irregularities in the system’s software can never be discovered nor proven.

Q: Should voting systems offer flexibility in "verification" mechanisms?

A: As above, all records that are processed and stored strictly electronically and internally to a voting system cannot be verified except by comparison to a companion set of records actually verified by voters. Any system that offers paper ballots only to voters who choose them and otherwise relies on various sorts of electronic or digital records cannot by fully audited; at best, the voter verified paper ballots, to the extent used, would serve only as a "sample" or a "poll" of the accuracy of the total electronic tally, not an "audit" of the accuracy of the electronic tally.

There may be instances in which access to the verification process for individuals with disabilities is facilitated by the use of a hard copy format other than paper, and HR 550 allows in the case of systems for use by individuals with disabilities. However, a complete audit or recount of any particular contest (1) can only be undertaken if every vote cast in the contest has an independent paper or other hard copy replica of itself verified by the voter who cast it and (2) can only reasonably and expeditiously be undertaken if the number of formats upon which those individual voter verified records are recorded are reasonably limited in number (for example, a paper ballots for every single vote except such votes as are cast on some other hard copy format in order to facilitate access to the verification system by individuals with disabilities). HAVA mandated only one audit technology – "a permanent paper record." HR 550, because it requires the voters, rather than the voting machines, to verify what is printed or recorded on that permanent record, requires a voter verified paper ballot for every voter except those who require an accommodation in order to have access to the verification process, in which case another hard copy format is acceptable.

Q: Have there been any proven instances of fraud on DREs?

A: When the certificate of Ohio’s electoral votes was challenged in Congress in January 2005, a Republican Member of Congress said "There is no evidence whatsoever . . . that the claims that are being made are valid." That is the problem – there is no evidence. In all of the recent computer assisted elections there have been ample accounts of errors and irregularities with computerized voting results. In fact, without an independent, voter-verified paper trail, it is impossible to discover almost any but the most egregious anomalies, accidental or intentional. A voter-verified paper audit trail would enable a complete audit of close or questionable elections, and more fundamentally, would give voters confidence that their votes are actually being recorded and counted as they intended.

Q: Won't paper ballots be tampered with? Or sold?

A: Though some have described the voter-verified paper record as a "receipt," H.R. 550 requires the record to be preserved "within the polling place"; thus, the records cannot leave the polling place with the voters. (If they did, those "receipts" could be used to sell votes or intimidate voters.) Rather, the voter-verified paper audit trail gives the voters an opportunity to confirm that their intentions were recorded and can be recounted accurately, and election officials the documentation needed to independently audit the results reported by the electronic voting machines. American election officials have more than 200 years of experience in dealing with security concerns related to paper ballots, but comparatively little in dealing with security concerns involving privately owned and controlled electronic voting systems running on proprietary software that has no independent audit mechanism. Most polling places offer paper ballots for emergency use if equipment malfunctions and for provisional voting; thus, they must have procedures for handling paper securely. In addition, anyone who would tamper with (for example, steal) paper ballots would also tamper with (for example, steal) cassettes or other receptacles containing digitally recorded ballots. The use of paper ballots in voting systems does not create fraud activity where there would otherwise be none and do provide the opportunity to detect fraud or error.

Q: How will the requirement for a voter verified paper trail be paid for?

A: The Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act authorizes for the states $150,000,000 in funds to defray the cost of meeting the requirement for a voter verified paper trail. The amounts authorized remain available without fiscal year limitation until expended, and may be used by States to reimburse themselves for expenditures already made to meet the voter verified paper trail requirements.

Q: When are H.R. 550's requirements to be implemented?

A: H.R. 550's new audit trail requirements will be required as of HAVA’s original January 2006 deadline. Because the technology necessary to meet all of the requirement in the bill exists and is in use in various jurisdictions, it is reasonable to mandate that it be more fully deployed to preserve the integrity of the very next general election cycle. H.R. 550 does not modify HAVA’s disability access deadline.

Q: Why does H.R. 550 only address voter verified paper trails – aren’t there other issues of importance to the integrity of our electoral process?

A: There are many aspects of our electoral process – as affected by HAVA and otherwise -- that are important. The 2004 election made it clear that much work is yet to be done in a variety of areas, and Congressman Holt addresses many of those other issues through additional legislation or cosponsorship of legislation offered by other Members of Congress. But in November 2004 as many as 50 million voters voted on electronic voting machines with no voter verified paper trail. The accuracy of the vote count in those instances can never be confirmed, and there was enough distrust of November’s election results that a challenge to the certificate of the electoral votes from Ohio was launched, heard and voted upon in Congress before the 2004 election was ratified. Therefore, this security and auditability enhancement – a voter verified paper audit trail -- must be implemented as soon as possible, and before the next general election. H.R. 550 is not designed to solve every problem with the electoral process, only one of the most fundamental and pressing: the current lack of the ability to verify the accuracy of approximately 50 million American votes.

Q: Does H.R. 550 compromise confidentiality or accessibility for disabled voters?

A: No. H.R. 550 preserves HAVA’s existing disability access requirements and the timing and conditions under which they are required to be implemented. It also adds to those requirements, by mandating that voter verification mechanisms be made accessible to individuals with disabilities, and that the entire voter verification process be made accessible to individuals with disabilities. Voter verification mechanisms for use by individuals with disabilities may print the voter verified record on paper, or on another individualized, permanent medium. In addition, to the extent that any voter requires assistance while HAVA and/or H.R. 550 requirements are being implemented, H.R. 550 requires that poll workers receive specific instruction on the pre-existing right of individuals with disabilities to vote with the assistance of an aide of their own choosing (as opposed to the aide of a poll worker).