

COMPLETE TESTIMONY OF

MARK W. CRISP, PE
MANAGING CONSULTANT
C. H. GUERNSEY & COMPANY

SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF
THE CITY OF LAGRANGE
AND
THE WEST POINT LAKE COALITION

BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS
ON THE CONDITION OF WEST POINT LAKE AND THE IMPACTS OF THE
INTERIM OPERATING PLAN AND THE DROUGHT

MARCH 25, 2008

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Suite 950
Atlanta, Georgia 30339
770.857.1250

Good morning Members of the House Committee on Small Business. Welcome to West Georgia, the City of LaGrange and the West Point Lake Community. My name is Mark W. Crisp, PE. I am an engineering consultant engaged by City of LaGrange, Georgia and the West Point Lake Coalition to examine a number of issues and opportunities associated with West Point Lake. My primary areas of practice are water resources, basinwide hydrologic system operations, and hydropower operations. For many years the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin (“ACF”) (See Exhibit 1) has operated with minimal conflicts and relatively good availability of water through natural rainfall. However, during the last 20-25 years, our climatology has seen a significant change. For the greater part of the 20th century our climatology experienced robust and extensive wet seasons during the months of December through April with additional contributions of rainfall during Summer thunderstorms that occurred almost daily across much of the Southeast, including Georgia. However, starting in the early 1980’s and continuing today, our climatology has shifted to a more arid condition. Winter and Spring storms are less frequent and our Summer thunderstorm patter has moderated, as well. The cause of this climate moderation is a topic for another day. However, the effects of climate moderation and the Corps of Engineers operational response is the topic for discussion today, especially as it relates to how the Corps has operated West Point Lake during the last two (2) years in particular. A critical and significant factor in the Corps operation of West Point Lake has been the extreme effect caused by the US Fish & Wildlife’s Biological Opinion and the Corps Interim Operation Plan initiated in the ACF Basin in the Spring of 2006.

During the time period from 1980 through the present, the ACF has experienced three (3) major droughts; the drought of 1981, the drought of 1986-1988, and the current drought that actually started in 1998 and continues today. Many climatologists and meteorologists claim the current drought is a separate cycle from the one initiated in 1998. However, only a cursory level examination of rainfall data for this region for the period 1996-2007 clearly indicates that we never escaped the vise of the drought started in 1998. As a matter of fact, we continue to suffer from this drought to the tune of some 56.1 inches of rainfall below average that we have not received during the 1998 to 2008 time frame (See Exhibit 2). To exacerbate matters, during three years in the early 2000's that we received above average rainfall it was only due to remnant hurricanes that moved up from the Gulf coast. However, as beneficial as this rainfall was, it was short-lived and only benefited the reservoirs by providing a needed immediate boost to the lake elevations. The intense rainfall over a very short duration (1-2 days) mostly provided for immediate runoff into the major rivers and provided little to no benefit to restoring "order" to the hydrologic cycle (See Exhibit 2). If we discount this tropical rainfall, we are actually some 100 inches below average for the 12 years since 1996. That is over 8 feet below average. At the same time as the onset of our current, more arid weather cycle, the Southeast and particularly the Metro Atlanta Region was experiencing unprecedented growth in population. The planning agencies of the region looked primarily to the least expensive and most readily accessible source of water, storage of the Federal reservoir system, as a "savior" for water supply resources. The Corps of Engineers eagerly obliged the water supply utilities without formally undergoing the necessary processes to establish contracts. The conflicts started to arise between the

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Congressionally authorized project purposes and those uses that were seen as incidental benefits. These conflicts generated the now infamous “Water Wars” that have been going on for over two decades, through at least two administrations in each of the affected statehouses and continues today with little hope “at the end of the tunnel.”

As early as 2002, the US Fish and Wildlife and the Corps of Engineers initiated informal discussions concerning several species of freshwater mussels and the Gulf sturgeon. Fish & Wildlife was in the process of declaring some of the mussels and the Gulf Sturgeon as Endangered per the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). Declaring the species “endangered” provided the Fish & Wildlife with almost an unlimited arsenal of methods to effect change in the operations of Federal water projects that had been in operation with established operating plans that date back as far as 50 years. The entrance of the US Fish & Wildlife and the ESA brought a whole new dynamic to the escalating Water Wars. With little to no well defined objectives or performance matrices, the ESA has allowed Fish & Wildlife to dictate to the Corps how much water must be released downstream of the Jim Woodruff Dam during any seasonal period with little regard for upstream uses.

At this point, we now have major droughts, escalating water demands in the upper regions of the ACF, competing use issues for reservoir storage other than Congressional authorized uses, three States competing for a “share of the pie” and Fish & Wildlife playing the “nuclear option” in the lower portion of the basin. Unfortunately, West Point Lake sits squarely in the middle of the basin. Lake Lanier (Buford Project) sits at the

upper boundary of the basin and makes up a significant portion of the Metro Atlanta's water supply storage. Recreation, although not an authorized purpose of Lanier is also a significant economic incidental benefit of Lanier. However, unlike Lanier, West Point Lake does have recreation, sport fishing, and wildlife development as a specified and well defined Congressional Authorization. Political pressure on the Corps to maintain pool elevations at Lanier has been intense over the years. There is also significant concern that Lanier also holds over 60 % of the storage in the ACF basin yet it sits so far towards the headwaters of the Chattahoochee River. As such, it controls huge volumes of water (1,087,600 ac-ft in the conservation storage). Due to the political pressure to maintain reservoir elevations and support water supply, Lake Lanier is operated much as the "backstop" to the system. Only if everything else fails will Lanier be looked at as a resource to meet downstream needs, even with conservation storage that exceeds West Point Lake by 780,000 acre-ft, nearly 3.5 times that of West Point Lake (See Exhibits 3-1 & 3-2). With West Point Lake in its location, it is an easy target for the Corps to use, as recently referred to by General Schroedel, SAD Commander, as the "workhorse" of the system. However, in this case, the workhorse is being turned into a "mistreated sway-backed nag" due to over use, rapid and repeated fluctuations in elevations, and excessive drawdowns to support functions Congress never anticipated nor studies ever supported. The reservoir continues to suffer due to outdated operational plans and rule curves that penalize the reservoir when there is good rainfall. An example of the unauthorized purposes not conveyed to the Corps for use of storage at West Point Lake or any other of the Federal storage projects includes "providing cooling water associated with thermoelectric power as well as the accommodation of other municipal and industrial

needs such as non-Federal hydropower generation...” as stated to Congressman Westmoreland by General Schroedel in his letter dated November 27, 2007 (See Exhibit 5).

The “nuclear option” played by the US Fish & Wildlife that initiated the development of the Biologic Opinion and the Interim Operating Plan (“IOP”) created havoc with regards to the operation of West Point Lake during 2006 and 2007. In as much as the plan called for the release of huge volumes of water into the Apalachicola River from the Jim Woodruff project, the Environmental Assessment performed by the Corps did not effectively investigate the impacts it would have on upstream storage projects, particularly West Point Lake. As a matter of fact, personnel from the Corps actually stated during public comment sessions that they did not look at upstream reservoirs because “the EA and IOP was for only Jim Woodruff project and downstream.” This myopic viewpoint and total lack of understanding of how the projects are linked hydrologically is troubling at best. The Corps has been operating this system for over 50 years, and certainly should understand by now that any modification to operations that requires the release of as much as 37,000 cfs into the Apalachicola River cannot be sustained by Woodruff itself. The Corps and Fish & Wildlife’s zeal to accomplish “some” change during a period of extreme drought and intense negotiations between states typifies current philosophy employed in the Federal negotiations and failed compact discussions; “let’s find an answer and then we will develop the science to justify the answer.” Unfortunately for the Corps and Fish & Wildlife, this drought turned into the drought of record and the extreme demands placed on West Point Lake drained it to

near its lowest elevation on record. So low that the Corps made the decision that it could not afford to draw on West Point any further. Therefore they had to turn to Lake Lanier in order to meet the flow requirements of the IOP in the Apalachicola River. This action subsequently drained Lake Lanier to an all time record low level that appears to be unrecoverable this Spring. At Lanier's present elevation (1055.9, March 20, 2000), if we do not receive extraordinary rainfall during April and May, Lanier will enter the Summer of 2008 at an unprecedented low elevation. All for the sturgeon and mussels that, to date, no one can tell you, quantitatively, that the massive releases of 2006 and 2007 has done any good to restore habitat or populations.

The Corps of Engineers has claimed the IOP only accounted for 0.5 feet of the drawdown for West Point Lake during 2007 (Letter from Gen Schroedel to Congressman Westmoreland, dated November 15, 2007, subsequently confirmed in Westmoreland to Schroedel, dated, December 5, 2007, copy attached). However, if you compare the operational results, i.e., reservoir elevations, etc., of this drought (2007) with that of the drought period in 2000, it is easy to see that the Corps held reservoir elevations much higher during the previous droughts while meeting the downstream demands. The major change between those droughts and this one was approximately 4 inches less rainfall spread over the year and the implementation of the IOP. Therefore, the IOP **did** cause significantly worse conditions than the 0.5 foot drawdown at West Point as alleged by the Corps (See Exhibits 6 & 7).

If the Corps had taken a more aggressive and conservative approach to water management, knowing we were in the midst of a multi-year drought of significance, West Point Lake could have been sustained at levels above 630.0 well into the Summer of 2007, Lake Lanier could have been held higher and the releases into the Apalachicola River downstream of Jim Woodruff Dam could have been sustained at levels greater than those that were naturally produced but much less than the grossly exaggerated flows required by the IOP. As pointed out earlier, the drought of the Summer of 2007 is a continuation of a multi-year drought stretching back to 1998 as its origin. The rainfall we have received over the last 12 years cumulatively is 56.1 inches below the cumulative average (See Exhibit 2). If we discount the effects of tropical precipitation during this period we are 100 inches below average. For the last 12 years, only four of those years have produced rainfall greater than the long term average. During these four (4) years of above average rainfall, we did not receive sufficient rainfall to overcome the long term effects of the remaining eight (8) years. Had the Corps been “manning the rudder” tracking rainfall, tracking climatic conditions and reservoirs response, the devastation caused by an ill conceived plan such as the IOP would not have been exacerbated by the drought.

Entering the Summer of 2006 (June 1, 2006), West Point Lake’s elevation was at 631.3, 4.7 feet below the Summer Full Pool Elevation. This also equates to over 1 foot below the “recreation impact level” where opportunities for recreation are negatively impacted. I must remind you that recreation at West Point Lake was specifically and deliberately authorized by Congress and intended to be a significant part of the overall operational

plan not just an ancillary benefit to be available only when the Corps found it convenient. As the Summer progressed, the lake continued to operate within a 2 foot band width through most of 2006 and into the Spring of 2007 (See Exhibit 8). Beginning in May of 2007, West Point started a precipitous fall that did not end until the lake reached a near historic low in the early Winter of 621.75. This rapid fall has been characterized as exclusively due to the drought, except for 0.5 feet. However, when compared with other droughts periods during the last 25 years, there is no evidence to support this argument. The Water Control Plan for West Point Lake is the same as that utilized during each of the earlier droughts. While there are some day-to-day operational decisions that are made that may not be consistent from one drought to the next, the overall operational guidance is the same. The Corps has said that they maintain consistency with the Water Control Plans, therefore, it must be assumed that, in general, the management of the project was essentially the same for the 2006-2007 period as it was for the 1981 drought, 1986-1988 drought and the 1998-2001 phase of the current drought. The only change to the management plan was the adoption of the onerous characteristics of the IOP. As can be seen in Exhibits 6 & 7, the regional rainfall that occurred was reasonably consistent with the rainfall pattern of the year 2000. However, as can also be seen, the reservoirs at Lanier and West Point were managed very differently between the two droughts. During 2007 Lake Lanier was held higher well into the Winter of 2007 than the corresponding 2000 drought, while West Point Lake was West Point Lake was dropped to its near historic low by November of 2007. West Point Lake was not dropped nearly so steadily or precipitously in 2000. As a matter of fact, in 2000 West Point Lake was maintained nearly flat at elevation 631 while receiving very similar rainfall patterns during this time.

Again, the only, plausible explanation, since the Corps is adamant about operating according to their Water Control Plan which has not changed, is the adoption of the IOP. For the Corps and Fish & Wildlife to continue to refute this is absolutely ludicrous. Compounding the detrimental effects of the IOP on West Point Lake is the fact that the Corps, in its selfish efforts to preserve Lake Lanier for water supply and recreation, curtailed releases compared to their operations in 2000, which would have made up additional inflow into West Point helping to slow the massive drawdown (See Exhibit 7). Exhibit 7 clearly shows that the Lake Lanier elevation during 2007 was maintained higher than in 2000, even with somewhat lower rainfall occurring in 2007. Unfortunately, West Point Lake was placed into an untenable position by the Corps. It was looked at, as described by the Corps, as the “workhorse.” However, as the workhorse, West Point was called upon to make massive releases for downstream flows into the Apalachicola River that could not be sustained from storage. Meanwhile, the Corps was making smaller releases at Lake Lanier to preserve its elevation. Operating in this manner constrained West Point by limiting inflows from upstream while simultaneously ordering large releases from storage.

The IOP also required that the releases from Jim Woodruff Dam be reduced according to a “ramp down process.” The ramp down was developed to ostensibly minimize stranding of mussel species as the tailwater elevation was reduced as hydropower generation was curtailed. This theory is predicated on the assumption that the mussels had time and did “move” up into shallow water as the generation schedule released more water thereby increasing the tailwater elevation. Unfortunately, the Corps nor US Fish & Wildlife can

predict with any reasonable accuracy the movement of mussels, their response rate to increasing or decreasing water levels, or the ability of mussels to anticipate the need to move into shallow water. Therefore, the whole ramping issue is one of supposition and speculation. Absent sound science, the ramp down rate (See Exhibit 9) causes serious upstream impacts to storage due to the need to augment flows simply to accommodate the ramping process. Again, a process that neither the Corps nor Fish & Wildlife anticipated, understood, or modeled in their original EA and FONSI. Therefore, the upstream impacts were overlooked and, subsequently, the FONSI did not accurately portray the cumulative effects of the IOP. The ramp down process requires a slow progression of flow curtailments that translate to a slow decay of tailwater elevation from 0.25 feet per day to 0.5 feet per day, if flows are within the powerhouse capacity. If the powerhouse is generating at full capacity or about 16,000 cfs when it is determined the need for downstream flows has been met, it will take another 10 to 12 days just to shut down the units and stay within the ramp down criteria. However, the normal operational cycle will require the units to be loaded the next day for a power generation schedule. Therefore, theoretically, as long as the flows downstream for the mussels and sturgeons are requiring turbine capacity flow or greater, the units will run 24/7 due to the ramping criteria. The requirement to run 24/7 in order to meet the ramp down criteria causes the upstream reservoirs, primarily West Point, to release water from storage just to sustain this illogical approach to system management. Not only is this illogical from a system management perspective, it is counter productive to one of the stated goals of the State of Florida, that of protection of the Apalachicola Bay and Estuary. The influx of this continuous abnormal flow of freshwater into the bay creates a “plume of freshwater” that dilutes the

salinity concentration in the plume region, changing the critical habitat of the fishery and nursery of the bay. So, while at one end of the Apalachicola River, the Corps and Fish & Wildlife seek to establish a new habitat criterion for mussels and sturgeon, it simultaneously placed the valued oyster industry of the Apalachicola Bay in jeopardy.

What could have been done to avoid such a damaging situation from occurring? During 2007 even in the midst of the worst drought of record, the Basin Inflow during the Winter and early Spring of 2007 was producing flows in excess of 5,000 cfs, the Flint River, by itself was producing flows in excess of the 5,000 cfs minimum flow requirement (See Exhibit 10). In some cases the basin inflows exceeded 35,000 cfs. However, due to the overly aggressive nature of the flow requirements of the IOP, and the fact the Corps and Fish & Wildlife did not anticipate nor track the evolving drought, nearly all of this available water was “flushed” through the system, as required by the IOP, without regard to refilling the system reservoirs. Had the flow requirement at Woodruff Dam taken into account the need to refill critical storage, nearly 1 Million Ac-Ft. of water over the yearly period of 2007 could have been preserved in the upstream reservoirs. If West Point had received just 20% of this, not only would the reservoir been able to refill before the Summer period, something it has not done since the July of 2005, but it would have had much more water storage in reserve that may have averted the catastrophic events of the Summer of 2007 that impacted the economy and livelihood of so many residential, small business and commercial interests of the LaGrange, West Georgia and East Alabama region. While “carving” out some of the basin inflow for storage replenishment, the Flint River, by its self could have produced flows at Woodruff in excess of 10,000 cfs for

much of the Spring and with a contribution of approximately 3,000 cfs from the Chattahoochee River (Flow attributed to normal instream requirements plus incremental inflows) it is extremely doubtful the mussels or sturgeons would have noticed there was much of a drought. In fact, if the more conservative approach had been taken, there would not have been such a “rush to judgment” about loss of mussels due to stranding. The flows would have been less variable but still sufficient to support sturgeon spawning.

It is clear the IOP has been and continues to be a significantly detrimental tool employed by the Corp and Fish & Wildlife in the name of Endangered Species. Asking the Corps and Fish & Wildlife if the operation under the IOP has been beneficial to the sturgeons and mussels, they cannot state with irrefutable scientific evidence that it has been beneficial nor can they, quantitatively, provide evidence that it will be beneficial in the future. Yet, we have documented severe negative impact to West Point Lake, West Georgia and the East Alabama region that the Corps **never** addressed in their so called “Finding of No Significant Impact.”


Concurrent with the IOP process in the Apalachicola River, there are rivers and habitats that Fish & Wildlife has identified in surrounding regions of the Gulf coastal area that they characterize as having these same threatened and endangered species (See Habitat Designation at US Fish & Wildlife Web Site for mussels and sturgeon, respectively: <http://www.fws.gov/southeast/drought/CH-FinalRule-PublishedFederalRegister.pdf> and http://www.fws.gov/alabama/gs/GS_final_rule.html). However, in many of these habitats, there are no storage projects to use to aid in flow augmentations nor are there

projects that create modified hydrologic flow regimes that Fish & Wildlife claim is a prime cause of mussel and sturgeon decline. While Fish & Wildlife and the Corps, under the umbrella of the ESA and the IOP, actively search for some beneficial matrix of operations that will produced the desired results of habitat improvement and species protection in the Apalachicola River, their combined efforts have placed an extraordinary burden on West Point Lake, specifically, and the entire ACF system of storage reservoirs. The Corps performed a perfunctory Environmental Assessment (“EA”) and subsequently issued a premature Finding of No Significant Impact (“FONSI”). However, the Corps alternatives did not examine the impacts of severe droughts; did not examine the effects of the ramping rates; did not examine in detail the economic and social damage that the IOP would cause upstream; did not adequately examine the options available to sustain viable communities in other river basins; has not provided sound science to back up supposition, speculation and guesswork about the actual life cycle of the species and their actual response to changing conditions; nor did they examine the cumulative impacts as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and other standards such as Environmental Justice. Again, the Corps and Fish & Wildlife had an “end game” in mind and there process was formulated in such a manner as to facilitate that end game with total disregard for the upstream reservoirs and particularly West Point Lake.

This concludes my testimony. Again, I appreciate the Committee taking time to convene this Field Hearing on such an important issue to the West Point Lake community, West Georgia and East Alabama. I am available to the Committee for questioning at your convenience.


Exhibits

Exhibit 1	ACF Map
Exhibit 2	Yearly Precipitation
Exhibit 3	Storage Tables for Lake Lanier and West Point Lake
Exhibit 4	Congressman Westmoreland Letter to General Schroedel
Exhibit 5	General Schroedel Letter to Congressman Westmoreland
Exhibit 6	West Point Lake Elevation vs. Rainfall
Exhibit 7	Lake Lanier Elevation vs. Rainfall
Exhibit 8	West Point Lake Elevation
Exhibit 9	Ramping Rates
Exhibit 10	Basin Inflows



Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin

1996 to 2007 Atlanta Yearly Precipitation



Tropical Precipitation (>1.5")

1997 - Tropical Depression Danny

1998 - Tropical Storm Earl

2000 - Tropical Depression Helen

2002 - Tropical Depression Hanna

2003 - Tropical Storm Bill

2004 - Tropical Depression Frances

- Tropical Storm Ivan

- Tropical Depression Jeanne

2005 - Tropical Depression Cindy

- Tropical Depression Dennis

- Hurricane Katrina

2006 - Tropical Storm Ernesto

Cons. Storage 71,000,000

1240 = 1148 ac-ft

Table 1-1

Euford Reservoir Area and Capacity
in Acres and Acre-Feet

Pool Elev	Total Area	Total Storage	Pool Elev	Total Area	Total Storage	Pool Elev	Total Area	Total Storage
920	0	0	1043	25701	1059900	1069	37515	1879200
			1044	26159	1085900			
940	1050	5000	1045	26619	1112200	1070	38024	1917000
			1046	27079	1139200	1071@	38542	1935200
960	3100	37000	1047	27535	1166300	1072	39078	1994200
			1048	27983	1194300	1073	39638	2033600
980	6450	121000	1049	28432	1222300	1074	40226	2073600
						1075	40833	2114000
1000	10984	296500	1050	28861	1250900	1076	41458	2155000
			1051	29291	1279900	1077	42086	2196900
1010	13819	420200	1052	29721	1309500	1078	42716	2239300
			1053	30153	1339500	1079	43348	2282300
1020	16912	574000	1054	30587	1369800			
			1055	31023	1400800	1080	43982	2326000
1030	20508	760100	1056	31461	1431800	1081	44618	2370300
1031	20894	781000	1057	31901	1463800	1082	45256	2415300
1032	21281	802000	1058	32343	1495800	1083	45896	2460800
1033	21668	823600	1059	32789	1528200	1084	46538	2507000
1034	22053	845600				1085+	47182	2554000
1035*	22442	867600	1060	33238	1561200			
1036	22829	890300	1061	33690	1594700	1090	50250	2800000
1037	23217	913300	1062	34147	1628700			
1038	23609	936500	1063	34610	1663000	1095	53300	3070000
1039	24008	960500	1064	35079	1698000			
			1065	35555	1733100	1100	56500	3330000
1040	24416	984500	1066	36036	1769100			
1041	24833	1009300	1067	36522	1805200	1110	62900	3850000
1042	25257	1034300	1068	37015	1842200			

*Minimum conservation pool @Top of conservation pool +Top of flood control pool

1-15. Powerhouse. The powerhouse is located in a deep rock cut at the right end of the earth dam just downstream from the intake structure. The powerhouse is a concrete structure, 205 feet long by 94.5 feet wide, and consists of 3 generating bays and an erection bay. A 6,000-kw unit is located at the right end, two 40,000-kw units in the center and the erection bay is located at the left end of the powerhouse. The flood control sluice passes through the substructure of the erection bay. The control room, all auxiliary services, public spaces and offices are located downstream from the units and erection space. Rating curves for the turbine discharge are shown on Charts 7 and 8.

1-16. Switchyard and transformer substation. The switchyard is located as shown on Charts 2 and 3. The step-up transformers are at the left end of the powerhouse. The transformer yard is connected to the powerhouse by a short power cable tunnel. The switchyard, located to the right of the powerhouse on a hill overlooking the site, is connected to the transformers by overhead lines spanning the tailrace. Control cables are extended to the switchyard through a vertical cable shaft and an underground duct.

B1-4

72 hour -
96 hour -
120 hour -

1040 sq. mi
Ave of 0.809' min
Flood Storage = 598,800 ac-ft

West Point Reservoir
Area and capacity

Elevation - msl (Level surface or flat pool)	Total area (acres)	Total Storage (ac. - ft.)
*620 ✓	15,512	298,396
621	16,100	314,202
622 ✓	16,702	330,602
623	17,318	347,612
624	17,949	365,245
**625 ✓	18,593	383,515
626	19,252	402,437
627 ✓	19,926	422,025
628	20,615	442,295
629 ✓	21,318	463,260
630	22,037	484,937
631 ✓	22,771	507,340
632	23,520	530,485
633 ✓	24,286	554,387
634	25,067	579,062
***635 ✓	25,864	604,527
636	26,677	630,796
637	27,507	657,887
638 ✓	28,353	685,816
639	29,216	714,600
640	30,096	744,254
**** 641 ✓	30,993	774,798
642	31,907	806,246
643	32,838	838,618
644	33,788	871,930
645 ✓	34,755	906,200

- * Minimum power pool
 ** Top of power pool - December through April
 *** Top of power pool - June through October
 **** Top of flood control pool

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND
3RD DISTRICT, GEORGIA

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1213 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-1008

December 5, 2007

COMMITTEES:
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REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE

Brigadier General Joseph Schroedel
Commander
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
South Atlantic Division
60 Forsyth Street, SE
Atlanta, GA 30303-9901

Dear General Schroedel,


I am in receipt of your November 15th, 2007 response to my letter requesting clarification about the U.S. Army Corps of Engineer's position as to the cause of low lake levels at West Point Lake. Thank you very much for your quick response.

In the above mentioned letter addressed to me you stated that, *"Concerning the impacts from the Interim Operations Plan (IOP) on water levels at West Point Lake, modeling has indicated that implementation of the IOP would result in a 0.5 or less reduction in the lake level."*

I am requesting a copy of that modeling study and any supporting documentation that would support such a conclusion.

If you have any questions please feel free to call me, or my Chief of Staff, Chip Lake, at 202-225-5901.

Sincerely,



Lynn A. Westmoreland



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
SOUTH ATLANTIC DIVISION, CORPS OF ENGINEERS
ROOM 9M15, 60 FORSYTH ST., S.W.
ATLANTA, GA 30303-8801

CESAD-DE

November 27, 2007

The Honorable Lynn A. Westmoreland
1213 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Westmoreland:

Thank you for your November 13, 2007 letter regarding our Water Roundtable meeting on November 8th and your subsequent questions. We are working expeditiously to assist the States in resolving the ultimate issues related to the allocation of water in the ACF Basin.

The Corps of Engineers operates the ACF system and its projects in accordance with Congressional authorization and applicable environmental laws. These Congressional authorities are set forth either as specific project purposes or as more general Congressional authorizations for purposes that are not associated with specially named projects. As a Federal Agency, we may not act beyond the extent authorized by Congress. Therefore, when making decisions as to management of the ACF system, we look to Congressional authorizations to guide those decisions.

We believe we are reasonably managing the ACF system and West Point Lake, consistent with current authorities and limited available supplies of water. The drought is adversely affecting all options. We are doing our best to act consistently with Congressional authorizations and to balance competing interests for that limited available water in these extreme drought conditions. The Corps of Engineers is not managing the ACF Basin for thermoelectric power. Nor are we managing the ACF system for any unauthorized purposes. The Corps does operate these projects on a cooperative basis with States and local governments by making water supply storage space in reservoirs available to governmental entities for municipal and industrial use, pursuant to the authority of the 1958 Water Supply Act, where that is possible and appropriate, and by taking the needs of all stakeholders and users along the system into account. We accomplish this latter objective by monitoring water flows at various points along the system so that sufficient supplies of good quality water are available for various uses, including providing cooling water associated with the thermoelectric power you mentioned as well as the accommodation of other municipal and industrial needs such as non-Federal hydropower generation at other sites and the supplies of drinking water that are drawn directly from the river.

We are aware of the impacts the drought is having on communities. The stakeholder input obtained during our bi-weekly drought teleconferences has been very beneficial in our decision-making.

I trust this sufficiently answers the questions you have asked concerning the management of the water resources of the ACF Basin during these extreme drought conditions. If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Joseph Schroedel". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "J" and "S".

Joseph Schroedel
Brigadier General, US Army
Commanding

West Point Elevation vs Rainfall

Exhibit 6





Exhibit 7

Lake Lanier Elevation vs Rainfall



Lake West Point Maximum Monthly Elevation

Exhibit 8

vs
Total Monthly Rainfall




Exhibit 9

IOP minimum discharge from Woodruff Dam by month and by basin flow (BI) rates.

		Basin Inflow (cfs)^a	Releases from Woodruff Dam (cfs)
March - May	High	>= 37,400	not less than 37,400
	Mid	>= 20,400 and < 37,400	>= 70% BI; not less than 20,400
	Low	< 20,400	>= BI; not less than 5,000
June - February	High	>= 23,000	not less than 16,000
	Mid	>= 8,000 and < 23,000	>= 70% BI; not less than 8,000
	Low	< 8,000	>= BI; not less than 5,000
<p>^a The running 7-day average daily inflow to the Corps' ACF reservoir projects, excluding releases from project storage.</p>			

IOP maximum fall rate for discharge from Woodruff Dam by release range.

Release Range (cfs)	Maximum Fall Rate (ft/day)^a
> 30,000	Fall rate is not limited.
> 20,000 and < 30,000	1.0 to 2.0
> 16,000 and < 20,000	0.5 to 1.0
> 8,000 and < 16,000	0.25 to 0.5
< 8,000	0.25 or less
<p>^a Consistent with safety requirements, flood control purposes, and equipment capabilities, the IOP indicates that the Corps will attempt to limit fall rates to the lower value specified for each release range.</p>	

Exhibit 10

Total Basin Inflow & Flint River Basin Inflow

