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Statements and Letters

September 19, 1994

The Honorable Federico F. Pena
Secretary
Department of Transportation
400 Seventh Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Secretary Pena:

For more than a year, the Los Angeles Times has published a series of investigative reports on problems regarding construction of the Metro Rail Red Line in Los Angeles. They are serious problems, including the presence of methane gas and hydrogen sulfide in some stations, tunnel walls that were built much thinner than contract specifications, and ground sinkage along Hollywood Boulevard of up to nine inches.

At the core of these failures is a pattern of what appears to be indifference to accepted construction practices and disregard of existing requirements. I request that the Department of Transportation conduct a formal review of these problems -- including the performance of the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA), its subway construction contractors, and its management firm -- to determine what federal action is appropriate under the circumstances.

The following cases demonstrate why a comprehensive review is warranted.

METHANE GAS AND HYDROGEN SULFIDE LEAKS

In 1985, I raised concerns about constructing and operating a subway system in areas where dangerous gas is present after a large methane gas explosion occurred in my district. The City Council appointed a committee of technical experts to address my concerns, and transit officials promised to implement its list of recommendations. It ignored at least two: that gas sensors be put in passenger areas at the platform level inside the stations and in elevated exhaust ducts outside the station, and that automated emergency fans be used to disperse unacceptable levels of gas. Instead, according to a Los Angeles Times story on May 23, 1994, sensors were placed only in exhaust ducts outside the station at almost street level, and the emergency fans remained manually operated. Hydrogen sulfide is heavier than air, and placement of sensors inside the stations at passenger platform levels was considered necessary to get adequate readings of the presence of the gas.

To prevent dangerous gases from penetrating tunnel walls, transit officials spent an additional $16 million to seal the tunnels with a high-density polyethylene liner. In 1987, before construction began, analysts hired by the U.S. Department of Transportation indicated to transit officials the importance of installing this lining properly. According to the Los Angeles Times, however, the plastic liner was "routinely" punctured and not always repaired. In fact, a chief inspector reported that the contractor intentionally violated proper procedures and refused to allow workers to patch holes. During construction, a private testing lab, Smith-Emery Co., found "widespread deficiencies." Moreover, an outside consulting firm hired by the MTA concluded that the management firm failed to adhere to "acceptable industry practice."

SUBWAY WALL DEFECTS

The Los Angeles Times reported in August and September, 1993 that the subway walls in dozens of areas in the 1.9 mile Red Line segment from Union Station to Pershing Square were built thinner than the contract specifications required. More than 2,000 feet (twenty-one percent) of the tunnel walls were reported to be only six to eight inches thick instead of the required twelve inches. The problem was attributed to tunneling misalignment.

Inspectors are required to inspect concrete forms before contractors can pour concrete. According to reports, on at least a dozen occasions the contractor poured concrete when the inspector had withheld authorization to do so.

A tunnel designer warned transit officials in late 1992 that areas with thin walls could fail to hold in an earthquake or under other stresses. Transit officials subsequently required the contractor to reinforce the tunnel with steel plates to cover ninety feet in three locations. Transit officials maintained that the walls were structurally sound and nothing more was needed.

Outside experts indicated that steel reinforcing rods would also need to be used. The contractor claimed to have put rods in about 300 feet of the tunnel in addition to steel plates in the three locations. The Los Angeles Times reported in a later story, however, that steel plates had only been installed to cover forty feet in two locations, and that MTA did not know how much of the tunnel contained the reinforcing rods.

Independent outside specialists hired by the MTA to investigate concluded that "deviations from written procedures are at variance with what is considered acceptable industry practice."

GROUND SINKAGE

The contract specifications for the Vermont Avenue and Hollywood Boulevard tunnels required the contractor to perform contact grouting. The contractor proposed eliminating the grouting requirement, and the MTA did not enforce it. After the ground sank, the MTA stated that it had wanted to save the $1 million the grouting would have cost. Instead, the $165 million contract is expected to wind up costing $200 million.

An MTA tunnel expert warned in October 1993 that the specification for contact grouting needed to be enforced because he saw evidence of "irregular ground subsidence" on Vermont Avenue. His superiors did not accept his recommendation. The MTA did begin to require contact grouting in March 1994 after 1/3 of the tunneling had been completed.

By July 27,1994, the MTA reported that the sinkage on Hollywood Boulevard measured about four inches. On August 3, 8, 9, and 10 nonconformance reports were filed citing the contractor for failing to comply with the grouting specification. On August 18, the MTA stopped tunneling, and on August 20, the MTA reported that up to nine inches had sunk along a nine-block area on Hollywood Boulevard.

On September 1, MTA's Tunnel Review Board report recommended that the contractor begin compaction grouting to minimize further settlement. MTA's chief design engineer, who drafted this report, had rejected a staff engineer's recommendation in late July or early August to use compaction grouting.

We have an obligation to the public to ensure, at a minimum, that Metro Rail is constructed according to acceptable industry practice, that contract specifications are respected and enforced, that expert recommendations are followed, and that the safety of the riding public is valued and guaranteed. I appreciate your review of this matter and look forward to working with you to determine how we should proceed.

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely,

HENRY A. WAXMAN
Member of Congress