March
17, 2003
The
President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500
Dear
Mr. President:
I am writing regarding a matter of grave concern.
Upon your order, our armed forces will soon initiate
the first preemptive war in our nation’s history.
The most persuasive justification for this war is
that we must act to prevent Iraq from developing nuclear
weapons.
In
the last ten days, however, it has become incontrovertibly
clear that a key piece of evidence you and other Administration
officials have cited regarding Iraq’s efforts to obtain
nuclear weapons is a hoax. What’s more, the
Central Intelligence Agency questioned the veracity of the
evidence at the same time you and other Administration officials
were citing it in public statements. This
is a breach of the highest order, and the American people
are entitled to know how it happened.
As
you know, I voted for the congressional resolution condemning
Iraq and authorizing the use of force. Despite
serious misgivings, I supported the resolution because I
believed congressional approval would significantly improve
the likelihood of effective U.N. action. Equally
important, I believed that you had access to reliable intelligence
information that merited deference.
Like
many other members, I was particularly influenced by your
views about Iraq’s nuclear intentions. Although
chemical and biological weapons can inflict casualties,
no argument for attacking Iraq is as compelling as the possibility
of Saddam Hussein brandishing nuclear bombs. That,
obviously, is why the evidence in this area is so crucial,
and why so many have looked to you for honest and credible
information on Iraq's nuclear capability.
The
evidence in question is correspondence that indicates that
Iraq sought to obtain nuclear material from an African country,
Niger. For several months, this evidence has
been a central part of the U.S. case against Iraq.
On December 19, the State Department filed a response
to Iraq’s disarmament declaration to the U.N. Security Council.
The State Department response stated: “The
Declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from Niger.”
A month later, in your State of the Union address,
you stated: “The British government has learned
that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities
of uranium from Africa.” Defense Secretary
Rumsfeld subsequently cited the evidence in briefing reporters.
It
has now been conceded that this evidence was a forgery.
On March 7, the Director General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, reported that the
evidence that Iraq sought nuclear materials from Niger was
“not authentic.” As subsequent media accounts
indicated, the evidence contained “crude errors,” such as
a “childlike signature” and the use of stationary from a
military government in Niger that has been out of power
for over a decade.
Even
more troubling, however, the CIA, which has been aware of
this information since 2001, has never regarded the evidence
as reliable. The implications of this fact
are profound: it means that a key part of
the case you have been building against Iraq is evidence
that your own intelligence experts at the Central Intelligence
Agency do not believe is credible.
It
is hard to imagine how this situation could have developed.
The two most obvious explanations — knowing deception
or unfathomable incompetence — both have immediate and serious
implications. It is thus imperative that you
address this matter without delay and provide an alternative
explanation, if there is one.
The
rest of this letter will explain my concerns in detail.
Use of the Evidence by U.S. Officials
The
evidence that Iraq sought to purchase uranium from an African
country was first revealed by the British government on
September 24, 2002, when Prime Minister Tony Blair released
a 50-page report on Iraqi efforts to acquire weapons of
mass destruction. As the New York Times
reported in a front-page article, one of the two “chief
new elements” in the report was the claim that Iraq had
“sought to acquire uranium in Africa that could be used
to make nuclear weapons.” [1]
This
evidence subsequently became a significant part of the U.S.
case against Iraq. On December 7, Iraq filed
its weapons declaration with the United Nations Security
Council. The U.S. response relied heavily
on the evidence that Iraq had sought to obtain uranium from
Africa. For example, this is how the New
York Times began its front-page article on December
13 describing the U.S. response:
American
intelligence agencies have reached a preliminary conclusion
that Iraq’s 12,000 page declaration of its weapons program
fails to account for chemical and biological agents missing
when inspectors left Iraq four years ago, American officials
and United Nations diplomats said today.
In
addition, Iraq’s declaration on its nuclear program, they
say, leaves open a host of questions. Among
them is why Iraq was seeking to buy uranium in Africa
in recent years. [2]
The
official U.S. response was provided on December 19, when
Secretary of State Colin Powell appeared before the Security
Council. As the Los Angeles Times reported,
“A one-page State Department fact sheet . . . lists what
Washington considers the key omissions and deceptions in
Baghdad’s Dec. 7 weapons declaration.”
[3] One of the eight “key
omissions and deceptions” was the failure to explain Iraq’s
attempts to purchase uranium from an African country.
Specifically,
the State Department fact sheet contains the following points
under the heading “Nuclear Weapons”: “The
Declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from Niger.
Why is the Iraqi regime hiding their uranium procurement?”
A copy of this fact sheet is enclosed with this letter.
The
Iraqi efforts to obtain uranium from Africa were deemed
significant enough to be included in your State of the Union
address to Congress. You stated: “The
British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently
sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”
[4] As the Washington
Post reported the next day, “the president seemed quite
specific as he ticked off the allegations last night, including
the news that Iraq had secured uranium from Africa for the
purpose of making nuclear bombs.”
[5]
A
day later, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told reporters
at a news briefing that Iraq “recently was discovered
seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa.” [6]
Knowledge
of the Unreliability of the Evidence
The
world first learned that the evidence linking Iraq to attempts
to purchase uranium from Africa was forged from the Director
General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
Mohamed ElBaradei. On March 7, Director ElBaradei
reported to the U.N. Security Council:
Based
on thorough analysis, the IAEA has concluded, with the concurrence
of outside experts, that these documents — which formed
the basis for reports of recent uranium transactions between
Iraq and Niger — are in fact not authentic. We
have therefore concluded that these specific allegations
are unfounded. [7]
Recent
accounts in the news media have provided additional details.
According to the Washington Post, the faked
evidence included “a series of letters between Iraqi agents
and officials in the central African nation of Niger.”
[8] The article stated
that the forgers “made relatively crude errors that eventually
gave them away — including names and titles that did not
match up with the individuals who held office at the time
the letters were purportedly written.”
[9] CNN reported:
one
of the documents purports to be a letter signed by Tandjia
Mamadou, the president of Niger, talking about the uranium
deal with Iraq. On it [is] a childlike signature
that is clearly not his. Another, written
on paper from a 1980s military government in Niger, bears
the date of October 2000 and the signature of a man who
by then had not been foreign minister of Niger for 14 years. [10]
U.S.
intelligence officials had doubts about the veracity of the
evidence long before Director ElBaradei’s report. The
Los Angeles Times reported on March 15 that “the CIA
first heard allegations that Iraq was seeking uranium from
Niger in late 2001” when “the existence of the documents was
reported to [the CIA] second- or third-hand.” The
Los Angeles Times quotes one CIA official as saying:
“We included that in some of our reporting, although
it was all caveated because we had concerns about the accuracy
of that information.” [11] The Washington
Post reported on March 13: “The CIA . .
. had questions about ‘whether they were accurate,’ said one
intelligence official, and it decided not to include them
in its file on Iraq’s program to procure weapons of mass destruction.” [12]
There
have been suggestions by some Administration officials that
there may be other evidence besides the forged documents that
shows Iraq tried to obtain uranium from an African country.
For instance, CIA officials recently stated that “U.S.
concerns regarding a possible uranium agreement between Niger
and Iraq were not based solely on the documents which are
now known to be fraudulent.” The CIA provided
this other information to the IAEA along with the forged documents.
After reviewing this complete body of evidence, the
IAEA stated: “we have found to date no evidence
or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons
programme in Iraq.” [13] Ultimately,
the IAEA concluded that “these specific allegations are
unfounded.”
[14]
Questions
These
facts raise troubling questions. It appears
that at the same time that you, Secretary Rumsfeld, and State
Department officials were citing Iraq’s efforts to obtain
uranium from Africa as a crucial part of the case against
Iraq, U.S. intelligence officials regarded this very same
evidence as unreliable. If true, this is deeply
disturbing: it would mean that your Administration
asked the U.N. Security Council, the Congress, and the American
people to rely on information that your own experts knew was
not credible.
Your
statement to Congress during the State of the Union, in
particular, raises a host of questions. The
statement is worded in a way that suggests it was carefully
crafted to be both literally true and deliberately misleading
at the same time. The statement itself — “The
British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently
sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa” —
may be technically accurate, since this appears to be the
British position. But given what the CIA knew
at the time, the implication you intended — that there was
credible evidence that Iraq sought uranium from Africa —
was simply false.
To
date, the White House has avoided explaining why the Administration
relied on this forged evidence in building its case against
Iraq. The first Administration response, which
was provided to the Washington Post, was “we fell
for it.” [15]
But this is no longer credible in light of the information
from the CIA. Your spokesman, Ari Fleischer,
was asked about this issue at a White House news briefing
on March 14, but as the following transcript reveals, he
claimed ignorance and avoided the question:
Q:
Ari, as the president said in his State of the Union
address, the British government has learned that Saddam
Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium
from Africa. And since then, the IAEA said
that those were forged documents —
Mr.
Fleischer: I’m sorry, whose statement was
that?
Q:
The President, in his State of the Union address.
Since then, the IAEA has said those were forged documents.
Was the administration aware of any doubts about
these documents, the authenticity of the documents, from
any government agency or department before it was submitted
to the IAEA?
Mr.
Fleisher: These are matters that are always
reviewed with an eye toward the various information that
comes in and is analyzed by a variety of different people.
The President’s concerns about Iraq come from multiple
places, involving multiple threats that Iraq can possess,
and these are matters that remain discussed.
Thank
you [end of briefing]. [16]
Plainly,
more explanation is needed. I urge you to
provide to me and to the relevant committees of Congress
a full accounting of what you knew about the reliability
of the evidence linking Iraq to uranium in Africa, when
you knew this, and why you and senior officials in the Administration
presented the evidence to the U.N. Security Council, the
Congress, and the American people without disclosing the
doubts of the CIA. In particular, I urge you
to address:
-
Whether
CIA officials communicated their doubts about the credibility
of the forged evidence to other Administration officials,
including officials in the Department of State, the Department
of Defense, the National Security Council, and the White
House;
-
Whether
the CIA had any input into the “Fact Sheet” distributed
by the State Department on December 19, 2002; and
-
Whether
the CIA reviewed your statement in the State of the Union
address regarding Iraq’s attempts to obtain uranium from
Africa and, if so, what the CIA said about the statement.
Given
the urgency of the situation, I would appreciate an expeditious
response to these questions.
Sincerely,
Henry A. Waxman
Ranking Minority Member
Enclosure

[1] Blair Says Iraqis Could
Launch Chemical Warheads in Minutes, New York Times
(Sept. 25, 2002).
[2] Threats and Responses:
Report by Iraq, Iraq Arms Report Has Big Omissions,
U.S. Officials Say, New York Times (Dec. 13, 2002)
(emphasis added).
[3] U.S. Issues a List of
the Shortcomings in Iraqi Arms Declaration, Los Angeles
Times (Dec. 20, 2002) (emphasis added).
[4] The President, State
of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128‑19.html)
(emphasis added).
[5] A War Cry Tempered by
Eloquence, Washington Post (Jan. 29, 2003).
[6] Press Conference with
Donald Rumsfeld, General Richard Myers, Cable News
Network (Jan. 29, 2003) (emphasis added).
[7] IAEA Director General Dr.
Mohamed ElBaradei, The Status of Nuclear Inspections
in Iraq: An Update (Mar. 7, 2002) (online
at www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Statements/ 2003/ebsp2003n006.shtml).
[8] Some Evidence on Iraq
Called Fake; U.N. Nuclear Inspector Says Documents on
Purchases Were Forged, Washington Post (Mar. 8, 2003).
[10] U.N. Saying Documents
Were Faked, CNN American Morning with Paula Zahn (Mar.
14, 2003).
[11] Italy May Have Been
Misled by Fake Iraq Arms Papers, U.S. Says, Los Angeles
Times (Mar. 15, 2003).
[12] FBI Probes Fake Evidence
of Iraqi Nuclear Plans, Washington Post (Mar. 13,
2003).
[13] IAEA Director General
Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, supra note 7 (emphasis added).
[14] Id. (emphasis added).
[15] Some Evidence on Iraq
Called Fake, supra note 8.
[16] The White House, Press
Briefing by Ari Fleischer (Mar. 14, 2003) (online
at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030314-12.html)
(emphasis added).
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